Defence tech, la Silic
IrpiMedia’s latest investigation reveals that two new military projects were announced in the US at the end of September, one of which is closely linked to Silicon Valley start-ups and US politics. These are Agincourt, which is to set up a unit dedicated to autonomous warfare within a year, and Meridian, which is to provide it with a strategic vision. The latter involves a number of figures linked to Silicon Valley who have been called upon to coordinate it or contribute as experts, with a view to producing a report containing recommendations on the technologies of future warfare.
Defence tech start-ups
Among the various figures, many of whom are associated with the MAGA movement, the first to be mentioned is, of course, Elon Musk. Next is Palmer Luckey, founder of Oculus VR and Anduril – the latter being one of the leading start-ups in autonomous weapon systems; then Dino Mavrookas, founder of the start-up Saronic Technologies, valued at $9 billion, which manufactures autonomous warships and which, the day before the Meridian project was announced, had announced that it had been awarded a production contract by the US Navy; then Joe Lonsdale, co-founder of Palantir and 8VC, a venture capital fund that invests in defence tech start-ups, including Anduril itself; and finally Chris Power, founder and CEO of Hadrian Automation, a start-up in which 1789 Capital – the venture capital fund of which the President’s son, Donald Trump Jr, is a partner – has invested.
Potential conflicts of interest
The investigation suggests that Anduril has a framework agreement with the US Department of Homeland Security, signed in 2020 and worth approximately one billion dollars. In September, it secured a contract worth $15 million to supply remote-controlled drone countermeasure systems to the Marine Corps base at Quantico. Finally, it notes that Luckey donated nearly $6 million to the Republican Party for Trump’s election campaign.
In short, the Pentagon’s new suppliers are being called upon to design what the Pentagon will buy. But the investigation goes beyond the issue of conflicts of interest, arguing that private companies no longer merely sell equipment to the military, but are now shaping its doctrine.
The Bridge over the Atlantic
And what about on the other side of the ocean, in Europe? We have been covering this topic on these pages for some time, explaining how the American model is not some distant frontier to be observed through binoculars, but has already made its way into our homes – through the door of capital.
The most telling figure comes from *The State of Defence Tech 2026*, the report by Dealroom and Resilience Media published on 5 October 2026. European defence start-ups raised $7.4 billion in venture capital in the first nine months of 2026. This is almost triple the $2.6 billion raised in the whole of 2025, and the year-end projection stands at $10.5 billion.
The most striking fact concerns the origin of the investors: 47 per cent of funding for European defence tech comes from US investors, compared with 12 per cent in 2020. Among the most active are Founders Fund (the fund run by Peter Thiel, co-founder of Palantir), Accel, General Catalyst, Lightspeed and Y Combinator. In short, the European defence sector is also being financed by dollars from the very same ecosystem that shapes strategy in Washington.
Then there is the technology. Anduril has not wasted any time: since June 2025, it has been a strategic partner of Rheinmetall, Germany’s leading defence contractor. The agreement provides for the development and production in Europe of European variants of the Barracuda drone-missile and the Fury autonomous aircraft, integrated into the platform that Rheinmetall, without a hint of irony, calls ‘digital sovereignty’.
Here’s the paradox: European sovereignty is also being built on the basis of Palmer Luckey’s company’s code – the very same Luckey who donated nearly 6 million dollars to the Republican Party and now sits on the steering committee of the Meridian project.
The European equivalent of Luckey is called Ek
If Anduril is the American icon, its European counterpart is Helsing. Founded in Munich in 2021, it develops artificial intelligence software, attack drones, underwater systems and an unmanned combat aircraft. In July 2026, it closed a $1.8 billion Series E funding round at a valuation of $18 billion. It is the largest round ever raised by a German company and a European record in the defence sector: back in 2021, its $113 million Series A round was already enough to set the record.
Behind Helsing is Daniel Ek, founder of Spotify. In June 2025, his investment vehicle, Prima Materia, led the €600 million funding round that saw him appointed chairman of the company – and how could we forget how that decision sparked a revolt amongst artists, who began withdrawing their catalogues from Spotify (in Italy, Willie Peyote attacked him from the stage).
This is not a case of Luckey funding a political party, but of a tech billionaire who heads an arms company and presents it as part of Europe’s security infrastructure. A market that rests on the shoulders of just a few: according to Dealroom, mega-rounds account for over 85 per cent of funding in 2026. Munich is home to just 4.1 per cent of European defence start-ups, yet accounts for 39 per cent of their value and 40 per cent of the capital raised this year.
On these pages, at the height of that protest, we had tried to take the logic of it to its logical conclusion: if it is a problem to fund drones with money from the music industry, it is also a problem to do so with money from our smartphones. Google and Amazon provide cloud services and artificial intelligence to the Israeli government through Project Nimbus; Microsoft offers cloud services and AI to the Israeli armed forces; Meta has made its Llama models available to the defence agencies of allied countries. And Meta’s CTO, Andrew Bosworth, admitted that in Silicon Valley, when it comes to supporting the military, ‘the tide has turned’. Ek is merely the most recognisable face of a tide that is sweeping across much of the tech sector.
As in Washington, the line between decision-makers and salespeople is blurred in Europe too: 16 per cent of sales managers at European defence technology firms have a background in the military or government. Among investors in specialised funds, this figure rises to 34 per cent.
