{"id":77980,"date":"2026-11-11T10:02:41","date_gmt":"2026-11-11T10:02:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/77980\/"},"modified":"2026-11-11T10:02:41","modified_gmt":"2026-11-11T10:02:41","slug":"kofman-ukraine-gains-ground-in-2026-as-russias-army-runs-out-of-ways-to-win-biggo-finance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/77980\/","title":{"rendered":"Kofman: Ukraine Gains Ground in 2026 as Russia&#8217;s Army Runs Out of Ways to Win \u2014 BigGo Finance"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Russia&#8217;s army is having its worst year in the field since early 2023, and Ukraine is gaining ground in places at a pace it could not manage during its entire much-heralded summer counteroffensive. That is the central judgment of Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and host of the Russia Contingency Podcast, who walked through the state of the war with Preston Stewart on the Lex Fridman Podcast.<\/p>\n<p>Kofman dates the turn to roughly fall 2025. &#8220;You really start to see the inflection point probably around fall of twenty twenty-five,&#8221; he said. &#8220;And then in twenty twenty-six, the Russian effort is quite floundering, and Russian forces face significant reversals with the battle space a lot more dynamic this year.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>That is not how most people picture this war. The popular image is a static map and a grinding stalemate. Kofman pushes back on it directly: &#8220;There&#8217;s often a perception that it&#8217;s just a positional stalemate. But in fact, even more recently, some of Ukraine&#8217;s offensive operations had gained more terrain than Ukrainian forces were able to do during the summer twenty twenty-three offensive, which was planned to be a much bigger operation.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The catch is that battlefield momentum and war-ending leverage are two different things. The same conversation makes clear that Russia is still the side with the bigger army, the deeper manpower pool, and the only campaign that can hit Ukrainian cities at will. The ground war is improving for Ukraine. The war against Ukraine&#8217;s civilian infrastructure is not.<\/p>\n<p>The ground war has turned, but the sky has not<\/p>\n<p>Kofman runs through the two localized Ukrainian offensives doing the work: a creeping air-assault campaign in Zaporizhzhia and the Third Corps&#8217; &#8220;Vihod&#8221; operation near Liman. Both have liberated terrain, and together they have produced the odd statistic that Ukraine&#8217;s recent gains exceed those of the 2023 offensive \u2014 a months-long operation from June to about November that was planned to be far larger.<\/p>\n<p>The counterweight is Russia&#8217;s strike campaign, which has evolved far beyond its original targets. &#8220;At this point in 2026, we&#8217;ve seen that campaign really broaden to include warehouses, data centers, schools, medical facilities, malls, actually quite a few shopping malls in the last few months, trains,&#8221; Kofman said. &#8220;So it&#8217;s gone far beyond energy infrastructure to include a host of other civilian types of targets.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The munitions have changed too. What began in fall 2022 with cruise and ballistic missiles has shifted toward saturation attacks by one-way drones, now including jet-powered models that Kofman describes as effectively light ground-launched cruise missiles. The open question heading into winter is not the front line but the cities \u2014 the civilian population, the economy, and the power grid.<\/p>\n<p>DimensionKofman&#8217;s assessment, late 2026Ground warUkraine advantaged; Russia at diminishing returns since summer 2025Russian strike campaignExpanding in both scope and volumeUkrainian offensivesTwo localized operations, Zaporizhzhia and Liman, both gaining terrainRussian prospectsNo good path to advancing across most of the frontKey uncertaintyWinter damage to Ukraine&#8217;s economy and population centers<\/p>\n<p>Kofman is deliberately careful about declaring a winner. He says it is a question he generally avoids, because the two sides are fighting for different things and wars turn fast \u2014 Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan both looked unstoppable at the midpoint of their wars. Neither side, in his view, can currently impose a collapse on the other. A black-swan event, like the Wagner march on Moscow in 2023, could still change the trajectory.<\/p>\n<p>Drones kill, but they do not fight alone<\/p>\n<p>The most concrete part of the conversation is a tour of the kill zone \u2014 the band of ground on either side of the front where movement is punished. Drones account for roughly 80% of losses. But Kofman is emphatic that they work only as one layer of a combined-arms system, alongside minefields, artillery, and prepared defenses. Artillery still matters because its presence forces troops to spread out and slows assaults as they approach drone range. It is also the backup when weather \u2014 spring and fall rain, winter wind \u2014 keeps drones on the ground.<\/p>\n<p>The scale is hard to absorb. Stewart cites roughly 8,000 to 10,000 first-person-view drones expended per day by one side, hundreds of thousands per month \u2014 more than the number of soldiers and vehicles on the battlefield. Kofman&#8217;s hit ratios, drawn from footage that is not public, show what that means in practice.