Ukraine’s most important weapon against Russia may not be a drone at all. It is the decision to destroy the systems that let Russia see, before trying to fight what Russia can see.
That is the argument defence analyst Alex Turner makes in a recent episode of The Economist’s podcast, walking host David Rennie through Operation Vivaldi — the campaign that dismantled Russian drone operations around Avdiivka — and the wider economics of Ukraine’s strike campaign. His case: Kyiv’s edge comes from attacking information and supply chains, not from matching Russian mass. The corollary is less comfortable. The same strikes that degrade Russia’s war machine also raise diesel prices and shipping insurance worldwide, handing Moscow a political weapon aimed at Ukraine’s supporters.
The front line is empty, and that is the whole problem
Turner starts with a picture of the battlefield that explains everything else. The front line in Ukraine, he says, has become a depopulated kill zone 20 to 40 km wide, where anything moving on the surface dies quickly. He compares it to flying over the First World War in a Sopwith Camel: you would see trench lines and almost nothing else, because everyone was underground.
That creates a brutal problem for any attacker: how do you emerge, mass your forces, and take ground without being destroyed on the way? Russia’s answer has been the German First World War method — small teams of determined infantry infiltrate, find a gap, then wave a larger force forward. In Ukraine, Turner says, that larger force is hit by drones and artillery before it reaches its objective.
Ukraine’s answer required what Turner calls an important mental leap: “Before you attempt anything like that, peel back the system which can see you doing this, because it’s information in warfare that then leads to action.”
Vivaldi: blind the system, then starve it
Operation Vivaldi was built on months of patient intelligence work mapping where Russian drones operated from and how they were resupplied. The first phase hit the supply nodes feeding drones into the system. Only then did Ukrainian forces target headquarters and operators once they were located. Blinding and starving that system created a window for Ukrainian manoeuvre.
Turner’s analogy for the target set is deliberately mundane: “Imagine if you’ve ordered something from Amazon, you know, hit the warehouse rather than attacking the van that’s delivering it to you.”
That is the mental model behind nearly every Ukrainian success he describes — go upstream, hit the node that supplies the delivery system, rather than duelling with the delivery system itself.

An air force Ukraine never had
Ukraine has coined the term “mid-range strike” for hits roughly 200 to 400 km behind enemy lines — Turner notes opinions vary on the exact band. The purpose is to follow any system further up its supply chain. These strikes are primarily the preserve of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, operating large drones piloted from afar through Starlink terminals.
Turner argues this campaign is doing what an air force would have been doing had Ukraine had one. The tasks mirror what tactical air wings did in the Second World War — the Italian campaign’s railway and supply interdiction — and the priority was putting a stranglehold on Crimea.
From there the campaign pivoted. Unmanned Systems Forces around Crimea began this summer hitting shipping in the Sea of Azov and economic targets on Russia’s west coast, such as Novorossiysk, connecting the tactical campaign to the wider economic picture.
The refineries are photogenic. The missile factories matter more.
A chart of Ukrainian strikes beyond roughly 250 km shows a rapid increase. Turner attributes that less to a change of intent — Ukraine would have done this earlier — than to the arrival of the “5.1” long-range drone as a workhorse, bringing previously out-of-range targets into play.
Refineries get the headlines, especially when hit during an economic forum. But Turner is explicit about priorities: “The priority for Ukraine is actually hitting the military supply and production system which is feeding the war and particularly feeding the war being brought upon their own cities.”
Most long-range strikes go after propellant and explosive casing production, aircraft manufacturing and deep maintenance, and ballistic missile production. The aircraft piece matters because it sustains Russia’s glide-bomb fleet — dumb bombs fitted with pop-out wings that travel 80 to 100 km, letting the Russian air force bomb front lines from a safe distance. The factories and maintenance depots behind those bombs are the real target.
Refineries still count, for a simple reason: there are few of them, so a small share of strikes produces an outsized effect.
Turner cites Russian diesel export capacity falling from about 800,000 barrels a day to about 140,000. That number is the bridge between the battlefield and the global fuel market — and to the political trouble discussed below.
Russia’s answer is five times bigger and harder to shoot down
On a comparator chart drawn to the same scale, Turner says Russian strikes on Ukraine exceed Ukraine’s strikes on Russia by orders of magnitude — up to five times greater in volume. Both charts count only successful impacts, not shootdowns.
