The Economic Affairs and Taxation Committee of the Swiss Council of States voted 10-2 with one abstention on August 31 to approve a proposal allowing UBS Group AG to fund 50% of the additional capital requirements backing its foreign subsidiaries with lower-cost Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bonds instead of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital. The decision represents a retreat from the Swiss government’s proposal, which had demanded 100% CET1 backing as part of tougher bank regulations following the collapse of Credit Suisse.

Committee Chairman Erich Ettlin said after the vote, “This is not a victory for UBS, but a solution that serves Switzerland.” According to his explanation, under the committee’s proposal UBS would be able to maintain roughly its current CET1 capital levels while needing to issue additional AT1 bonds. AT1 bonds are cheaper to hold than CET1 capital and are designed to absorb losses in times of distress, but regulators view them as inferior from a safety standpoint.

To enhance the credibility of AT1 bonds, the committee also proposed introducing an additional trigger that would activate if UBS’s CET1 capital ratio falls below approximately 11%. If that threshold is breached, UBS would be required to halt dividend payments to investors, share buybacks, and AT1 coupon payments, and bonus payouts would also be reduced unless the bank rebuilds its capital base within a specified period. These modifications would effectively raise the real cost of holding AT1 bonds for UBS.

Conflict with the Government Proposal and the Legislative Path Ahead

More than three years after Credit Suisse’s collapse in 2023, the Swiss government has been pushing reforms to transform UBS—now the country’s only global bank—into an institution resilient to crises. The centerpiece of these reforms is an additional capital requirement of roughly $20 billion (approximately ¥3.2 trillion), aimed at preventing losses in foreign operations from destabilizing the domestic business.

UBS management has argued that the measure would undermine competitiveness and has implicitly supported the use of AT1 bonds as a practical compromise. Jefferies analysts Joseph Dickerson and Theo Massing noted in a client memo that the committee “effectively endorsed a more lenient approach,” and that the outcome gives UBS flexibility in how it meets the government’s demands.

The Swiss Bankers Association said in a statement that it welcomed the AT1 bond reform proposal while reiterating its opposition to the additional capital requirement itself. UBS declined to comment immediately on the committee’s decision.

Meanwhile, the Social Democratic Party, the second-largest party in parliament, issued a statement the same day criticizing the committee’s stance. The party holds influence in the more left-leaning lower house, where some of the concessions to UBS could be reversed. The bill will now proceed to a full vote in the upper house before being considered by committees and the full lower house. The upper house vote is expected to take place during the autumn session running from September 14 to October 2, with the overall legislative process likely to extend at least into next year.

The AT1 Bond Market and UBS’s Position

AT1 bonds were introduced after the 2008 global financial crisis as a mechanism to enhance banks’ loss-absorbing capacity. UBS has a significant presence in the European AT1 bond market, with its outstanding AT1 issuance accounting for roughly 7% of the total European market of approximately $286 billion (about ¥45.7 trillion).

Debt-based funding is generally cheaper than pure equity capital, and if the committee’s proposal is ultimately enacted into law, the impact of the additional capital requirement on UBS’s profitability and shareholder returns would be mitigated. However, the Swiss Federal Department of Finance has consistently expressed concerns that AT1 bonds lack reliability as a mechanism for absorbing losses with certainty in a crisis, leaving a gap between the government and parliament unresolved.

The AT1 bond reform endorsed by the committee addresses a weakness exposed during Credit Suisse’s collapse—namely, that the loss-absorption function of AT1 bonds did not trigger sufficiently under stress conditions. By front-loading the trigger requirements, the design increases the likelihood that AT1 bonds will actually perform their role of principal write-downs or equity conversion in a crisis.

UBS would back the full value of its foreign subsidiaries with a combination of CET1 capital and AT1 bonds, which formally satisfies the government’s original demand. However, the finance ministry’s concerns about the reliability of AT1 bonds have not been resolved, and tougher amendments are likely to be introduced during lower house deliberations.