{"id":79153,"date":"2026-11-12T02:52:18","date_gmt":"2026-11-12T02:52:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/79153\/"},"modified":"2026-11-12T02:52:18","modified_gmt":"2026-11-12T02:52:18","slug":"fault-lines-chinas-navy-mobilises-marines-in-manila-pngs-lng","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/79153\/","title":{"rendered":"Fault Lines \u2013 China\u2019s navy mobilises, Marines in Manila, PNG\u2019s LNG"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"2560\" height=\"1534\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-102468\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/GettyImages-2245239270-scaled.jpg\"  \/><\/p>\n<p>Welcome to the latest edition of ASPI\u2019s Fault Lines.<\/p>\n<p>Every fortnight, ASPI\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aspi.org.au\/programs\/defence-strategy-and-national-security\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Defence Strategy Program<\/a> monitors the actions and developments shaping the regional order and Australia\u2019s security.<\/p>\n<p>This edition covers the period 30 October 2026 to 12 November 2026. Subscribe\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/aspidefence.substack.com\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">here<\/a>\u00a0to receive every edition of\u00a0Fault Lines\u00a0direct to your inbox.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Northeast Asia<\/p>\n<p>All hands on deck<\/p>\n<p>Find a map and draw an arc that bends from the southern tip of Hainan, down into the South China Sea, out into the Pacific, halfway to Guam, up past Okinawa and back around into the Yellow Sea. You\u2019ve now drawn an ambitious perimeter around Taiwan. You\u2019ve also, not entirely by coincidence, roughly described the operational area of what looks to have been the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.taiwannews.com.tw\/news\/6471672\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">largest<\/a> Chinese naval exercise so far this year.<\/p>\n<p>According to Joseph Wu, secretary-general of Taiwan\u2019s national security council, as of 3 November, China\u2019s navy and coast guard had more than 100 ships deployed across that arc. Those ships <a href=\"https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/research\/china-taiwan\/china-taiwan-update-november-6-2026\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">include<\/a> four surface task groups drawn from the People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern, Northern and Southern Theater Commands, among them the Liaoning carrier strike group. China\u2019s newest carrier, the Fujian, was also active in the South China Sea. Taiwan\u2019s immediate vicinity also saw a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.taiwannews.com.tw\/news\/6470873\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">higher-than-usual<\/a> buzz of surface combatants, coast guard ships and combat aircraft sorties.<\/p>\n<p>In several respects, this was unusual. China\u2019s coastal theatre commands have rarely coordinated major surface forces in a single operation beyond the first island chain. Historically they\u2019ve had <a href=\"https:\/\/digital-commons.usnwc.edu\/cmsi-maritime-reports\/9\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">difficulty<\/a> defining command arrangements for these sorts of activities, and when Beijing wants a show of force to express cross-strait displeasure it\u2019s usually just the Eastern Theater Command that gets the call. For China\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/chinas-carriers-increasingly-venture-beyond-first-island-chain\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">carriers,<\/a> sophisticated operations beyond the first island chain are still a relative novelty; they began doing them only a few years ago. The whole arrangement suggests a considerable maturation of Beijing\u2019s ability to manage naval operations outside its immediate vicinity \u2013 and on a massive scale.<\/p>\n<p>Scale is only part of the story. Out on the water were, among other things, two of China\u2019s three carriers and at least four of its 10 Type 055 destroyers. That\u2019s a considerable portion of Beijing\u2019s naval combat power, and much of it \u2013 three task groups and the Liaoning \u2013 was east of Taiwan. (We don\u2019t know whether it still is.) In most foreseeable scenarios that\u2019s precisely where supplies from the United States and other key partners would need to travel during a cross-strait conflict.<\/p>\n<p>So Beijing\u2019s motive for showing off its ability to float a lot of heavily-armed steel there on relatively short notice isn\u2019t hard to comprehend. It\u2019s useful practice for what the Chinese navy would probably be doing in a serious fight anyway.