{"id":88352,"date":"2026-11-18T06:03:08","date_gmt":"2026-11-18T06:03:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/88352\/"},"modified":"2026-11-18T06:03:08","modified_gmt":"2026-11-18T06:03:08","slug":"another-world-war-inside-story","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/88352\/","title":{"rendered":"Another world war? \u2022 Inside Story"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>We blundered into monumental insanity twice last century. Surely not again? Three new books \u2014 one by a historian and two by journalists \u2014 examine the bloody prospect that great war could again define the century. The journalists paint from the front pages. The historian reaches back to compare today\u2019s contests with the forces that erupted in the First World War.<\/p>\n<p>The journalists <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/gideon-rachman\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Gideon Rachman<\/a> and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/authors\/peter-apps\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Peter Apps<\/a> bring to their books the travelling habits and writing rhythms of columnists who deliver instant history every couple of days. Both have walked the cities they write about; both are brimming with quotes from the politicians, soldiers and strategists who must plan for war. The warnings offered by Rachman and Apps, like their ample footnotes, are drawn from the headlines.<\/p>\n<p>The catastrophe that set the course of the twentieth century frames the thinking of <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/jackson.yale.edu\/directory\/odd-arne-westad\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Odd Arne Westad<\/a>, professor of history and global affairs at Yale University. Westad fears a repeat of 1914 blunders will deliver what he capitalises as a \u201cGreat Power\u201d war \u2014 more destructive than other conflicts because of its intensity and scale, the weapons used, and its tendency to spread across the globe:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A Great Power war today would make all other current wars pale in comparison, even if the ultimate weapons of mass destruction were not to be used. Millions would die. Human development would be set back by a generation and our children would spend their lifetimes putting the pieces of progress back together again. If there are lessons from history, now is the time when we need to heed them, so that we do not end up in another Great Power war because of the fatal combinations of jingoism, fear, fatalism and sheer stupidity that set off the first major war of the twentieth century.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>The three titles map that great war dread. Westad\u2019s book is <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.penguin.com.au\/books\/the-coming-storm-9780241770573\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Coming Storm: Power, Conflict and Warnings from History<\/a>. Apps, the Reuters global defence commentator, offers <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.hachette.com.au\/peter-apps\/the-next-world-war-the-new-age-of-global-conflict-and-the-fight-to-stop-it\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Next World War: The New Age of Global Conflict and the Fight to Stop It<\/a>. Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times for two decades, starts with an acid quote attributed to Trotsky \u2014 \u201cYou may not be interested in war. But war is interested in you\u201d \u2014 and his book is <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.penguin.com.au\/books\/war-is-interested-in-you-9781847928993\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">War Is Interested In You: The Breakdown of International Order and the Threat of World War Three<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Apps argues that the contest for the world has begun. \u201cEven if we avoid outright conflict and disaster, it now looks very much as though international confrontation rather than cooperation will be the order of the day for years if not decades.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Rachman offers three fundamental reasons why war has returned as a major driver of international politics:<\/p>\n<p>\u2022 A shift in the global balance of power is \u201cencouraging challenges to the US-dominated world order that emerged at the end of the Cold War.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u2022 A group of strongman leaders \u201csee war as a legitimate and necessary tool to achieve national greatness.\u201d Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu and Xi Jinping \u201cbelieve that force rather than international law should be the decisive factor in international affairs.\u201d They are not Hitler or Napoleon, Rachman writes, but all of them \u201cbelieve that they are historic figures, whose destiny is to make their nations \u2018great again\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u2022 A law-governed world is giving way to a might-makes-right world. \u201cAs the global balance of power shifts and strongman rulers become more common, so international rules and laws are breaking down.\u201d The strongmen see war as \u201ca natural and necessary part of human affairs.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>How to understand what we face? Westad turns to \u201cone of the biggest disasters in human history.