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US, British, and Australian defence innovation organisations can learn from Canada and New Zealand, which are jointly focusing on faster, mission-driven challenges to achieve operational capability.<\/p>\n
Canada and New Zealand are demonstrating that defence innovation can deliver operational value at relatively low cost. They are bringing in defence innovators to analyse future battlespaces, in which integrated and hybrid systems, both crewed and uncrewed, operate against new types of threats.<\/p>\n
This approach is effective because it starts with a problem and looks for a cheap solution, rather than first going after a technology. It combines an operational objective with an assessment of what existing systems can achieve to meet it. It determines whether new technologies or major equipment are required to better respond to the challenge.<\/p>\n
An example is the collaboration<\/a> between Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), the Royal Military College of Canada and the New Zealand Defence Force\u2019s Defence Science and Technology. The study modelled a hypothetical Halifax Harbour scenario using existing and future operational capabilities and assessed how to defend the port against an enemy ship carrying containerised strike missiles. The model used a future Royal Canadian Navy River-class destroyer, a Hellfire missile-armed MQ\u20119B SkyGuardian surveillance drone and ground-based air-defence systems kilometres inland from the harbour.<\/p>\n The long-term goal of this collaboration is for the two countries to obtain the data needed to respond to realistic scenarios using existing major equipment. It would also enable them to identify which capabilities and potential platforms can be used to fill any gaps.<\/p>\n In February, Canada launched its national security innovation initiative, Borealis,<\/a> as a part of its first Defence Industry Strategy<\/a>, under which Defence Innovation Secure Hubs<\/a> will accelerate the transition of technologies into operational capability. For example, it was announced <\/a>this month that the new Uncrewed Systems Defence Innovation Secure Hub will be placed under the Canadian Joint Forces Command, which is responsible for identifying capability gaps and generating operational priorities for the Canadian Armed Forces.<\/p>\n Similarly, in May<\/a>, through DRDC under Borealis, the Canadian Autonomy Trials Series\u2013Maritime (CATS-M) was established<\/a> to<\/a> develop \u2018the capabilities needed to support our military and transition them into operational use\u2019. In one innovation experiment, CATS-M deployed<\/a> \u2018multiple maritime unmanned systems in support of anti-submarine warfare\u2019. In another CATS-M initiative<\/a>, the Maritime Defence Innovation Secure Hub Pilot uses surface and subsurface platforms, data fusion and diffuse sensing to model maritime surveillance capabilities. The NZDF\u2019s Defence Science and Technology praised<\/a> DRDC\u2019s approach for its practical nature.<\/p>\n In contrast, the AUKUS initiative to develop advanced capabilities through Pillar Two has struggled to translate requirements into operational capability. AUKUS was already four years old when, in May this year, the partners announced their first Pillar Two project to develop uncrewed underwater<\/a> technology. With delivery starting in 2027, the capabilities will not affect the operational capabilities of their armed forces for some time yet.<\/p>\n To date, the trilateral innovation challenges of AUKUS Pillar Two \u2013 electromagnetic warfare and maritime innovation \u2013 have been framed around technology areas rather than a defined hypothetical mission.<\/p>\n The AUKUS partners can learn from the Canada\u2013New Zealand modelling of the Halifax Harbour scenario, which is significant not for the major equipment that was used but for how those systems were brought together. By considering both existing and future capabilities, defence planners in Ottawa and Wellington can more accurately determine whether the problem they are facing is one of doctrine, integration or entirely new capabilities yet to be developed.<\/p>\n This approach also mitigates against a principal cause behind the valley of death<\/a> phase that troubles defence innovators, who tend to build capabilities around technologies and platforms in search of a mission. Not only does it provide better solutions to real-world problems such as containerised missiles, but it also ensures that innovators and planners know what is needed before committing resources to a new platform that could be lengthy and costly to build.<\/p>\n Recent reforms suggest allied defence innovation organisations are beginning to move in a similar direction. The US Defense Innovation Unit said<\/a> in July it would focus on converting commercial technology into combat power by addressing real-world operational problems.<\/p>\n UK Defence Innovation has also this month reorganised<\/a> and launched a competition<\/a> for novel autonomy and robotics. But this competition and Australia<\/a>\u2019s Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator suggest that the two governments are still focused on technology capability areas rather than defined operational scenarios.<\/p>\n Technology-driven competitions remain important for discovering novel capabilities for Britain, Australia and other allies. But without complementary mission-driven challenges, defence organisations risk overlooking opportunities to combine existing systems, refine doctrine and identify genuine capability gaps before investing in new technology.<\/p>\n Defence innovation too often begins with an attractive technology or broad capability category, and only later attempts to match it to a sufficiently urgent operational requirement. The Halifax Harbour challenge reverses that by beginning with a specific mission and allowing capability requirements \u2013 whether doctrinal, integrative or technological \u2013 to emerge through operational, experimental and model-based iteration. If AUKUS Pillar Two is to deliver, it needs to iterate faster and learn from the Canada\u2013New Zealand partnership.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"US, British, and Australian defence innovation organisations can learn from Canada and New Zealand, which are jointly focusing…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":153589,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[49643,17,3042,4789,49644],"class_list":["post-153588","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-canada","tag-aukus","tag-canada","tag-innovation","tag-military-technology","tag-pillar-two"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/153588","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=153588"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/153588\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/153589"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=153588"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=153588"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/canada\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=153588"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}