<\/p>\n<p>That this latest activity has apparently gone ahead without an official exercise announcement, let alone a Seagal-esque title like last December\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/globaltaiwan.org\/2026\/01\/pla-justice-mission-2025\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Justice Mission<\/a> drills, is also suggestive. Much like the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iiss.org\/online-analysis\/online-analysis\/2026\/10\/china-muddies-the-waters-east-of-taiwan\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">introduction<\/a> of regular Chinese coast guard and civilian agency patrols in the waters east of Taiwan since June, the idea is not to conceal hard power but to make its persistent use look normal.<\/p>\n<p>News from abroad<\/p>\n<p>A proposal to revise the mandate of the Cheonghae Unit \u2013 a rotating maritime-security detachment of South Korea\u2019s navy, stationed in the Gulf of Aden since 2009 \u2013 was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.khan.co.kr\/en\/article\/202611101218007\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">approved<\/a> by President Lee Jae-myung\u2019s cabinet on 10 November. It\u2019s yet to pass the National Assembly, though. The proposal would see the unit\u2019s authorised operating area almost double in size, extending eastward into international waters south of Oman, within 650 kilometres of the Strait of Hormuz. It\u2019d <a href=\"https:\/\/biz.chosun.com\/en\/en-policy\/2026\/11\/05\/HYZKHWQZ4ZE7HID25UGRZJLYGI\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">also<\/a> send a P-8A maritime patrol aircraft and explosive ordnance disposal specialists. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chosun.com\/english\/national-en\/2026\/11\/06\/ZO37ID5AAFDIPKUTJKUCHRHYAI\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Officially<\/a> there\u2019s no directive to do so, but this capability mix would position South Korea well to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.koreajoongangdaily.com\/korea\/lee-rules-out-combat-deployment-to-strait-of-hormuz-but-leaves-options-open\/12882749\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">play a role<\/a> in future mine-clearance operations when the strait reopens. While the Cheonghae Unit has long supported counter-piracy operations under the Combined Maritime Forces \u2013 particularly Combined Task Force 151 in the Gulf of Aden \u2013 Seoul has emphasised that the expanded mission would remain under South Korean command.<\/p>\n<p>Southeast Asia<\/p>\n<p>What goes around<\/p>\n<p>The US Marine Corps\u2019 rotational force in the Philippines departed at the end of October and was immediately <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pacom.mil\/Media\/News\/News-Articles\/Article\/4636214\/presence-with-purpose-mrf-sea-builds-on-us-philippine-relationship\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">replaced<\/a> by another. That hasn\u2019t been normal. Established in 2022, Marine Rotational Force \u2013 Southeast Asia (MRF-SEA) previously deployed for only six months of the year. It operated as a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.marines.mil\/News\/News-Display\/Article\/3554744\/i-mef-announces-marine-rotational-force-southeast-asia-deployment\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">modest<\/a>, scalable task force with a forward command element that moved between Southeast Asian countries to support exercises and other engagements. Since <a href=\"https:\/\/news.usni.org\/2026\/04\/03\/u-s-marine-force-southeast-asia-lingers-longer-in-the-philippines\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">April<\/a> 2026, however, successive rotations have maintained a continuous command presence in the Philippines, marking a shift from periodic regional engagement towards sustained cooperation with Philippine forces.<\/p>\n<p>The shift began this year, when an MRF-SEA deployment was immediately followed by another tasked to lead a \u2018focused effort\u2019 in the Philippines at Manila\u2019s invitation. That new rotation participated in Balikatan 2026 \u2013 the keystone US\u2013Philippines bilateral exercise, held in April-May. Since then, MRF-SEA has taken part in combined exercises across the Philippine archipelago, with land-based maritime strike operations a notable focus. That deployment has now ended, but its mission will go on. The command element <a href=\"https:\/\/www.stripes.com\/theaters\/asia_pacific\/2026-10-29\/marine-force-rotation-philippines-23296285.