President Trump’s decision to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities in the summer of 2025, after joining Israel in its “12-day war” against Iran, dramatically illustrates the executive branch’s almost single-handed capacity to initiate war. The conflict subsequently recommenced with a joint Israeli and US aerial bombardment campaign on February 28, 2026, and continues today intermittently after a series of temporary ceasefires. The Iran War’s inception and its effects have brought into high relief the potential fragility and danger for America in its chosen method of waging war by relying on the sole judgment of the president. President Trump embarked on the war without consulting Congress, let alone persuading it or seeking its approval. Our practice of unilateral presidential war-making did not begin with Trump, but his war exemplifies its most troubling aspects.
Passed in 1973 during the Vietnam War after the override of President Richard Nixon’s veto, the War Powers Resolution was enacted when Congress sought to restore a constitutional balance of power after being bypassed by presidential actions in Vietnam and Cambodia. Yet every presidential administration since the War Powers Resolution’s enactment has treated its strict 60-day withdrawal clock and unilateral deployment restrictions as an unconstitutional infringement on executive authority. Whatever its merits or demerits, the War Powers Resolution has proven ineffective.
Is there a path to rethinking and finally establishing what should be the norm in American constitutionalism: Congressional control of the use of force? One route could be originalism. The meaning of the power to declare war has been endlessly studied and debated, with thoughtful scholars on both sides of presidential and congressional control of war powers. We should question whether this issue can ever be resolved by text and legal judgment. But textual ambiguity need not lead to a formless constitutionalism. Our help might come from a different source: political constitutionalism which gives us old but still genuine constitutional ground to recover the power of the representative branches over the use of war powers. Political constitutionalism affirms that parties and leaders operating within representative institutions can chart a program and course for constitutional direction, one that aims at proper ends and purposes of a constitutional people.
The unilateral presidential use of force could work if prudence and thorough deliberation occur within the White House before striking the enemy. But to be a judge in your own cause is difficult for mortals, and as Madison, writing as Helvidius, affirmed, “Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from enacting laws.” Underlying Helvidius’s warnings is the principle that different wielders of power, in this case elected officials in Congress, are more able to employ their wisdom and authority to ensure that proper questions, deliberations, and answers are formulated before the decision to go to war is made. What happens if the right questions aren’t even asked and thus can’t be answered?
Without congressional control, what constraints, if any, limit the president’s decision to go to war? The answer, it seems, is very few.
We have been left with a set of rather difficult consequences unfolding from the decision to attack Iran. Iran didn’t surrender, as Trump seems to have thought it would. How else to explain an opening decapitation strike on the regime? Our most sophisticated form of missile defense weapons and strategic missile stockpiles have declined to levels that may have led the military leadership to urge President Trump to pause the military campaign in April. Taking stock of our means and ends doesn’t seem to have occurred. Because Trump did not see fit to persuade or even disclose to most European allies that America was going to strike Iran, they remain largely indifferent to the war. Energy prices have increased to the consternation of many Americans who were unaware of the coming war, since the administration did little to justify the war in a public campaign of persuasion. Oil crunches are beginning in different parts of the world.
Good things have also happened: Iran’s defense and industrial sectors have been devastated. Its currency is a deflated mess, and its economy is much diminished. Much of its political leadership is dead. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps now appears to lead the country, but for how long can a medley of fanatical warriors and regime cronies govern? Iran survives, but seems incapable of striking back except through its terror proxies, many of which have been brought to heel by Israel. Iran’s gambit to control the Strait of Hormuz failed, but it has still greatly reduced oil transit through it, although signs suggest oil is now resuming much of its pre-war flow through the Strait. Yet all this underscores that war-making, when it rests in one set of hands, is highly tenuous, even when key objectives such as eliminating Iran’s nuclear capacity are possible.
The Unbalanced War Power
For decades, Congress has largely acquiesced to the executive branch’s unilateral use of force, rarely contesting such decisions with its constitutional authority. At the same time, Congress has appropriated resources for an immense military while remaining largely content with how the president deploys it. Without congressional control, what constraints, if any, limit the president’s decision to go to war? The answer, it seems, is very few.
