{"id":28100,"date":"2026-10-08T03:42:18","date_gmt":"2026-10-08T03:42:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/28100\/"},"modified":"2026-10-08T03:42:18","modified_gmt":"2026-10-08T03:42:18","slug":"what-seoul-and-kyiv-should-learn-from-the-north-korean-pow-dispute","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/28100\/","title":{"rendered":"What Seoul and Kyiv Should Learn from the North Korean POW Dispute"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-34547\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/PIC0072366-KCTV-300x200.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"300\" height=\"200\"  \/>(Source: Korean Central Television)<\/p>\n<p>The dispute over two North Korean soldiers transferred from Ukraine to South Korea has exposed a weakness in cooperation between governments confronting the military partnership between Russia and North Korea. Some twenty months after their capture by Ukrainian forces, Kyiv and Seoul completed the transfer of the two soldiers to Seoul\u2019s custody. However, the dispute that ensued over the disclosure of this transfer now threatens to affect the wider relationship. While we wait to see how this diplomatic incident is resolved, there is a larger lesson here. With North Koreans still present in and assisting Russia\u2019s war efforts, the two countries should use what they\u2019ve learned from this experience to establish clearer rules for handling future North Korean prisoners, from protecting their identities and assessing their wishes, to aligning messaging and transfer protocols.<\/p>\n<p>An Escalating Dispute<\/p>\n<p>On September 23, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/sep\/29\/south-korea-ukraine-north-korea-prisoners-of-war-dispute-explainer\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">announced<\/a> that the country had \u201csent two North Korean prisoners of war to the Republic of Korea\u201d at the United Nations General Assembly. However, the following day, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung <a href=\"https:\/\/en.yna.co.kr\/view\/AEN20260925000200315\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">said<\/a> on X that Ukraine had breached \u201ca non-disclosure agreement\u201d about the fate of the prisoners. Dmytro Lytvyn, communications adviser to Zelenskyy, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2026\/09\/25\/8055035\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">denied<\/a> that such an agreement existed. South Korea <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/south-korea-summons-ukraine-envoy-protest-over-north-korean-pow-transfer-2026-09-28\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">summoned<\/a> Ukraine\u2019s acting ambassador on September 28, and on October 2, Lee <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/Jaemyung_Lee\/status\/2105834441973375354\" rel=\"nofollow\">warned<\/a> of further measures unless Kyiv acknowledged the agreement and apologized. In the <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/Jaemyung_Lee\/status\/2105834441973375354\" rel=\"nofollow\">same post<\/a>, Lee said that denying the agreement had made him a \u201cliar.\u201d He described the issue as a matter of dignity for South Korea and its people.<\/p>\n<p>South Korea\u2019s foreign ministry has described a \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/en.yna.co.kr\/view\/AEN20260929009300315\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">clear understanding<\/a>\u201d that the transfer would remain confidential. However, the precise terms of any such arrangement, and how they were communicated in each government, remain unclear from the public record. What is clear is that the dispute has moved beyond the two soldiers: voices within South Korea\u2019s ruling party are now <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/sep\/29\/south-korea-ukraine-north-korea-prisoners-of-war-dispute-explainer\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">questioning<\/a> whether assistance to Ukraine should continue.<\/p>\n<p>Following Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion in February 2022, South Korea <a href=\"https:\/\/world.kbs.co.kr\/service\/news_view.htm?lang=e&amp;Seq_Code=167889\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">condemned<\/a> Moscow and joined international sanctions. In July 2026, Lee <a href=\"https:\/\/www.koreajoongangdaily.com\/korea\/lee-offers-100-million-for-ukraine-reconstruction-in-first-official-summit-with-zelensky-at-nato\/12762285\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">pledged<\/a> $100 million in support for Ukraine, including humanitarian assistance and support for recovery and reconstruction. Like Japan, South Korea has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mofa.go.jp\/press\/release\/pressite_000001_02376.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">focused<\/a> on humanitarian assistance and non-lethal equipment rather than supplying lethal weapons directly to Ukraine, reflecting Seoul\u2019s cautious approach to involvement in the war.