Does Canada need a nuclear energy strategy?\u00a0 Yes (domestically), and yes (internationally).<\/p>\n
For decades, Canada\u2019s nuclear energy sector has operated in a netherworld, without a clear policy framework or articulation of national interest by the federal government. For provinces utilising nuclear reactors for power generation, the value proposition is likely self-evident, and for those who do not, there has not been a direction or document for policymakers, industry, regulators, electricity sector analysts or the public to reference regarding nuclear\u2019s potential to alleviate Canada\u2019s coming acute electricity strain.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Similarly, the uranium extraction sector has operated relatively quietly, exporting 90% of its world-class production from world-class reserves, but without a strategy connecting extraction to domestic generation, to boosting exports \u2013 a significant comparative advantage \u2013 or to innovations that will underpin the next generation of reactors propelling domestic and international electricity system applications. Its contribution to energy security around the world is of heightened importance in 2026, and can fulfil its resource potential by increasing production and exports.<\/p>\n
Canada\u2019s nuclear energy strategy, announced<\/a> on June 22nd, acknowledges nuclear\u2019s existing role in the country\u2019s electricity generation (13% of generation in 2023, although only 8% of Canada\u2019s total energy supply), and positions for a realistic export boost \u2013 both for the fuel itself, and updated reactor technology.\u00a0 Perhaps most importantly, the federal government unequivocally articulates the value proposition for underpinning Canada\u2019s economic resilience: \u201cNuclear energy is essential to powering Canada\u2019s future\u201d.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Strengthening Canada\u2019s Uranium Exports<\/p>\n Canada is a powerhouse of uranium production, ranked second in the world, producing 15% of the world\u2019s uranium (behind Kazakhstan at 43%), second in world exports at 14% (also behind Kazakhstan), and third in global known recoverable resources (5.9 Mt) at 10% (behind Australia and Kazakhstan).\u00a0 Uranium forms a 21% share of Canada\u2019s primary energy production, of which 90% is exported.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Countries are seeking lower-carbon, diversified, secure, and stable energy systems\u2014particularly due to the oil and gas supply shock caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the looming quantum computing and AI boom, and as the world embarks on the \u201cAge of Electricity<\/a>\u201d.\u00a0 Expanding exports of uranium means net new revenue for Canada, with associated taxes, employment and Indigenous community benefits.\u00a0 Attributes of Canadian uranium, including international agreements committing to peaceful, civilian uses and transparent reporting to global standards, a predictable regulatory system, and long-established, globally-recognised firms like Saskatchewan\u2019s Cameco, gives it a competitive advantage to leverage Canada\u2019s natural endowment in uranium.<\/p>\n Nuclear energy in Canada<\/p>\n Domestically, power grids from east to west are under strain, partly due to increased demand, not least from increased population, sector electrification and data centres, and partly due to lack of connective infrastructure investments over many decades.\u00a0 As Macdonald-Laurier Institute\u2019s Heather Exner-Pirot points out<\/a>, \u201cAt a time when electricity is increasingly scarce and its availability is a key competitive advantage, Canada\u2019s impending shortage is not just an affordability issue \u2013 it is also an economic and security crisis.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n The magnitude of Canada\u2019s anticipated increase in electricity demand is sobering, and not credibly met<\/a> by electricity procurement planning in many Canadian jurisdictions: according to the Canada Energy Regulator\u2019s (CER) latest scenarios, electricity demand increases from 2023 to 2050 by 44% (Current Measures scenario) or 73% (in the Higher scenario), by far the largest category across all forms of end-use energy demand. The Canadian Nuclear Association estimates<\/a> that Canada could need 150 gigawatts (GW) of new supply, including 115 GW of non-emitting baseload power by 2050.\u00a0<\/p>\n The strategy doesn\u2019t specify a target for the proportion of domestic energy to be served by nuclear power (a matter of provincial\/territorial jurisdiction), but it does expand on the federal government\u2019s recent National Electricity Strategy, and signals its prioritising of nuclear energy as a non-emitting abundant source of power. One pillar of the nuclear strategy \u2013 increasing the availability of nuclear reactors to power electricity grids (CANDU type and Small Modular Reactors \u201cSMR\u201d) \u2013 underlines the seriousness and consequences of Canada\u2019s electricity gap, and serves as a nudge to provinces whose electricity policies presently eschew nuclear power.<\/p>\n The benefits of building out more nuclear electricity capacity in Canada are clear: diversification of baseload (i.e. stable), reliable, non-emitting, and above-all secure power from vast domestic sources of uranium; large increments of capacity increases essential for Canada\u2019s credibility in powering sovereign AI and other advanced computing and technology; underpinning growth of the natural resource sectors (a goal of federal and many provincial governments); and flexibility to balance the variability of renewables like wind and solar, which are contributing an increasing share to Canada\u2019s electricity mix.<\/p>\n While Canada\u2019s new nuclear energy strategy leaves some gaps (quantitative objectives across its four pillars, and more precise plans for how\u2014and importantly where\u2014the domestic build-out is expected to happen), it can contribute much more to fulfilling domestic need, and the global opportunity for a tripling or more<\/a> of nuclear power in the world\u2019s electricity mix.<\/p>\n The views expressed in this article are those of the author, Karen Graham, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Resource Works Advisory Council.<\/p>\n Resource Works News<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Does Canada need a nuclear energy strategy?\u00a0 Yes (domestically), and yes (internationally). For decades, Canada\u2019s nuclear energy sector…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":100664,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[17,36593,11230,12278,13206,36594],"class_list":["post-100663","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-canada","tag-canada","tag-canadian-nuclear-strategy","tag-energy-security","tag-nuclear-energy","tag-small-modular-reactors","tag-uranium-mining"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100663","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=100663"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/100663\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/100664"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=100663"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=100663"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=100663"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}