Harvard Law Professor Jack Goldsmith, who was assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from 2003 to 2004, and special counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002 to 2003, has argued that the dearth of congressional action in the use of war powers for over half a century has led to a situation where executive branch precedent now dominates constitutional discourse about presidential decisions to use force. Much of that precedent takes the form of OLC opinions, almost all of which favor the president’s decision to commence war in the name of national interests, self-defense, or inherent Article II powers.
Goldsmith’s analysis of these OLC opinions notes that none of them dismiss congressional authority to declare war, but they apply a single test: whether the use of force, based on its anticipated nature, scope, and duration, constitutes a war. Because they tend to conclude that America’s use of force doesn’t rise to the level of a certified war, Congress’s imprimatur isn’t needed.
The difficulty is how quickly almost any deployment of force to kill or damage another country’s forces can lead to war. Even the smallest intervention can potentially metastasize and draw America into an intractable conflict. The 2011 operations in Libya totaled more than $1 billion, featured thousands of air combat missions, and led to the removal of a foreign leader. But it was judged under the nature/scope/duration test to not constitute a war. Can disloyalty to reality serve as a basis for the constitutional use of war powers? Goldsmith summarizes our situation as follows:
Our country has—through presidential aggrandizement accompanied by congressional authorization, delegation, and acquiescence—given one person, the president, a sprawling military and enormous discretion to use it in ways that can easily lead to a massive war. That is our system: One person decides.
He further concludes, “This is not the system the framers had in mind, and it is a dangerous system for all the reasons the framers had in mind.”
Originalism and War Powers
What, then, do we make of the constitutional text that allocates to Congress, under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, the power “To declare war”? Authorities are divided on this question. My Civitas Institute colleague John Yoo, one of the preeminent scholars of executive power, has argued persuasively in important law review articles and other publications that Congress’s power to declare war was never a causal power to fight a war. Rather, declaring war in its original textual meaning was a formal written declaration of a change in status between America and its enemy or enemies. The Constitutional Convention incorporated a standard of declaring war widely practiced by European states: informing one another and the wider world that they were now at war. In return, they invoked and received protections under the laws of war for enemy combatants.
Accordingly, the president, under “the executive Power” and as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,” has the constitutional authority under Article II to commence hostilities. Yoo counsels that Congress’s power of the purse is the real check on this power because it can approve or deny the president the ability to wage war. As Yoo puts it, “When Congress maintains a large standing Army and Navy, the President can engage in hostilities, and Congress can use its power of the purse, oversight, impeachment, and the political process if it opposes him.” Congress can issue warnings of its plans to reduce or end appropriations. Of course, cutting resources to American soldiers in the field is fraught with difficulty and peril.
Many congressional scholars and originalists take the opposite position, arguing that the declare war clause allocates that power to Congress and denies it to the president. Legal scholar Michael D. Ramsey states that the eighteenth-century meaning of declaring war wasn’t limited to formal declarations but meant initiating a state of war by a public act, whether by formal declaration or by starting armed hostilities. Ramsey cites foundational legal authorities from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including English philosopher John Locke, English jurist William Blackstone, and Jacques Necker, finance minister to Louis XVI, as arguing that “declare war” meant “wage war.”
Ramsey also offers quotations from major framers and interpreters of the Constitution who all affirmed the view that only Congress could take the nation to war. His list of notables includes Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Adams, along with subsequent influential constitutional commentaries by American jurists Joseph Story and William Rawle, who served as chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association from 1827 to 1836, and St. George Tucker, one of the most influential jurists and legal scholars in the early years of the United States. Ramsey further contends that no evidence shows any member of the Constitutional Convention or the state ratifying conventions thought the declare-war power was only a formal declaration power.
