Pars Today – Reuters has reported in an investigative report that Iran and its allied forces have carried out at least 135 missile and drone strikes on 84 major US infrastructure sites in Persian Gulf countries since the start of the Third Imposed War on February 28, 2026.

According to Pars Today, Reuters reported that the attacks targeted US infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain, disabling oil and gas facilities, airports, pipelines and strategic equipment linked to US companies. Reuters stressed that the precision of the strikes and the consequences of damage to key equipment had disrupted Washington’s war plans and increased the economic and strategic costs of the war for the United States and the Israeli regime.

The Reuters report should not be viewed merely as a military tally of the number of attacks; rather, it should be seen as an account of how the nature of the war has changed and the regional balance of power has shifted. In the Third Imposed War, Iran relied on precision-guided ballistic missiles and long-range drones, avoiding both a direct war of attrition with the US military and a conventional battlefield confrontation. Instead, by targeting US-linked infrastructure in Persian Gulf countries, it struck at a point where Washington and its allies were most vulnerable.

Oil and gas facilities, airports, pipelines and strategic equipment form the backbone of the region’s economy and logistics. Strikes against these targets had consequences extending beyond direct military damage, affecting economic activity and energy exports.

The first layer of undermining US war plans lies in logistics and support. Washington’s war plans are generally built around secure access to military bases, ports, airports and fuel supply lines across the region. When these facilities come under precision missile and drone attacks, US bases shift from being strategic assets to vulnerable targets. In such circumstances, US commanders are forced to devote a significant portion of their defensive and intelligence capabilities to protecting these very bases — capabilities that were supposed to be used in an attack on Iran. This is where the concept of “neutralization” comes into play. It does not mean the complete defeat of the US military, but rather preventing its war plans from being executed smoothly and swiftly.

The second layer is the increased economic and political cost of the war for Washington and its allies. Attacks on oil and gas facilities and pipelines are not merely military operations; they target the economic lifelines of host countries. These countries, whose economies depend on energy exports, become hostages to the continuation of the war. Reuters has also emphasized that the vulnerability of the region’s concentrated and strategic infrastructure highlights the limitations of protecting these facilities against precision strikes.

The result is political pressure on Washington from regional allies to end the war or, at the very least, reduce its scope. In other words, by targeting US interests in third countries, Iran has turned the regional alliance against itself into a fragile and cautious coalition. The UAE and Kuwait, however, should be excluded from this assessment, as they have continued to call for the war against Iran to continue despite suffering extensive damage.

The third layer is deterrence through punishment. In the Third Imposed War, Iran demonstrated that if the United States sought to carry out its war plans, Washington’s interests and those of its allies across the Persian Gulf would be at risk. This deterrence was based not merely on nuclear threats or verbal warnings, but on a demonstrated ability to conduct precise and sustained strikes. The continuation of 135 attacks throughout the war points to Iran’s resilience and strategic stockpiles. Coordination with allied forces also created a multilayered front that complicated US planning. When an adversary does not know where the next attack will come from or which infrastructure will be targeted, it is forced to disperse its forces and adopt a defensive posture.

The fourth layer is psychological and concerns the credibility of US power. The United States has consistently sought to project an image of overwhelming strength and an ability to protect its allies. But when US-linked bases and infrastructure in seven countries across the region are targeted and damaged, that image begins to crack. Regional countries realize that the US security umbrella is not guaranteed. This creates an opening for Iran to increase the strategic costs of the war for Washington and gain the upper hand in negotiations over how the war ends. Reuters has also identified these attacks as one of the factors increasing the economic and strategic costs of the war for the United States and the Israeli regime.

The role of Iran’s missile and drone operations in the Third Imposed War should be understood within the framework of a strategy of “imposing reciprocal costs.” By targeting sensitive infrastructure linked to the United States, Iran pushed Washington’s war plan off its fast, low-cost course and turned it into a costly, protracted conflict fraught with uncertainty.

These attacks effectively held US bases hostage, turned regional allies into sources of pressure on Washington, and enabled Iran to strengthen its bargaining power on the diplomatic front as well.

The Reuters report shows that in asymmetric warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles and drones can largely neutralize conventional superiority and shift the balance of power in favor of the side capable of striking with greater precision, selectivity and continuity.