
Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa stands next to Peru’s President Keiko Fujimori (unseen) during the ceremony marking the transfer of the Pro Tempore Presidency of the Andean Community during the 17th Peru-Ecuador Binational Cabinet meeting at the Government Palace in Lima on October 20, 2026.
Photo by Connie FRANCE / AFP via Getty Images
The Briefing:President Noboa told digital outlet Altavoz on November 15 that U.S. personnel at Taura Air Base are conducting only “temporary activities of security and intelligence cooperation” — not operating a permanent base.An AFP investigation published in October documented roughly 20 U.S. military flights into Taura between June and mid-October, along with dozens of tent installations and new construction at the facility.Ecuador’s Air Force commander, Lieutenant General Mauricio Salazar, was removed from his post two days after formally requesting legal clarity on the status of U.S. military operations at the base.
Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa flatly denied on Sunday that the United States operates a military base on Ecuadorian soil — even as documented evidence of aircraft deployments, construction activity, and troop infrastructure at Taura Air Base continues to mount. His denial does nothing to resolve the constitutional crisis it has opened.
The stakes are significant. Ecuador embedded a prohibition on foreign military bases into its constitution in 2008, and the ongoing expansion at Taura comes one year after nearly 61% of Ecuadorians voted down a November 2025 referendum proposal that would have lifted that ban.
Noboa’s Position: “It’s an Ecuadorian Base”
Speaking to Altavoz on November 15, Noboa offered a semantic defense of the arrangement at Taura, located roughly an hour outside Guayaquil. “No es una base estadounidense, es una base ecuatoriana,” he said — insisting that while U.S. forces are present, the facility remains under Ecuadorian command authority.
Noboa described the American role as narrowly scoped: drone flights to gather intelligence against drug trafficking organizations, framed as bilateral cooperation rather than a permanent foreign footprint. He offered no elaboration on the construction activity or the tent installations that AFP had already placed on record, nor did he address the U.S. aircraft documented at the base.
What AFP’s Investigation Actually Found
The AFP inquiry, published in October, was not built on secondhand accounts. Investigators documented the arrival of approximately 20 U.S. military flights between June and mid-October, the installation of dozens of tents, and infrastructure construction at Taura — Ecuador’s only airfield reserved exclusively for military use, with a runway exceeding 3,000 meters capable of handling heavy transport aircraft. Some of those flights connected Taura directly to U.S. military installations in North Carolina and Delaware, with layovers in Puerto Rico and Panama.
The scale of that footprint makes the “temporary cooperation” framing difficult to sustain. Activity of that scope typically accompanies longer-term operational planning, not a brief training rotation.
The General Who Asked a Reasonable Question — and Was Dismissed
Perhaps the clearest signal of how sensitive the government considers this issue: Lieutenant General Mauricio Salazar, then commander general of the Ecuadorian Air Force, sent a formal letter to the Joint Command of the Armed Forces on September 8, requesting legal guidelines on hosting U.S. military personnel at Taura without violating Ecuador’s constitution. He specifically cited Article 5 of Ecuador’s charter and stressed the need for the Air Force to retain unconditional operational and administrative control of the base. Two days later, on September 10, Noboa signed Executive Decree 496 removing Salazar as Air Force commander and reassigning him to less senior duties.
Requesting legal clarity on foreign troops operating inside a national military installation is a standard institutional responsibility — not an act of insubordination. Salazar’s dismissal signals that the Noboa administration is unwilling to engage even internal scrutiny of the arrangement, let alone the public constitutional debate it deserves.
The Legal Architecture Behind the Arrangement
Noboa has not been acting without a legal scaffold. A Status of Forces Agreement, originally signed in October 2023 and ratified by Noboa via executive decree in February 2024, grants U.S. military personnel and contractors privileges equivalent to diplomatic immunity when operating in joint missions on Ecuadorian soil. That framework gives the arrangement a legal veneer — though it was ratified without a popular mandate and was never presented to the legislature, after Ecuador’s Constitutional Court ruled in January 2024 that the cooperation agreements did not constitute a treaty establishing foreign bases and therefore did not require congressional approval.
The bilateral relationship has deepened considerably since then. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called Ecuador a “model partner” during a Pentagon meeting with Noboa in June. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, visiting Quito in September, went further, hailing Ecuador as the most “aggressive” partner in the Trump administration’s push against transnational criminal networks across the Western Hemisphere.
A Constitutional Line That Keeps Getting Blurred
When Ecuadorians went to the polls in November 2025, nearly 61% rejected the proposal to lift the constitutional ban on foreign military bases — the same prohibition that has governed the country since the 2008 charter took effect and that ended the U.S. lease at the Manta Air Base in 2009.
What Noboa is now doing — permitting a de facto operational presence under SOFA cover while insisting it does not constitute a “base” — tests the limits of that mandate directly. The legal distinction between a “temporary cooperation mission” and a functioning foreign military installation ultimately comes down to permanence, infrastructure, and command authority. On all three counts, the documented reality at Taura sits in uncomfortable tension with the official framing. Whether Ecuador’s legislature, judiciary, or electorate will accept Noboa’s semantic split remains the central political question — and one the president has shown no appetite to answer directly.
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