{"id":8539,"date":"2026-09-01T05:37:21","date_gmt":"2026-09-01T05:37:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/8539\/"},"modified":"2026-09-01T05:37:21","modified_gmt":"2026-09-01T05:37:21","slug":"winning-the-salvo-competition-how-to-rebuild-the-air-and-missile-defense-industrial-base","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/8539\/","title":{"rendered":"Winning the Salvo Competition: How to Rebuild the Air and Missile Defense Industrial Base"},"content":{"rendered":"

Large salvos of missiles and drones define modern war. Nightly attacks in Ukraine and recent missile exchanges in the Middle East<\/a> show that the military balance increasingly turns on two production rates: how quickly an adversary can produce missiles needed for large salvos and how quickly defenders can regenerate<\/a> air defenses. A conflict involving China or North Korea would place even greater pressure on U.S. and allied stocks. Furthermore, a future Russian attack to test NATO<\/a> would require extensive air and missile defenses<\/a> across Europe and support from a defense industrial base not yet on a wartime footing<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This new operational reality makes industrial capacity increasingly central to defense planning. The question is how to scale industry to the challenge. The recent expansion of production lines for dual-role air defense missiles such as the Infra-Red Imaging System Tail\/Thrust Vector-Controlled missile (IRIS-T) and the AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) offers key insights. Diehl Defence<\/a>, the manufacturer of the IRIS-T, responded to growing demand from Ukraine by expanding its workforce and production facilities. RTX<\/a>, the manufacturer of the AMRAAM, expanded production using a mix of new digital manufacturing techniques.<\/p>\n

These cases point to a larger need to win the salvo competition by starting with the factory floor and reinforces calls to \u201cbuild allied<\/a>.\u201d U.S. and European governments should work with industry to turn wartime demand and recent one-time surge investments into lasting expansions of the defense industrial base. This will require policy alignment to facilitate transatlantic industrial investment and cooperation.<\/p>\n

The Operational Problem: Integrated Air and Missile Defense<\/p>\n

A central operational problem in modern war is countering missile salvos. Long-range strikes that combine ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones are now commonplace.<\/p>\n

Russia uses air and missile salvos to wage a coercive punishment campaign<\/a> in Ukraine. Moscow<\/a> is on track to launch 840 ballistic missiles at Ukraine this year, a 47 percent increase from 2025. This number could increase to close to 1,000 based on reports of North Korea<\/a> sending additional missiles to Russia. As Ukraine\u2019s stock of Patriot missiles<\/a> and IRIS-T<\/a> interceptors declines, its military has less capacity to intercept ballistic missiles. As a result, interception rates<\/a> have dropped from 24 percent to 10.2 percent over the same period. While Ukraine is still intercepting the majority<\/a> of cruise missiles and drones fired daily by Russia, the shortage of interceptors capable of shooting down ballistic missiles is creating significant challenges. Put simply, ballistic missiles put a premium on higher-end capabilities such as Patriot, THAAD<\/a>, AMRAAM, and IRIS-T.<\/p>\n

This challenge also extends to countering Russian glide bombs<\/a>. Russia uses extended range glide bombs<\/a> that can travel up to 95 kilometers, allowing aircraft such as the Su-34, Su-35 and Su-30 to remain outside the range of many Ukrainian air defenses. To counter this threat, Ukraine has used a mix of donated air-to-air missiles compatible with its legacy Soviet aircraft as well as newer Western systems compatible with Western aircraft.<\/p>\n

Looking ahead, the need for air defense, including air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, will almost certainly continue to grow over the next 10 years. China has increased its production of ballistic missiles by 140 percent<\/a> and is building 100\u2013120 stealth fighters<\/a> per year. These growth trends suggest that salvo rates seen in Ukraine and Iran are likely smaller than what the United States should expect in a Pacific war or a future conflict with Russia.<\/p>\n