<\/p>\n<p>TargetDrones typically needed to destroy itIndividual soldierAbout 5 (one observed case: 12)Infantry fighting vehicle15\u201320Tank30\u201340Heavily armored tank with electronic warfare protection79 in one extreme caseMechanized company on the attackClose to 300 hits<\/p>\n<p>Every one of those drones is still flown by a person. A typical team needs two or three \u2014 pilot, navigator, technician \u2014 and the work is exhausting screen time. Kofman pushes back on the autonomy hype: terminal guidance and last-mile targeting exist, but they are a tiny share of the fight. The videos that shape public perception are also badly skewed, since only the successes get published.<\/p>\n<p>Fiber-optic drones, first adopted heavily by Russian units during the fighting around Kursk, are unjammable and hard to detect \u2014 no radio signal for a detector like the Chuika to pick up \u2014 but they fly slowly, trail a spooled filament, and remain perhaps 15% or less of tactical strike drones. Kofman frames the whole war as a three-to-four-month cycle of technology and tactics: Ukraine innovates faster from the bottom up, Russia scales and standardizes faster once it identifies a winner. Each has an advantage the other cannot easily copy.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/f64faffa39ea0c3a_1794361228_inline_2.jpg\" alt=\"\"\/><\/p>\n<p>Russia&#8217;s infantry infiltrates, and it pays in bodies<\/p>\n<p>Russia has abandoned large armored formations that get spotted 10 to 30 kilometers out and hunted by long-range drones. Instead it sends individual infantry, then light motorized waves on motorcycles, ATVs, and even Ladas. Sometimes a mechanized assault is launched purely to distract Ukrainian drone units while the light force slips through gaps.<\/p>\n<p>Ukrainian forward positions are often three-man pickets several hundred meters apart, so a few Russian soldiers get through. Then more follow the same path, accumulating behind the lines and threatening drone crews and logistics. Stewart quotes an American volunteer with the First National Guard Corps in the Dobropillia direction: it is &#8220;an incredible tactic if you don&#8217;t care about losing soldiers,&#8221; chewing through terrain while losing 90\u201395% of the men. Kofman&#8217;s version of the same grim math: send 10, seven die, three find the gap, and now the path is known.<\/p>\n<p>Ukraine&#8217;s answer is different in kind, not just in scale. Successful Ukrainian operations set conditions first \u2014 suppress Russian drone units, interdict their logistics, channel them \u2014 then run a coordinated strike plan during the assault. That restores some mobility and cuts losses. Kofman cites Code Nine Two and the First Separate Assault Regiment experimenting with drone-enabled mechanized assault, and air-assault brigades clearing tree line by tree line with three-man fire teams. Ukraine cannot fight Russia&#8217;s way: it lacks the manpower, and it would not accept the casualties.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Control&#8221; is not what the map says it is<\/p>\n<p>One of Kofman&#8217;s sharpest contributions is a working definition of something everyone uses loosely: control of terrain. &#8220;Probably the best way to describe control is you&#8217;re able to use terrain for your purposes,&#8221; he said. &#8220;That is, not only do you deny it to your enemy, not only do you have presence there, but you are able to largely use this terrain, and the enemy does not have substantial amount of fire control over it.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>By that standard, a great deal of the space between the lines is a gray zone. Positions can be nominally held at 10 to 15 kilometers from the front while being unusable in practice \u2014 troops cannot move freely, bring in supplies, or mass without being seen and struck. The distinction matters because it explains why map-based claims of &#8220;encirclement&#8221; and &#8220;breakthrough&#8221; can be technically true on paper and meaningless on the ground.<\/p>\n<p>Bakhmut became a political fixation that outlived its value<\/p>\n<p>Kofman walks through the siege as two simultaneous battles \u2014 the urban fight inside the city and the fight to keep the roads open \u2014 with Wagner&#8217;s convict-staffed assault groups exhausting Ukrainian defenders, Russian airborne securing the flanks, and Russian artillery leveling the city. By the time Russia took it in May 2023, little was left.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Bakhmut syndrome&#8221; is Kofman&#8217;s term for defending a city past the point where it makes sense. Ukraine had just won in Kharkiv and Kherson in fall 2022 and feared that losing Bakhmut would sour Western support, so it declared &#8220;Fortress Bakhmut.&#8221; The cost was real: experienced units were tied down and expended, and greener troops with Western equipment had to lead the June 2023 breaching operation instead.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I always worry when any city, especially a fairly small city, is declared a fortress, because then it means that forces there will not be able to withdraw or retrograde in a timely manner,&#8221; he said. The proof that losing it did not matter, he argues, is that it took Russia a full year to reach Chasiv Yar and another to take much of it.<\/p>\n<p>Stewart notes the same dynamic may now be forming around Kostiantynivka. Kofman&#8217;s test for when to withdraw: when you must counterattack just to hold, and your lines of communication are being cut, the attrition ratio has stopped favoring you.