‘Dual use’ – the magic word
Washington has renamed the Pentagon to call a spade a spade: today it is the ‘Department of War’. Brussels has taken the opposite approach, renaming its plan, ReArm Europe, as Readiness 2030, because countries such as Italy and Spain feared that the original name was too divisive. And to get the money to start-ups, a bridge word was already needed.
In March 2025, on Startupbusiness, we reported how that term was ‘dual-use’. Indeed, the EIB, which by its statutes cannot finance defence, had found in the definition of dual-use goods a loophole to open a 6-billion fund. And many venture capital funds, bound by clauses excluding armaments, discovered the same loophole. Meanwhile, climate start-ups, left without green funding, were repositioning themselves towards national security and artificial intelligence. This repositioning mirrored the trend in the US, where climatech start-ups had already begun this pivot a few months earlier.
A year and a half later, the opening has become a gateway. From 17 June 2026, the Commission has opened up the European Innovation Council to dual-use and defence tech, with a 100 million call that brings direct equity investment to defence companies. According to Dealroom and the NATO Innovation Fund, in 2025 European start-ups in the defence, security and resilience sectors raised $8.7 billion: 43 per cent of all European deep tech funding.
In terms of vocabulary, in short, the difference with the United States is simply this: over there, rearmament is declared; here, it is translated.
The rules keep coming
IrpiMedia concludes by highlighting the risk that autonomous weapons may develop faster than the institutions’ ability to regulate them. And there is no shortage of examples: in July, in Zaporizhzhia, the first Russian attack using fully autonomous drones was documented; in September, Iran announced that it had captured an Anduril underwater drone.
Europe is supposed to be the continent of rules, of excessive bureaucracy linked to technology that would slow it down, thanks to various regulations (DMA, DSA, Data Act, AI Act) and new proposals such as the EU Kids Act. Yet the AI Act itself – the world’s first regulation on artificial intelligence – explicitly excludes from its scope systems used for military, defence or national security purposes. Recital 24 refers to international law, which, however, does not yet contain any binding provisions on autonomous weapons.
In September this year, in these pages, we asked who was really afraid of AI and who stood to gain from it. The conclusion was that the alarm over existential risk was diverting attention from the real and measurable danger: the governance gap, where tools were being adopted more quickly than the systems needed to oversee them. In the same article, we noted that Anthropic had been under pressure from the Pentagon to relax restrictions on the military use of its models.
And it wasn’t a sudden surge in pressure. As early as September 2025, we had wondered whether the AI bubble was being propped up by the winds of war: whilst MIT confirmed that 95 per cent of generative AI pilot projects in companies were failing, in July the CDAO, the Pentagon’s office for data and artificial intelligence, awarded contracts for cutting-edge AI to OpenAI, Anthropic, Google and xAI: when the civilian market fell short, the military market acted as a safety net.
Those who sell the safety net today also sit at the table where decisions are made about when to jump
It is therefore in the defence sector that the governance gap is widest and least visible. In the United States, the very people who sell the technology are tasked with bridging this gap. In Europe, quite simply, the proposed legislation (the AI Act) stops precisely where the defence sector begins.
And what about Italy?
In Italy, European rearmament, for the time being, is primarily a matter of public finances. Of the 14.9 billion in SAFE loans earmarked for our country, the government has officially requested 8.9. Minister Crosetto has made it clear: SAFE does not add to military expenditure, but rather finances it, and is considered an alternative to BoTs and CcTs on the basis of cost-effectiveness.
Beneath the surface, the SME sector is making progress, but less so than is often claimed. In the pages of *Startupbusiness*, Marta Abbà had investigated this in the Como district, cross-referencing financial statements with export authorisations under Law 185: camouflage fabrics, electromagnetic shielding, and ammunition components. Examples of excellence do exist, but they remain isolated cases. According to The Weapon Watch, many companies that have switched to the defence sector have not yet recovered their pre-Covid turnover, and military spending remains concentrated on Leonardo and the major groups, with no real spillover to subcontractors.
Where a change of direction is evident, however, is further upstream, in venture capital. NVM Venture Lazio has raised 23.6 millionto invest in 10–15 dual-use start-ups at the pre-seed and seed stages. Of this amount, 18.83 million comes from Lazio Innova via Lazio Venture 2, the regional fund of funds co-financed by the ERDF 2021–2027. Managing the sector, as a key figure alongside Alessandro Casiraghi, is Giorgio Gulienetti, who ended his career at Leonardo as R&D Policy Director. This reflects how European funds for territorial cohesion are finding their way into the dual-use sector, guided by those with in-depth knowledge of the defence industry. This is the result of a political decision: with the mid-term review of cohesion policy in July 2025, Brussels allowed Member States to channel those funds towards defence and security as well, as we reported at the time.
The Italian venture capital sector, for that matter, has already adopted the terminology. In December 2025, at the Luiss Campus in Rome, Zest organised a conference on the ‘dual-use economy’ andlaunched Publica.AI, a platform that connects public administrations, businesses, start-ups, investors and research centres. Among the use cases are: multi-domain situational awareness using satellite data, sensors and drones; cyber defence of critical infrastructure; and digital twins for joint civil-military training. Luigi Capello, founder of Zest, framed it as a matter of ‘technological sovereignty’.
In the United States, Silicon Valley has made its way into the ‘control room’. In Europe, the door to that room is still closed, but the corridor is full of American capital, companies born out of the war, and a single term – ‘dual-use’ – which unlocks almost every door. It remains to be seen who, when that door finally opens, will have written the rules. (image: Depositphotos)
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