{"id":130762,"date":"2026-09-15T06:17:11","date_gmt":"2026-09-15T06:17:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/130762\/"},"modified":"2026-09-15T06:17:11","modified_gmt":"2026-09-15T06:17:11","slug":"novartis-erases-40b-in-a-week-and-the-lpa-race-now-has-one-question-antisense-or-sirna-biggo-finance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/130762\/","title":{"rendered":"Novartis Erases $40B in a Week, and the Lp(a) Race Now Has One Question: Antisense or siRNA? \u2014 BigGo Finance"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Novartis entered September 2026 as one of the best-performing large-cap pharma companies on the planet \u2014 &#8220;one of the brightest kind of futures pharmas,&#8221; as BioCentury editor Stephen Anson put it on the BioCentury This Week podcast. Ten days later, the company had lost more than $40 billion in market capitalization, absorbing three clinical setbacks in rapid succession and forcing a full-field re-evaluation of one of cardiology&#8217;s most anticipated drug targets.<\/p>\n<p>The damage was concentrated in a single readout: the Horizon Phase 3 outcomes trial of pelacarsen, an antisense oligonucleotide targeting lipoprotein(a), or Lp(a). The drug did what it was designed to do biochemically \u2014 it lowered Lp(a) substantially. What it did not do was reduce the risk of subsequent heart attacks, strokes, cardiovascular deaths, or urgent coronary procedures in patients who had already had one cardiovascular event. That distinction \u2014 an efficacy failure rather than a safety problem \u2014 goes to the heart of why the market reacted so violently, and why the result now frames the next year of cardiovascular drug development.<\/p>\n<p>The Ten-Day Sequence That Erased $40 Billion<\/p>\n<p>The Novartis slide began with a safety disclosure, not an efficacy failure. The company revealed three patient deaths in its CAR-T trial of rapcabtagene autoleucel for autoimmune indications. The market shrugged \u2014 shares actually rose 4% that day, cushioned by a simultaneous positive readout for remibrutinib in multiple sclerosis. And this is why the sequence matters.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;What had been a great run it seemed like for Novartis&#8230; everything comes in three,&#8221; Anson said.<\/p>\n<p>Three days after the CAR-T disclosure came the Horizon miss. Then, the same day the podcast was recorded, Novartis announced that the HARBOR Phase 3 trial of its DM1 program \u2014 acquired through the roughly $12 billion takeout of Avidity Biosciences earlier in the year \u2014 had also failed.<\/p>\n<p>EventTimingAsset \/ programOutcomeCAR-T safety disclosureStart of September 2026Rapcabtagene autoleucel, autoimmune indicationsThree patient deaths disclosedHorizon Phase 3 outcomes trial~3 days after CAR-T disclosurePelacarsen (antisense oligo, Lp(a))Failed to reduce risk of subsequent CV eventHARBOR Phase 3Recorded same dayDM1 program from ~$12B Avidity takeoutFailedAggregate market impactOver ~10 daysNovartis&gt;$40B market cap wiped out<\/p>\n<p>The market reaction to the efficacy failures was brutal. The read-across knocked roughly $21 billion off Amgen and about $25 billion off Eli Lilly in intraday trading on the day of recording. Those companies don&#8217;t have competing products on the market yet \u2014 they have competing clinical programs targeting the same protein. That is how seriously investors took the Lp(a) result.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/7e8897ba1186a36d_1789451005_inline_1.jpg\" alt=\"\"\/><\/p>\n<p>Why the Failure Doesn&#8217;t Answer the Question That Matters<\/p>\n<p>The most important point the panel makes is epistemological: the data disclosed so far cannot discriminate between three competing explanations for why pelacarsen failed. And each explanation leads to a profoundly different conclusion for the broader field.<\/p>\n<p>First, the molecule. Pelacarsen is an antisense oligonucleotide that achieved roughly 80% knockdown of Lp(a) in earlier trials. Amgen&#8217;s and Arrowhead&#8217;s siRNA programs, by contrast, have reached close to 100% knockdown \u2014 the upper 90s \u2014 in Phase 2 testing. That gap is the first candidate explanation.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;We know it knocked down Lp(a). We don&#8217;t know how much it knocked it down,&#8221; said Lauren Marts, who heads BioCentury Intelligence.