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\n Photo. https:\/\/www.tccb.gov.tr\/en\/ Presidency of the Republic of T\u00fcrkiye<\/p>\n
The NATO Summit in Ankara in July 2026 marked a turning point in the tense defence relations between the United States and T\u00fcrkiye. President Donald Trump\u2019s clear declarations of his desire to lift sanctions under the Countering America\u2019s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) created a new, positive political climate. American officials, including US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker and Congressman Mike Turner, officially confirmed that Ankara\u2019s return to the F-35 fighter jet programme is possible and that talks with Turkish decision-makers are yielding \u201epromising\u201d results. Nevertheless, as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan soberly notes, alongside the political will of President Trump and President Erdo\u011fan, the legal framework imposed by the US Congress remains crucial, constituting a necessary condition for any compromise.<\/p>\n
CAATSA as a Serious Obstacle to US\u2013Turkish Relations<\/p>\n
CAATSA sanctions were imposed on T\u00fcrkiye after the SSB finalised a deal with a major Russian arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, to purchase the S-400 air defence system. From the US perspective, this action violated Section 231 of the aforementioned act, which imposes penalties on entities concluding significant transactions with the Russian defence or intelligence sectors.<\/p>\n
The main argument for imposing sanctions was the risk of technological espionage. The US viewed the acquisition of these systems as a direct threat to NATO\u2019s defence architecture and the security of US military technology. Washington feared that T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s simultaneous use of the Russian S-400 air defence system and US F-35 fighter jets could allow Russian radars and intelligence agencies to intercept highly sensitive data regarding the aircraft\u2019s stealth technology. Moreover, the operation of the S-400 system posed the risk that Russian specialists would gain insight into the infrastructure of the Turkish Armed Forces and defence industry.<\/p>\n
By opting for the S-400\u2014instead of alternative NATO-interoperable systems\u2014T\u00fcrkiye became the first member of the Alliance to be subject to such US sanctions. It is worth emphasising that these sanctions do not constitute a general embargo covering the entire Turkish economy, but rather targeted measures affecting the defence sector, military technologies, and financing channels.<\/p>\n
The SSB was banned from obtaining any US export licences or permits for equipment and technologies. Furthermore, US banks were prohibited from financing the SSB, and the institution itself lost its ability to borrow from international financial institutions.<\/p>\n
Direct sanctions were also imposed on the then head of the SSB, Dr \u0130smail Demir, and several other high-ranking officials within the agency. These restrictions included a freeze on financial assets in the US and a visa ban preventing entry to the United States. Importantly, although the first deliveries of Russian batteries took place in 2019, the formal announcement of sanctions did not occur until 14 December 2020, at the end of the first Trump administration. It should be emphasised, however, that even the lifting of the aforementioned CAATSA sanctions does not automatically mean that Ankara will fully return to the F-35 programme. A multi-stage process is more likely: first easing or suspending sanctions, then rebuilding military trust, and only then negotiating T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s access to cutting-edge American technologies.<\/p>\n
Ankara\u2019s Exclusion from the F-35 Programme<\/p>\n
It is worth noting that T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s exclusion from the F-35 programme occurred in 2019, a year before CAATSA sanctions were formally imposed. T\u00fcrkiye was one of the project\u2019s nine main partners, and its domestic defence industry produced over 1,000 key components, such as the fuselage, landing gear, and cockpit canopies. Ankara paid $1.4 billion for the fighters, and Turkish pilots even travelled to the United States to train on Turkish-flagged aircraft. Unfortunately, after the S-400 crisis erupted, the aircraft never reached T\u00fcrkiye, and in 2020, the US Congress formally reinforced this blockade by legally preventing the transfer of the fighters until the Russian systems were removed.<\/p>\n
The US Congress\u2019s Position<\/p>\n
