{"id":70673,"date":"2026-11-06T14:41:09","date_gmt":"2026-11-06T14:41:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/70673\/"},"modified":"2026-11-06T14:41:09","modified_gmt":"2026-11-06T14:41:09","slug":"trump-admins-new-cyber-operations-plan-a-french-perspective","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/70673\/","title":{"rendered":"Trump Admin\u2019s New Cyber Operations Plan: A French Perspective"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In August, the Trump administration announced <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2026\/08\/expanding-capabilities-to-combat-transnational-cyber-enabled-crime\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">plans<\/a> to allow vetted private companies to participate in \u201coffensive cyber operations\u201d carried out by the U.S. government. The initiative\u2019s stated primary goal is to reinforce law enforcement\u2019s fight against transnational criminal groups, although it also includes intelligence-gathering and defense features. This change in U.S. policy provides an opportunity to compare the state of other countries\u2019 positions on letting non-state actors conduct active cyber-defense missions.<\/p>\n<p>According to NATO\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/cyberlaw.ccdcoe.org\/wiki\/Glossary\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">website<\/a>, taking action against a malicious cyber operation to mitigate or block its effects is called a hack-back. From the perspective of France, letting private actors conduct hack-back operations is neither acceptable domestically, nor a practice that should be allowed by the international community, especially as the Trump administration\u2019s interpretation of \u201cself-defense\u201d under international law is significantly broader than France\u2019s.<\/p>\n<p>France\u2019s Approach to Fighting Transnational Criminal Groups<\/p>\n<p>France tackles cybercrime through law enforcement as well as through its intelligence services.<\/p>\n<p>Regarding French law enforcement, the fight against cybercrime sits with the Police as well as the Gendarmerie, the latter employing military personnel. Two units lead cyber-operations: the Office Anti-Criminalit\u00e9 (OFAC) that employs police forces focused on cyberattacks, the dark web, and country-wide coordination on cybercrime response; and the Unit\u00e9 Nationale Cyber (UNC), which is staffed with gendarmes to focus on organized crime such as ransomware attacks. The Ministry of Interior provides oversight of both units.<\/p>\n<p>With regard to the new U.S. effort announced in August, the closest policy equivalent for France would be its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.interieur.gouv.fr\/actualites\/actualites-du-ministere\/strategie-nationale-pour-lutter-contre-cybercriminalite?\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">2025-2028 national strategy to combat cybercrime<\/a>. Although the country formally cites public-private partnerships as a pillar of its approach, there is no evidence that France has a program geared toward allowing the private sector to take part in operations against criminal threats. Private partners are involved in threat analysis, forensics, prevention, and crisis management. In simple terms, they support crime prevention and fighting, but companies are not authorized to carry out cyber operations against criminal actors by themselves. Active cyber defense (e.g. penetration of systems, neutralization, disruption) remains entirely in the hands of authorities.<\/p>\n<p>In parallel to law enforcement, as part of their <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000030935040\/2026-09-23\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">legal mandate<\/a>, intelligence services will gather intelligence useful to prevent organized crime and terrorism. France\u2019s intelligence legal framework also does not include any scheme aimed at empowering vetted private actors to conduct intelligence operations.<\/p>\n<p>Circling back to the White House\u2019s policy announcement, President Donald Trump praised the U.S. private sector for providing the country a \u201ccritical offensive cyber advantage.\u201d From a French perspective, law enforcement and the intelligence services have operational powers that include powerful tools, but again, their deployment is controlled by the public sector. For instance, hacking techniques that enable the capture of computer data stored, typed, received or as seen on a screen, are available to French law enforcement via the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000038311624\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">legal basis<\/a> of the infamous <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/programmes\/articles\/DBGyP8G2b95gkPzglbPrbY\/what-happens-when-the-police-crack-an-encrypted-phone-network-used-by-thousands-of-criminals\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">EncroChat<\/a> case, as well as to the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000053415254\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">intelligence services<\/a>, in application of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Interior Security Code. It is noteworthy that although private companies do not have access to such techniques, the list of law enforcement units able to use this type of hacking is long and has been modified approximately every 1.5 years since its adoption in 2015. The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000043887476\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">relevant article of law<\/a> on hacking techniques specifies that tools enabling the collection of computer data are only allowed when such data cannot be collected through any other legally authorized way. In addition, intelligence services deploying hacking techniques must report on each deployment to France\u2019s intelligence independent oversight body, the Commission Nationale de Contr\u00f4le des Techniques de Renseignements (CNCTR). Whether private actors may lead on cyber operations or not, independence of oversight bodies is fundamental when using such technologies. Such a safeguard is no longer as robust in the United States after the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2026\/jul\/14\/federal-officials-fired-by-trump-supreme-court-ruling\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Trump v. Slaughter<\/a> in June, which found that the president can remove the leaders of independent agencies and commissions. This concern was <a href=\"https:\/\/edri.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/The_credibility_of_the_EUs_adequacy_framework.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">raised<\/a> to the European Commission by civil society organisations.