<\/p>\n<p>Second, the target. As Marts noted, cardiovascular disease has repeatedly produced targets that look spectacular on genetic and preclinical evidence \u2014 associated with disease risk \u2014 but do not produce clinical benefit when you hit them. Editor-in-chief Simone Fishburn pushed back on this reading, arguing the Lp(a) genetic evidence is simply too deep for target failure to be the most likely explanation. But even she acknowledged the broader pattern: &#8220;the whole cardiovascular field for so long has been hounded by markers biology that then don&#8217;t&#8230; you hit the marker, you do at a molecular level what you plan to do and it doesn&#8217;t always translate to improved outcomes.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Third, and this is where the most interesting disagreement sits: timing. Horizon enrolled a secondary-prevention population \u2014 people who had already had one heart attack, whose elevated Lp(a) is a genetic predisposition present from birth, circulating for decades and driving vascular damage long before the index event. If the intervention window is the problem, the logical conclusion is that you would need to treat far earlier \u2014 near primary prevention \u2014 which is nearly impossible to run as an outcomes trial unless a surrogate endpoint like Lp(a) reduction is formally validated.<\/p>\n<p>Fishburn&#8217;s counterpoint is that statins already solved this problem for LDL cholesterol. They are used in primary prevention precisely because outcomes data established the link between lowering LDL and preventing events. The hope for Horizon was to establish the same chain of evidence for Lp(a). That hope is now in serious question.<\/p>\n<p>The Antisense-versus-siRNA Contest Gets a Sharp Edge<\/p>\n<p>The Horizon miss is potentially a decisive data point in the antisense-versus-siRNA modality debate, a contest that has been building in the field for years. Fishburn put the stakes plainly: if an siRNA product shows a substantial, significant outcome effect against Lp(a) and the antisense does not, &#8220;that would have a very big impact on the whole field of antisense versus siRNA \u2014 I think it would be a really big ding against them.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The structural argument is straightforward. Applied to the same indications, siRNA repeatedly shows higher knockdown and longer dosing intervals than antisense. For some indications, a modest knockdown deficit is tolerable. For Lp(a), Marts suggests you may need to get close to 100%. Even in a scenario where efficacy is equivalent, Fishburn noted, one-month dosing versus six-month dosing is an inherent structural advantage for where siRNA technology sits today.<\/p>\n<p>Martis&#8217;s counterweight \u2014 and it is a legitimate one \u2014 is that antisense is the more established modality, with Ionis Pharmaceuticals having broadened its indications considerably, and antisense retains opportunities to get a head start or address smaller, orphan-sized markets.<\/p>\n<p>The next data point will come from Amgen&#8217;s Phase 3 outcomes trial, which has completed enrollment and is event-driven. Anson expects a readout within roughly the next year. Its enrollment criteria require slightly higher Lp(a) levels than Horizon, which could produce a larger degree of knockdown. But it is also a secondary-prevention population. And it is an siRNA.<\/p>\n<p>The wildcard is Novartis&#8217;s own hedge. Pelacarsen was Novartis&#8217;s first Lp(a) program, licensed and moved into Phase 3 with the trial starting in 2019. But the company subsequently did two deals with Argo Biopharma, a private Chinese company \u2014 one in 2024 and one in 2025, with $160 million and $185 million upfront respectively \u2014 for cardiovascular siRNA assets. One of those yielded DII235, an siRNA targeting Lp(a), currently in Phase 2 with data expected next year.<\/p>\n<p>Anson offered two readings, both reasonable: either Novartis is building an Lp(a) franchise with pelacarsen as first-in-class followed by an siRNA follow-on offering less frequent dosing and incremental efficacy, or the company saw something in blinded data it did not like and hedged. Either way, if Novartis pivots to the siRNA it is behind Amgen and Lilly.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/7e8897ba1186a36d_1789451174_inline_3.jpg\" alt=\"\"\/><\/p>\n<p>Novo Nordisk Adds to a Bad Weekend for CV<\/p>\n<p>The cardiovascular damage was not confined to Novartis. Novo Nordisk, better known as an obesity play, also took a hit. One Phase 3 trial of ziltivekimab, an IL-6 inhibitor, had already failed. Over the holiday weekend, an independent data monitoring committee determined that two further cardiovascular studies were unlikely to show significance on their primary endpoints, and Novo halted both.