Attacking the Problem from the Factory Floor<\/p>\n

In military doctrine, countering air and missile threats falls under integrated air and missile defense. U.S. joint<\/a>, Japanese<\/a>, and NATO<\/a> doctrine describes integrated air and missile defense as part of larger counterair and missile operations. This framework includes defensive counterair operations that protect friendly forces from air and missile attacks using a mix of active and passive measures. For example, combat air patrols work alongside surface-to-air missile sites to deny adversaries opportunities to launch attacks through the air domain. It also includes offensive counterair operations that launch attacks into enemy airspace and prevent the launch of air and missile threats. In Ukraine, integrated air and missile defense requires both a sustained supply of interceptors and offensive strikes<\/a> against Russian airfields and missile launchers.<\/p>\n

Both defensive and offensive counterair operations require larger inventories of air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles. The question is how to expand those inventories. For years, countries underinvested in munitions production capacity, leaving many factories operating on a limited basis and creating significant supply chain bottlenecks.<\/p>\n

The answer resides on both the demand and supply sides of the equation. Industry needs stable demand before it will commit its own capital to expanding industrial capacity, hiring new workers, and addressing supply chain issues. Demand can come from wartime requirements, often too late, or from a broader customer base supported by foreign military sales and financing. Investments in industrial capacity, such as plants and workers, as well as new approaches to manufacturing, have the potential to accelerate production. Two case studies illustrate how to accelerate production of key defensive munitions: the IRIS-T and AMRAAM.<\/p>\n

IRIS-T: Increasing Production Through Investments in People and Infrastructure<\/p>\n

The IRIS-T is a modular interceptor. Originally envisioned by a German-led European consortium as a replacement<\/a> for the AIM-9 Sidewinder, it relies on an advanced imaging infrared seeker and a solid-propellant motor to achieve off-boresight kills in air-to-air engagements. Thrust vectoring gives the IRIS-T high maneuverability against aircraft and incoming cruise missiles. The missile also has a limited but growing ability to intercept ballistic missiles<\/a>.<\/p>\n

As the character of warfare has shifted toward layered air defense, Diehl Defence has adapted the baseline effector into ground-launched variants<\/a> such as the SLS and SLM, extending the IRIS-T from air-to-air combat into ground-based air defense. The IRIS-T has also been tested at sea on German frigates<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Diehl reported that IRIS-T SLM missile output has increased 20-fold<\/a> since 2022. The company expects to produce 10 SLM and SLS firing units<\/a> in 2026 and increase capacity to 16 annually within two years.<\/p>\n

Investments in people, infrastructure, and supply chains drove growth. The defense division increased<\/a> its workforce by around 800 to 5,400 last year, and by the end of 2026, the defense division is set to grow to roughly 6,000 employees. Diehl is also expanding its production infrastructure. In January 2026, the firm opened a new 3,400-square-meter<\/a> missile integration center at its Nonnweiler site, where various IRIS-T variants are manufactured. Construction has also begun on three additional production buildings, with 20 further construction projects planned across the site. Infrastructure investments amount to at least \u20ac450 million<\/a> (about $528 million), approximately \u20ac250 million more than originally planned. Company-wide, Diehl Defence cited investments of \u20ac1.5 billion<\/a> (about $1.7 billion).<\/p>\n

AMRAAM: Scaling Production Through Digital Manufacturing and Supply Chain Expansion<\/p>\n

The AMRAAM<\/a> is a beyond-visual-range missile. It uses inertial guidance and midcourse datalink updates before its active radar seeker guides the missile during the terminal phase. The intercept sequence relies on an initial inertial navigation track updated midflight via datalink before the missile\u2019s own radar takes over for the final kill chain execution. In addition to air-launched variants, which are used by over 40 countries<\/a>, the missile can be fired from ground-based launchers as part of the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System<\/a> (NASAMS), which is used by 13 countries. NASAMS has proved particularly effective in Ukraine, with a 94 percent intercept rate<\/a> against drones and cruise missiles.<\/p>\n