<\/p>\n<p>This caution has a wider diplomatic context. Russia was a significant trading <a href=\"https:\/\/www.9dashline.com\/article\/from-equidistance-to-engagement-the-evolution-of-russias-korea-strategy\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">partner<\/a> for South Korea before the war, particularly in the manufacturing and energy sectors. South Korea-based car brands, Kia and Hyundai, were Russia\u2019s second- and third-best-selling car <a href=\"https:\/\/www.koreatimes.co.kr\/business\/companies\/20251119\/will-hyundai-motor-return-to-russia\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">brands<\/a>, respectively, in 2021, while Russia <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/south-korea-considers-importing-russian-oil-naphtha-industry-ministry-says-2026-03-19\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">supplied<\/a> about 6 percent of South Korea\u2019s crude oil imports that year. Although Seoul subsequently halted Russian crude purchases, Middle Eastern supply disruptions prompted the government to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/south-korea-considers-importing-russian-oil-naphtha-industry-ministry-says-2026-03-19\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">discuss<\/a> importing Russian crude and naphtha in March 2026. This illustrates the competing pressures of supporting sanctions against Moscow and securing alternative energy supplies.<\/p>\n<p>South Korea also has a <a href=\"https:\/\/unikorea.go.kr\/web\/eng_unikorea\/contents\/whatwedo_support\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">system<\/a> for receiving and supporting North Korean defectors, and accepting the two soldiers was consistent with its policy of offering protection to North Koreans who wish to settle in the South. Seoul\u2019s reason for keeping the transfer confidential <a href=\"https:\/\/www.afp.com\/en\/seoul-summons-ukraine-envoy-row-over-north-korean-pows\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">centered<\/a> on the safety of the men and their families. The transfer was particularly sensitive for the Lee administration seeking to improve relations with Pyongyang while managing the security implications of closer Russian\u2013North Korean military ties.<\/p>\n<p>For Kyiv, the soldiers\u2019 fate was also tied to efforts to bring home Ukrainians held by Russia. Captured in Russia\u2019s Kursk region in January 2025, the two North Koreans <a href=\"https:\/\/www.koreaherald.com\/article\/10884141\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">reportedly<\/a> wanted to settle in South Korea. Moscow, however, had twice <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2026\/05\/04\/8033032\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">requested<\/a> them in exchange negotiations, a Ukrainian official said in May. Their transfer to Seoul therefore raised a difficult question: why send prisoners sought by Moscow to South Korea rather than retain them for a possible exchange that might bring Ukrainian soldiers home? This gave the transfer a political sensitivity that went beyond accommodating the men\u2019s wishes or Seoul\u2019s request.<\/p>\n<p>According to lawmakers briefed by South Korea\u2019s National Intelligence Service (NIS), Ukraine initially <a href=\"https:\/\/world.kbs.co.kr\/service\/news_view.htm?lang=e&amp;Seq_Code=204567\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">requested<\/a> confidentiality because of \u201cthe potential impact on prisoner exchanges with Russia.\u201d Yet the announcement might also have offered a political benefit. The NIS <a href=\"https:\/\/world.kbs.co.kr\/service\/news_view.htm?lang=e&amp;Seq_Code=204567\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">assessed<\/a> that Zelenskyy may have hoped publicizing the transfer would encourage South Korean support for greater assistance to Ukraine, including weapons, although this is an assessment of his motives, rather than a confirmed explanation.<\/p>\n<p>A Successful Transfer, a Diplomatic Rift<\/p>\n<p>Despite their different priorities, Seoul and Kyiv agreed on the transfer. At their July 8 meeting, Lee and Zelenskyy <a href=\"https:\/\/en.yna.co.kr\/view\/AEN20260708011552315\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">committed<\/a> to handling the prisoners\u2019 situation in accordance with international law and humanitarian principles while respecting their wishes. According to South Korean officials, the men <a href=\"https:\/\/en.yna.co.kr\/view\/AEN20261001011500315\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">arrived<\/a> in Seoul in mid-September. On October 2, a senior foreign ministry official said that the men\u2019s wishes to settle in South Korea had been <a href=\"https:\/\/news.sbs.co.kr\/english\/article.do?news_id=N1008780616\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">verified<\/a> repeatedly by both governments and an unidentified third party.