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Another different sort of novel use of IL-6 and inflammation in cardiovascular failed as well. Not a great holiday weekend for CV therapies,&#8221; Anson said.<\/p>\n<p>The pattern is striking: two companies, two different mechanisms \u2014 antisense and IL-6 inhibition \u2014 failing in cardiovascular outcomes trials in the same month. It reinforces the panel&#8217;s broader point that cardiovascular disease remains the graveyard of targets that look compelling in genetics but fail in outcomes.<\/p>\n<p>The Deal Market: 221 Deals and a Shift Toward Disruption<\/p>\n<p>Away from the clinical disappointments, Marts presented her fourth annual analysis of top-pharma dealmaking, covering mid-year to mid-year across 21 large pharma companies. The headline number: 221 qualifying deals, with activity up versus the prior period and nearly back to where it stood two periods ago.<\/p>\n<p>But the more consequential finding is qualitative. Two years ago, deep in the bear market, pharma concentrated on big opportunities with validated targets. The focus on big opportunities persists. But risk appetite has visibly re-entered the deal set \u2014 and the modality mix is where it shows.<\/p>\n<p>Bi-specifics are the standout. That category increased the most year-over-year and continued rising even in a down year for deals overall. Within bi-specifics, there is heavy weighting toward T-cell engagers, particularly for autoimmune disease \u2014 an attempt to reset the immune system the way a CAR-T would, but in a more accessible format. Tri-specifics appear, and myeloid cell engagers showed up in a surprising number of deals. In vivo CAR-Ts continue to rise, sitting conceptually between ex vivo CAR-T and T-cell engagers on accessibility and safety.<\/p>\n<p>ModalityDirectionStated rationaleBi-specifics \/ tri-specificsRising most, even in a down deal yearT-cell and myeloid engagers to reset the immune system in autoimmune diseaseIn vivo CAR-TRisingBetween ex vivo CAR-T and T-cell engagers on accessibility and safetysiRNAWay upHigher knockdown, longer dosing intervals than antisenseAntisenseZero deals in the setDisplaced by siRNA in this analysisTargeted protein degraders \/ molecular gluesPresent in the setDisruptive mechanism, less clinical validation<\/p>\n<p>The siRNA-versus-antisense finding is notable: &#8220;S.A. deals were also way up this year. I don&#8217;t think there are any anti-sense deals in the set. So, this SA anti-sense debate, this kind of is more proof that people are moving away from anti-sense and toward sir,&#8221; Fishburn said. Zero antisense deals in a set of 221 \u2014 that is a structural signal, not a noise event.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I think the focus is still on those big opportunities, but there&#8217;s definitely some more risk appetite that&#8217;s working into the deals that pharmas are going after,&#8221; Marts added.<\/p>\n<p>China Rises, But No One Buys a Chinese Biotech<\/p>\n<p>The regional picture complicates the prevailing narrative about China in biopharma. China deals rose \u2014 China is now roughly equivalent to Europe as a deal partner for large pharma. But here is the kicker: the number of US biotech deals rose significantly too.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;It&#8217;s more like the whole pie grew and more of that was from China rather than pharmas are going to China rather than in the US,&#8221; Marts said. The pie grew, and China took a larger share of a larger pie. It is not that pharma is substituting China for the US.<\/p>\n<p>European deal counts were flat. Europe&#8217;s share fell only because China&#8217;s and the US&#8217;s rose. M&amp;A tells a starker story, though: there were zero acquisitions of Chinese biotechs in the period, while the US was &#8220;off the charts.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Host Jeff Cranmer added a practical data point. In a prior BioCentury podcast, James Hong \u2014 a biotech investor with deep China experience \u2014 &#8220;almost visibly shuddered&#8221; at the question of why there is so little China M&amp;A. Too many hoops. The only recent example Cranmer could recall is AstraZeneca&#8217;s acquisition of Gracell two years ago. Since then, essentially nothing, in a year when M&amp;A has otherwise been a dominant theme.