The Political Constitution
But textualism isn’t the only way or the best way to decide this question. We wouldn’t want the federal judiciary to parse the text for a precise understanding in this context of war, and the judiciary’s non-committal stance reflects its recognition of this fact. We need to decide the question through political settlement, through an argument about the ends and goals of constitutional order. Moreover, if we’re in a contest for constitutional authority on a question that has become lopsided in one branch’s favor, we’ll need heavy resources to resituate it. For that, we need to look to what legendary University of Virginia political theorist James Ceaser called political constitutionalism. The Constitution, Ceaser says, is now known to us mostly as a legal document: “a set of rules that can decide policies or cases; these rules are of a sort that can offer definitive answers and that could be employed and enforced by courts.” This is mostly how we think about constitutionalism now, Ceaser adds, and it is a chief impediment to recovering the constitutionalism that Ceaser counsels. But there is a “second sense” which is richer and affords us the opportunity to be constitutional people in a fuller and more potent sense. That’s “political constitutionalism,” which “understands the Constitution as a document that fixes certain ends of government activity, delineates a structure and arrangement of powers, and encourages a certain tone to the operation of the institutions.” Political constitutionalism understands that “it falls mostly to political actors making political decisions to protect and promote constitutional goals.”
Congress can pass laws that firmly and transparently proclaim and bind future presidents’ actions regarding the use of force.
This account does not diminish or indict legalistic constitutionalism, which is important in its own right, however much it now overshadows this thicker sense of constitutional meaning. But we need to recover the form of constitutionalism best suited to tackling unrestrained government by putting forward the “accumulation of ordinary policies” made “in the political realm and by political means” that will “protect the Constitution” going “well beyond anything the courts could determine.” In this debate, we should recover the older constitutional and political wisdom for why Congress is the first mover in war powers.
Joseph Story, who served as an associate justice of the Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845, explains in his abridged commentaries that this power ought to belong to Congress, where all the states and all the people of the States are represented. War, Story notes, is “so dreadful” that the “Chief magistrate” should not be able to take the nation to war. The people, Story continues, bear the expenses and the burdens of war and “would have no direct voice in the matter.” But giving the House of Representatives the power of war means “harmony” because the voice of the people sustains that power. Joseph Story’s highly regarded constitutional writings uncover why we should give Congress the nod in debates over who controls war powers. Congress, not the president, represents the nation in its fullest diversity and does so through deliberation. And because war’s consequences pulsate through the country, impacting the economy, the culture, and families, it is Congress that should declare war.
But we also face the reality that, as the 2018 Syria OLC opinion (regarding targeted strikes by the United States against Syrian chemical weapons facilities) notes, “by the middle of the twentieth century, scholars had identified well over 100 instances of military deployments without prior congressional authorization.” As John Yoo notes, “Congress has not issued a formal declaration of war since 1942.” Constitutional practice is never finally settled, however, because the process of republican self-government never finally ends. How, then, do we begin the congressional reclamation of the declaration of war powers as it is meant in the Constitution? We first need to settle when a common practice amounts to a de facto constitutional settlement.
The accumulation of OLC opinions endlessly justifying presidential use of force do not establish a final constitutional decision. Such decisions can be revisited and resettled precisely because they result from the interplay of text, institutions, and the struggle between Congress and the executive branch over the allocation of power. A constitutional decision is a settlement reached through constitutional disputes, using legislation and other measures to establish a firm program of action to restore constitutional authority.
One response to this congressional view is that the constitutional requirement is better fulfilled when Congress creates the large expeditionary military and then allows the president to use it for war. This form of delegation in the foreign policy context has not been treated as unconstitutional. But the response points to the old constitutional wisdom Story uncovered. War can touch the entire nation in many ways, from hardship to annoyance and distress; it stands to reason that democratic norms and representation are best served when Congress authorizes an offensive war, matching reasons and appropriations in public debate. And if Congress now fields fewer statesmen or seems unfit for such constitutional duties, the same might be said of the Executive branch. We might also note that where governing muscles haven’t been used, they atrophy.
Past measures can’t be undone, nor can all future uses of war powers be seamlessly rationalized with the proposed program, but Congress can pass laws that firmly and transparently proclaim and bind future presidents’ actions regarding the use of force. The first measure should be Congress’s insistence that all military expenditures used to begin an offensive war receive Congress’s approval before the expenditure.
This recent adventure in Iran should focus our attention on Congress’s neglect of its own authority to declare war, and the president’s insistence that he can take the nation to war when he wants. No options are foolproof, though. Congress approved of our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, both at the outset and for years to come. Civilian leadership still made the wrong decisions. But the course remains open to members of Congress who would appeal to our written constitution and the authority it gives them over the powers of war and death.