<\/p>\n<p>Russian maps lie, and the lies come back as casualties<\/p>\n<p>Russian forces routinely claim 10 to 15 kilometers more territory than they hold, sometimes on the strength of one soldier waving a flag for a drone camera \u2014 and in one recent case, an AI-generated video that Russian commentators themselves called out.<\/p>\n<p>Kofman says the falsification is worse than Ukraine&#8217;s because of Russian military culture. &#8220;There is a real lack of trust in the Russian military between soldiers and their commanders, and that breeds a lack of cohesion,&#8221; he said. &#8220;Second, the military runs on a very coercive culture, so you expect that for any mistake, you&#8217;re going to be punished, and so there&#8217;s a strong incentive to lie.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The operational cost is concrete. Fire support gets planned around positions Russia does not hold. Units rotating in are handed wrong maps and take casualties as a result. Kofman recalls being just west of Kupiansk in 2025 when Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian general staff, told Putin that Ukrainian units there were encircled. &#8220;When you&#8217;re actually right by there and you see the situation, these things don&#8217;t pass the giggle test, but nonetheless, this is what you see Russian senior military leadership tell their political leadership.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>He also flags a pattern worth watching into next year: Russian offensives tend to intensify from October into November, when commanders are pressed to actually seize ground they have been reporting for months. Stewart adds the second-order effects \u2014 air power and fire support get moved because a sector is reported &#8220;secure.&#8221; Ukraine has relieved commanders for misreporting, though it has its own version of the problem when troops are ordered to retake untenable positions.<\/p>\n<p>Prigozhin&#8217;s mutiny exposed an army Russia could not control<\/p>\n<p>Kofman traces Wagner from its 2022 pairing with the airborne and the May 2022 fight at Popasna, through Prigozhin&#8217;s prison recruitment and the Bakhmut grind, to the June 2023 mutiny. The trigger was Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu&#8217;s ultimatum requiring Wagner personnel to sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense after Bakhmut \u2014 a move that would have stripped Prigozhin of his autonomous force. Wagner seized the Rostov headquarters, shot down Russian helicopters and aircraft, and drove mechanized columns toward Moscow.<\/p>\n<p>Kofman&#8217;s read is that it was never close to regime change. Personalist authoritarian regimes eliminate alternatives, and most coups are stopped before they start. Prigozhin used the march as leverage to negotiate amnesty and a handover of assets. He was killed when his jet exploded midair on August 23, 2023, along with senior Wagner commanders \u2014 a demonstrative killing that Kofman says surprised no one who followed Russia.<\/p>\n<p>Stewart adds the information-war dimension: Prigozhin ran the Internet Research Agency bot farms, and when the march began the bots did not know which side to back. Wagner was brutally effective \u2014 he cites the video of Wagner men killing one of their own with a sledgehammer \u2014 and Russia dismantled it, folding remnants into the Africa Corps. Kofman&#8217;s postscript is the &#8220;Wagnerization&#8221; of the Russian military: Shtorm-Z and Shtorm-V convict assault companies, assault detachments spread across formations, and an overspecialization in small-unit assault that later hurt Russia&#8217;s ability to run complex operations.<\/p>\n<p>Putin&#8217;s goals outrun his army, and a ceasefire may only buy time<\/p>\n<p>Kofman divides the war into two parts. The first 30 days were a failed coup de main aimed at replacing Ukraine&#8217;s government; that attempt failed decisively and cannot be recreated. Everything since is an attritional war that will shape borders, economic viability, and Ukraine&#8217;s strategic orientation \u2014 but not whether Ukraine exists as a nation.<\/p>\n<p>Putin&#8217;s maximalist aims remain: the rest of Donbas, as much of Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk as Russia can take, limits on Ukraine&#8217;s military and NATO membership, and recognition of annexed territory. Kofman calls this a fundamental mismatch between political goals and military means, and places the fault squarely with Putin.<\/p>\n<p>The economics are starting to bite. Russia spends about 44% of its government budget on the war, roughly 9 to 10% of GDP, and key elites began publicly calling that unsustainable in spring 2026. North Korea at one point supplied around 40% of Russian artillery ammunition and sent troops to Kursk. Stewart expected sanctions and casualty levels to break Russian public support and has been wrong; he sees a &#8220;shadow mobilization&#8221; of coercion beginning instead. Ukraine, meanwhile, depends on Western money, weapons, and intelligence \u2014 and Kofman notes the US still supplies equipment that Europeans pay for.<\/p>\n<p>Both men are critical of the Trump administration&#8217;s handling. Stewart says the US ceded its leadership role, lost leverage over Ukraine by stopping weapons, and has not layered on sanctions. Kofman calls the engagement fitful, says the Anchorage meeting began to bring Russia out of isolation, and argues the administration&#8217;s only positive contribution was forcing all parties to state their terms \u2014 the Biden administration, he says, had no plan beyond &#8220;as long as it takes,&#8221; and European allies had years to produce a peace plan and did not.