\u201d The First World War killed or injured forty million and \u201cdestroyed a world where many people believed in progress and gradual advance and replaced it with a cynical and desperate world, in which nations and ideologies were natural and necessary enemies.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The historian proves that a jeremiad doesn\u2019t have to be long and mournful. Westad delivers a tight book on \u201cthe most important issue of our time, the question of war and peace.\u201d His introduction is titled \u201cWarnings from History,\u201d his three chapters \u201cThe Rise of the Great Powers,\u201d \u201cFears and Resentments\u201d and \u201cCauses of War.\u201d The conclusion seeks hope under the heading \u201cThe Case for Peace.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Starting with the grouch shared by all historians \u2014 that people forget history \u2014 Westad observes that today less than half of one per cent of the world\u2019s population has experienced Great Power war. \u201cMost people who are of age today have grown up in relatively stable worlds that were presided over by either one or two superpowers,\u201d he writes. \u201cThose worlds were not peaceful, but they were to some extent predictable.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>No longer, he declares:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>We are entering a phase where multiple Great Powers jostle for supremacy within regions and within human endeavours such as nuclear technology, artificial intelligence, or space exploration. Trade, which was becoming freer for two generations, almost back to where it was before World War I started, is increasingly more restricted and fragile and trade wars are breaking out among major powers.<\/p>\n<p>The world is unlike anything any of us have experienced in our lifetimes. But it does look quite a bit like the world of more than a hundred years ago, from the late nineteenth century to 1914. Back then we also had a world of many Great Powers that clashed with one another and sought to dominate their neighbourhoods. Nationalism and populism were on the rise, and many people felt that the globalisation of the day had not worked for them. Protectionism and tariffs increased and growing numbers blamed the citizens of other countries for their problems. Immigration and terrorism were among the big issues.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Westad sees China standing where Germany had reached in 1914, rising \u201cfrom almost nothing to become one of the world\u2019s leading powers.\u201d Like Germany under the Kaiser, he writes, China\u2019s assertive foreign policy is not an unmitigated push for conquest. As much as pride and ambition, it is driven by fear and hubris: \u201cXi Jinping is afraid that he will lose control at home and that the US and its friends and allies are aiming to encircle China and destroy its rise through producing economic stagnation and political dissonance.\u201d China\u2019s answer is to seek \u201ca predominant position\u201d in Asia.<\/p>\n<p>In turn, China provokes fear in the United States: \u201cWhile still the most important global power, the US is going through an era of political and social unrest and a deep fear of decline.\u201d Its unpredictability is adding to the multipolar complexities: \u201cJust as Britain before 1914, the US is today deeply uncertain about its role in the world and insecure about its domestic and imperial order.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Using the outbreak of the First World War as the model, Westad identifies \u201cpotential flashpoints for Great Power conflict, from Taiwan, Korea and the South China Sea, to the Himalayas, Ukraine and the Middle East.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Our world is as messy as the international scene that created the First World War, Westad says, and today\u2019s leaders are no better. Facing complex and confrontational times, leaders must manage the transition to multipolarity without creating spheres of influence based on brutal might-makes-right calculations. To avoid Great Power conflict, today\u2019s version of the president, kaiser or czar must know how to deter, but also \u201chow to buy time and avoid uncontrollable escalation.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Peter Apps begins his warning with a frightening estimate: \u201cDuring the writing of this book, several people have asked me how likely I believe a major war to be. My personal belief is that the risk stands at around 30 to 35 per cent over the coming decade.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>If you had a one-in-three chance of winning millions of dollars over the next decade, you\u2019d be ecstatic. But a one-in-three possibility of a world war means the millions in play are people\u2019s lives.<\/p>\n<p>As in the early years of the Cold War, Apps writes, \u201cthe world looks like it\u2019s entering a cycle in which repeated and sometimes overlapping crises can fuel repeated escalation.\u201d While still short of the visceral terror of the most alarming Cold War years, \u201cthe prospect of the world being torn apart by multiple atomic blasts is once again no longer unimaginable.