{"id":85983,"date":"2026-11-16T18:12:16","date_gmt":"2026-11-16T18:12:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/85983\/"},"modified":"2026-11-16T18:12:16","modified_gmt":"2026-11-16T18:12:16","slug":"stop-gutting-the-conventional-army","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/85983\/","title":{"rendered":"Stop Gutting the Conventional Army"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In wars fought principally on land, the U.S. Army\u2019s conventional forces \u2013 its maneuver brigades and divisions \u2013 are the primary agents of victory. They take and hold territory and play by far the most important roles in engaging and destroying enemy forces. Accordingly, the quality and numbers of their leaders are all-important in setting conditions for success in land wars. If so, why are the Army\u2019s best leaders regularly siphoned off in huge numbers to other communities that cannot play decisive roles?<\/p>\n<p>Here is a snapshot of the problem. In 2026 the Active Army fields 20 Special Forces (\u201cGreen Beret\u201d) battalions with a total of 360 twelve-man \u201cA\u201d detachments, totaling 4,320 officers and noncommissioned officers. All are drawn from the conventional force. Stacked on top of these hundreds of \u201cA\u201d teams are officers and NCOs at the SF company, battalion and group levels, along with hundreds more in SF training organizations and higher headquarters such as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), <a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" href=\"https:\/\/www.army.mil\/usasoc#org-units\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">1st Special Forces Command<\/a> and the US Army Special Warfare Center, SF\u2019s training organization. Many others are assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). For decades, Special Forces Groups included three battalions, but during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) a <a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" href=\"https:\/\/arsof-history.org\/articles\/pdf\/v14n2_victoria_ex_umbra.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">fourth battalion<\/a> was added to each group, along with a support battalion. All told, these high-quality leaders represent enough combat leaders to staff the combat units for three Army divisions.<\/p>\n<p><a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" title=\"Link to The Army Needs a Data Logistics Discipline Before the Next Surge\" class=\"absolute inset-0 z-10\" data-testid=\"content-card\" href=\"https:\/\/www.realcleardefense.com\/us-army\/articles\/the-army-needs-a-data-logistics-discipline-before-the-next-surge-2026-11-11\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">The Army Needs a Data Logistics Discipline Before the Next SurgeSteve Ferenzi \u2022 RealClearDefense<a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" title=\"Link to U.S. Soldier Arrested on Suspicion of Espionage Linked to Russia\" class=\"absolute inset-0 z-10\" data-testid=\"content-card\" href=\"https:\/\/www.realcleardefense.com\/us-army\/articles\/us-soldier-arrested-on-suspicion-of-espionage-linked-to-russia-2026-11-11\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">U.S. Soldier Arrested on Suspicion of Espionage Linked to RussiaEmma Burrows \u2022 Associated Press<a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" title=\"Link to Partnering Decides Whether Flexible Military Construction Can Work\" class=\"absolute inset-0 z-10\" data-testid=\"content-card\" href=\"https:\/\/www.realcleardefense.com\/us-army\/articles\/partnering-decides-whether-flexible-military-construction-can-work-2026-11-04\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Partnering Decides Whether Flexible Military Construction Can WorkMatt Russell \u2022 RealClearDefense<a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" title=\"Link to The Drinking Well: The Army Should Train Leaders to Make Decisions Under Pressure\" class=\"absolute inset-0 z-10\" data-testid=\"content-card\" href=\"https:\/\/www.realcleardefense.com\/us-army\/articles\/the-drinking-well-the-army-should-train-leaders-to-make-decisions-under-pressure-2026-11-03\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">The Drinking Well: The Army Should Train Leaders to Make Decisions Under PressureBoyd A. Melson \u2022 RealClearDefense<\/p>\n<p>The Army\u2019s elite 75th Ranger Regiment represents a further drain on the combat leadership resources available to the conventional force. Highly trained, well-funded, exquisitely equipped and manned with the very best Soldiers and leaders, the Rangers are the apex predators of the Army. Essentially a raiding force, the Ranger Regiment \u2013 like the Green Berets \u2013 does not take and hold ground as conventional forces do. All Ranger officers <a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" href=\"https:\/\/75thrangerregiment.org\/CareerPath\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">must first serve<\/a> in conventional formations before serving with the 75th. Organized with only two small battalions\u00a0 throughout most of the Cold War, the Rangers expanded dramatically beginning in the 1980s, adding a third battalion and a regimental headquarters. The Global War on Terror saw a fourth rifle company and a support company added to each battalion, along with a ranger special troops battalion and military intelligence battalion. A fourth ranger infantry battalion is <a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" href=\"https:\/\/thehighside.substack.com\/p\/the-75th-ranger-regiment-prepares\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">reportedly forming<\/a>. Many of the best junior officers and sergeants from across the Army, especially from the Army\u2019s fourteen <a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" href=\"https:\/\/www.defenseone.com\/ideas\/2025\/05\/us-army-too-light-win\/405669\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">light infantry brigades<\/a>, migrate from these conventional formations to the 75th every year.