The clearest trade of the Iran war may not have been in oil. It was in Chinese solar panels, batteries and electric cars.
China’s monthly exports of clean-energy goods averaged about $15 billion in the twelve months before the US-Israel war with Iran began, and jumped to roughly $21 billion a month through July, according to Ethan Zindler, head of country and policy research at BloombergNEF, speaking on the Trumponomics podcast. That is a 40% step up, and it happened in a sector where cause and effect are usually impossible to pin down.
“The war we considered to have been a true turning point or a catalyst for clean energy deployment,” Zindler said. Most energy projects take years to move from decision to steel, which blurs the impact of any single event. Consumer goods are different. Once a buyer can adopt an EV, a rooftop solar system or a home battery, the spending shows up in the trade data within weeks.
Zindler acknowledged one caveat: China changed an export tax rule that could explain a single-month spike. But the gain held month after month, which points to real demand rather than accounting.
Host Stephanie Flanders pressed exactly that point. “We thought the first month that might be the real reason for it, but actually the consistent performance it suggests the market has really expanded,” she said. China is where to look because it makes the vast majority of the world’s photovoltaic panels, EVs and batteries, and a great deal of its wind equipment.
The US kept the walls and removed the fertilizer
The contrast with America is the heart of the conversation. Bloomberg News Americas managing editor Craig Trudell described a US EV market “still kind of down in the dumps,” and traced the cause to a decade of policy whiplash. President Obama set ambitious fuel-efficiency targets. Trump slashed them in his first term. Biden restored and raised them, then the Inflation Reduction Act pushed serious capital into battery plants and EV factories.
Now that support is gone too. “The Inflation Reduction Act was hugely consequential and effective in getting industry to really put serious amounts of money into standing up battery plants and electric vehicle factories,” Trudell said. “The rug has really been pulled out from under those manufacturers.”
The US has built what amounts to a walled garden for its carmakers: a 100% tariff on Chinese vehicles, rules targeting “connected cars,” and until recently a $7,500 credit for new EV purchases. Remove the credit and you keep the walls but lose the fertilizer. Domestic producers end up protected from competition without being helped to scale.
FactorUnited StatesEurope and other marketsChinese EVsEffectively walled off by 100% tariffWidely sold and affordableNew-EV purchase credit$7,500 federal credit removedVaries; EU debating quotasGasoline contextAbout $4 a gallonUK equivalent roughly $8.80 a gallonAverage new vehicle price$50,000-plus—Consumer preferenceLarge pickups and SUVs; hybrids risingShift toward Chinese EVs

Why $4 gasoline doesn’t sell Americans an EV
The gasoline argument sounds stronger than it is. Americans are unhappy about $4 a gallon, but British drivers pay roughly the equivalent of $8.80. The real obstacle is the sticker price. With the average new US vehicle above $50,000 and EVs typically carrying a premium on top, the payback period on an electric car stays long even when fuel gets expensive.
That arithmetic explains the boom in hybrids. Trudell said the “Prius type” is hot again, and the competitive order is shifting with it. Toyota is giving GM a serious run for its money in a way not seen in years, while Hyundai is threatening Ford.
The quiet corner of the US market: a million used EVs
Zindler pushed back, gently, on the idea that American EV adoption is uniformly dead. His evidence is the used market. Three-year leases are ending and, by one estimate, as many as a million used EVs are coming back to dealers. Battery degradation has been less severe than many buyers feared, which makes those cars good value.
“Used-EV sales are harder to track than new ones,” he said, which is precisely why the segment may be underestimated. It is the one affordable channel in a market where new EVs remain out of reach for many buyers.
Six in ten cars in China are now electric
If the US is the outlier, China is the norm. “In China, about six in 10 cars being sold in recent months have been electric or plug-in hybrid electric vehicles,” Zindler said. “In fact, even three in 10 trucks are electric now or plug-in hybrid electric trucks as well.”