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Apps predicts the most dangerous time may be the arrival of a new US president in 2029. He thinks the \u201csheer unpredictability\u201d of Donald Trump \u201cmay act as an effective deterrent\u201d for Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin until then. Trump will continue to damage the US, and a new president in 2029 will face compounding uncertainties.<\/p>\n<p>Xi and Putin are ageing leaders seeking to deepen their legacies. Apps sees \u201ca highly credible chance that whoever is in power in Moscow or Beijing may wish to test the next US president as they enter office.\u201d If Russian and Chinese leaders \u201cbelieve that they can take something by force, then they will try to do so \u2014 and perhaps unleash catastrophe.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The response to perilous times is to find a balance between \u201ccomplacency and panic,\u201d a formula offered to Apps by the British strategist <a href=\"https:\/\/insidestory.org.au\/authors\/lawrence-freedman\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Lawrence Freedman<\/a>. But what if WWIII is already under way? The Reuters columnist reports a belief in Eastern Europe that a new world war has started and is escalating from Ukraine to elsewhere.<\/p>\n<p>Apps rejects the view that Russia\u2019s 2022 invasion of Ukraine marks the start of a new great war: \u201cFirstly, because I dislike the idea that endless escalation is inevitable, but secondly because the death, destruction and disruption we have seen so far, horrific though it is, would be dwarfed by the consequences of a true new global conflict. Still, it is increasingly undeniable that a serious battle for the future of the world is already under way.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Gideon Rachman\u2019s work on the threat of WWIII builds on his three previous books. In Zero-Sum World (2010) he warned that the global financial crisis of 2008 would cause a backlash against globalisation, a growth of populist parties and a surge in international tensions. In Easternisation: Asia\u2019s Rise and America\u2019s Decline (2016) he showed how the <a href=\"https:\/\/insidestory.org.au\/asias-rise-the-rules-and-the-rulers\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">economic might of Asia<\/a> was undermining Western power, describing \u201ca dangerous rise in diplomatic and military tensions\u201d as China challenged America and Japan.<\/p>\n<p>Later, in The Age of the Strongman: How the Cult of the Leader Threatens Democracy Around the World (2022), he documented how authoritarian nationalists thrive on \u201cthe rhetoric of violence,\u201d undermine liberal principles and increase the risk of conflict. The strongmen stalk the stage, brandishing weapons and stirring anger.<\/p>\n<p>Today\u2019s wars and flashpoints, Rachman notes, \u201chave so far been largely separate regional conflicts,\u201d but a world war would link conflicts on several continents at the same time. The emerging link he sees is an \u201caxis of adversaries\u201d or \u201caxis of upheaval\u201d joining China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. \u201cThe four members of the \u2018axis\u2019 have similar aspirations,\u201d he writes. \u201cAll of them want a regional sphere of influence free of encroaching American power.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>When North Korean troops joined Russia on the front line in 2024, Ukraine\u2019s president Volodymyr Zelensky described it as \u201cthe first step to a world war.\u201d While Zelensky \u201chad an interest in dramatising what was at stake,\u201d Rachman says, \u201chis statement was more than mere hyperbole.\u201d The four axis nations are united in the effort \u201cto challenge the US-led world order.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Russia deploys Iranian-designed drones to attack Ukraine. North Korea sends troops, missiles and ammunition. While not supplying complete weapon systems, China provides Russia with technology \u201ccrucial to fighting a war, such as semiconductors and radar equipment.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>All of the axis powers are authoritarian nations opposed to the West\u2019s promotion of democracy, \u201cwhich they see as barely disguised attempts at regime change through Western-sponsored \u2018colour revolutions.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Comforting observations about the strength of the West and democracies smash into the spectre of Donald Trump. He stomps through these three books, blindsiding America\u2019s friends and offering comfort to foes. He capriciously abandons Ukraine; would he throw Taiwan to China?<\/p>\n<p>Trump teaches the world what it means not to rely on the US. He imposes tariffs on allies and demands they pay for America\u2019s protection. A for-profit presidency proclaims: show-me-the-money. The mafia method needs little policy and no principles.<\/p>\n<p>Trump may be the symptom of a trend that will outlast him \u2014 an American retreat from the central role it has played in global affairs for eighty years. Adversaries step up while the US steps back.<\/p>\n<p>Rachman observes that Trump is \u201cclearly prepared, in some circumstances, to align with the axis of adversaries and against America\u2019s traditional allies.