{"id":137513,"date":"2026-09-28T12:56:08","date_gmt":"2026-09-28T12:56:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/137513\/"},"modified":"2026-09-28T12:56:08","modified_gmt":"2026-09-28T12:56:08","slug":"%e2%9d%9dwhen-algorithms-dictate-war-and-the-promise-of-efficiency","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/137513\/","title":{"rendered":"\u275dWhen algorithms dictate war and the promise of efficiency"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Speed \u200b\u200bhas long been considered a determining factor in military decision-making. But algorithms promise to accelerate these decisions far beyond human capabilities, to the detriment of the protective logic of law, writes Anna Rosalie Greipl, postdoctoral researcher at the Global Studies Institute, University of Geneva.<\/p>\n<p>In a series of articles published from 22 to 26 September in collaboration with Le Temps, Geneva Graduate Institute professors share their outlook on the world, amid increasing threats \u2013 much as their predecessors at the Graduate Institute of International Studies did in the summer of 1939. Geneva Solutions is publishing a select number from the original series.<\/p>\n<p>A soldier looks at a screen. A name and a photo appear, flagged by an algorithm as a militant. She has seconds to decide: is the person a lawful target? That, and little else, risks being the human judgment separating an AI recommendation from lethal force.<\/p>\n<p>This is not about autonomous weapons which identify and attack targets without human involvement. It is the quieter reality of AI decision-support systems that increasingly shape military decisions, including those about life and death. Their appeal rests on a deceptively simple conviction: AI systems can solve demanding decision tasks better than humans. Faster. More accurately. More rationally. Seductive though it is, that promise risks displacing the human judgment element that the law of armed conflict depends upon.<\/p>\n<p>This promise echoes a familiar idea. Long before algorithms took centre stage, strategists envisioned perfecting decision-making through speed and precision. Today, AI represents the latest attempt to realise this ambition, but the difference lies in how much human judgement we are prepared to surrender in pursuit of it.<\/p>\n<p>The legacy of speed<\/p>\n<p>The modern ideal of accelerated decision-making is most closely associated with US Air Force colonel John Boyd and his Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop. <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Boyd argued<\/a> that victory belongs to the side that can cycle through this loop faster than its adversary can respond. Decision-making speed, in this account, is not just one virtue among others. It is the decisive one.<\/p>\n<p>That logic still shapes military thinking. It influences how militaries are trained, how command structures are designed, and how new technologies are evaluated.<\/p>\n<p>A (re)newed dream through machine efficiency<\/p>\n<p>AI has gained traction largely because it promises to fulfil this ambition better than humans can. For decades, rapid decision-making was understood as a distinctly human achievement, cultivated through training and intuition. Now, humans are increasingly cast as the main obstacle: prone to fatigue, cognitive overload, inconsistency, and delay. AI promises to remove these limits, drastically raising the bar for targeting emerging threats from minutes to an astonishing <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">1,000 tactical decisions per hour<\/a> (one every 3.6 seconds). That compression far surpasses the <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">speed of human thought<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The shift is easy to miss because the relentless pursuit of faster, more efficient decisions remains the ideal. Only the hero at the centre has changed.\u00a0The subtle but profound result is that humans are transitioning from actively applying informed judgment to passively endorsing algorithmic suggestions.<\/p>\n<p>This logic is in systems such as <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Lavender<\/a> and <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Gospel<\/a>, reportedly used by Israeli forces in Gaza, or the <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Maven Smart System<\/a>, <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">reportedly<\/a> used by the US during Operation Epic Fury against Iran earlier this year. Promoted as AI decision-support tools, they increasingly perform tasks once reserved for trained military officers. Tasks that hold profound legal implications: identifying lawful targets and recommending whether to use force. Humans remain formally involved, but machine speed leaves little room for real review. Oversight risks becoming a mere \u201c<a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">stamp of approval<\/a>\u201d for algorithmic recommendations, drastically altering the nature of military decision-making.<\/p>\n<p>Machine efficiency and war\u2019s legal deliberation<\/p>\n<p>This redistribution of authority matters because it challenges a foundational assumption of the law of armed conflict: that decisions about the use of force remain the product of <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">genuine human judgment<\/a>. Obligations such as <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">distinction<\/a>, <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">proportionality<\/a>, and the taking of <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">feasible precautions<\/a> are not purely computational exercises but require <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">contextual and qualitative evaluation<\/a>. If meaningful deliberation migrates from the human to the algorithm, the legal architecture remains formally intact while its premise is quietly hollowed out.<\/p>\n<p>The tension becomes clearest when optimising military decision-making collides with the law\u2019s protective logic. Optimisation prizes \u201c<a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">maximum lethality<\/a>\u201d. The law recognises the realities of combat, but insists that <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">military necessity<\/a> does not eclipse the obligation to protect civilians. Commanders, for instance, must take <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">all feasible precautions<\/a> before launching an attack, by assessing risks and considering whether civilian harm can be reduced. Those duties require deliberation, and deliberation takes time.<\/p>\n<p>Once machine speed becomes the defining measure of ideal decision-making, deliberation about civilian protection risks appearing as <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">inefficiency rather than a legal duty<\/a>. Hence, civilian protection need not be explicitly abandoned to be weakened. They may instead erode more subtly, as growing faith in faster, AI-assisted decisions leaves ever less room for the human judgment the law demands.<\/p>\n<p>The future of warfare: a human choice<\/p>\n<p>It is tempting to treat this trajectory as inevitable. As if legally significant decisions will naturally migrate from humans to AI systems to win wars. But AI systems are not neutral \u201ctools\u201d that emerged from nowhere. They are general-purpose technologies that do whatever they were designed to do. Every system embodies <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">human choices<\/a> about what to optimise for and what kind of war it is preparing for.<\/p>\n<p>Therefore, the current trajectory reveals less about what AI is than about the priorities and blind spots of the institutions shaping it. The push toward ever faster targeting decisions is not an objective insight into what war must become. It is a normative vision of what war should become, dressed in the borrowed authority of the machine.<\/p>\n<p>This recognition offers both hope and caution. If today\u2019s AI systems mirror human choices, tomorrow&#8217;s can reflect different ones. Changing course begins by rejecting the idea that this path is unavoidable. Then doing the harder work of imagining these technologies through a different set of <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">priorities, values and ambitions<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Ultimately, AI will not determine the future of warfare. Humans will. The real challenge in warfare, as everywhere else, lies not in deciding what AI can do, but in deciding what kind of humanity we want it <a href=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">to embody<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Anna Rosalie Greipl is a postdoctoral researcher at the Global Studies Institute at the University of Geneva. Her research sits at the intersection of international law, emerging technologies and critical studies, with a particular focus on armed conflict. She holds a PhD in International Law, summa cum laude, from the Geneva Graduate Institute.<\/p>\n<p>Geneva Solutions publishes opinions and columns proposed by or requested from external contributors and experts. These texts reflect the point of view of their authors and do not represent the position of the media.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Speed \u200b\u200bhas long been considered a determining factor in military decision-making. But algorithms promise to accelerate these decisions&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":137514,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[7],"tags":[225,65,789,4140],"class_list":["post-137513","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-geneva","tag-artificial-intelligence","tag-geneva","tag-technology","tag-war"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@ch\/117348780362600031","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/137513","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=137513"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/137513\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/137514"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=137513"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=137513"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ch\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=137513"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}