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">handover<\/a> at Clark Air Base on or around 26 October shows that both the US and the Philippines intend to keep this more sustained presence around for a <a href=\"https:\/\/news.usni.org\/2026\/11\/02\/marine-force-southeast-asia-will-maintain-continuous-presence-in-the-philippines\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">while<\/a> yet \u2013 certainly through Balikatan 2027.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"750\" height=\"500\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-102469\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/500h_q95.webp\"  \/><\/p>\n<p>Same-day delivery<\/p>\n<p>MRF-SEA\u2019s conspicuous interest in combined training for maritime strike missions says as much about Manila\u2019s priorities as Washington\u2019s. The Philippines has been buying anti-ship cruise missiles at pace for the last few years. The country became the first foreign buyer of India\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/missilethreat.csis.org\/missile\/brahmos\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">BrahMos<\/a> missile <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/asia-pacific\/2022\/01\/28\/philippines-signs-deal-for-brahmos-supersonic-anti-ship-missile\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">in 2022<\/a>, and as of 5 November is presently in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/india-final-stage-talks-expand-missile-sale-philippines-sources-say-2026-11-05\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">talks<\/a> with Delhi to buy another five batteries and 60 missiles.<\/p>\n<p>More such orders are likely. The procurement has a clear rationale. India\u2019s sales pitch for BrahMos is its combination of speed and destructive power. Travelling at Mach 3, the 3-tonne missile carries a 300-kilogram payload, which, combined with its kinetic energy, could put most surface ships out of action or send them to Davy Jones. BrahMos\u2019s export model is limited in range to 290 km, but that\u2019s no problem here. It covers most of the Philippines\u2019 disputed South China Sea claims when measured from its coastline, including flashpoints such as <a href=\"https:\/\/amti.csis.org\/second-thomas-shoal\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Second Thomas Shoal<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Sabina_Shoal\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Sabina Shoal<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/amti.csis.org\/scarborough-shoal\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Scarborough Shoal<\/a>. These are regular haunts for China\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/diplomacy\/article\/3372764\/beijing-drills-water-cannons-and-drones-near-disputed-south-china-sea-shoals\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">coast guard<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/china-conducts-combat-readiness-patrols-around-disputed-shoal-south-china-sea-2026-10-30\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">navy<\/a>, which were conducting water-cannon drills and combat readiness patrols around the disputed features as recently as late October.<\/p>\n<p>China\u2019s considerable advantages in fleet size and resourcing have let it operate with relative impunity. For Manila, preventing that impunity from becoming an enduring position of strength is the name of the game. Matching China ship-for-ship is economically out of the question, but how about planting the thought of a trip to the ocean floor at six minutes\u2019 notice in the mind of any passing Chinese captain? Well, the budget has room for that. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/china\/indonesia-buy-brahmos-missiles-indian-govt-official-says-2026-07-07\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Indonesia<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/india-says-signed-brahmos-missile-deal-with-vietnam-2026-05-30\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Vietnam<\/a>, which both ordered BrahMos missiles earlier this year, may well be thinking along similar lines.<\/p>\n<p>That\u2019s the theory, anyway. But missiles, however well advertised, are expensive lawn ornaments unless you also have a targeting enterprise: the whole suite of sensors, communication links, procedures and command structures that get you from a blip on the radar to a palpable hit. The Philippines hadn\u2019t operated coastal anti-ship missiles at all before it bought the BrahMos system four years ago, so it\u2019s had to build much of this at a cracking pace, and work is still ongoing. Help from the US on this is surely welcome in Manila. In August, for example, MRF-SEA trained alongside Philippine forces, using drones to track simulated PLA Navy ships and relay targeting data back to BrahMos missileers.