<\/p>\n<p>The transfer was thus a substantive achievement, but it soon became a source of political contention in Seoul. On September 25, a Democratic Party spokesperson <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chosun.com\/english\/national-en\/2026\/09\/25\/6DKQE6BB6VBZXDVFIP7YIRHR4U\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">criticized<\/a> the disclosure as damaging bilateral trust and endangering the soldiers and their families. Kim Byung-joo, lawmaker and special presidential adviser for defense policy, went further, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mk.co.kr\/en\/politics\/12164782\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">calling for<\/a> an immediate review of assistance to Ukraine, although he clarified that this was his \u201cpersonal opinion.\u201d However, opposition criticism took a different direction: People Power Party leader Jang Dong-hyeok <a href=\"https:\/\/www.upi.com\/Top_News\/World-News\/2026\/10\/05\/politics-opposition-leader-ukraine-dmz-mine-explosion\/5051791235325\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">accused<\/a> Lee of showing \u201cuncontrolled anger toward Ukraine\u201d while remaining conciliatory toward Pyongyang. Meanwhile, the government was considering a stronger diplomatic response. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun <a href=\"https:\/\/en.yna.co.kr\/view\/AEN20261006005600315?section=national\/diplomacy\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">confirmed<\/a> on October 6 that recalling South Korea\u2019s ambassador to Ukraine was among the options under review.<\/p>\n<p>Why Cooperation Still Matters<\/p>\n<p>Despite some negative reactions from Seoul, there are also voices <a href=\"https:\/\/asianews.network\/kyiv-and-seoul-share-concerns-over-pyongyangs-role-in-the-ukraine-war-so-why-the-diplomatic-rift\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">calling<\/a> for broader cooperation not to be impacted by the latest exchange of accusations. For South Korea, the reasons to work with Ukraine extend beyond solidarity with a country under invasion. Ukrainian forces have direct experience of fighting North Korean troops and encountering North Korean weapons. Information from that experience can help Seoul assess the capabilities and limitations of the forces it faces on the peninsula.<\/p>\n<p>Russia\u2019s military cooperation with North Korea <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2026\/09\/north-koreas-military-partnership-russia-has-consequences-far-beyond-ukraine\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">gives<\/a> Seoul a direct stake in developments on the Ukrainian battlefield. Pyongyang\u2019s forces are gaining combat experience, while Russian support and potential technology transfers could contribute to capabilities that South Korea must prepare to face at home. Cooperation with Kyiv can help South Korea better assess what North Korea is learning, and how that knowledge might affect its forces.<\/p>\n<p>Ukraine also has an interest in preserving South Korean support. According to its foreign ministry, South Korea <a href=\"https:\/\/mfa.gov.ua\/en\/news\/oleksandr-mishchenko-proviv-zustrich-iz-zastupnikom-ministra-zakordonnih-sprav-respubliki-koreya-dzhong-jon-du\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">provided<\/a> more than $550 million in assistance between 2022 and 2025, including contributions through international organizations and equipment for demining, engineering, and medical care. Deliveries of ambulances, generators, and mine-clearing vehicles have supported essential services during the war. The relationship also offers a basis for longer-term recovery: a bilateral agreement <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kmu.gov.ua\/en\/news\/ukraina-otrymaie-mozhlyvist-zaluchaty-kredytni-resursy-zahalnym-obsiahom-do-21-mlrd-vid-pivdennoi-korei-uriady-krain-pidpysaly-vidpovidnu-uhodu\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">allows<\/a> Ukraine to access up to $2.1 billion in development loans between 2024 and 2029. Even without direct supplies of lethal weapons, South Korean support therefore matters to Ukraine\u2019s ability to sustain civilian life and rebuild after the war.<\/p>\n<p>Looking Ahead<\/p>\n<p>Assuming South Korea-Ukraine cooperation continues, there are lessons to be learned from this experience that suggest a need for a framework for dealing with potentially future North Korean prisoners of war. The aim should be to preserve the procedures that worked in this case and reduce the likelihood of another dispute.<\/p>\n<p>A prisoner\u2019s freely expressed wishes must remain the starting point. Seoul\u2019s account <a href=\"https:\/\/news.sbs.co.kr\/english\/article.do?news_id=N1008780616\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">suggests<\/a> that multiple meaningful checks occurred before this transfer including by a third party; future arrangements should build on that experience. The governments should agree on a process that includes confidential advice, third party involvement, and an opportunity to reconsider before departure.