The recent spike has two drivers. First, a large increase in Russian production: the Shahed-derived Geran drone is the workhorse, and Turner says production targets are now up to about 28,000 a year, from low thousands of predecessor systems one to two years ago. Second, interception has become harder because the drones are jet-powered, with hit rates falling from roughly 8-9 in 10 to 3-4 in 10.
MetricUkraine strikes on RussiaRussia strikes on UkraineRelative volumeBaselineUp to ~5x greaterLong-range workhorse”5.1″ droneShahed-derived GeranStated annual productionNot givenUp to ~28,000Interception rate (Russian drones)n/aDown to ~3-4 in 10
The diesel question: smart militarily, costly politically
Rennie puts the awkward question directly to Turner: by cutting global diesel supply and raising prices, did Ukraine hurt American consumers and Donald Trump politically rather than hurting Russia?
Turner does not blame Ukraine. He notes the country is the weaker party and a victim of a much stronger system, and that stepping too far back to judge “pain” in the abstract misses how desperate Kyiv is. He also says Ukraine could not, or did not, factor the Iran war into its calculations.
The diesel numbers in the wider market show the stakes. U.S. average diesel stood at $6.13 a gallon in mid-November — down from $6.33 when Trump signed a sanctions waiver in October, but up 63% from $3.76 before the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran began in late February. A tanker loaded with 40,000 metric tons of Russian diesel has been idling off the U.S. East Coast, unable to find a buyer despite the waiver, as sanctions law, banking caution and political opposition override presidential intent. That standoff is the clearest illustration of how a single Ukrainian strike decision can echo through American pump prices and midterm politics.
The Black Sea insurance bill is where Ukraine’s own costs show up
Turner’s sharper criticism is reserved for the Black Sea. Ukraine had established a grain corridor running close to NATO territory and recovered meaningful grain exports, with ships hugging the coastline to avoid open water. Russia could only hit those ships deniably — a drifting mine or stray drone — but any unattributed incident would raise insurance costs for everyone.
That changed when Ukraine began hitting export facilities on the eastern Black Sea. Turner says Ukraine claims damage to 116 merchant ships in the Sea of Azov, and Black Sea insurance prices rocketed. He cites insurance press from the morning of the recording putting the spike — not the average — at 20% of a vessel’s value for docking at Novorossiysk.
Rennie supplies the historical yardstick that makes that number look extreme: “In the Battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War the insurance premium for a merchant ship was 1% of whole value and that was when the Wolfpacks were actively sinking ships hand over fist.”

Moscow’s real strategy is to spread the pain
Turner frames the whole exchange as an asymmetry of blame. Ukraine, fighting for its life, is willing to punch hard in painful places. Russia’s game is to ensure that pain is felt widely — by Trump as American pain, by other countries as surging food prices — so that Putin can convince people it is Ukraine’s fault.
This is the article’s central tension. Tactical success and political success diverge. A strike that degrades Russian refining or Black Sea export capacity can simultaneously raise diesel prices for U.S. voters and insurance costs for neutral shipping, giving Moscow material for its argument that Kyiv is the author of global economic disruption.
The broader oil market is already pricing in both directions. Brent fell to $91.62 a barrel on the same day, down about 21% since the start of November, as traders weighed peace-talk signals against the reality that roughly 30% of Russian refining capacity has been offline since late October following renewed Ukrainian drone attacks, including a strike on the Baltic port of Ust-Luga. Diplomacy may remove the risk premium; demining and insurance costs mean physical flows would lag any deal by months.
What to watch
The through-line across these campaigns is that Ukraine’s best results come from attacking the information and supply systems that enable Russian action, not from matching Russian mass. Vivaldi, the mid-range campaign against Crimea, and the long-range strikes on glide-bomb and missile production all follow that logic. The unresolved tension is that the same logic produces global price effects — diesel, insurance, food — that Russia can convert into political pressure on Ukraine’s supporters. The open questions are whether Ukraine can sustain interception rates against jet-powered Gerans, whether Russian production of roughly 28,000 drones a year holds, and whether Kyiv can calibrate future economic strikes to avoid handing Moscow the blame narrative.
For investors, the signal is that this war now transmits through three channels at once: energy, shipping insurance, and politics. Refining outages in Russia are bullish for diesel cracks even as peace headlines pressure crude. Black Sea war-risk premiums are a direct tax on grain and oil movements and a leading indicator of escalation. And every strike decision has a political price tag attached — which means the next phase of this campaign will be judged as much in Washington and on the world’s fuel markets as on the battlefield around Avdiivka.