Nevertheless, the American shift matters because a subject once dismissed as inadmissible has entered the negotiating agenda.

Until recently, Washington’s diplomatic efforts had focused on territory, and that appears to have been the principal issue at the Anchorage meeting in August 2025.

Moscow, however, has never abandoned what it calls the root causes of the conflict, which are the wider arrangements governing European security and for the first time, those issues are being addressed by the other side as part of a possible settlement, but this doesn’t mean agreement is close because the obstacles remain formidable.

The first is Western Europe’s determination to resist any settlement that gives Moscow a role in reshaping the continent’s security order, and the second is the changing political balance in Washington.

The Republicans’ defeat in the midterm elections has weakened Donald Trump and strengthened those who oppose his approach to Russia.

Trump insists he will continue pursuing his foreign policy regardless, and he may well do so, but domestic resistance will intensify, while Western European leaders, many of whom would like to see him reduced from a lame duck to a dead duck, will take encouragement.

Together with Kyiv, they have already shown that they can frustrate initiatives from the White House, and they will now believe their leverage has increased.

And yet Abu Dhabi could still prove a turning point, not merely because the agenda has widened, but because the circumstances surrounding the negotiations are changing.

Ukraine’s financial and military requirements continue to grow as Kyiv needs more money to sustain the state, more weapons, and greater outside support for almost every aspect of the war effort, and Western Europe is finding it increasingly difficult to meet these demands.

The United States, meanwhile, is no longer willing to finance Ukraine on the previous scale, and this reluctance may outlast Trump. Democrats will accuse him of appeasing the Kremlin and abandoning Kyiv, but the pressure to prioritise domestic concerns is growing in their own ranks.

Ukraine’s internal position is also becoming more precarious with economic, social, and political strains accumulating, while Zelensky has little incentive to compromise given retreat would threaten the foundations of his authority.

For now, he retains some room for manoeuvre, but what happens during and after the winter is much less certain, particularly if Western assistance does not increase.

There are signs, too, of unease within Western Europe’s establishment.

The recent calls to Putin by the Norwegian prime minister and Finnish president, whatever explanation they offered, suggest a dawning recognition that the present policy has reached its limits and that it makes little sense to demand a place at the negotiating table while refusing to speak to one of the principal parties.

A common Western boycott of Russia was at least a coherent strategy while Washington participated in it, but once the United States resumed direct engagement, Western Europe’s refusal to do likewise became an obstacle not only to diplomacy but to its own influence.

The prospect of a trilateral meeting between the leaders of Russia, China, and the United States in Shenzhen remains open and should it take place, the symbolism will be unmistakable in that the major powers are increasingly discussing the future of international security without Europe.

That’s the deeper significance of Abu Dhabi.

There may be no immediate agreement, and certainly no easy peace, but the debate is beginning to move beyond the Ukrainian front line towards the question Moscow raised before the fighting began, which is what kind of security order can Europe live with, and who gets to decide?

* Fyodor Lukyanov is the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs and Research Director of the Valdai International Discussion Club. This article was originally published at https://rt-english.com/

** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Media Group.