To meet increased demand, RTX\u2019s Raytheon has committed<\/a> to producing up to 1,900 AMRAAMs annually, a 58 percent increase over 2024 levels. Like the growth in IRIS-T production, increased U.S. government support<\/a> in the form of larger contracts alongside additional alliance requirements<\/a> has created more stable, long-term demand.<\/p>\n

Unlike the IRIS-T case, Raytheon has taken a less traditional approach to increasing manufacturing capacity. Based on conversations with officials at Raytheon, the firm combined increased staffing and capital investments in its production line with new manufacturing techniques. The firm used AI and machine learning in the production process to predict material failures at higher levels of assembly with lower-level test data. By using parametric and telemetry test data on subcomponents such as circuit cards, engineers could anticipate and address potential downstream failures before they required time-consuming and expensive rework later in the manufacturing process.<\/p>\n

In addition, Raytheon is exploring composable weapons<\/a> for the AMRAAM and other munitions. This manufacturing strategy centers on production data, automation, and shared test infrastructure to accelerate production. At the company\u2019s Tucson, Arizona, campus, a new large-scale automation factory utilizes robotics to increase component testing speeds by 30 percent over traditional manual methods. This modernization effort extends into a 20,000-square-foot common guidance factory that relies entirely on standardized equipment and digitally integrated workflows, allowing it to support several missile designs without constructing separate test environments. This shared infrastructure drastically reduces the time and financial costs historically associated with bespoke testing environments.<\/p>\n

Further Accelerating Production<\/p>\n

Taken together, the case studies point to measures that could add additional air defense capacity. The U.S. Congress should provide stable multiyear demand, finance solutions to common bottlenecks, and reduce export barriers. The European Union should clarify the European Defence Industry Programme<\/a> (EDIP) and Security Action for Europe<\/a> (SAFE) component-origin rules<\/a> and adjust its separate corporate-control requirements so that European production by trusted U.S.-controlled subsidiaries qualify. This model could extent further to include Canada<\/a>, such as recent efforts to increase stinger production, and even to key Asian allies Japan and Australia.<\/p>\n

The U.S. government can take three key steps to accelerate production.<\/p>\n

Protect a multiyear transatlantic interceptor demand signal. Congress should expand efforts to authorize and appropriate seven-year procurement profiles for critical munitions<\/a> and components<\/a>. These profiles should include advance procurement and economic-order-quantity purchases for long-lead components. When a continuing resolution effects an award or production rate increase for air defenses, Congress should include a named program anomaly that allows the Pentagon to bypass the budget freeze.<\/p>\n

The Pentagon should align U.S. procurement profiles with funded European purchases. The Trump administration should pursue deeper EU-U.S. defense partnership and an agreement under Article 17 of the SAFE Regulation<\/a> that supports scaling air and missile defense. Ideally, these efforts would be linked to NATO and broader security objectives across the alliance, including requirements based on the regional support plans<\/a> and intelligence estimates that Russia could invade a NATO member state by 2029<\/a>. The agreement should follow the EU-Canada SAFE precedent<\/a> and<\/p>\n

confirm that components manufactured in Europe by U.S.-controlled companies count toward the European share;permit U.S.-origin content above 35 percent for selected capability gaps when no timely European alternative exists;tie any exception to licensed production, second sourcing, repair capacity, or component manufacturing in Europe; andprovide comparable access for European firms establishing qualified production in the United States, and through initiatives such as the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience<\/a> to a broader network of Pacific partners.<\/p>\n

This effort can also include exploring ways to ensure allies and partners can qualify under the U.S. Buy American Act<\/a>. Combined with modifications to SAFE, this would produce a credible alliance network for scaling air and missile defense rather than relying on national industrial silos.<\/p>\n

