{"id":88422,"date":"2026-11-18T07:07:10","date_gmt":"2026-11-18T07:07:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/88422\/"},"modified":"2026-11-18T07:07:10","modified_gmt":"2026-11-18T07:07:10","slug":"mired-in-wars-us-and-russia-test-new-global-power-tactics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/88422\/","title":{"rendered":"Mired in wars, US and Russia test new global power tactics"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With the US preoccupied with Iran and Russia bogged down in Ukraine, two military operations in different parts of the world seem to be the catalyst for a new method for Washington and Moscow to exert power. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Over the last few years, narrower, increased security cooperation and regional maneuvering have emerged as international security arrangements have weakened.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first example of this regional cooperation was seen in Haiti on October 18 after the kidnapping of four Salvadorans by gangs. El Salvador initially sent 100 special forces soldiers to the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, to search and rescue. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By <a href=\"https:\/\/haitiantimes.com\/2026\/10\/23\/salvadoran-contingent-arrives-haiti-search-four-missing-soldiers\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">October 22<\/a>, the numbers grew to more than 2,000 troops, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/nov\/07\/el-savador-war-on-gangs-haiti\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">according to<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/nov\/07\/el-savador-war-on-gangs-haiti\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">The Guardian<\/a>. It was El Salvador\u2019s first independent foreign military campaign since its brief <a href=\"https:\/\/www.historyisnowmagazine.com\/blog\/2026\/10\/31\/the-football-war-the-hundred-hour-war-between-el-salvador-and-honduras\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">1969 war with Honduras<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Then, on October 26, Algeria announced plans to send troops to neighboring Niger amid separatist and jihadist activity on its southern border. It marks Algeria\u2019s first major foreign military commitment <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/10\/26\/algerias-president-orders-troop-deployment-to-neighbouring-niger\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">since the 1973 Yom Kippur War<\/a>, with the first convoy <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/africa\/first-algerian-troops-arrive-niger-where-jihadists-threaten-stability-2026-10-30\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">arriving on October 30<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The near-simultaneous timing and rarity of military campaigns by El Salvador and Algeria are notable. But their work alongside American and Russian security organizations makes these campaigns more significant. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Haiti, the US-based private military and security company (PMSC) Vectus Global has been <a href=\"https:\/\/globalinitiative.net\/analysis\/haiti-military-companies-organized-crime-gangs\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">providing security support<\/a> to Haitian authorities since early 2025. Niger has hosted Russia\u2019s Africa Corps paramilitary organization <a href=\"https:\/\/www.osw.waw.pl\/en\/publikacje\/analyses\/2024-04-22\/kremlins-march-through-sahel-russian-forces-niger\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">since 2024<\/a>, after it absorbed much of the Wagner PMSC\u2019s former African network.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While PMSCs and paramilitary forces often operate within multilateral alliances, Washington and Moscow have established independent security footholds in Haiti and Niger, respectively, through these organizations. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Vectus Global and the Africa Corps, however, have limited manpower and now appear to be turning to El Salvador and Algeria, respectively, to reinforce their operations. This provides the US and Russia with additional military support while allowing them to maintain some degree of distance from the deployments.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These simultaneous campaigns come amid a <a href=\"https:\/\/globalgovernanceforum.org\/rethinking-crisis-multilateralism-in-historical-perspective\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">weakening of global multilateral security<\/a> arrangements in recent years. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/392826944_The_Failures_of_UN_Peacekeeping_Reimagining_Global_Security_for_the_21st_Century\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Shortcomings of UN peacekeeping<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/publications\/commentary\/why-tensions-between-us-and-its-allies-are-now-so-critical-reflections\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">breakdown in the Western alliance<\/a>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.foreignaffairs.com\/united-states\/how-geopolitics-overran-globalization\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">questions about globalization\u2019s future<\/a> have created space for smaller, more selective partnerships. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But El Salvador and Algeria are not simply following Washington\u2019s and Moscow\u2019s lead. Haiti and Niger will also seek to protect their own sovereignty and national interests, potentially complicating these partnerships over time.<\/p>\n<p>The Caribbean cauldron<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After former Haitian President Jovenel Mo\u00efse\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2026\/09\/21\/nx-s1-5976026\/suspects-killing-haiti-president-extradited\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">assassination in 2021<\/a>, US and Salvadoran efforts to restore security gradually converged. