The most dangerous assumption in European defense right now is that technology wins wars. It doesn’t. What wins wars is the ability to replace what gets destroyed, and to do it faster than your enemy can. That is the uncomfortable message from two executives building companies in the middle of Europe’s rearmament boom. “Simply having technology is not enough. In fact, if you had to choose between the two, you would choose volume,” said Aistis Šimaitis, co-founder and CEO of Onodrim Industries, speaking on the Sourcery podcast. “Because volume wins. On a grand scale, it’s better to have a million of one thing than one of anything.”
Šimaitis is not a traditional defense insider. He ran Palantir’s commercial business in Europe before launching Onodrim, a company with a deliberately unglamorous mission: buying up quality manufacturing businesses to clear the bottlenecks choking Europe’s supply chains. His view is that the strategic problem has been misdiagnosed. Europe does not lack good ideas. It lacks the industrial plumbing to turn those ideas into equipment at the scale modern war demands.
The war that exposed Europe’s factories
George Hadjiminas, Director of Strategy at Fion — a Portuguese electro-optics supplier that went public in 2024 — has watched this shift from the factory floor. He notes that Europe underfunded defense for decades, and that the war in Ukraine proved this could not continue. But the flood of money now entering the sector is not just about buying more weapons. It is about changing what kind of weapons get built.
Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Šimaitis argues, much of the industry chased what he calls “the dreams of generals that cannot be mass-produced.” That era is over. The new imperative is that anything you build must be producible in the tens, hundreds of thousands, or even millions of units.
The unit economics make the point bluntly. Šimaitis cites a radio station that cost $30,000 for the military roughly four years ago. That was acceptable then. It is not acceptable when the requirement is autonomous mass systems and tens of thousands of robots. Components that were once exclusive — cameras, sensors, communications gear — must now become dramatically cheaper and radically more abundant.
The data shows the paradigm shift clearly:
Pre-war paradigmPost-Ukraine paradigmUnique, advanced technologies; “dreams of generals”Mass production in tens to millions of units$30,000 military radio acceptableCost must collapse for autonomous mass systemsExcellent test results treated as sufficientIterative field-updating required; test results insufficientTechnology as the differentiatorVolume as the differentiator, with technology as a complement
Host Bruno Wejchert adds an essential qualifier drawn from observed performance. Many systems that were new and tested in the United States, after being deployed in Ukraine, frankly did not work at the beginning of the war. They needed iterative cycles of constant updating and improvement. The systems that performed well in controlled testing failed in the chaos of the first months. The lesson is that scale and iteration are complements, not substitutes. You cannot buy your way out of the field-feedback loop.
This is why Hadjiminas frames the core tension the way he does: “Prototypes don’t fight in wars. No matter how good they are, they cannot win wars.” Competitiveness, he says, requires being at the forefront of technology and having the industrial flexibility to deliver at scale. One without the other is worthless.

The real bottleneck is the factory floor, not the lab
Wejchert’s diagnosis of where the construction is happening — and where it is not — is the most actionable market read in the conversation. Attention is concentrated on new prime contractors such as Helsing, and in each key region emerging players are likely to capture a large share of their country’s defense spending. But the biggest gap is elsewhere: these systems must be manufactured on a massive scale, and — critically — manufactured in Europe.
Doing that requires unifying a deeply fragmented manufacturing base. Delivery times for some components run into years. Certain contractors execute contracts over four to five years. Wejchert’s conclusion is direct: the main gap is in the manufacturing sector’s ability to deliver next-generation systems built on legacy supply chains.
This is precisely the bottleneck Onodrim was built to attack. Šimaitis describes the strategy in plain terms: “Our company is not trying to become another defense giant. We seek out quality manufacturing and critical systems businesses in Europe, acquire them, and eliminate bottlenecks so that defense contractors can fulfill orders for the next decade on time.”
The structure he describes is not a traditional prime contractor. It is infrastructure — the layer that makes the primes’ promises credible. And the logic applies across the entire supply chain.

Two kinds of company, not one
Asked whether defense companies in 20 years will look more like technology or industrial companies, the guests split the question rather than picking a side. Hadjiminas points to Fion’s own evolution: four or five years ago it was mostly an industrial company whose main product was night vision equipment — and, he says frankly, that is still largely the case — but it has expanded significantly into new technologies. Adoption by armed forces is evolution, not revolution. New technologies are gradually integrated into existing platforms.
