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\t<\/a><\/p>\n\t Besides the cost of the subs themselves, decades of sustainment work are expected to put the cost well into the tens of billions of dollars\u2014possibly as much as $100 billion\u2014which is in the same range as buying and operating a full fleet of F-35 fighter jets.\u00a0<\/p>\n What it means right now<\/p>\n Canada asked<\/a> interested companies to present themselves in 2024 and, in August 2025, settled<\/a> on TKMS and Hanwha Ocean as the finalists. By normal defence procurement standards, this has been incredibly fast, but there\u2019s still a lot of work to do.<\/p>\n Selecting TKMS as the preferred bidder means the company and Canada will get into the nuts and bolts of contract negotiations. Carney estimated those talks will take between six and 18 months.<\/p>\n In theory, that bargaining could fail and leave Canada to turn back what Carney said was a very competitive bid from Hanwha.<\/p>\n \u201cWe don\u2019t expect that,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n Defence sales come with obligations<\/a> for vendors to spend in Canada in amounts commensurate with the size of the contract. Whatever the final cost, this deal is enormous, but the eventual dollar figures and delivery schedule will determine just how much business TKMS does with Canadian firms.<\/p>\n Industry cashes in<\/p>\n TKMS promises<\/a> to work with an array of Canadian-based suppliers of raw materials (like Valbruna<\/a>, whose Canadian branch is meant to supply non-magnetic steel), parts (like Patriot Forge<\/a>), training tools (like CAE<\/a>) and AI services (like Cohere<\/a>). Seaspan<\/a> is in line to lead long-term support and servicing on Canadian soil.<\/p>\n The basic pitch: TKMS makes submarines for many countries and if Canada buys some, Canadian industry will be added to TKMS\u2019s supply network. It would join a submarine-making partnership, not be a mere customer.<\/p>\n Norway, Germany-based TKMS\u2019s first foreign customer for the 212CD, shows how the arrangement might work, with plans<\/a> for a shared maintenance facility in Bergen (on Norway\u2019s Atlantic coast) and the involvement of a Canadian subsidiary of Norwegian defence contractor Kongsberg in the bid.<\/p>\n Carney said Canadians will contribute materials, components and software to the new submarines, and will build and staff facilities to take care of them\u2014and other countries\u2019 212CD subs\u2014in Canada. He did not say that any of the vessels will be assembled in Canada, which would be even higher-level work.<\/p>\n The path not taken<\/p>\n Hanwha doesn\u2019t have TKMS\u2019s customer base; selling to Canada would have been epochal for the company and South Korean military exports, so it drew on the bigger<\/a> Hanwha Group conglomerate and its partner<\/a> Hyundai Heavy Industries to make a broader case for its KSS-III model.<\/p>\n In addition to an array<\/a> of TKMS-like supply agreements (including with some of the same vendors, like Cohere<\/a> and CAE), Hanwha pledged<\/a> to work with the Canadian Automotive Parts Manufacturers\u2019 Association on a joint venture to make heavy military vehicles and Hyundai said it would build<\/a> up the Canadian ecosystem for hydrogen transport trucks (answering, roughly, Industry Minister M\u00e9lanie Joly\u2019s explicit request<\/a> for a car plant).<\/p>\n Hanwha also proposed<\/a> to supply rockets for Maritime Launch Services\u2019 fledgling space-launch venture, and to work<\/a> with Kanata LNG on a multibillion-dollar floating liquefied natural gas platform off Prince Rupert, B.C.<\/p>\n With Hanwha Ocean out of the running, its industrial promises are likely toast unless any of them makes sense on its own for one of the Hanwha conglomerate\u2019s companies.<\/p>\n NATO over the Indo-Pacific<\/p>\n Stung by the U.S.\u2019s disregard for decades of military and economic integration, Carney has been trying to ingratiate Canada with friendly countries in both Europe<\/a> and the Indo-Pacific region<\/a>.<\/p>\n The submarine purchase forced him to choose between traditional partners (NATO allies, at that) in Germany and Norway, and shifting Canada\u2019s friendship with South Korea up about five gears. Seoul pushed<\/a> hard for the contract, including in a meeting<\/a> between Carney and President Lee Jae Myung at a recent NATO summit in France.<\/p>\n Germany\u2019s and Norway\u2019s defence ministers visited Ottawa to advocate<\/a> for TKMS\u2019s subs, including a late push<\/a> from Germany\u2019s Boris Pistorius at the Cansec military trade show in late May, where he promised faster delivery of the first vessels.<\/p>\n Although \u201cCanada\u2019s combined strategic, security and economic interests\u201d were key factors in favour of TKMS, Carney denied that the decision means Canada is turning away from its Indo-Pacific strategy.<\/p>\n \u201cThere are a series of other initiatives Canada and Korea are pursuing that build our economic resilience and our security footprint,\u201d he said, and pointed to his cordial meeting<\/a> with the Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. last week as further evidence.<\/p>\n For the navy<\/p>\n The 12 new submarines are to replace four<\/a> that Canada bought secondhand from Britain in 1998, which have never<\/a> met expectations (one, HMCS Chicoutimi, caught<\/a> fire on its first Atlantic crossing under Canadian command and didn\u2019t sail again for a decade). Even with a major overhaul<\/a>, they\u2019ll reach the ends of their lives in the 2030s.<\/p>\n
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