Finance solutions to common bottlenecks through one transatlantic capacity plan. While service procurement accounts should remain the primary vehicle for purchasing complete missiles, Congress can address common problems. The Industrial Base Fund<\/a> should address constraints shared across programs, including shortages of solid rocket motors, energetics, seekers, electronics, actuators, testing capacity, skilled workers, and qualified suppliers. Congress should require a single cross-service interceptor industrial base plan identifying (1) the bottleneck and affected missile families; (2) the required production rate; (3) the U.S. or European financing instrument; (4) the expected capacity increase; (5) the customer responsible for sustaining demand; and (6) the risk if expected orders do not materialize.<\/p>\n

The plan should coordinate Industrial Base Fund investments with EDIP production-capacity funding<\/a>. U.S. and European investments should create complementary facilities, qualified second sources, and common testing capacity rather than duplicate the same expansion. The European Commission and member states should standardize the guarantee process in the EDIP Regulation<\/a> for U.S.-controlled companies established in Europe. As stated previously, these efforts should be aligned with larger NATO plans and alliance commitments. Eligibility should require that the supported firm<\/p>\n

conduct substantial manufacturing or engineering in Europe;retain funded equipment and skilled workers in Europe;protect classified and sensitive information;provide defined European access to output during a crisis; andpossess adequate rights to maintain and modify supported products.<\/p>\n

For future EDIP funding cycles, the European Union should create a permanent category for trusted allied-controlled companies operating substantive European facilities to incentivize additional private sector investment. Congress should support this change by requiring an exportability plan for each designated interceptor that identifies the technical data, licenses, repair authorities, software access, and component-substitution rights needed to satisfy EDIP and SAFE requirements. These efforts would make it easier for industry to price foreign demand and justify deeper investments in expanding production capacity.<\/p>\n

Create transatlantic coordination measures to increase air and missile defense production. Congress should require the Department of Defense and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to maintain a rolling five-year demand-and-capacity assessment for priority missile families and key export partners, distinguishing between sale types and production status. The assessment should identify which systems exceed the 35 percent third-country-content ceiling, which components could be localized in Europe, and which U.S. export approvals are needed. The United States and European Union should exchange a protected transatlantic capacity annex covering aggregate demand, production rates, shared bottlenecks, and localization schedules.<\/p>\n

Congress should also create a capped air and missile defense priority within the Special Defense Acquisition Fund<\/a>. The fund could procure selected articles ahead of credible allied demand while SAFE aggregates European purchases and EDIP expands European production. U.S. appropriations, foreign military sales funds, SAFE loans, and EDIP grants should remain legally separate.<\/p>\n

Together, these changes would turn the 65\/35 rule into an incentive for deeper transatlantic production. European funding would build real manufacturing and sustainment capacity in Europe, including at qualified U.S.-owned facilities. U.S. procurement and export policies would provide the demand, technology access, and reciprocal treatment needed to sustain that capacity.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

The salvo competition extends to the factory floor and is ultimately a contest over capacity. The recent increase in devasting strikes in Ukraine demonstrates what happens when an adversary can generate attacks faster than the defender can regenerate air defenses. A broader conflict in Europe or the Pacific would impose the same logic across greater distances, larger salvos, and a more fragmented allied industrial base. The IRIS-T and AMRAAM cases illustrate the way forward: Governments must aggregate demand before a crisis, provide firms with a predictable production horizon, and invest below the prime contractor in the motors, seekers, electronics, testing capacity, and skilled labor that determine actual output.<\/p>\n

Modern deterrence rests on capacity<\/a>. The nation that can credibly demonstrate its ability to mass produce air and missile defense alongside other key systems such as high-powered microwaves<\/a>, directed energy<\/a>, and other low-cost interceptors<\/a> signals its ability to withstand an opening salvo and fight a protracted conflict.<\/p>\n

Benjamin Jensen is director of the Futures Lab and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Tobias Oestreich is a research intern with the Futures Lab at CSIS and a DAAD fellow at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Large salvos of missiles and drones define modern war. Nightly attacks in Ukraine and recent missile exchanges in…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":8540,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[14],"class_list":["post-8539","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-news","tag-defence-industry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8539","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8539"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8539\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8540"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8539"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8539"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/defence\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8539"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}