China was a marginal auto exporter five or six years ago. It is now the world’s number one auto-exporting country. Trudell’s ground-level example: land in São Paulo and hail an Uber to the airport, and very likely a BYD pulls up. Chinese models in those markets are cheaper, easier to buy and better equipped than the alternatives.
Europe is reacting late. Zindler’s read is that European carmakers, German ones especially, resisted erecting barriers to Chinese cars because they saw China as an export market for themselves. That bet soured once China’s own market came to be dominated by domestic brands. The cost is now visible in European autos, where Volkswagen has discussed tens of thousands of job cuts.

Washington’s China wall is bipartisan — and unlikely to fall
Keeping Chinese cars out is one of the few things both parties in Washington agree on. The driver is fear of what entry would do to GM and Ford factory jobs. Even Trump’s occasional suggestion that Chinese manufacturers could come in “as long as they build here” is unlikely to change anything, Trudell said, because Chinese companies know how unpopular they are on Capitol Hill and in state houses.
“Nobody wants to see Chinese car makers come in, in part because I think the writing’s on the wall in terms of what that would do,” he said.
Grassroots pressure is building anyway. A Bloomberg Businessweek story earlier this year covered Americans coveting cheap, tech-forward Xiaomi cars, and Chinese buyers are already choosing those over Teslas. Trudell expects an increasingly online US consumer to ask why the same cars are unavailable at home.
His deeper worry is structural, and personal. “There’s a sort of long-term concern that I have as a native of Michigan that GM and Ford over some decades now have largely kind of retreated back to this very protected, very unique home market,” he said.
No other market buys trucks and SUVs as large as Americans do. If GM and Ford cannot build an attractive, affordable smaller car that competes in the rest of the world, their long-term future is in question. Apart from Tesla, no US manufacturer has mounted a credible EV response.
Trump slowed clean energy — but 2026 is set to be a record year
The political story in Washington is mostly about retrenchment. Zindler said Trump has done everything he can to revive coal and slow clean energy: through legislation, through legal challenges to specific projects, and through what he called intentional incompetence in failing to answer permit requests.
Yet BloombergNEF expects record US deployment of wind, solar and storage capacity in 2026. Two forces are doing the lifting.
The first is demand. AI and data centers are pushing overall electricity consumption higher, and, in Zindler’s phrase, “that kind of rising tide is lifting all boats.”
The second is a messaging shift. Zindler argues the clean-energy industry has always been better at selling the net-zero environmental story than the energy-security one. That is changing, because energy security is now the stronger pitch. Own a rooftop solar system or a desert solar array, and the fuel is effectively yours.
On the broader net-zero question he declined a clean answer, calling it a multivariate problem with many unknowns. BloombergNEF research does find that as the world shifts to lower-carbon sources, the need to import fuel falls — modestly under business as usual, and much faster on a net-zero path.
What to watch
The through-line across the episode is that the Iran war produced a demand shock that Chinese manufacturers were best positioned to serve. Zindler’s export numbers, Trudell’s BYD anecdote and China’s six-in-ten EV penetration all point the same way.
For investors, the question is whether the US protected market eventually produces a competitive Detroit or merely delays a reckoning. The Iran war itself is already fading as a price driver: Brent settled at $95.82 a barrel on Nov. 12 even as the International Energy Agency said global supply exceeded demand this quarter for the first time since the war began, flipping its fourth-quarter forecast from deficit to a surplus of about 1.7 million barrels a day. The oil risk premium is loosening; the policy premium in autos is not.
That makes three signposts worth tracking. First, whether the EU follows through on Chinese-EV quotas, which would tell you whether Europe repeats America’s walled-garden mistake. Second, whether used EVs become a measurable growth channel in the US, the one path to affordable adoption that does not require a subsidy. Third, whether GM and Ford can build a car the rest of the world wants before the online American consumer starts asking why Xiaomi and BYD are unavailable in their own driveway. The export surge may normalize as war-driven demand fades. The structural gap between China’s six-in-ten and America’s stalled EV market will not.