<\/p>\n<p>In the past, several United Nations authorities have raised concerns relevant to the impact this new U.S. policy will have on evidence produced by law enforcement. First, in the wake of the Edward Snowden revelations, the U.N. Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/Documents\/HRBodies\/HRCouncil\/RegularSession\/Session23\/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">stressed<\/a> that<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>[o]\ufb00ensive intrusion software such as Trojans [\u2026] not only enable a State to access devices, but also enable them to alter \u2013 inadvertently or purposefully \u2013 the information contained therein. This threatens not only the right to privacy but also procedural fairness rights with respect to the use of such evidence in legal proceedings.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Secondly, in 2017, the U.N. Human Rights Committee <a href=\"https:\/\/digitallibrary.un.org\/record\/1312173\/files\/CCPR_C_ITA_CO_6-EN.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">urged<\/a> that<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>such activities [like offensive intrusion software be associated with] robust independent oversight systems over surveillance, interception and hacking, including by providing for judicial involvement in the authorization of such measures in all cases and a\ufb00ording persons a\ufb00ected with e\ufb00ective remedies in cases of abuse, including, where possible, an ex post notification that they were subject to measures of surveillance or hacking.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>International Law Thresholds<\/p>\n<p>The White House\u2019s memorandum limits the operations the private sector may be authorized to conduct, prohibiting participation in operations that could have \u201cCritical Outcomes.\u201d These include operations that could result in the loss of lives and\/or could qualify as use of force or an armed attack under international law \u2014 that is, operations that another state could qualify as an act of aggression allowing it to legally resort to self-defense under Article 51 of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/about-us\/un-charter\/full-text\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">U.N. Charter<\/a>. This prohibition echoes the Trump administration\u2019s clear acknowledgement that companies would be participating under the government\u2019s \u201ccontrol and oversight,\u201d meaning that any operation is still the responsibility of the United States.<\/p>\n<p>This restriction on operations that could qualify as a use of force or an armed attack deserves to be read through the lens of France\u2019s defense policy. In line with the U.N. Charter, use of force or armed attacks from an entity vested with a state\u2019s power could be interpreted by France as an act of aggression allowing it to use self-defense. Most importantly, since 2017, France has been clear on its interpretation of its right to self-defense. Like the United States, it is two-fold. First, the right to cyber self-defense extends to anticipatory measures where an attack is imminent, noting that France <a href=\"https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/66194\/frances-major-statement-on-international-law-and-cyber-an-assessment\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">rejects<\/a> preventive self-defense, i.e. attacks against a state that neither has the capacity to attack nor the intent. Second, France follows the accumulation of events theory, according to which recurrence and volumes of actions may be taken together to meet the aggression threshold. France\u2019s interpretation of what allows a state to use self-defense is therefore broad, especially because it reserves the right to have its own list of criteria to assess whether the seriousness of actions triggers the qualification of an \u201carmed attack.\u201d These nine criteria are listed in France\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sgdsn.gouv.fr\/files\/files\/Publications\/20180206-np-revue-cyber-public-v3.3-publication.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">foundational cyber defense position of 2018<\/a> and include, for instance, accumulation of events, attribution, intention, and impact on the economy or the environment.<\/p>\n<p>Where France would deem the \u201cuse of force\u201d or \u201carmed attack\u201d threshold to be met, its Defence Code allows the state to take hack-back measures as defined by NATO. In fact, hack-back measures have been in France\u2019s Defense Code since 2013. Namely, the Defence Code <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/article_lc\/LEGIARTI000028342546\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">states<\/a> that if a cyberattack threatens the country\u2019s security, warfare or economic assets, or the survival capacities of the nation, authorities can deploy techniques allowing it to characterize the attack and neutralize it through the information systems from which it emanates. The Defense Code goes on to specify that the military also has access to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.legifrance.gouv.fr\/codes\/section_lc\/LEGITEXT000006071307\/LEGISCTA000023710861\/?anchor=LEGIARTI000037200943#LEGIARTI000037200943\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">hacking tools for intelligence gathering<\/a>, under the oversight of the CNCTR.<\/p>\n<p>With regard to the Trump administration\u2019s plans, the French defense apparatus, just like its law enforcement counterparts, may only rely on the private sector for intelligence and operational support. In fact, since <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sgdsn.gouv.fr\/files\/files\/Publications\/20180206-np-revue-cyber-public-v3.3-publication.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">2018<\/a>, France has had a strict position on hack-back operations by private actors: they ought to be prohibited by international law. At the time, the French Defense apparatus included in its definition of hack-backs the aim to inflict a punishment. Taking action against a malicious cyber operation to mitigate or block its effects, ie. NATO\u2019s definition of hack-backs, offers no leeway for violent cyber-offensive acts. It nonetheless remains that the French position is not aligned with a scheme where private actors are vetted to conduct operations or hack-backs, as envisaged by the Trump administration. This is all the more true if hack-backs go beyond the NATO definition as the U.S. government\u2019s memorandum does by allowing the possibility for private actors to interfere with the targeted systems, such as by disrupting or destroying them.