The decision-making process in the United States is hampered by strong lobbying pressure. This is currently one of the most serious obstacles. Both Athens and Tel Aviv are openly and vocally opposed to equipping T\u00fcrkiye with advanced F-35 fighter jets, fearing that this would disrupt the balance of power in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Many key members of Congress are therefore influenced by the security concerns of Israel and Greece and by the state of Ankara\u2019s relations with these countries.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, scepticism persists among some Democrats and Republicans about Ankara\u2019s long-term geopolitical intentions, including its relationship with Russia. Even if T\u00fcrkiye were to sell the S-400 system to a third country, such as a Persian Gulf state, sceptics\u2014including representatives of the think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD)\u2014warn that this would not fully resolve the issue. Locating the Russian system in the Persian Gulf, which is home to important US bases and critical infrastructure, would pose new security threats and could give Congress grounds to veto the agreement.<\/p>\n
However, it is crucial that the process of resolving this crisis is supported by, among others, Senator Jeanne Shaheen\u2014one of the main authors of the original bill excluding T\u00fcrkiye from the F-35 programme. Donald Trump himself also retains strong influence over Republican politicians in Congress, which could be crucial to pushing through the final agreement. It should be remembered, however, that CAATSA was deliberately designed to limit the president\u2019s authority to lift the imposed sanctions unilaterally. The US president cannot lift sanctions by arbitrary presidential decree, as these restrictions are based in law. However, the president can negotiate the terms of the agreement, determine the pace of talks with Ankara, and exert political pressure on his party in Congress. The upcoming November midterm elections, however, could lead to the Republicans losing their majority, which analysts believe would almost certainly hinder any chance of transferring F-35 technology and, from January next year, could block it completely. Hakan Fidan himself admitted that Turkish diplomacy is now entering a process in which it will have to actively manage pressure and negative lobbying by external actors targeting the American political establishment.<\/p>\n
The window for concluding an agreement on lifting CAATSA sanctions is currently quite narrow. Although the political climate has improved significantly following the NATO Summit, final congressional approval will depend on the precision of the proposed solution and the effective neutralisation of negative external lobbying.<\/p>\n
It should also be noted that T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s return to the F-35 programme was blocked by a special clause in the 2020 defence budget, which additionally requires formal congressional approval for the transfer of the aircraft.<\/p>\n
Impact of Sanctions on the Turkish Defence Industry and Technological Cooperation with the US<\/p>\n
Although public debate has focused on the F-35 fighter jet, CAATSA sanctions have had far-reaching consequences for Turkish industry. These sanctions have severely hampered the SSB\u2019s ability to acquire key avionics, components, and technologies from the United States, as well as hindering the modernisation of existing platforms.<\/p>\n
CAATSA has negatively affected flagship Turkish national projects, such as the fifth-generation KAAN fighter, due to difficulties in acquiring American F110 engines, the H\u00fcrjet aircraft, the Altay tank, the Atak helicopter, and M\u0130LGEM naval vessels. The lack of access to the F-35 also forced Ankara in 2021 to seek the purchase of F-16 fighter jets and upgrade kits for its ageing fleet, a move that also faced significant political obstacles in the US.<\/p>\n
It should be also mentioned that given the country\u2019s current level of technological development, a potential purchase of a limited number of F-35s would not undermine the national programme. On the contrary, it would complement it. Operating both types of aircraft would therefore provide the Turkish Air Force with enormous operational flexibility. Experts emphasise that such a solution would eliminate the need for T\u00fcrkiye to deploy KAAN aircraft everywhere, which in turn would allow for better protection of their unique capabilities, performance characteristics, and technological secrets. However, American officials and experts emphasise that even if sanctions were immediately lifted, new F-35s would take several years to reach T\u00fcrkiye due to production delays in the US and a long queue of other customers awaiting deliveries. This situation gives Ankara time to complete the KAAN programme without creating a drastic gap in its defence capabilities. In this context, Minister Fidan\u2019s key piece of information is that the deadline for notifying the US Congress about the purchase of F110 engines\u2014absolutely essential for powering the KAAN fighters\u2014has passed.<\/p>\n
In short, the normalisation of relations could pave the way for the modernisation of the Turkish Air Force, although the ultimate success of these efforts depends on striking a balance between Washington\u2019s strategic interests and Ankara\u2019s pursuit of defence autonomy.<\/p>\n
Possible Scenarios<\/p>\n