\u201d Trump\u2019s international approach is \u201cmore a set of instincts than a coherent grand strategy,\u201d a worldview \u201cdriven by a few long-held beliefs and prejudices, an insatiable appetite for attention and \u2018wins,\u2019 and an eye for business opportunities.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Apps sees America\u2019s relations with its allies becoming more factious and transactional: \u201cAmong almost every major democracy, there was a feeling of crisis and looming dread about the future. The question was: what were they prepared to do about it?\u201d The loss of confidence in the US, he writes, means talk about getting nuclear weapons is \u201csubtly gaining traction.\u201d Apps lists Australia as one of those countries that might go nuclear, along with \u201cSouth Korea, Poland, Ukraine and even Germany and Japan.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Westad notes that Trump is \u201ccutting loose former partners in Europe and elsewhere to concentrate on America\u2019s own problems.\u201d The historian says the US is caught between a confrontational view of its main rival, China, and Trump\u2019s \u201cwish to do far less in international affairs overall. In an almost exact parallel to early-twentieth-century Britain, the US wants to be respected as the number one country while also wanting to do less and less to defend that position.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The war Trump launched against Iran in February showcased America\u2019s formidable military strength but also the limits of hard power, Apps writes: \u201cThis was warfare as only the US could fight it. Only the world\u2019s pre-eminent superpower could conduct high-tech military action on this scale half a world away, justifying its actions through its own ruthless priorities. Iran, though, proved more resilient than expected.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Apps quotes the judgement of <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2026\/04\/iran-war-united-states-limits-of-power-alliances-historical-context\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Amr Hamzawy<\/a> of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: \u201cThe Iran war is becoming one of the pivotal moments in history that are measured not merely by the outcomes of military battles, but by the profound impact they leave upon the political and symbolic standing of major powers.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>American bombs and missiles have not delivered what Trump wants in Iran \u2014 a conclusion made even sharper by Trump\u2019s hazy blustering about whatever those aims are. Apps writes that Xi Jinping took advantage of this strange dynamic:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The Chinese leader was soon welcoming multiple leaders from every region of the world to Beijing at an ever-faster rate, proclaiming China as a more stable alternative against what he called the \u201claw of the jungle,\u201d and defender of a \u201cmultipolar world.\u201d In reality, Moscow, Beijing and Washington were all simultaneously confronting limits to their military capability to achieve their political aims, even as all three poured more and more effort into the tools of military coercion.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>In attacking Iran, Rachman writes, Trump casually \u201creversed the arguments he had made for many decades about the risk of a third world war. He had once endorsed the idea that it would be dangerous folly for the US to attack Iran.\u201d In his victory speech in 2024, Trump had proclaimed: \u201cI\u2019m not going to start a war, I\u2019m going to stop wars.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Rachman says America\u2019s European allies have simultaneous worries \u2014 that Trump is \u201ctoo warlike in the Middle East and too intent on peace at any price in Europe.\u201d A \u201cparticular danger of our era,\u201d he says, is the mismatch between Trump\u2019s flirtation with spheres of influence and the reality of the American alliance system built since the Second World War, with 750 US bases in eighty countries: \u201cIf it came to it, would America really not intervene in the case of an attack on Japan? Or Poland? Or Britain? Nobody can really be sure of the answer to the questions any more. That creates uncertainty. And uncertainty creates danger.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Confronting the same awful prospect, the three writers offer similar approaches, defined by caution, reason and hope.<\/p>\n<p>The main lesson from the First World War, Westad says, is that \u201csudden and dramatic changes in Great Power constellations may lead to war\u201d but there are always choices. The decision for war has three main elements: estimates of relative power; attitudes and beliefs; and the immediate cause or crisis. From this mix, war \u201cmay emerge from misperceptions and miscalculations.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Very few leaders inherently believe war is the best outcome for their country, Westad writes, but they are pushed by \u201cfear of humiliation, fear of losing, fear of deception, fear of being too late. World War I went from crisis to conflict mainly because of debilitating fear. The ability to learn to live with fear and uncertainty is a key element of strategy but one that is hard to attain.