<\/p>\n<p>In its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sgdsn.gouv.fr\/files\/files\/Publications\/20260129_SNC%20EN_0.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">2026-2030 cybersecurity strategy<\/a>, France cemented its posture, indicating that the mobilization of the private sector is one of its objectives. However, its involvement would remain limited to threat intelligence and operational support for detection, characterization and, if necessary, the blocking of attacks.<\/p>\n<p>Implications of the New U.S. Policy<\/p>\n<p>The policy change announced by the Trump administration in August impacts the broader U.S. cyber industry strategy. With taxpayers\u2019 money financing the development of private offensive capacities, the United States is getting one step closer to the Chinese model. For years, China has been sponsoring offensive groups like the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group Judgement Panda to be equipped to deploy lasting attacks on critical infrastructure, like the attack against Sophos in South Asia, codenamed <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sophos.com\/en-us\/content\/pacific-rim\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Pacific Rim<\/a>. These attacks may not have been against organized crime per se, but what constitutes organized crime for one country is somewhat political, as international law offers leeway on domestic interpretation.<\/p>\n<p>This is why the prohibition of the international law thresholds of \u201cuse of force\u201d and \u201carmed attacks\u2019\u201d like the targeting of critical infrastructure, may be important safeguards. Nevertheless, in her article previously published as part of this series, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/161321\/trends-cyber-surveillance-expansion\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Lisandra Novo<\/a> stressed that tackling international crime may lead to operations impacting critical infrastructure of other countries.<\/p>\n<p>Nevertheless, companies with records of human rights violations are getting ready to respond to the White House\u2019s call. For instance, the Israeli spyware company Paragon <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/story\/the-secrets-of-the-us-spyware-king\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">recently<\/a> indicated it would pursue contracts under the White House scheme. The fact that companies selling intrusion technology found to be <a href=\"https:\/\/cpj.org\/2025\/02\/italian-investigative-journalist-francesco-cancellato-targeted-with-paragon-spyware\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">used on investigative journalists<\/a> and that admit that <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/story\/the-secrets-of-the-us-spyware-king\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">their processes cannot withstand the test of democratic accountability<\/a> is a concerning omen.<\/p>\n<p>Last but not least, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/66194\/frances-major-statement-on-international-law-and-cyber-an-assessment\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">unlike France<\/a>\u2019s position, the U.S. cybersecurity posture allows for two concepts considerably broadening the interpretation of what a state may do in the name of self-defense. First, the United States supports preventive operations, i.e. operations against a state even if they do not have the capabilities nor the intent to attack the United States. Second, the United States allows operations in the sovereign cyberspace of a state deemed \u201cunwilling or unable\u201d to act against organized criminal activities. In the past, this second concept has justified the conduct of counterterrorism operations. In practice, these two concepts mean that in the future, private actors vetted by the U.S. government could find themselves operating in multiple countries, for a wide variety of tasks. A country like France could presumably struggle to find some of these actions legitimate, raising tensions, if not leading to conflict.<\/p>\n<p>In any case, the Trump administration\u2019s policy change may incentivize private entities to obtain more powerful active-defense tools, such as potent zero-days, to competitively position themselves in the market \u2014 and all the more now that there is a<a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/BILLS-119hr10777ih\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"> codification initiative<\/a>. Once a revocable presidential directive converts into durable statutory demand, investment plans may be impacted. Still, the scheme is limited to vetted entities, but the example of Paragon may be illustrative as it boasts to<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wired.com\/story\/the-secrets-of-the-us-spyware-king\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"> \u201cprovide customers with personnel who possess \u2018appropriate clearances.\u2019\u201d<\/a> States worried by this new policy may find that improved, coordinated disclosures of vulnerabilities that could be exploited would lower risks by increasing private actors\u2019 costs to enter the arena.<\/p>\n<p>FEATURED IMAGE: Map of France on a digital pixelated display (via Getty Images)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In August, the Trump administration announced plans to allow vetted private companies to participate in \u201coffensive cyber operations\u201d&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":70674,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3295,18959,36596,4189,30,8978,8977,25268,31888,1397,36597,302,842,36598,11559,1403,1201],"class_list":["post-70673","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-europe-nato-security","tag-cyber","tag-cyberattacks","tag-digital-surveillance","tag-emerging-technology","tag-france","tag-french-defence","tag-french-defense","tag-intelligence-activities","tag-intelligence-community","tag-law-enforcement","tag-law-enforcement-hacking","tag-national-security","tag-police","tag-series-comparing-national-trends-in-cyber-and-surveillance-expansion","tag-surveillance","tag-trump-administration-second-term","tag-white-house"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@conflicts\/117570023147115766","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70673","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70673"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70673\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/70674"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70673"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70673"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70673"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}