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the aftermath, Haiti <a href=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2021\/07\/10\/1014914892\/haiti-requests-u-s-assistance-to-restore-order-after-president-moises-assassinat\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">requested US military assistance<\/a>. However, despite concerns that instability could trigger a refugee crisis and create opportunities for organized crime, the Biden administration <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/newshour\/politics\/biden-says-u-s-will-protect-haiti-embassy-wont-send-troops\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">declined to intervene directly<\/a>, instead backing a UN security force <a href=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2023\/10\/03\/1203171295\/u-n-security-council-approves-sending-a-kenya-led-force-to-quell-violence-in-hai\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">led by Kenya in 2023<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As instability worsened, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele offered to help. In 2024, Bukele said that while a UN Security Council resolution was required, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/the-americas\/2026\/11\/05\/el-salvadors-president-thinks-he-can-eliminate-haitis-gangs\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">El Salvador could \u201celiminate\u201d Haiti\u2019s gangs<\/a> by using his domestic anti-gang policies, which he has credited with making El Salvador the <a href=\"https:\/\/ia.sv\/blog\/el-salvador-safest-country-americas\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">safest country in the Americas<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Under the second Trump administration, these efforts coalesced. In early 2025, the US State Department <a href=\"https:\/\/smallwarsjournal.com\/2026\/06\/02\/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-61drone-strikes-from-haitian-task-force-pmsc-vectus-global-kill-over-twelve-hundred-people\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">authorized Vectus Global<\/a> to export defense services to Haiti, permitting military-related work there. Founded by Trump ally Erik Prince, the company <a href=\"https:\/\/gazette.com\/2025\/08\/14\/exclusive-trump-ally-erik-prince-plans-to-keep-personnel-in-haiti-for-10-years-to-fight-gangs-and-collect-taxes-a86fd702-a355-5fd8-b743-4cdf142496a9\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">secured<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/gazette.com\/2025\/08\/14\/exclusive-trump-ally-erik-prince-plans-to-keep-personnel-in-haiti-for-10-years-to-fight-gangs-and-collect-taxes-a86fd702-a355-5fd8-b743-4cdf142496a9\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">a<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/gazette.com\/2025\/08\/14\/exclusive-trump-ally-erik-prince-plans-to-keep-personnel-in-haiti-for-10-years-to-fight-gangs-and-collect-taxes-a86fd702-a355-5fd8-b743-4cdf142496a9\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">10-year contract<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/gazette.com\/2025\/08\/14\/exclusive-trump-ally-erik-prince-plans-to-keep-personnel-in-haiti-for-10-years-to-fight-gangs-and-collect-taxes-a86fd702-a355-5fd8-b743-4cdf142496a9\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">to improve security by combating gangs<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/gazette.com\/2025\/08\/14\/exclusive-trump-ally-erik-prince-plans-to-keep-personnel-in-haiti-for-10-years-to-fight-gangs-and-collect-taxes-a86fd702-a355-5fd8-b743-4cdf142496a9\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">and strengthening Haiti\u2019s<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/gazette.com\/2025\/08\/14\/exclusive-trump-ally-erik-prince-plans-to-keep-personnel-in-haiti-for-10-years-to-fight-gangs-and-collect-taxes-a86fd702-a355-5fd8-b743-4cdf142496a9\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">customs framework<\/a>. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since March 2025, Vectus Global personnel have <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iar-gwu.org\/blog\/rxw7pcbo1bdi8kzwvq56ii6yu0wj5w\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">conducted drone strikes and helicopter attacks<\/a> in Haiti, provided <a href=\"https:\/\/international-and-comparative-law-review.law.miami.edu\/haitis-vectus-gamble-private-force-and-private-customs-in-a-failing-state\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">combat training<\/a>, and supplied hundreds of fighters. <a href=\"https:\/\/smallwarsjournal.com\/2026\/06\/02\/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-61drone-strikes-from-haitian-task-force-pmsc-vectus-global-kill-over-twelve-hundred-people\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Small Wars Journal<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/smallwarsjournal.com\/2026\/06\/02\/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-61drone-strikes-from-haitian-task-force-pmsc-vectus-global-kill-over-twelve-hundred-people\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">describes the campaign<\/a> as one in which \u201ccontracted mercenaries are engaging in legally questionable activities to stave off violent armed gangs from taking over full control of the capital Port-au-Prince.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile, Erik Prince\u2019s ties to El Salvador predated Trump\u2019s reelection. In August 2024, he visited El Salvador and proposed using their existing <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2025\/04\/11\/military-contractors-prison-plan-detained-immigrants-erik-prince-00287208\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">prison complex<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2025\/04\/11\/military-contractors-prison-plan-detained-immigrants-erik-prince-00287208\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">for migrants. In 2025, he registered<\/a> an LLC called 2USV in Wyoming and shared his proposed plan with the White House when Trump took power. