U.N. monitoring estimates that roughly 6,000 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters remain in Afghanistan, while repeated Pakistani cross-border strikes have further strained relations with Kabul. Neither periodic airstrikes nor another unenforceable ceasefire is likely to resolve the dispute.

What is needed is a reciprocal security framework built around verification, conditional restraint and regional monitoring.

Diplomacy has been tried, but not institutionalized

Pakistan did not begin with military pressure.

Since the Taliban returned to Kabul in 2021, Islamabad has pursued religious, tribal, diplomatic and security engagement. Pakistani officials cite ministerial missions, Joint Coordination Committee meetings, hundreds of border meetings and repeated formal protests.

Even after major clashes in October 2025, Pakistan and Afghanistan returned to mediated talks. Qatar and Turkiye helped facilitate a ceasefire in Doha, followed by negotiations in Istanbul focused on cross-border terrorism and security arrangements.

Those efforts did not produce a durable settlement.

The central weakness was not simply a lack of dialogue. It was the absence of a mechanism able to verify whether commitments were being carried out.

That should be the starting point for the next diplomatic effort.

Pillar one: verification and reciprocal security commitments

The first requirement is a system for testing claims.

Pakistan has repeatedly demanded concrete and verifiable action against TTP infrastructure. Kabul, in turn, objects to Pakistani strikes and rejects the accusation that it is knowingly enabling anti-Pakistan militancy.

A workable mechanism should therefore focus on evidence rather than rhetoric.

It could include agreed lists of militant leaders and facilities under investigation, regular intelligence exchanges, third-party verification of the closure of identified camps, documented reporting on arrests or restrictions imposed on militant networks, and a formal procedure for investigating disputed attacks.

The purpose would not be to give Pakistan authority over Afghan territory. It would be to create a process through which allegations could be assessed independently.

The security track should also be separated from broader political disputes over the border, refugee policy, trade, recognition and regional alignments.

Pakistan’s immediate concern is whether Afghan territory is being used to organize attacks against Pakistan. Kabul’s immediate concern is preventing Pakistani military operations inside Afghanistan.

Those interests can be linked through a reciprocal arrangement:

verifiable Afghan action against identified militant infrastructure in exchange for Pakistani restraint on cross-border strikes while compliance continues.

That would create a measurable security bargain rather than another open-ended political commitment.

Pillar two: use economic incentives to support compliance

Security cooperation should not rely only on coercion.

Pakistan and Afghanistan remain economically interdependent, especially through trade, transit routes and border crossings. Even during periods of political tension, the two sides have continued negotiating trade concessions and facilitation measures.

That interdependence creates incentives that a security agreement could use rather than leave disconnected from the political process.

Commercial incentives such as smoother transit access, preferential trade arrangements and predictable border procedures could be structured to reward measurable progress on agreed security benchmarks.

Humanitarian assistance should remain outside such bargaining. Afghan civilians should not bear the cost of security disputes between governments.

But commercial and transit benefits can be used to create constituencies on both sides with an interest in stability and continued cooperation.

This matters because military pressure may destroy individual targets, but it does not by itself alter the political incentives that allow militant networks to survive.

A durable arrangement has to make cooperation more beneficial than continued confrontation.

Pillar three: create a standing regional monitoring mechanism

Pakistan and Afghanistan have repeatedly needed outside mediation.

Qatar and Turkiye played important roles in the 2025 ceasefire and subsequent negotiations. China has also sought to prevent further escalation, while other regional actors have strong interests in avoiding prolonged instability.

The next step should be to institutionalize that mediation.

A small standing contact mechanism could monitor ceasefire violations, verify implementation of counterterrorism commitments, facilitate emergency communication and convene technical-level meetings before disputes escalate militarily.

Its mandate should remain narrow.

The goal should not be to create another large regional organization. Its value would lie in being operational, continuous and focused on implementation.

This mechanism could also provide a channel for managing the hardest unresolved issue: the use of force.

Pakistan is unlikely to renounce the possibility of military action so long as it believes major attacks are being planned from Afghan territory. Kabul is equally unlikely to accept an arrangement that appears to legitimize Pakistani strikes.

The most realistic approach is therefore conditional restraint.

Pakistan could commit to using the verification and consultation mechanism before resorting to force except where it faces an immediate threat. Afghanistan, in turn, would accept specific obligations to investigate identified militant networks and provide evidence of action taken.

The goal would be to make force the exception rather than the operating principle of the relationship.

From crisis management to conflict prevention

The failure of previous talks does not mean diplomacy is exhausted.

It means the form of diplomacy has been inadequate.

Repeated political meetings, protest notes and temporary ceasefires have not produced durable security because they have lacked verification, monitoring and consequences for non-compliance.

That is the gap the next diplomatic effort must fill.

Pakistan’s concerns are supported by more than its own intelligence claims. U.N. reporting documents a substantial TTP presence in Afghanistan. Kabul, meanwhile, has legitimate concerns about sovereignty and civilian harm from cross-border strikes.

A sustainable policy has to address both realities.

The way forward is therefore neither endless airstrikes nor another vague declaration of cooperation.

It is a reciprocal and verifiable security framework built around Afghan action against militant infrastructure, Pakistani restraint on cross-border force, conditional economic incentives and continuous regional monitoring.

The core problem is no longer identifying the dispute.

It is creating institutions strong enough that neither side has to rely solely on the other’s assurances.

Saima Afzal is a researcher specializing in South Asian security, counterterrorism, and broader geopolitical dynamics across the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Indo-Pacific. Her work examines strategic affairs and evolving patterns of regional conflict. She is currently a Research Scholar at Justus Liebig University, Germany.