<\/p>\n<p>News from the neighbourhood<\/p>\n<p>The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers\u2019 Meeting-Plus came and went on 28 to 29 October, but much of the interesting stuff had to wait a while to come out. A meeting of the Squad \u2013 as the grouping of Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the US is informally called \u2013 on the sidelines produced a terse <a href=\"https:\/\/www.minister.defence.gov.au\/statements\/2026-11-10\/joint-statement-meeting-defense-ministers-from-australia-japan-philippines-united-states\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">statement<\/a> two weeks later. That included commitments to establish a Combined Coordination Center in the Philippines to support an expanded program of multinational exercises. The centre began in 2024 as a <a href=\"https:\/\/ipdefenseforum.com\/2024\/12\/coordination-center-boosts-philippines-u-s-interoperability\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">bilateral project<\/a>, but will now bring in other partner states. The four countries also said that they would aim at \u2018synchronizing defense investments to support the Philippines in defending its archipelago\u2019. No details on that, nor on the broader US\u2013ASEAN <a href=\"https:\/\/www.minister.defence.gov.au\/transcripts\/2026-10-29\/doorstop-philippines\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Framework for Defence Cooperation<\/a> announced elsewhere, have so far materialised.<\/p>\n<p>Oceania<\/p>\n<p>Gradually and then suddenly<\/p>\n<p>Taipei <a href=\"https:\/\/en.mofa.gov.tw\/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&amp;sms=273&amp;s=123381\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">has agreed<\/a> to Papua New Guinea\u2019s calls to end its diplomatic presence in the country after nearly four months of trying not to. In July, PNG\u2019s foreign minister, Justin Tkatchenko, said that Taiwan\u2019s presence was not \u2018recognised or required\u2019 and requested that Taiwan close its local economic office \u2013 unofficial embassy, that is. Taipei <a href=\"https:\/\/www.taipeitimes.com\/News\/front\/archives\/2026\/07\/28\/2003861535\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">wanted<\/a> to talk things out, and to encourage Port Moresby to do so it <a href=\"https:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2026-07-29\/taiwan-to-stop-buying-png-gas-on-spot-market\/106972968\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">suspended<\/a> open market purchases of PNG\u2019s liquefied natural gas (LNG). No small chunk of change, that: Taiwan\u2019s bought about 500,000 tonnes of LNG at open market prices in the first half of this year alone, at a value of roughly A$800 million.<\/p>\n<p>While we can\u2019t know what conversations took place behind the scenes, on 6 November it became clear that Taiwan\u2019s efforts had failed. The foreign ministry in Taipei <a href=\"https:\/\/en.mofa.gov.tw\/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&amp;sms=273&amp;s=123381\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">released a statement<\/a> that day agreeing to \u2018close the office, withdraw all stationed personnel, and conduct a full review and adjustment of bilateral ties\u2019 with PNG. Taiwan further <a href=\"https:\/\/en.mofa.gov.tw\/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&amp;sms=273&amp;s=123381\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">said<\/a> that the situation with PNG reflects \u2018China\u2019s continued use of political pressure and economic influence to interfere in the diplomatic decisions of other nations and suppress Taiwan\u2019s international participation\u2019. As a parting note, that temporary ban on open market LNG purchases has now been made permanent, although Taiwan\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.santos.com\/news\/png-lng-project-signs-lng-sale-and-purchase-agreement-with-cpc\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">long-term contract<\/a> to import 1.2 million tons of LNG from PNG annually until 2030 seems to be still intact. Taiwan also ceased all foreign aid to Port Moresby, though that\u2019s more a political gesture. According to our colleagues at the Lowy Institute, Taiwan <a href=\"https:\/\/pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org\/map\/?from=2024&amp;recipients=papua-new-guinea\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">provided<\/a> only A$900,000 or so in aid to PNG in 2024 \u2013 less than a third of what Norway gave in the same year.