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The proposal would have put Prince\u2019s company in charge of managing logistics for the prisons, including transporting detainees from American holding cells to El Salvador\u2019s prison, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2025\/04\/11\/military-contractors-prison-plan-detained-immigrants-erik-prince-00287208\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">according<\/a> to Politico. Prince\u2019s proposal, however, showed <a href=\"https:\/\/insightcrime.org\/news\/erik-prince-privatizing-latin-america-war-crime\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">no signs of progress<\/a>. The Trump administration, meanwhile, deported migrants to El Salvador prisons as <a href=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2025\/07\/08\/g-s1-76491\/migrants-salvadoran-prison-under-u-s-control\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">part of its own operations<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While Prince\u2019s \u201cprison plan\u201d might have fallen through, Salvadorans comprise a <a href=\"https:\/\/international-and-comparative-law-review.law.miami.edu\/haitis-vectus-gamble-private-force-and-private-customs-in-a-failing-state\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">large part<\/a> of Vectus Global\u2019s personnel in Haiti.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El Salvador has also strengthened official military cooperation with Washington before its deployment to Haiti. It received shipments of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.army.mil\/article\/288354\/speed_and_precision_asae_rapid_rifle_delivery_highlights_value_of_fms_partnerships\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">US rifles<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/sv.usembassy.gov\/united-states-transfers-helicopters-to-el-salvador\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">helicopters<\/a> throughout 2025, followed by <a href=\"https:\/\/dinero.com.sv\/en\/miscellaneous\/el-salvador-strengthens-military-capabilities-with-equipment-donation-from-u-s-southern-command\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">additional firearms, medical supplies, and helicopter maintenance equipment<\/a> from US Southern Command in 2026. In April, the two countries also <a href=\"https:\/\/www.southcom.mil\/News\/PressReleases\/Article\/4454340\/multinational-exercise-centam-guardian-26-strengthens-regional-security-coopera\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">cohosted<\/a> the multinational military exercise CENTAM Guardian 26.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">El Salvador\u2019s October move into Haiti <a href=\"https:\/\/haitiantimes.com\/2026\/10\/30\/do-what-you-have-to-do-trump-backs-bukeles-troop-deployment-to-haiti\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">received Washington\u2019s approval<\/a>, and the US \u201cprovided C-130 transport aircraft to help move Salvadoran troops to Haiti,\u201d a US military official <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/around-1000-soldiers-el-salvador-have-deployed-haiti-source-says-2026-10-27\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">told<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/around-1000-soldiers-el-salvador-have-deployed-haiti-source-says-2026-10-27\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Reuters<\/a>. The buildup indicates the deployment was planned well in advance, and the US, El Salvador, and Haiti each have reasons to see it through.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For Washington, the mission supports the Trump administration\u2019s effort to <a href=\"https:\/\/financialservices.house.gov\/news\/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=410998\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">reassert US influence in the Americas<\/a>. Haiti overlooks <a href=\"https:\/\/haitiantimes.com\/2025\/11\/17\/haiti-hidden-investment-frontier\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">important<\/a> Caribbean shipping routes, has potential for port and infrastructure development, and has lucrative <a href=\"https:\/\/en.ayitikanpemin.org\/mining-in-haiti\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">mining resources<\/a>. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Once security is restored, Vectus Global plans to <a href=\"https:\/\/international-and-comparative-law-review.law.miami.edu\/haitis-vectus-gamble-private-force-and-private-customs-in-a-failing-state\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">implement<\/a> a customs program collecting duties on goods crossing Haiti\u2019s border with the Dominican Republic, further entrenching US influence. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The transitional government in Haiti is also supporting Vectus, having \u201cchosen a more direct path\u2014turning to Prince and Vectus rather than awaiting the results of yet another experiment in multilateralism,\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/international-and-comparative-law-review.law.miami.edu\/haitis-vectus-gamble-private-force-and-private-customs-in-a-failing-state\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">according<\/a> to an opinion piece on the University of Miami School of Law\u2019s website.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Bukele, meanwhile, can promote his security model abroad, expand El Salvador\u2019s regional influence, and strengthen ties with Washington. Following the <a href=\"https:\/\/responsiblestatecraft.org\/haiti-gangs-un\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">struggles<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/responsiblestatecraft.org\/haiti-gangs-un\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">of<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/responsiblestatecraft.org\/haiti-gangs-un\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">the UN-led mission<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/smallwarsjournal.com\/2026\/06\/02\/third-generation-gangs-strategic-note-no-61drone-strikes-from-haitian-task-force-pmsc-vectus-global-kill-over-twelve-hundred-people\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Vectus Global<\/a> to restore order in Haiti, an estimated 6.4 million people needed humanitarian aid at the start of 2026, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cordaid.org\/en\/news\/humanitarian-crisis-haiti\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">according to the nonprofit organization Cordaid<\/a>. Haiti\u2019s government has little choice but to look beyond the approaches that have already failed.