As an example, he cited Ukraine’s Brave 1 system—an initiative that allows soldiers to earn additional weapons for the front through a points-based mechanism. Under this framework, units can rapidly secure materiel tailored to operational needs.

Jaakkola implied that such systems reflect deep integration between battlefield demand signals and industrial responsiveness—something that cannot be replicated simply by purchasing new hardware.

Looking beyond Finland, Jaakkola argued that Europe must develop a new version of maneuver warfare if it wishes to avoid a protracted war of attrition against Russia — one in which front lines ultimately freeze.

Emerging technologies, in his assessment, are already reshaping operational priorities. High-value manned platforms require enhanced protection. Logistics must be strengthened. Long-range weapons systems must be developed further.

In essence, Jaakkola’s message was not anti-technology. Rather, it was a call for disciplined integration: technological innovation must be subordinated to coherent doctrine, resilient command structures, and sustainable force design.

Based on reporting by Iltalehti (March 2), journalist Solmu Salminen.

What Is Maneuver Warfare?A Finnish Defense Forces tank in Kankaanpää, in western Finland.A Finnish Defense Forces tank in Kankaanpää, in western Finland. Foto: Antti Aimo-Koivisto / Lehtikuva / Imago Images / Scanpix

Western military doctrine contains an elegant theory of maneuver war: win by creating advantage in time, space, and cohesion, rather than by grinding strength-on-strength.

The U.S. Marine Corps’ MCDP 1: Warfighting defines maneuver warfare as a philosophy aimed at shattering enemy cohesion through speed, surprise, and attacks on “critical vulnerabilities,” not merely accumulating destruction.

Initiative. Maneuver begins with setting problems the enemy must solve. In doctrine, mission command and initiative are praised; in practice, Western operations often centralize authority upward when risk is high. Multinational political constraints, legal review pipelines, and escalation management can slow decisions and narrow subordinate freedom of action, turning “initiative” into carefully controlled, deliberate sequencing. NATO doctrine itself acknowledges the complexity of alliance operations — an operational reality that often taxes tempo.

Preemption. Preemption is temporal overmatch: arriving first, finishing first, transitioning first. That requires not only cognition but depth — stockpiles, sustainment, repair, and replacement. High-intensity war in Europe exposed that Western ammunition and industrial capacity were not sized for sustained consumption; governments then launched emergency measures to expand artillery production. When expenditure becomes strategically scarce, maneuver’s decisive “spend quickly to win quickly” logic collapses into conservation and operational caution.

Disaggregation. The maneuver ethic is to avoid the enemy’s strengths and attack systemic weaknesses. Yet Western practice often drifts toward “target servicing”: destroying what is visible and legally/technically easy to strike, rather than what is operationally decisive. Professional military scholarship warns that tools like “center of gravity” are frequently misapplied, pushing planners toward heavily defended nodes instead of exploitable vulnerabilities.

Dislocation. Dislocation fights where advantage exists, making enemy strengths irrelevant. Modern battlefield transparency (drones, persistent ISR) and long-range precision fires raise the price of classic flanking: sustainment nodes and routes are increasingly targetable. Contemporary analysis argues that logistics survivability is now a frontline issue; without dispersion, deception, air defense, and resilient repair/recovery, maneuver forces become canalized into predictable corridors and pauses—handing the enemy the very reactions maneuver seeks to impose.

Conclusion. The West largely has the theory of maneuver, but often lacks the enabling ecosystem for sustained maneuver against a peer: fast decision cycles under political constraint, deep magazines and mobilizable industry, and survivable logistics under precision strike. The result is a recurrent pattern: doctrine promises initiative, preemption, disaggregation, and dislocation; force structure and process frequently produce deliberate, attritional habits instead.

The Baltic Sentinel