<\/p>\n<p>Other \u201cspecial\u201d organizations also compete for the leadership talent found in Army brigades and divisions. The Army\u2019s active duty Civil Affairs community was expanded in 2006 from a single battalion to five battalions under the <a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" href=\"https:\/\/www.civilaffairsassociation.com\/army-active-units\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">95th Civil Affairs Brigade<\/a>. The Psychological Operations career field saw a similar expansion, with no active duty battalions in 1975 <a data-rc-component=\"TrackedLink\/TrackedLink\" href=\"https:\/\/www.usapova.org\/us-army-psyop-units\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">but seven today<\/a>. Neither community is \u201centry level\u201d for commissioned officers; all are drawn from the conventional force. Grouped under 1st Special Forces Command, all are airborne organizations and wear the SF shoulder patch, attracting significant numbers of young leaders from the less-glamorous conventional Army.<\/p>\n<p>These organizations draw heavily on the leadership \u201ccream\u201d of the Army, but they are not the only ones. The 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) performs \u201cadvise and assist\u201d missions, training foreign armies in combatant command areas of responsibility. Manned with 123 officers and 693 NCOs (all E6\/staff sergeants or above), it represents the equivalent of the leadership of an entire maneuver brigade combat team. The SFAB concept may have made sense when high intensity conflict with peer competitors was not in prospect. Today those resources can be put to far better use.<\/p>\n<p>There is, of course, a case to be made for each of these organizations and communities. In the best of worlds, a full toolkit is always desirable. But in a world of constrained resources, hard choices have to be made. Concentrating large numbers of the Army\u2019s best combat leaders in bespoke organizations that, in the end, are not decisive in land warfare does not serve the national interest. The Army does not win wars with commandos. It wins with large, powerful, fully manned conventional forces led by quality leaders. Today, those forces are regularly stripped of their best talent in favor of boutique communities performing secondary missions. Most were grown to their current size following 9\/11 for a security environment that no longer exists.<\/p>\n<p>What is the alternative? A good place to start is to look is to look at the Active Army and the logic underpinning its force structure. Much of the growth of the Army\u2019s specialist communities can be traced to pressure from regional combatant commanders desiring \u201caligned forces\u201d oriented on their AORs. The SOF community was only too happy to oblige by expanding to meet the demand and by folding in civil affairs and psyops formations. If the true priority is an Army postured for large scale combat operations, a more rationalized\u00a0 approach would look something like this:<\/p>\n<p>\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Three Special Forces Groups of three battalions, each with three companies<\/p>\n<p>\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 One Ranger Regiment of three battalions, each with three companies<\/p>\n<p>\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 One Civil Affairs Brigade and one Psyops Brigade of three battalions, each with three companies<\/p>\n<p>\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 No Security Force Assistance Brigade<\/p>\n<p>Pruning excess or overstaffed headquarters in these communities can also go far to rebalance the force. Deactivated formations may migrate to the reserve component. These changes would preserve needed capabilities while returning thousands of quality combat leaders to Active Army brigades and divisions badly in need of their talent \u2013 where the demand is greatest and the stakes the highest. Soon, the Army may find itself once again engaged in major theater war. Before it does, it makes sense to posture for success.<\/p>\n<p>R.D. Hooker Jr. is a Senior Fellow with The Atlantic Council.\u00a0 He served three tours on the National Security Council and commanded a parachute brigade in Iraq.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In wars fought principally on land, the U.S. Army\u2019s conventional forces \u2013 its maneuver brigades and divisions \u2013&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":85984,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[11],"tags":[5373,792,42237],"class_list":["post-85983","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-military-defense","tag-special-forces","tag-u-s-army","tag-u-s-army-special-operations-command"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@conflicts\/117627476227021948","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85983","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=85983"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85983\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/85984"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=85983"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=85983"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=85983"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}