With Russian infrastructure being pummeled by Ukrainian drones, the Kremlin is hoping to sustain its war effort in Ukraine going by deepening defense cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It is uncertain, however, whether Astana and Tashkent will go along with Moscow\u2019s wishes.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Russia appears to be primarily interested in outsourcing the manufacture of arms, establishing assembly lines and maintenance facilities in the Central Asian nations, thus putting them beyond the reach of Ukrainian drones<\/a>, according to a report published<\/a> by RFE\/RL.<\/p>\n \u201cUkraine has certainly become more bold in its actions, but it will not want to launch drone strikes on Kazakhstani territory,\u201d defense analyst Derek Bisaccio told<\/a> RFE\/RL\u2019s Central Asian service. \u201cThat would be seen there as a serious escalation.\u201d<\/p>\n Any move to shift arms production from Russia to Central Asia would mark a sharp change in regional dynamics. For most of the post-Soviet era, Russia was the main supplier of weapons to Central Asian states. Moscow\u2019s near monopoly on the regional arms market started eroding in 2022, when the Kremlin launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Now, Kyiv\u2019s successful drone campaign appears to be forcing Russia to consider becoming an arms importer rather than exporter.<\/p>\n Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are already home to facilities capable of keeping Russian equipment in the field, including the Semey Engineering plant<\/a> and Almaty\u2019s Aircraft Repair Plant<\/a> in Kazakhstan, as well as the Chirchik Aircraft Repair Plant<\/a> in Uzbekistan.<\/p>\n For Kazakh and Uzbek leaders, the hassles of expanding defense cooperation with Russia may well outweigh<\/a> the advantages. For one, doing so could expose both countries to expansive secondary sanctions from the United States and European Union.<\/p>\n Responding to a query by RFE\/RL, a Kazakh Defense Ministry official was equivocal, saying the matter was still under review. Uzbek authorities offered no comment. Meanwhile, Pavel Baev, a regional expert at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), told RFE\/RL he saw little incentive for Astana and Tashkent to embrace what he termed Moscow\u2019s \u201cless-than-smart plan.”\u00a0<\/p>\n Lost amid the discussion of what would effectively be the offshoring of Russia\u2019s military-industrial complex is how Moscow could pay for it.<\/p>\n The war has crimped Russian state coffers and the country\u2019s ability to finance large-scale projects. Russia already has had to push back major projects in Central Asia, including the construction of nuclear power plants, due to cash-flow difficulties<\/a> experienced by the state-controlled nuclear entity, Rosatom. Russian state-controlled entities have likewise seen contracts<\/a> to build power plants in Kazakhstan cancelled due to financing woes.<\/p>\n The evident shortage of resources is not stopping Russia from trying to project an air of normalcy. On August 18, the Russian state-aligned outlet Sputnik Kyrgyzstan reported<\/a> that an entity called the Russia-Kyrgyzstan Development Fund (RKDF) was ready to finance $660 million in infrastructure projects to narrow Kyrgyzstan\u2019s electricity deficit. The report did not provide details on how the projects would be funded, however.<\/p>\n The RKDF was created in 2014 under the auspices of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union to \u201cpromote economic cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, to modernize and develop the Kyrgyz economy\u201d with an aim of promoting \u201cEurasian economic integration.\u201d\u00a0 The entity\u2019s reported<\/a> capitalization in 2025 was $574 million.<\/p>\n