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The UN rebranded its mission in Haiti as the <a href=\"https:\/\/international-and-comparative-law-review.law.miami.edu\/haitis-vectus-gamble-private-force-and-private-customs-in-a-failing-state\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Gang Suppression Force in September 2025<\/a>, and has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.miamiherald.com\/news\/nation-world\/world\/americas\/haiti\/article317899359.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">distanced itself<\/a> from El Salvador\u2019s operation. On November 3, the UN announced that it had received a request from a major Haitian gang leader <a href=\"https:\/\/www.upi.com\/Top_News\/World-News\/2026\/11\/03\/latam-un-haiti-gang-salvadoran\/1191793729403\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">calling for international mediation<\/a>, with the Salvadoran troops escalating their actions against criminal groups. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the days that followed, a drone strike <a href=\"https:\/\/www.caribbeantoday.com\/sections\/news-2\/haitian-gang-leader-killed-as-security-forces-intensify-operations\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">killed Boston gang leader Mathias Saintil operating in Haiti<\/a>. In another operation, the Haitian police, along with Salvadoran forces, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.miamiherald.com\/news\/nation-world\/world\/americas\/haiti\/article317992703.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">destroyed a house<\/a> used by the 400 Mawozo leader Wilson Joseph, suggesting the offensive against Haiti\u2019s gang continues to intensify.<\/p>\n<p>Niger and Wider Sahel Instability<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Niger has similarly faced years of growing instability from separatist and jihadist groups. It expelled French and US forces in <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/niger-france-sahel-coup-troops-security-macron-97c8ccfe880169832965c33e96d7befe\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">2023<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2024\/09\/16\/politics\/us-military-niger-withdrawal\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">2024<\/a>, respectively, turning instead to Russia\u2019s Wagner group and later the Africa Corps, which <a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/africa-corps-maintains-russias-presence-in-africa-after-wagners-departure-from-mali\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">absorbed much<\/a> of Wagner\u2019s African operations. Since October 30, Algerian forces have <a href=\"https:\/\/thesoufancenter.org\/intelbrief-2026-november-3\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">guarded infrastructure<\/a> and supported Niger\u2019s security efforts, helping relieve pressure on the Africa Corps.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia and Algeria also took time to develop their current security relationship. Russia\u2019s private military networks expanded across Africa <a href=\"https:\/\/inss.ndu.edu\/Research-and-Commentary\/View-Publications\/Article\/2425797\/russias-escalating-use-of-private-military-companies-in-africa\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">during the 2010s<\/a>, most notably through Wagner, which secured contracts for political influence and access to natural resources.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Wagner expanded into the Sahel <a href=\"https:\/\/gjia.georgetown.edu\/global-governance\/russia-in-africa-private-military-proxies-in-the-sahel\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">in 2021<\/a>, marked by its arrival in Mali. Subsequently, military coups and deteriorating relations between countries in the region and Western governments led to the withdrawal of Western forces from Mali, Burkina Faso, and later Niger. Despite Algeria\u2019s longstanding military ties with Russia, Wagner\u2019s growing presence and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.orfonline.org\/research\/wagner-s-final-chapter-in-africa\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">struggle to contain<\/a> regional violence have <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/commentary\/mercenary-politics-algerias-response-wagner-mali\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">worried Algiers<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune visited Russia <a href=\"https:\/\/mecouncil.org\/publication\/algerian-russian-relations-military-cooperation\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">in June 2023<\/a>, the two nations signed the Declaration on Enhanced Strategic Partnership. Wagner\u2019s rebellion during the same month and the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August accelerated Kremlin efforts to bring the organization under state control. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Over the following months, much of its African operations <a href=\"https:\/\/oe.t2com.army.mil\/product\/revisiting-russian-africa-corps-organizational-structure\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">reorganized into the Africa Corps<\/a>, making it \u201cmore manageable and less associated with the controversial Prigozhin,\u201d <a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/africa-corps-maintains-russias-presence-in-africa-after-wagners-departure-from-mali\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">according to<\/a> the Jamestown Foundation.