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"960\" height=\"636\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-102470\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/Port_moresby_5986707759.jpg\"  \/><\/p>\n<p>Through the open market or by contract, Taiwan buys roughly one-third of all the LNG that PNG exports, but that altogether comprises just 8 percent of Taiwan\u2019s LNG imports. Taiwan says that it\u2019s already found alternative sources of LNG, and given inflated oil and gas prices worldwide, it\u2019s likely that PNG will be able to find other buyers \u2013 so who ends up hurting the most from this relationship breakdown remains to be seen. Back in July, Tkatchenko said that a key reason for ending Taipei\u2019s diplomatic presence was to take PNG\u2019s relationship with China \u2018to unprecedented levels\u2019 \u2013 a claim which met with fulsome <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/wjbzhd\/202607\/t20260723_11990091.shtml\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">praise<\/a> from China\u2019s foreign minister, Wang Yi. Taiwan\u2019s economic heft as an LNG consumer clearly hasn\u2019t provided the leverage over Port Moresby that it had hoped.<\/p>\n<p>News from the family<\/p>\n<p>What Chinese officials described as a \u2018wine bottle\u2019 but PNG police described as an undetonated 130mm Chinese Type 59 artillery projectile <a href=\"https:\/\/www.abc.net.au\/news\/2026-11-03\/papua-new-guinea-artillery-shell-wine-bottle\/107342264\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">was found<\/a> in a commercial shipping container in Port Moresby. Four Chinese nationals were arrested on 30 October and the investigation is ongoing, although the Chinese embassy in Port Moresby <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ChineseEmbPNG\/posts\/pfbid02iZarL62qkM5pPhQ9NPzpYr4hNLH8EDsMjZsn8d71i7iT1q8bvSiaHooV4xiQvzQkl?rdid=oitt9kfM74AyInvp\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">maintains<\/a> that \u2018it is virtually impossible for an illegal military-grade artillery shell to be smuggled out of China to PNG\u2019. And yet, the pictures seem to tell a different story. Although many countries across the world have guns compatible with the projectile, PNG is not one of them.<br \/>\nLast week, Fiji\u2019s parliament <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fijivillage.com\/t\/parliament-approves-fiji-australia-vuvale-union-and-ocean-of-peace-alliance-veitacini-treaty-d20009\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">ratified<\/a> the Vuvale Union and the Ocean of Peace Alliance with Australia in a 27\u20137 vote, although one member abstained and a further 18 didn\u2019t show up. While the ratification passed comfortably, Fiji\u2019s first ever alliance has not been without controversy. A few days prior to the ratification, the parliament\u2019s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence <a href=\"https:\/\/www.parliament.gov.fj\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/Review-Report-of-the-Fiji-Australia-Vuvale-Union-and-Ocean-of-Peace-Alliance.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">recommended<\/a> deferring ratification on the grounds that the treaties lacked transparency, further stoking fears that the ratification would surrender Fijian sovereignty. Prominent Fijian Chief Tevita Mara expressed <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rnz.co.nz\/news\/pacific\/1515912\/fijian-chief-calls-for-scrutiny-of-fiji-australia-security-treaties\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">similar concerns<\/a> in September.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/aspidefence.substack.com\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-101751\" src=\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/FL_V5_1500x300.png\"   alt=\"\" width=\"1105\" height=\"222\"\/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>This article was originally published in\u00a0, ASPI\u2019s fortnightly newsletter that monitors the actions and developments shaping the regional order and Australia\u2019s security.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Welcome to the latest edition of ASPI\u2019s Fault Lines. Every fortnight, ASPI\u2019s Defence Strategy Program monitors the actions&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":79154,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[11],"tags":[40008,571,2155,9155,1828,2611],"class_list":["post-79153","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-military-defense","tag-northeast-asia","tag-oceania","tag-philippines","tag-southeast-asia","tag-taiwan","tag-u-s-marines"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79153","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=79153"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/79153\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/79154"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=79153"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=79153"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=79153"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}