Šimaitis takes a more provocative position. He argues that technology companies developing AI and software for defense and the connected battlefield should not aspire to become global manufacturing giants. The recipe for success, he says, is to have technology companies that focus on technology, software, AI, final assembly, and testing — and industrial companies that are extremely skilled at producing the components. The relationship should be “zero-sum collaboration,” where they work together to produce at scale rather than competing to absorb each other’s functions.
This is a structural argument against vertical integration, and it runs counter to how some US defense startups have operated. But Šimaitis believes the separation of roles is the only way to reach the volume Europe needs.
Why better products lose to worse balance sheets
The most sobering part of the conversation concerns capital. Šimaitis is direct about the customer: the government is the buyer. He acknowledges theories that private military corporations will become the next way of conducting defense, but states this is not yet the case. Funding therefore flows from governments, with many initiatives originating at the European Union level. This attracts venture funding — what he describes as trillions of dollars pouring into defense, driving private funding for companies to take advantage of that money by 2030.
But Wejchert supplies the counterweight. Many of the startups riding this wave have raised only $5 million or $10 million. Their products could be better than existing systems. The problem is that when the end user is the government, a thin balance sheet undermines confidence in your ability to deliver and scale — compared with a competitor that has worked with the government for 10 or 20 years, has thousands of employees, and hundreds of millions on its balance sheet.
His prediction follows logically: many such European companies will not succeed even with a better product. The de facto favorites — Helsing in Germany, and ICE at the European level for SAR applications — will continue taking market share from traditional leaders.
ConstraintDetail as statedBuyerGovernment; EU-level initiatives drive much of the fundingTypical thin startup raise$5–10MIncumbent advantage10–20 years of government relationships, thousands of employees, hundreds of millions on balance sheetDe facto favorites namedHelsing (Germany), ICE (European level, SAR applications)Capital flow projectionTrillions into defense, driving private funding through 2030
The implication for investors is uncomfortable: product quality is not the binding constraint. Credibility is. And credibility is expensive.
Europe’s structural mistake: national champions and a false analogy
The sharpest disagreement with conventional wisdom comes on the question of what Europe gets wrong. Hadjiminas argues that European defense largely possesses technological capabilities similar to those of the United States — not as far apart as many think — and points to fantastic companies on the continent. The real difference is the prevalence in the US of startups that became large companies. He names Anduril and Palantir, while cautioning that calling them merely “large” understates their true scale.
In Europe, the traditional general contractors resemble their US counterparts. The divergence is political. Europe has countries defending their own interests, and those interests conflict. That produces many “national champions” simply because there are many countries — unlike the states in the US. His conclusion is stark: Europe has more companies than necessary, many of them national champions that would not survive in a competitive environment, whereas in the US the main contractors appear to have found their niches.
Wejchert adds a second structural error: the belief that US and European defense procurement processes are similar. They are not. They are fragmented and depend on each individual country or on the European level. As a result, much of the current military-industrial complex is outdated, and countries like Germany have a large number of systems that do not necessarily work. In the US, companies like Anduril and Hadrian have partnered with the government in joint initiatives to genuinely change the relationship between government spending and defense manufacturers. Europe is moving in this direction but lags far behind on such partnerships. That, in his view, is the biggest misconception.
The half-trillion-dollar question
On talent, Šimaitis sees no constraint. He cites his co-founder’s return to Germany after 17 years in the US specifically to strengthen European defense, and reports strong demand at companies with big ambitions — a quality he says has been lacking in Europe. Helsing, he notes, sees the same dynamic and has no problem attracting top specialists.
But the episode’s boldest prediction belongs to Wejchert. Given how big the defense market is, especially in Europe, and how close Europe is to the front lines, if Europe can achieve exceptional results in both local manufacturing and creating an intelligent layer for defense, Europe could have a half-trillion-dollar defense company — one founded probably in the last five years or so. Asked how long it would take, he says it can be done in the next decade, with the caveat: “don’t quote me on this.”
Hadjiminas offers a more contrarian investment angle. Defense needs more visibility to scale, not crazy innovation or revolution in technology. The task, he argues, is not finding something that revolutionizes everything but finding the right approach with the potential to scale and succeed. He explicitly frames favoring scalable companies over defense startups as a somewhat controversial idea.
The final reconciliation comes from Šimaitis, drawing on his Palantir experience under Alex Karp. Palantir was not profitable for over 15 years. The lesson he carries into Onodrim is to focus on being important and useful, and the money will come. It is a philosophy that fits the moment: Europe’s defense buildout is not a sprint to a liquidity event. It is a decade-long industrial transformation, and the companies that survive it will be the ones that make themselves indispensable, not the ones with the best pitch deck.