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<\/p>\nPresident Trump met with U.S. munitions makers at the White House in June as his administration pushed to expand weapons production. Military operations in Iran, American support for allies and other conflicts had drawn down U.S. stockpiles, raising concern over inventories of air-defense and precision-guided weapons.<\/p>\n
The meeting was treated as a production problem. It should also be read as a strategic warning.<\/p>\n
Washington is still accustomed to viewing the Middle East through the framework that dominated the post-9\/11 era: terrorist organizations, insurgencies, proxy warfare and the states that sponsor them. That framework remains necessary. Iran still uses regional proxies to extend its influence and pressure its adversaries. But it is no longer sufficient.<\/p>\n
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The region is entering a period in which military power will depend increasingly on what states can manufacture, replenish and sustain\u2014not simply on what they can deploy through proxies or hold in their arsenals at the start of a conflict.<\/p>\n
The clearest evidence is not found in speeches. It is found in factories.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
Two decades of state investment have transformed Turkey from a country heavily dependent on foreign arms producers into a major exporter of drones and other military equipment. It now supplies nearly 40 countries, mainly across the Gulf, Africa, Asia and parts of Europe. Buyers are drawn to Turkish systems because they are often cheaper, faster to deliver and more adaptable than competing products.<\/p>\n
This is more than an export success story. Turkey has built a defense industry suited to a world in which Western states are rearming, alliances are shifting and access to foreign suppliers can no longer be taken for granted. Ankara\u2019s production capacity now gives it greater freedom to pursue its own strategic priorities while expanding its influence abroad.<\/p>\n
Saudi Arabia is moving in the same broad direction through localization rather than exports. Agreements signed with Turkish defense companies are intended to bring the production of drones, ammunition, optical sensors, electronic systems and mechanical components into the Kingdom. They also include final testing, training, support services and the transfer of technical knowledge.<\/p>\n
The goal is explicit. Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia aims to localize more than half of its military spending. Riyadh does not want to remain only a purchaser of foreign weapons. It wants the capacity to produce, maintain and develop military systems at home. That long-term strategy now extends beyond conventional defense industries. This week, Washington and Riyadh announced a landmark civilian nuclear agreement<\/a>, giving the U.S. a central role in supporting Saudi Arabia\u2019s nuclear energy program. Following its signing, President Trump on Truth Social placed a new condition<\/a>, saying that it was conditional on Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel. While this deal focuses on civilian nuclear cooperation, it reflects the same strategic logic: Saudi Arabia is investing in capabilities that will shape its national security and strategic autonomy for decades to come.<\/p>\n These investments are often discussed as economic diversification or industrial policy. That misses their strategic significance. A state that can manufacture key components, service its own systems and train its own workforce is less vulnerable to delays, political pressure and interruptions in foreign supply. It is also better prepared for a conflict that lasts longer than expected.<\/p>\n The war in Ukraine has<\/a> made the consequences of inadequate production impossible to ignore. Modern warfare consumes missiles, interceptors and precision-guided weapons at rates that strain even the most advanced military powers. An arsenal that appears formidable on the first day of a war may be far less impressive months later if production cannot replace what has been used.<\/p>\n That lesson has now reached Washington. The U.S has supplied large quantities of weapons to allies while also drawing on its own inventories during military operations. The result is growing pressure on defense contractors to increase output, particularly for air-defense and precision-guided systems. At the June White House meeting, officials initially told industry executives that they were not doing enough. By the end, the discussion had shifted toward cooperation and the need to move onto a \u201cwar footing.\u201d<\/p>\n The phrase matters because it captures the scale of the transition. Industrial capacity is no longer a secondary logistical issue. It is part of deterrence itself.<\/p>\n A country may possess advanced aircraft, missile-defense systems and precision weapons, but its adversaries will also ask a harder question: How long can it keep fighting? Can it replace interceptors? Can it repair damaged systems? Can it expand production during a crisis? Can it obtain critical components when supply chains are disrupted?<\/p>\n Those questions are becoming central to the Middle East\u2019s balance of power.<\/p>\n American policy has not fully adjusted. Washington still tends to organize regional strategy around immediate crises: containing Iran, weakening proxy organizations, protecting shipping routes, reassuring partners and preventing escalation. Those priorities are understandable, but they risk obscuring a longer-term transformation already underway.<\/p>\n Decisions on arms sales, joint production, technology transfer and defense partnerships are shaping which states will possess the industrial foundations of military power a decade from now. They will determine who remains dependent on foreign suppliers, who becomes a regional producer and who gains the ability to sustain a prolonged conflict.<\/p>\n The U.S. therefore needs to evaluate defense cooperation as more than a response to current threats. An arms sale is not only a transaction. A localization agreement is not only an economic project. A production line is not merely a factory. Each one alters future strategic autonomy and the regional balance.<\/p>\n For two decades, analysts learned to follow terrorist networks, financing channels, proxy militias and ideological movements. They must now pay equal attention to manufacturing agreements, ammunition plants, component supply chains and production targets.<\/p>\n Tomorrow\u2019s Middle East is already being built. Washington should watch the assembly lines.<\/p>\n Bradley Martin is the Executive Director of the Near East Center for Strategic Studies. Follow him on Facebook and X @ByBradleyMartin<\/p>\n Dr. Liram Koblentz-Stenzler is the Head of the Global Extremism and Antisemitism Desk at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University, Herzliya, and a visiting scholar at Brandeis University. 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