The future of CAATSA sanctions and T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s potential return to the F-35 programme remains dependent on numerous political, legal, and strategic factors. The resolution of the S-400 issue, the position of the US Congress, and the willingness of both sides to compromise will all be crucial. On this basis, four most likely scenarios can be identified.<\/p>\n
At present, the most likely scenario assumes a gradual easing of sanctions, under which T\u00fcrkiye would remove or permanently disable the S-400 systems. The United States would gradually ease the sanctions, while negotiations regarding the F-35 programme would remain a separate process.<\/p>\n
The optimistic scenario assumes complete diplomatic success and a swift resolution of the impasse. The S-400 systems would either be completely removed from Turkish territory or sold with Moscow\u2019s consent. The US president would manage to convince Congress that the Russian system no longer poses a threat, leading to the full and official lifting of CAATSA sanctions. As a result, T\u00fcrkiye would not only receive approval to take delivery of the F-35 fighter jets already produced and paid for on its behalf, as part of its $1.4 billion contribution, but would also rejoin the global supply chain as a key manufacturer of components for these aircraft. This return would consequently significantly strengthen NATO\u2019s southern flank and the interoperability of Alliance forces.<\/p>\n
The limited-compromise scenario assumes that sanctions would remain in place, but that the presidential administration would use exemption mechanisms, known as waivers, or legal loopholes that would allow selected key defence contracts to be concluded. This \u201etransactional normalisation\u201d would allow the strict regulations to be circumvented in order to provide T\u00fcrkiye with essential technologies. This would primarily include unblocking the supply of American F110 engines for the KAAN programme, for which the congressional notification period has already expired, as well as the modernisation of existing platforms and systems.<\/p>\n
The negative scenario, however, assumes a complete lack of agreement. This would mean a lack of consensus on the future of the S-400 system. It is also possible that Congress would block concessions, leading T\u00fcrkiye to diversify its defence partnerships even further. Ankara would intensify work on the national KAAN fighter jet, finalise purchases of European Eurofighter Typhoons, and fully implement its multi-vector policy, deepening its military and strategic autonomy regardless of Washington\u2019s decisions.<\/p>\n
Regardless of the ultimate fate of CAATSA sanctions and the F-35 programme, T\u00fcrkiye would continue its multifaceted policy, maintaining and balancing its relations with the United States, NATO, Russia, the Gulf states, European partners, and China. The easing of US sanctions under such an agreement would primarily be aimed at protecting Ankara\u2019s national interests and strengthening its independent position on the international stage.<\/p>\n
The Significance of the Potential Lifting of Restrictions<\/p>\n
The expected lifting of CAATSA sanctions would formally remove the restrictions imposed on the SSB. According to Turkish officials, this would open up the possibility of acquiring key components for domestic projects. Furthermore, the lifting of restrictions would enable Turkish defence products to be sold to the United States and other NATO countries and pave the way for the launch of entirely new joint defence projects.<\/p>\n
However, it is important to remember that negotiations regarding T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s return to the F-35 programme remain a separate and much longer process. As noted by US officials, including Ambassador Matt Whitaker, even after all legal requirements have been met, the delivery of the advanced fighter jets would be time-consuming due to production queues and logistical constraints.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"ANALIZA WA\u017bNE WIADOMO\u015aCI PILNE Photo. https:\/\/www.tccb.gov.tr\/en\/ Presidency of the Republic of T\u00fcrkiye The NATO Summit in Ankara in…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":3863,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1936,14,2380,1365,2381,243,1920,455,95,97,1769],"class_list":["post-3862","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-news","tag-caatsa","tag-defence-industry","tag-f-16","tag-f-35","tag-kaan","tag-nato","tag-ssb","tag-trump","tag-turkey","tag-turkiye","tag-usa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3862","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3862"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3862\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3863"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3862"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3862"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3862"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}