<\/p>\n<p>Kofman&#8217;s near-term outlook is pessimistic. Putin is likely waiting on the winter strike campaign and on European elections such as France&#8217;s in spring 2027. A partial ceasefire \u2014 on energy strikes, or on Black Sea shipping \u2014 is conceivable. His core warning is that a ceasefire without security guarantees lets Russia rearm while Ukraine demobilizes, and the two failed Minsk agreements from 2014 are the precedent.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;How this war ends takes us to the next one,&#8221; he said. He raises the prospect of a third iteration of this war, in the way India and Pakistan or Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought repeated rounds.<\/p>\n<p>The satellite and drone economy is where the war is heading<\/p>\n<p>The mechanics Kofman describes on the ground have an orbital counterpart. Ukraine now relies on SpaceX&#8217;s Starlink and its military variant Starshield for battlefield communications and drone operations, and it has learned how uncomfortable that dependence is. In October, speed restrictions on Starshield disrupted drone operations and military communications for 10 days. Kyiv is now building an independent network with Denmark&#8217;s GomSpace, aiming for 245 satellites, after launching its first test satellite last month.<\/p>\n<p>Russia is chasing the same capability. Its Rassvet constellation, built by Bureau 1440, has launched 32 satellites with a stated goal of 292 and more than 900 by 2035. Ukraine has struck the Samara factory that builds the Soyuz-2 rockets carrying them, and has sanctioned 10 companies tied to the program. On the ground, Russia is deploying trailer-mounted jammers that target individual satellites overhead rather than drones or terminals. Each covers roughly 25 square kilometers, and Ukrainian officials say deployments are expanding along the front.<\/p>\n<p>For markets, the escalation cuts two ways. Defense electronics, electronic warfare, and space-based surveillance are moving from niche budgets to front-line essentials \u2014 a tailwind for contractors on both sides of the Atlantic. But the willingness of governments to jam or threaten commercial satellites raises the risk premium on orbit-dependent services, from broadband to Earth observation. One data point from outside the war shows how far that reputational risk travels: BT Group has delayed the commercial launch of its Starlink broadband partnership, with chief executive Allison Kirkby telling the Financial Times the company will launch &#8220;only when we feel the noise has died down a little bit on Elon Musk and Starlink as a result of the Ukraine thing.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The demand signals from the battlefield itself are equally clear. Drones are consumables on a scale no peacetime procurement plan anticipated \u2014 thousands a day, hundreds of thousands a month \u2014 and the drone that survives is the one with better electronic warfare, better fiber, or better autonomy. The three-to-four-month innovation cycle Kofman describes is a permanent pressure on suppliers to iterate, not just deliver.<\/p>\n<p>The war&#8217;s unresolved tension is that battlefield advantage has not translated into negotiating leverage. Russia&#8217;s demands remain maximalist while its army stalls, and the US has moved from coalition leader to would-be referee without compelling either side. Watch three things: whether a compartmentalized ceasefire on energy or Black Sea strikes materializes, whether Russian recruitment coercion produces visible domestic friction, and whether Ukraine&#8217;s drone-enabled maneuver units can scale what Code Nine Two and the air-assault brigades have demonstrated. Kofman treats the winter and the durability of Western support as the real variables, not the map. The episode closes on the human register \u2014 a wounded soldier flown out 30 kilometers by drone in a pod built by the company SkyFall, a commander in a pickup truck pulling two wounded men out under fire \u2014 offered as the counterweight to the grim arithmetic.<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/f64faffa39ea0c3a_1794361222_inline_9.jpg\" alt=\"\"\/><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Russia&#8217;s army is having its worst year in the field since early 2023, and Ukraine is gaining ground&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":77981,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[39532,39531,24688,39524,39527,39528,39530,39525,39522,39523,24687,2424,795,39526,39529,3162,869,22691,29245,46,1726,21715],"class_list":["post-77980","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-ukraine-russia","tag-allison-kirkby","tag-bt-group","tag-bureau-1440","tag-carnegie-endowment","tag-code-nine-two","tag-first-separate-assault-regiment","tag-gomspace","tag-lex-fridman","tag-michael-kofman","tag-preston-stewart","tag-rassvet","tag-russian","tag-russian-military","tag-sergei-shoigu","tag-skyfall","tag-spacex","tag-starlink","tag-starshield","tag-valery-gerasimov","tag-vladimir-putin","tag-wagner-group","tag-yevgeny-prigozhin"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@conflicts\/117597238151480019","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77980","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=77980"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/77980\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/77981"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=77980"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=77980"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=77980"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}