India<\/a> acknowledged aviation losses but rejected Islamabad\u2019s figures.<\/p>\nEven so, the confirmed part of the picture was already deeply damaging to New Delhi\u2019s reputation.<\/p>\n
French military officials spoke of evidence indicating the loss of several Indian aircraft, including a Rafale. Even the confirmed loss of one such fighter was a serious blow to the prestige of the Indian Air Force.<\/p>\n
In India, the Rafale had been presented almost as a technological talisman \u2014 an expensive symbol of modernisation, a politically significant purchase, and proof that New Delhi had gained access to advanced Western technology. Real combat, however, offered a reminder of an obvious truth: a high contract price, a ceremonial handover, and patriotic television footage do not create an invisible protective field around an aircraft.<\/p>\n
Reuters, citing US officials, reported that Pakistani Chinese-made J-10 fighters had shot down at least two Indian military aircraft. Subsequent analysis suggested that one reason for the losses may have been India\u2019s incorrect assessment of the range of China\u2019s PL-15 missile.<\/p>\n
Indian pilots may have believed they were operating outside the effective engagement zone, while the Pakistani side was able to attack from a longer distance.<\/p>\n
In other words, an aircraft purchased as a symbol of qualitative superiority entered combat without an accurate understanding of the enemy\u2019s weapons.<\/p>\n
More damaging still was the systemic nature of the failure. Based on publicly available information, Pakistan operated through an integrated combination of J-10C fighters, PL-15 missiles, airborne early warning aircraft, ground-based surveillance assets, and tactical data-sharing systems.<\/p>\n
Pakistani aircraft could receive information from remote radars without activating their own sensors and revealing their positions too early. India, meanwhile, faced the consequences of operating a mixed fleet consisting of French, Russian, and domestically produced platforms.<\/p>\n
Different communication standards, data links, avionics, and difficulties in creating a common operational picture can neutralise the advantage of even the most expensive fighter aircraft.<\/p>\n
The main lesson of the May confrontation was simple: modern air warfare is not won by the state with the most expensive and dramatically presented aircraft. It is won by the side that detects the enemy first, shares information faster, assesses the threat more accurately, and closes the kill chain earlier.<\/p>\n
Against this background, Indian media claims about creating a \u201cground-based air defence system based on Indian technologies\u201d in Armenia as an answer to Azerbaijani aviation look particularly comical.<\/p>\n
The world has already seen the real capabilities of Indian technology during India\u2019s latest confrontation with Pakistan. While New Delhi spoke of a high-tech army of the future, Pakistan demonstrated how little loud slogans, billion-dollar acquisitions, and parade-ground confidence mean when the opponent possesses a more coherent system of intelligence, communications, and command.<\/p>\n
Until recently, the Indian military convincingly demonstrated one skill above all others: staging parades that looked more like scenes from Bollywood films. Soldiers formed multi-level pyramids on moving motorcycles, waved flags, performed acrobatic routines, and presented the spectacle as a symbol of discipline and combat power.<\/p>\n
![\"News](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/r-day2-1783684820.webp\" "\\"2026\/07\/2636084-india-missiles-1783684772.webp")
<\/p>\n
Credit:\u00a0ddindia.co.in<\/p>\n
Lately, even this genre has not always looked as flawless as before.
