{"id":91056,"date":"2026-11-19T20:32:08","date_gmt":"2026-11-19T20:32:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/91056\/"},"modified":"2026-11-19T20:32:08","modified_gmt":"2026-11-19T20:32:08","slug":"addressing-an-unsophisticated-take-on-philippine-history","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/91056\/","title":{"rendered":"Addressing an unsophisticated take on Philippine history"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Third of a series<\/p>\n<p>IN some respects, the difference between Spanish and American conquest of the Philippines is night and day. Spain ran a colonial state in the archipelago from the 16th to the 18th centuries with just a few hundred soldiers. In contrast, by mid-1900, according to Frank Golay (author of \u201cFace of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations,\u201d 1898\u20131946), 72,000 American troops were stationed in the archipelago to prosecute the Filipino-American War. All in all, according to James Blount, author of \u201cAmerican Occupation of the Philippines,\u201d 1898\u20131912, more than 120,000 American troops were involved in the annexation of the archipelago.<\/p>\n<p>The American conquest of the Philippines was infinitely more militarized than the Spanish 300 years earlier. Still, Erwin Tulfo\u2019s statement that Filipinos used \u201ccrude weapons\u201d against his brethren American soldiers has no basis whatsoever.<\/p>\n<p>It is true that during the Filipino-American War, Filipino troops were, overall, poorly armed. So many joined the hostilities, and it was not possible to provide every single volunteer with proper weapons. Nevertheless, Teodoro Agoncillo (in \u201cMalolos: The Crisis of the Republic\u201d) wrote that thousands of Filipinos were armed with Mauser, Remington and older rifles, with the rest wielding bladed weapons.<\/p>\n<p>The American troops sent to the Philippines, for the record, were themselves mostly volunteers, not members of the regular armed forces. Yet, the Americans mostly bested the Filipino troops who were ill-equipped for the conduct of conventional warfare. The Philippine military chain of command was frayed. Capt. Pedro Janolino, for example, infamously refused to carry out the orders of his superior, Gen. Antonio Luna, because he only took orders directly from Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo. The same was true for Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, who had a direct line to Aguinaldo, according to Gen. Jose Alejandrino. Military discipline was weakened by the officers\u2019 personal loyalties and provincial factions, rather than an obedience to the institutional chain of command.<\/p>\n<p>Get the latest news<br \/>\n                <br class=\"br-line\"\/><br \/>\n                delivered to your inbox<\/p>\n<p>Sign up for The Manila Times newsletters<\/p>\n<p>            By signing up with an email address, I acknowledge that I have read and agree to the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.manilatimes.net\/terms-of-service\" title=\"Terms of Service\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Terms of Service<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.manilatimes.net\/privacy-policy\" title=\"Privacy Policy\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Privacy Policy<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The Filipinos suffered successive losses after hostilities broke out with the Americans on Feb. 4, 1899. For instance, the attack by Filipino troops stationed near Santa Mesa initially compelled Col. John Miller Stotsenburg to call for reinforcements but were eventually beaten. Filipino troops were also driven away from the blockhouses they occupied northeast of Manila. The Americans then captured El Deposito in San Juan and moved on to Mandaluyong. Then they proceeded to attack Filipino positions in Paco, Malate, Pasay, Pandacan, Santa Ana, Makati, Pasig and Pateros.<\/p>\n<p>However, when Filipinos (belatedly) resorted to guerrilla tactics, with their familiarity of the terrain, the support of the populace, among other advantages, the results were more encouraging. What this means is that weapons \u2014 as in G.I. Joe Tulfo\u2019s idea of crude Filipino weapons \u2014 were not the reason why battles were lost; military discipline and the use of correct tactics became the difference-maker.<\/p>\n<p>Even then, an honest assessment by the Americans concluded that the Filipinos were actually winning the war \u2014 which is why they needed more and more troop reinforcements. Agoncillo quotes a report by an American field officer:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWe have lost by wounds and death fully 1,000 men and, including the sick, have some 4,000 in hospitals. We have always, or almost always, been able to drive the Filipino troops out of the towns of works we have attacked, but as we have of late months pushed out to some distance from our lines to make such attacks, we have had to fall back each time to our own lines; this because our forces are too weak to hold advance points and guard our base \u2014 Manila.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>American commanders routinely pressed for additional troops to be sent to the archipelago as the 25,000 troops Gen. Elwell Otis originally estimated as sufficient to procure victory in the Philippines \u2014 Commo. George Dewey even thought that 5,000 men were enough to occupy Manila \u2014 was way off the mark. Continued the American officer\u2019s report:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cTo conquer these islands will take at least 75,000 men. So far, their losses have probably been less than ours&#8230; The reports published in America underrate our losses and vastly overestimate the enemy\u2019s. We have always had to attack them in a chosen field and fortified position. The odds are all against us.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Americans possessed a slight advantage in conventional warfare. However, as soon as the Filipino generals realized the wisdom of shifting to guerrilla warfare, the results became much more optimistic. Here is Reynaldo Ileto\u2019s summary (in \u201cKnowledge and Pacification: On the US Conquest and the Writing of Philippine History\u201d):<\/p>\n<p>\u201cDuring the first year of the war, the US Army managed to subdue the main Filipino defense forces in central and northern Luzon. The following year, it concentrated on taking southern Luzon and the Visayas, managing to control major towns by the middle of 1900. At that point, Filipino resistance took the form of guerrilla warfare.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Ileto continues:<\/p>\n<p>\u201cAfter General [Emilio] Aguinaldo was captured in April 1901 and took an oath of allegiance to the United States, a number of his generals did likewise and in fact began to assist the US Army in hunting down the leaders of the guerrilla resistance.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Those who have read the earlier parts of this series will undoubtedly see that despite the different military circumstances between the Spaniards and the Americans, a parallel with the Spanish conquest of the 16th century also emerged: Filipino collaboration proved vital in the success of the colonial advance. Nevertheless, a strong Filipino armed resistance continued deep into the colonial era.<\/p>\n<p>We have been misled by the histories produced by the Americans and their Filipino collaborators, which made it appear that our independence aspirations ended with Aguinaldo\u2019s capture (or with Gen. Miguel Malvar\u2019s surrender in 1902). The Americans officially declared an end to the \u201cinsurrection\u201d in July 1902 and proceeded with their colonial agenda, supported by Filipino collaborators. They moved to delegitimize the remnants of the Philippine revolution, calling them \u201cbandidos,\u201d or outlaws, resorting to Draconian measures to isolate them from popular support. The Americans also employed thousands of Philippine Scouts to help prosecute the remaining revolutionists.<\/p>\n<p>This is nothing but historical d\u00e9j\u00e0 vu.<\/p>\n<p>To be continued<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Third of a series IN some respects, the difference between Spanish and American conquest of the Philippines is&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":91057,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[43434,217,44030,1945,5243,19533,44032,44031],"class_list":["post-91056","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-us-wars","tag-addressing","tag-american-troops","tag-an","tag-history","tag-on","tag-philippine","tag-take","tag-unsophisticated"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@conflicts\/117645013530293623","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/91056","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=91056"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/91056\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/91057"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=91056"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=91056"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/conflicts\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=91056"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}