<\/p>\n<p>Washington editor Steve Uden connected this to live policy. Discussions are underway in Congress and at Treasury about adding biotech to the COINS Act, which would impose limitations on US\u2013China dealmaking. VCs are going to Treasury arguing that the US benefits greatly from these deals and that restricting American or European companies from acquiring high-value Chinese assets at low cost would harm the American biotech industry. Uden flagged the obvious conflict \u2014 those VCs have a financial interest \u2014 and noted the counterargument that capital spent acquiring Chinese assets is opportunity cost not invested in US biotech.<\/p>\n<p>Fishburn pointed out that Marts&#8217;s data does not support the opportunity-cost claim. Rising US deal counts alongside rising China deal counts \u2014 no evidence of substitution or displacement. The empirical record, assembled across four years of deal analysis, cuts against the argument being made to Treasury.<\/p>\n<p>Eli Lilly is the buyer of the year, signing 40 of the 221 qualifying deals \u2014 18% \u2014 more than double its nearest peers, with GSK, Novartis, and Sanofi tied for second. When one company accounts for nearly one in five of all pharma deals in a period, it is not just a statistical outlier; it is a statement of intent about how a company plans to sustain a growth rate that its base business alone cannot deliver.<\/p>\n<p>Marts also flagged a clear shift in what pharma partners with China for. A couple of years ago it was heavily oncology and next-generation antibody technologies \u2014 bi-specifics, ADCs. This year the modality chart for China deals is nearly an even split across the top modalities, with peptide therapies reflecting the GLP-1 and obesity focus, and a notable emergence of RNA-based approaches.<\/p>\n<p>The MFN Deals: Who Wasn&#8217;t in the Room<\/p>\n<p>Uden&#8217;s focus on the White House most-favored-nation pricing announcement remains on the absentees rather than the attendees. Administration sources and pharma lobbyists tell him Vertex, Biogen, and Eli Lilly are under pressure to sign MFN deals, with no indication so far that they will.<\/p>\n<p>Two new details have emerged that illustrate how opaque these arrangements are \u2014 and why the eventual disclosure will be so consequential.<\/p>\n<p>First, Insight. The company did not attend the White House press conference and issued no press release, but disclosed in an SEC filing that it agreed to give state Medicaid programs access to two products at prices aligned with an international reference price. Uden&#8217;s understanding, which he labels as supposition based on secondhand accounts but consistent with the filing, is that Insight was excluded from the White House event because it has not committed to tying future launches to an MFN price. The company did not respond to his request for comment.<\/p>\n<p>Second, BridgeBio. The company did attend, and its SEC filing contains a forward-looking exclusion for medicines approved exclusively for orphan indications \u2014 and its pipeline consists entirely of orphan drugs. Two companies, two different levels of commitment, two different carveouts. The eventual release of these deals will reveal each company&#8217;s negotiated exclusions, and show how they square with the administration&#8217;s claim of massive taxpayer savings against companies&#8217; claims that the deals cost them nothing material in the near term.<\/p>\n<p>The enforcement hammers are two mandatory Medicare pricing models: GLOBE (Global Benchmark for Efficient Drug Pricing, Medicare Part B) and GUARD (Guarding US Medicare Against Rising Drug Costs, Medicare Part D). GLOBE was supposed to start October 1 but will not \u2014 details have not been released. GUARD is slated for January 1. Uden reports speculation that the administration will announce GLOBE has slipped and start both models on January 1, with litigation expected promptly upon any announcement.<\/p>\n<p>Companies that signed MFN deals have been promised some form of exclusion from GLOBE and GUARD \u2014 but it is unclear whether terms are identical across companies, whether exclusions are drug-specific or portfolio-wide, and whether they cover future launches. That ambiguity, more than any single deal or model, is what Uden identifies as the structural change coming to pharma dealmaking. If the models go live and the carveouts are inconsistent, the competitive landscape \u2014 already reshaped by the move toward disruptive modalities \u2014 gets a new layer of regulatory complexity that companies will have to factor into every deal they sign and every launch they plan.