<\/p>\n<p>The legal basis for a transfer and the responsibilities that follow should also be clear to both sides. The International Committee of the Red Cross <a href=\"https:\/\/www.icrc.org\/en\/document\/prisoners-war-what-you-need-know\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">explains<\/a> that non-refoulement protections apply to prisoners of war facing relevant risks of persecution, torture, or death upon return. An individual\u2019s wish to reach South Korea must be considered alongside those obligations. The two governments should establish how applicable protections continue through departure, reception, and any subsequent custody, drawing on independent legal and humanitarian expertise where needed.<\/p>\n<p>Protection also depends on how information is handled. In an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.koreaherald.com\/article\/10671300\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">interview<\/a> with The Korea Herald earlier this year, UN special rapporteur Elizabeth Salm\u00f3n warned that public exposure could endanger the soldiers and their families. The men\u2019s identities and reported wishes had already appeared in the media before the transfer was announced. That earlier publicity could not be undone, but it did not make disclosure of their arrival inconsequential because the release of new information can create different risks.<\/p>\n<p>Those risks should be assessed carefully. The Third Geneva Convention <a href=\"https:\/\/ihl-databases.icrc.org\/en\/ihl-treaties\/gciii-1949\/article-13\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">protects<\/a> POWs from public curiosity; the ICRC\u2019s guidance emphasizes the dangers of publishing identifying information, including when prisoners appear willing to participate. In future cases, Seoul and Kyiv should consider these protections early in the process and take greater care when handling photos, videos, and other identifying information that could endanger prisoners or their families in North Korea. There should also be different protocols for how to disclose their preferences versus what is disclosed about their fate, and how it should be messaged to various audiences. These decisions must be aligned both for the protection of the prisoners and to prevent the kind of diplomatic disputes the countries face today.<\/p>\n<p>Containing the Fallout<\/p>\n<p>The immediate task is to keep the current disagreement from consuming the relationship. On October 1, Yonhap <a href=\"https:\/\/en.yna.co.kr\/view\/AEN20261001011500315\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">reported<\/a> Seoul said the dispute \u201cwould not be linked to other areas of bilateral cooperation, including humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and joint postwar reconstruction efforts.\u201d Pressure within the ruling party to reconsider support should therefore be distinguished from a government decision to do so.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, diplomatic channels seem to be actively working to resolve this matter. On October 1, Sybiha <a href=\"https:\/\/newsukraine.rbc.ua\/news\/north-korean-prisoner-dispute-ukraine-moves-1790887756.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">said<\/a> he hoped for a swift resolution, emphasizing South Korea\u2019s importance to Ukraine and his wish to sustain their cooperation. On October 6, Cho <a href=\"https:\/\/m-en.yna.co.kr\/view\/AEN20261006005600315\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">said<\/a> that messages from Sybiha had included an apology, although it fell short of Seoul\u2019s expectations. Both governments should use those channels to address the disputed commitments and establish common expectations for future cases.<\/p>\n<p>The two soldiers reached South Korea because Seoul and Kyiv were able to reconcile different priorities. Yet agreement on their destination did not prevent a dispute over disclosure. With North Korean forces still involved in Russia\u2019s war, similar cases may arise again. Clearer procedures for assessing prisoners\u2019 wishes, protecting sensitive information, and coordinating transfers would help both governments protect those captured while preserving cooperation that serves their wider security interests.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"(Source: Korean Central Television) The dispute over two North Korean soldiers transferred from Ukraine to South Korea has&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":28101,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[18710,3966,9475,35,2233,170,326],"class_list":["post-28100","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-ukraine-russia","tag-donggak-heo","tag-foreign-affairs","tag-pow","tag-russia","tag-russia-war","tag-russia-ukraine-war","tag-south-korea"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@conflicts\/117403224858068195","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28100","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=28100"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/28100\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/28101"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=28100"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=28100"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=28100"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}