Perhaps Indian military experts should first learn how to connect their own aircraft, radars, and command centres into a reliable integrated system before promising to build an air defence shield for Armenia.<\/p>\n
A country that failed to assess the range of a potential opponent\u2019s missile in time and could not ensure seamless integration of its own mixed aircraft fleet is now explaining to Yerevan, with a perfectly serious expression, how to defend itself against Azerbaijani aviation.<\/p>\n
It sounds bold.<\/p>\n
Almost as bold as building a pyramid of soldiers on motorcycles and declaring it proof of combat readiness. As a last resort, New Delhi can always offer Armenia this proven Indian technology. A multi-level structure made of soldiers and motorcycles may indeed impress spectators during a military parade. Its effectiveness against JF-17 fighters, drones, and precision-guided missiles, however, has yet to be demonstrated.<\/p>\n
Perhaps they should simply sing for us from the motorcycles once again. Although judging by recent results, even that no longer seems to work as confidently as it once did.<\/p>\n
India is effectively exporting to Armenia the same problem it has faced itself: a collection of heterogeneous platforms accompanied by grand promises, but not necessarily integrated into a unified and battle-tested system.<\/p>\n
New Delhi sells Yerevan radars, missiles, artillery, and air defence systems as though the label Made in India automatically transforms them into a strategic solution. Yet the May confrontation with Pakistan showed that the confidence of India\u2019s defence marketing machine is far ahead of the real capabilities of its network and command architecture.<\/p>\n
The political dimension of India\u2019s approach is equally problematic. New Delhi continues to benefit from economic and energy relations with Azerbaijan while simultaneously arming Armenia.<\/p>\n
India imports Azerbaijani oil, participates in energy projects, and remains interested in transport routes connected to the Caspian region. At the same time, Indian companies supply Yerevan with weapons that Armenia views as a means of changing the military balance with Azerbaijan.<\/p>\n
The formula is extremely convenient: buy Azerbaijani energy while profiting from arming Armenia.<\/p>\n
It is difficult to describe such an approach as principled or balanced diplomacy. It is simply an attempt to profit from both sides while ignoring the contradictions of one\u2019s own policy.<\/p>\n
Indian analysts also openly link closer cooperation with Armenia to Azerbaijan\u2019s ties with Pakistan and T\u00fcrkiye. This means New Delhi views the South Caucasus not as an independent region with its own interests, but as another arena in the Indian-Pakistani rivalry.<\/p>\n
Armenia is being used as an instrument of pressure against states that maintain close relations with Islamabad. Azerbaijan, in turn, receives additional reasons to deepen its defence cooperation with Pakistan and T\u00fcrkiye.<\/p>\n
Indian arms supplies therefore do not strengthen regional stability. They become part of a new arms race. Every additional system delivered to Yerevan encourages countermeasures and deepens mutual distrust.<\/p>\n
It is especially dangerous that this is happening while Azerbaijan and Armenia are attempting to consolidate the peace process. A responsible outside power would support border delimitation, restored transport links, economic cooperation, and confidence-building measures.<\/p>\n
India instead offers Armenia new missiles, artillery, and air defence systems, creating the illusion among part of Armenian society that another package of imported weapons can replace normalisation with neighbouring states.<\/p>\n
Weapons do not solve political problems. They merely postpone their resolution while increasing the price of the next mistake.<\/p>\n
New Delhi provides Armenia with no genuine security guarantees. Indian soldiers will not defend Armenian airspace, Indian crews will not take responsibility for operating these systems during a war, and the Indian government will not compensate Yerevan for the consequences of escalation.<\/p>\n
India will simply sell the weapons, collect the money, and announce another success for its national export industry.<\/p>\n
Armenia will then be left alone with the problems of compatibility, maintenance, personnel training, and integration of heterogeneous systems.<\/p>\n
In the long term, this policy may cost New Delhi more than Indian leaders expect. Azerbaijan is an important energy, transport, and political partner linked to routes connecting Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, T\u00fcrkiye, and Europe.<\/p>\n
Deteriorating relations with Baku would limit India\u2019s opportunities in the region and push Azerbaijan even further towards cooperation with Pakistan.<\/p>\n
At the same time, Indian weapons are unlikely to give Armenia strategic superiority. They will not eliminate the geographic, demographic, economic, and military differences between the sides. They will not replace a peace treaty or automatically transform Armenia\u2019s fragmented arsenal into a functioning combat network.<\/p>\n
India may continue to advertise Akash, Pinaka, and other systems as proof of its technological maturity. But a genuine military power is not judged by the number of missiles it sells, the volume of its television rhetoric, or the height of a pyramid built by soldiers on motorcycles.<\/p>\n
It is judged by its ability to build functioning systems, assess adversaries correctly, and avoid turning vulnerable regions into exhibition halls for its military-industrial complex.<\/p>\n
In the South Caucasus, India is currently choosing the opposite path \u2014 commercially profitable, politically cynical, and strategically short-sighted.<\/p>\n
New Delhi is not selling Armenia guaranteed security. It is selling another expensive illusion. And as May 2025 demonstrated, Indian military illusions have an unpleasant habit of collapsing at the first encounter with a well-organised opponent.<\/p>\n
By Murad Samedov<\/p>\n
News.Az<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The expansion of military-technical cooperation between India and Armenia is increasingly presented in New Delhi as a major…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":2960,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1458,1942,153,38,14,233,1307,1941,1943,1063],"class_list":["post-2959","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-news","tag-air-defence","tag-armenia","tag-azerbaijan","tag-defence","tag-defence-industry","tag-india","tag-missile","tag-motorcycle-pyramids","tag-pakistan","tag-weapons"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2959","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2959"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2959\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2960"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2959"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2959"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2959"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
![\"News](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/pinaka1-2024-11-2a35e25521307d3bdcf2d92e5823c7b6-1783684977.webp\" "\\"2026\/07\/2636084-india-missiles-1783684772.webp")
<\/p>\n