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Managed by Russian military intelligence, the Africa Corps\u2019 operations draw on Russian state personnel, former Wagner fighters, and other PMSC personnel, according to the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/IF12389\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Congressional Research Service<\/a>. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Its structure also allows the Russian Defense Ministry to contract a \u201cvariety of organizations\u201d and individuals, RUSI senior research fellow Antonio Giustozzi <a href=\"https:\/\/committees.parliament.uk\/oralevidence\/16464\/html\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">told the UK\u2019s<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/committees.parliament.uk\/oralevidence\/16464\/html\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee<\/a> in 2025, as the organization expanded its presence in the Sahel.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the <a href=\"https:\/\/thesoufancenter.org\/intelbrief-2026-november-3\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">2025 Algerian break<\/a> with the Alliance of Sahel States\u2014a 2023 security pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso\u2014complicated <a href=\"https:\/\/gjia.georgetown.edu\/global-governance\/russia-in-africa-private-military-proxies-in-the-sahel\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Russia\u2019s regional ambitions<\/a>. Moscow aims to build a stronger military presence, secure access to the region\u2019s natural resources, and expand its political influence at the expense of Western powers. Algeria\u2019s rift with its southern neighbors, however, made it harder for Moscow to use its ties with Algeria to strengthen its position in the Sahel.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The AES has increasingly <a href=\"https:\/\/africa.businessinsider.com\/local\/markets\/algeria-arms-niger-with-4-military-helicopters-as-north-african-power-moves-closer-to\/xr85gx3\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">deepened<\/a> military ties with Russia, and Moscow has sought to mend relations between the alliance and Algiers, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.arabnews.com\/world\/how-algeria-and-mali-restored-ties-after-sahel-rift-2651449\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">mediating a diplomatic reset<\/a> in July. Russia also strengthened military ties with Algeria through <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2026\/04\/30\/investigation-russian-shadow-airlines-use-algeria-as-base-for-secretive-missions\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">a growing stream of military-linked cargo flights<\/a>, alongside official deliveries of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vietnam.vn\/en\/nga-chinh-thuc-ban-giao-may-bay-nem-bom-su-34m-cho-algeria\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">long-range bombers<\/a> and the <a href=\"https:\/\/united24media.com\/latest-news\/russian-su-57e-appears-in-algeria-marking-moscows-first-stealth-fighter-export-15718\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">first export<\/a> of its Su-57E fighter jet in early 2026. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Defense News, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2026\/04\/30\/investigation-russian-shadow-airlines-use-algeria-as-base-for-secretive-missions\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">calling<\/a> Algeria an \u201cimportant Russian ally at Europe\u2019s southern flank,\u201d added that Moscow was \u201cusing the country as a hub to project Russia\u2019s power deeper into Africa.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia and Algeria have cooperated in Niger before their October deployment. In August, Algeria sent fighter jets and air-to-air refueling planes to secure Nigerien airspace <a href=\"https:\/\/adf-magazine.com\/2026\/10\/algeria-deploys-military-to-bolster-sahel-security\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">during an attempted coup<\/a>, while Russian Africa Corps personnel <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/8\/31\/niger-mutiny-puts-russias-expanding-role-in-the-sahel-to-the-test\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">supported<\/a> troops on the ground along with providing aerial support. Algerian aircraft used Niger\u2019s Air Base 101 in Niamey, the country\u2019s main military outpost <a href=\"https:\/\/adf-magazine.com\/2026\/10\/algeria-deploys-military-to-bolster-sahel-security\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">and an Africa Corps base<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Algeria and Niger also share a growing inventory of Russian-origin military equipment. In August, Algeria <a href=\"https:\/\/africa.businessinsider.com\/local\/markets\/algeria-arms-niger-with-4-military-helicopters-as-north-african-power-moves-closer-to\/xr85gx3\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">transferred four helicopters from its own arsenal<\/a> to Niger, further connecting their armed forces.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Algeria\u2019s decision to deploy its forces in October was viewed favorably in Moscow, but Algiers is pursuing its own interests. Algerian officials have said that the deployment aims to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ynetnews.com\/opinions-analysis\/article\/bkik0uq6me\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">protect the country\u2019s energy and economic interests in Niger<\/a>, particularly those of state oil and gas company Sonatrach. These include the proposed <a href=\"https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/africa\/20260620-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline-african-dream-that-could-reshape-world-energy-markets\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline<\/a>, which would carry Nigerian gas through Niger and Algeria to European markets.