<\/p>\n<p>Separately, Section 232 tariffs of up to 100% on certain drugs are scheduled to take effect September 29. That deadline is the proximate reason foreign companies came to the White House. Uden expects more tariff-exposed companies to announce MFN deals before that date. And he offers a concrete prediction: if either chamber of Congress flips in the midterms, he expects subpoenas for the deals and likely public release.<\/p>\n<p>Remembering a Giant of FDA Law<\/p>\n<p>The episode closes with a remembrance of Peter Barton Hutt, who died last week at 91. Uden, who knew him, describes him as a larger-than-life figure: FDA chief counsel from 1971 to 1975, then extraordinarily active as a lawyer and teacher, teaching FDA law at Harvard Law School every year and authoring the field&#8217;s primary textbook.<\/p>\n<p>Hutt&#8217;s fingerprints are on much of what the biotech industry now takes for granted. The adequate and well-controlled investigation standard survived because Hutt won four Supreme Court cases upholding it in a single year, 1973. The off-label doctrine \u2014 permitting physicians to lawfully prescribe approved drugs for unapproved uses \u2014 also traces to him, and he fought for it out of personal experience: a brother with a serious condition treatable only off-label, whose physician Hutt assured it would be legal to treat. Nutrition labeling on foods was another Hutt cause.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Four cases in one year in the Supreme Court \u2014 there&#8217;s not too many attorneys out there that can claim that,&#8221; Cranmer observed.<\/p>\n<p>The implication for investors: the regulatory landscape that pharma operates in \u2014 the standards for drug approval, the rules around off-label prescribing, the labeling requirements \u2014 was not handed down by fiat. It was built by people like Hutt, argued case by case. And in a policy environment where MFN carveouts, GLOBE and GUARD, and COINS Act restrictions are all being negotiated in real time, the absence of a figure of Hutt&#8217;s intellectual heft is itself a signal about how the next chapter of drug regulation will be written.<\/p>\n<p>The Lp(a) field now hinges on Amgen&#8217;s event-driven Phase 3, expected within roughly the next year, in a similar secondary-prevention population with slightly higher enrollment Lp(a) thresholds. If the siRNA succeeds where the antisense failed, the modality read-across is severe \u2014 not just for Lp(a) but for every indication where antisense and siRNA compete. If it fails too, the target itself comes under genuine doubt, and the primary-prevention timing question becomes the field&#8217;s central unresolved problem. For investors, the next twelve months will answer the question that a $40 billion market-cap loss raised but could not resolve: whether Novartis&#8217;s failure was a molecule problem, a target problem, or a timing problem. Each answer points to a different future for one of cardiology&#8217;s most promising therapeutic hypotheses.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Novartis entered September 2026 as one of the best-performing large-cap pharma companies on the planet \u2014 &#8220;one of&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":130763,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[127],"tags":[4498,62558,14607,7849,63595,30284,9072,63591,216,63594,41991,63593,28740,63590,206,2233,62554,57008,62560,1290,28743,63592],"class_list":["post-130762","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-novartis","tag-amgen","tag-argo-biopharma","tag-astrazeneca","tag-avidity-biosciences","tag-biocentury-this-week","tag-biogen","tag-bridgebio","tag-dii235","tag-eli-lilly","tag-gracell","tag-gsk","tag-harvard-law-school","tag-ionis-pharmaceuticals","tag-lepodisiran","tag-novartis","tag-novo-nordisk","tag-olpasiran","tag-pelacarsen","tag-peter-barton-hutt","tag-sanofi","tag-vertex-pharmaceuticals","tag-ziltivekimab"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@ch\/117273601470594503","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/130762","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=130762"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/130762\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/130763"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=130762"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=130762"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=130762"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}