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Surveying the gathering storm, Westad offers this conclusion on what could trigger another great war:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The lack of experience we have with Great Power multipolarity makes the years ahead very dangerous. The worry is not so much accidental war or large-scale wars of conquest. It is that in an increasingly complex world, the definitions of interests that Great Powers are developing are both broad enough to be dangerous and narrow enough to be hard to retreat from. Unlike a cold war, where ideologies, in the end, made for enough flexibility to avoid cataclysmic war, the mix of nationalism and interest-based politics in today\u2019s world makes it harder for Great Powers to retreat in times of crisis and easier to believe that, given the stakes on one\u2019s own side, the other guy will blink first.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Gideon Rachman says he is not predicting that WWIII is inevitable, but analysing developments that are well under way:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The Russian invasion of Ukraine has already fundamentally altered the world; so has the war between the US, Israel and Iran. But the main reason why it would be wrong to be fatalistic about a third world war is that there remains a great deal of choice for both political leaders and the nations they lead. The growing dangers of conflict are impossible to ignore. But the future is, fortunately, not yet written.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Peter Apps takes some comfort in how the Cold War played out in the twentieth century. \u201cLuck and common sense could hold,\u201d he writes, and WWIII \u201cmight yet be postponed and deterred indefinitely.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Apps ends by describing the first months of 2026 as delivering \u201csound and fury, leaving the world even more combative and disjointed. The coming months and years would likely prove at least as testing. A new world war was eminently preventable, but that would require effort and innovation. And time might be running out.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Great power politics is back. And that means the chance of great war between great powers is also back. War in Ukraine. War in the Middle East. A damaged president in Washington, rejected by midterm voters, will seek glory (and gold) beyond America. China constantly rehearses an ever-bigger naval blockade of Taiwan while Japan proclaims it\u2019d go to war to keep Taiwan free.<\/p>\n<p>Sitting uneasily between war and peace lies the \u201cgrey zone\u201d of constant cyberwar, black ops and hacks, sabotage, propaganda and misinformation.<\/p>\n<p>Trust is in short supply in a time of truculence and turmoil. The international order <a href=\"https:\/\/insidestory.org.au\/the-mail-arrives-yet-the-world-spins-awry\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">sags, shifts and splinters<\/a>. Rules are contested. Norms are ragged. The international arc is raw and rough. The danger of great war means the \u201cgreat\u201d leaders of this century must do a better job than their predecessors in the first half of the last century.<\/p>\n<p>The rhymes of history threaten to become another great funeral dirge. \u2022<\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.readings.com.au\/product\/9781035424863\/the-next-world-war-the-new-age-of-global-conflict-and-the-fight-to-stop-it--peter-apps--2026--9781035424863#rac:dt4xiswhx65g\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Next World War: The New Age of Global Conflict and the Fight to Stop It<\/a><br \/>By Peter Apps | Wildfire | 472 pages | $34.99<\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.penguin.com.au\/books\/war-is-interested-in-you-9781847928993#rac:dt4xiswhx65g\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">War Is Interested In You: The Breakdown of International Order and the Threat of World War Three<\/a><br \/>By Gideon Rachman | Bodley Head | 336 pages | $39.99<\/p>\n<p><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"https:\/\/www.readings.com.au\/product\/9780241770573\/the-coming-storm--odd-arne-westad--2026--9780241770573#rac:dt4xiswhx65g\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">The Coming Storm: Power, Conflict and Warnings from History<\/a><br \/>By Odd Arne Westad | Allen Lane | 256 pages | $49.99<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"We blundered into monumental insanity twice last century. Surely not again? Three new books \u2014 one by a&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":88082,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[11238,21,227,3966,103,102,1945,3712],"class_list":["post-88352","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-global-conflict","tag-books","tag-conflict","tag-diplomacy","tag-foreign-affairs","tag-global","tag-global-conflict","tag-history","tag-warfare"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@conflicts\/117635934119947204","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88352","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=88352"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88352\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/88082"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=88352"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=88352"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=88352"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}