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Russia\u2019s Africa Corps has nonetheless gained additional military support from Algerian forces, while Niger has secured a powerful regional partner in its efforts to restore stability.<\/p>\n<p>New model of intervention<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It\u2019s unclear whether Washington and Moscow tacitly accommodated each other\u2019s plans, but the movement of personnel and equipment, alongside diplomatic signals, suggests both were aware of the other\u2019s intentions. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Neither Washington nor Moscow has openly challenged the other\u2019s military operations yet, and both may tolerate them as long as they remain limited and don\u2019t threaten the other country\u2019s interests.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The joint deployments of private\/paramilitary forces and individual national militaries point to a new way for major and regional powers to extend their military influence abroad, as multilateral security arrangements weaken and narrower partnerships gain importance. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Coordinating the interests and activities of multiple governments and security organizations will be difficult, however, and success in one country does not guarantee it in the other. Algeria, for example, has far greater autonomy than El Salvador given its larger population and economy and distance from Russia\u2019s sphere of influence, leaving Moscow with less influence over its partner than Washington has over its own.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While El Salvador and Algeria could enhance their positions and strengthen ties with Washington and Moscow, they may ultimately be left carrying the burden if the arrangements fail. Haiti and Niger, meanwhile, could see their instability worsen.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Yet for relatively little direct commitment, Washington and Russia can extend their reach while limiting political costs, diplomatic fallout, and responsibility for abuses by forces operating on the ground. <\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">David Alpher, a US Army veteran and humanitarian adviser and conflict specialist, now with the grassroots organization <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aidonthehill.org\/about\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Aid on the Hill<\/a>, tells me that \u201cthe companies are coming because there\u2019s some resource profit involved. They\u2019ll say, \u2018We\u2019ll take care of your counterterrorism problem, but we want preferential access to basic rights, overflight rights, mineral rights, whatever.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Combining these operations with national military deployments makes the underlying agreements difficult to untangle. As Alpher notes, \u201cwith a formal military arrangement, that\u2019s comparatively transparent. Not everything will be public, and some of it will be classified, but these corporate arrangements are completely opaque,\u201d and \u201cnobody knows who signed up to what or what the trade-offs were. Once they\u2019re in, you\u2019re not getting rid of them very quickly.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Success could encourage other countries to pursue similar partnerships, where the risk of overlapping operations will grow \u2014 Russian and US private military companies have operated in the same country before, with Vectus Global and Africa Corps <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sofx.com\/breakdown-tim-kennedy-shot-in-ambush-on-erik-princes-congo-force\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">both currently operating<\/a> in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For Washington and Moscow, using these organizations may limit their exposure, but it will not limit the consequences.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">John P. Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, DC, and a world affairs correspondent for the <a href=\"https:\/\/independentmediainstitute.org\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Independent Media Institute<\/a>. He is a contributor to several foreign affairs publications, and his book, \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/rowman.com\/ISBN\/9780761873389\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas<\/a>\u201c, was published in December 2022. Follow him on X <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/john_ruehl\" rel=\"nofollow\">@john_ruehl<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This article was produced by <a href=\"https:\/\/independentmediainstitute.org\/economy-for-all\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Economy for All<\/a>, a project of the Independent Media Institute, and republished with permission. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"With the US preoccupied with Iran and Russia bogged down in Ukraine, two military operations in different parts&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":88423,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[43251,38873,12767,3894,23562,43252,35,43253,289,39,43254,1726],"class_list":["post-88422","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-us-wars","tag-2usv","tag-africa-corps","tag-block-2","tag-el-salvador","tag-erik-prince","tag-independent-media-institute","tag-russia","tag-russia-africa-corps","tag-u-s-wars","tag-united-states","tag-vectus-global","tag-wagner-group"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@conflicts\/117636185901393283","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88422","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=88422"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/88422\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/88423"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=88422"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=88422"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=88422"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}