{"id":4978,"date":"2026-07-28T08:16:09","date_gmt":"2026-07-28T08:16:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/4978\/"},"modified":"2026-07-28T08:16:09","modified_gmt":"2026-07-28T08:16:09","slug":"russias-sarmat-icbm-still-under-testing-despite-2023-service-claim","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/4978\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia’s Sarmat ICBM still under testing despite 2023 service claim"},"content":{"rendered":"

Yesterday, Dallas Analytics<\/a> published another analysis of the delays of Russia\u2019s<\/a> next-generation nuclear ICBM, which can be thought of as the opposite number of the US Air Force\u2019s upcoming LGM-35A Sentinel.<\/p>\n

Whereas the US Air Force is openly admitting its Sentinel is delayed from 2027 into the early 2030s<\/a>, Russia is claiming its missile entered service years ago, even though it remains in testing. <\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s new ICBM declared operational in 2023 remains in testing<\/p>\n

Using leaked official Russian documents, Dallas Analytics concluded that Russia declared its new RS-28 \u201cSarmat\u201d (\u201cSatan II\u201d in some Western media) heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) operational in September 2023, even though it remains under testing as of mid-July 2026.<\/p>\n

\ud83d\udea8Russia declared the RS-28 Sarmat \u2013 its newest nuclear-armed ICBM \u2013 “on combat duty” in 2023. Internal defence-industry files obtained by Dallas Analytics tell a different story.
A strategic weapon called operational faster than its own factories could document, price or deliver\u2026 pic.twitter.com\/BrmVUUVatI<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014 Dallas Analytics (@dallas_analytic) July 27, 2026<\/a> <\/p>\n

The publication writes, \u201cThe claim was neither the first nor the last of its kind: Vladimir Putin had promised the first Sarmat regiment on alert \u2018by late 2022\u2019 as far back as April 2021, and again pledged deployment \u2018this year\u2019 in February 2023.\u201d<\/p>\n

According to the Kremlin\u2019s<\/a> English-language website, the Sarmat is a silo-based, stationary ICBM being developed to replace the Soviet-era Voyevoda system.<\/p>\n

It claims the new Sarmat improves on the range, payload, launch readiness, and countermeasure capabilities. The ICBM is being developed by the\u00a0Academician V. Makeyev State Rocket Centre.<\/p>\n

My thanks to @MT_Anderson<\/a> for providing this Planet Labs imagery and allowing me to publish it with comments. <\/p>\n

As is readily apparent, the RS-28 Sarmat test was a complete failure. The missile detonated in the silo leaving a massive crater and destroying the test site. The\u2026 https:\/\/t.co\/FuKIaTNFVs<\/a> pic.twitter.com\/AuIpQRrDLa<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014 MeNMyRC (@MeNMyRC1) September 21, 2024<\/a> <\/p>\n

In May 2026, Russia announced another successful test flight of the Sarmat, adding, \u201cWe will now proceed with placing the\u00a0missiles on\u00a0combat standby duty.\u201d<\/p>\n

Dallas Analytics wrote, \u201cA system declared operational in 2023 was, in 2026, still being test-fired towards acceptance.\u201d<\/p>\n

Why the Sarmat ICBM has been delayed<\/p>\n

The report asserts that the Sarmat\u2019s delays are being inflicted not by sanctions or engineering but by Russia\u2019s own bureaucracy. It says it is supported by a supply chain where every link depends on a single qualified supplier with no substitute.<\/p>\n

\ud83d\udca5 Russia: Putin’s latest intercontinental ballistic missile RS-28 Sarmat (Satan II) failed spectacularly at the Yasnoe cosmodrome test site in Orenburg region. pic.twitter.com\/B0fFROGHnv<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014 Igor Sushko (@igorsushko) November 28, 2025<\/a> <\/p>\n

One issue has been the practice of officials certifying work as complete that had not yet been completed. This creates a gap between what exists on paper and what exists in reality.<\/p>\n

For example, in 2024, Vladimir Verteletsky, Head of Directorate within the Department of the Russian MoD for State Defence Order, was investigated by the Investigative Committee of Russia (ICR). <\/p>\n

The ICR stated, \u201cIn 2022, Verteletsky signed off on work that had not actually been completed under a research and development contract awarded as part of a state contract.\u201d <\/p>\n

\"MinutemanPhoto: DVIDS<\/p>\n

It is not possible to explain all the details here, but Dallas Analytics identifies three failures: documentation, logistics, and price.<\/p>\n

Regarding that last failure, the report writes, \u201cEvery delivery hung on a fixed price the parties never set.\u201d<\/p>\n

A recurring theme in Russia <\/p>\n

Announcing a system to be operational years before it is, is nothing new in Russia. However, there is nuance; Russia may routinely exaggerate its capabilities, but it still has capable systems. <\/p>\n

\"NewPhoto: UAC<\/p>\n

AGN has previously reported how its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is used primarily for signaling<\/a> rather than for battlefield effects. Oreshnik is available in very low (likely single-digit) numbers and has been used without warheads. It appears to have missed its targets by kilometres.<\/p>\n

Other parallels can be seen with Russia continuing to focus on production of its Su-35S six years after the Su-57 Felon entered service.<\/p>\n

It appears a modern Su-35S air superiority fighter lost an air battle with an old Ukrainian ex-Dutch\/Danish F-16 in July<\/a>. These F-16s are original 1970s\/1980s builds and were last updated in the early 2000s. The specifics of the battle are unclear.<\/p>\n

\"SukhoiPhoto: Dmitry Terekhov\/Wikimedia Commons<\/p>\n

The Felon is produced at a low rate and is believed to be more exposed to sanctions and is known to have been delivered lacking key systems<\/a>. While not aviation, Russia\u2019s much-paraded next-generation T-14 Armata tank (officially entered service in 2024) has been sidelined for the entire 4.5-year-long war.<\/p>\n