India and Germany have long shared a robust economic relationship, but defence has historically remained a marginal area in their bilateral engagement. This appears to be changing.
Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s recent three-day visit to Berlin, where a Defence Industrial Cooperation Roadmap was signed with his German counterpart Boris Pistorius, marked an inflection point. The agreement commits both countries to deeper defence collaboration through the co-development and co-production of defence equipment and niche technologies, signalling Germany’s commitment to positioning itself as a long-term defence partner for India, in addition to an economic one.
This shift is partly driven by Germany’s own strategic recalibration. Berlin’s Zeitenwende (turning point) involved a sweeping reassessment of its security posture following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which loosened longstanding export restrictions that had previously constrained German arms exports to India. A 2024 German government document titled “Focus on India” explicitly seeks to redirect Indian arms procurement towards German firms, with the strategic subtext of weaning New Delhi away from Moscow. The results are already evident. According to data from the German Economy Ministry, in the first half of 2024, India ranked as the third-largest recipient of German arms exports, valued at €153.75 million. Germany remains fifth overall among India’s defence suppliers, behind Russia, France, the United States (US), and Israel, but the trajectory is seemingly upward.
Crucially, unlike many defence deals, this one involves meaningful Transfer of Technology (ToT). If realised, it would mark the first time Germany has transferred submarine production technology — ordinarily a closely guarded domain — to a non-European country.
India’s own deteriorating threat environment is also shaping a deeper Indo-German defence partnership. India’s structural rivalries with China and Pakistan — including the Galwan Valley clash with China in 2020, Beijing’s growing naval footprint in the Indian Ocean, and the 2025 India-Pakistan military conflict, which illustrated the collision of Western and Chinese technologies in combat — have intensified India’s push towards military modernisation. Compounding this is the current uncertainty surrounding the trajectory of the Indo-US partnership. In this context, Germany and the broader European Union (EU) may offer India relatively stable, lower-risk partners for diversifying its defence supply chains.
A Landmark Submarine Deal
A key highlight of Singh’s visit was the anticipated finalisation of the US$8 billion submarine deal between Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and India’s state-owned Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders (MDL). Germany has indicated that it expects the deal to be signed within three months, making it one of the largest military-industrial collaborations between the two countries.
The agreement falls under India’s Project-75I (P-75I) programme, which seeks to build next-generation conventional submarines for the Indian Navy. Under its terms, six advanced diesel-electric submarines equipped with Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems will be built in India, aligning squarely with New Delhi’s “Make in India” agenda. Crucially, unlike many defence deals, this one involves meaningful Transfer of Technology (ToT). If realised, it would mark the first time Germany has transferred submarine production technology — ordinarily a closely guarded domain — to a non-European country.
The depth of the ToT included in the final agreement will, as analysts have noted, serve as the true litmus test of the deal’s strategic value. At the same time, India’s Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 mandates 30 to 50 percent indigenisation for high-value contracts, a requirement that will need to be reconciled with Germany’s own ambitions of growing its domestic defence industrial base.
Even though accessing SAFE will require an additional agreement, and the German submarine deal will not automatically translate into a template for broader EU-India defence collaboration, taken together, these developments add considerable credibility to the role of EU member states as serious defence partners for India.
The deal would meaningfully enhance India’s undersea deterrence posture, particularly given China’s expanding presence in the Indian Ocean region, as well as Pakistan’s growing naval capabilities, including Hangor-class submarines built with Chinese assistance. Meanwhile, India faces delays in the delivery of Russian-origin platforms, including nuclear-powered attack submarines, disrupted in part by the pressures of Moscow’s war in Ukraine. From a regional security perspective, the deal would enhance stability in the Indo-Pacific by bolstering Indian capabilities, while anchoring Germany’s security footprint in the region.
A Broader Defence Industrial Architecture
Beyond the submarine deal, Minister Singh highlighted a range of areas where India is actively seeking to co-develop and co-produce with German partners, including AI-driven Unmanned Aerial Systems, advanced radar and sensor technologies, Sonobuoys, and next-generation short-range air defence systems such as Germany’s Sky Shield. In the land domain, German firm Rheinmetall has already partnered with India’s Reliance Defence to manufacture 155mm artillery shells and explosives in India. The new Defence Industrial Cooperation Roadmap will provide a structured framework to accelerate and expand these partnerships.
A broader EU-level security architecture is also taking shape around this bilateral momentum. Singh underscored the significance of the recently signed EU-India Security and Defence Partnership (SDP), referring to it as a major step in strengthening collective engagement. The SDP, signed in January 2026, opens a potential pathway for India to access the EU’s €150 billion SAFE instrument, designed to accelerate defence industrial production across Europe. Even though accessing SAFE will require an additional agreement, and the German submarine deal will not automatically translate into a template for broader EU-India defence collaboration, taken together, these developments add considerable credibility to the role of EU member states as serious defence partners for India. This reinforces the complementary strategic messaging emerging from Brussels as well as individual European capitals.
Berlin’s pragmatic approach of offering technology transfers, rather than diplomatically coercing or pressuring New Delhi to limit ties with Moscow, may organically contribute to reducing India’s dependence on Russia for defence.
India’s approach to defence is evolving from a traditional buyer-seller model towards high-tech partnerships and co-development and co-production, which is what makes this German engagement so promising, given its potential to strengthen India’s indigenous defence manufacturing and reduce import dependence. Germany’s technical prowess and industrial strength in aerospace, electronics, naval engineering, and precision manufacturing complement the capabilities India is seeking to build domestically. Meanwhile, Singh’s visit coincided with Germany unveiling its first formal military strategy for the Bundeswehr, or German Armed Forces, with the aim of strengthening specific capabilities and transforming Germany into Europe’s strongest conventional army. Partnering with India, given its manufacturing capacity, ability to scale, and skilled workforce, may contribute to Germany’s “aufwuchs” or military buildup.
On the other hand, Russia, despite remaining an important supplier given the affordability of its platforms, an established ecosystem of spares and components, and easier access to certain technologies, is losing its previously dominant share of India’s arms imports. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia’s share of India’s total arms imports declined from 69 percent in 2012-2016 to 36 percent in 2019-2023, with India actively diversifying its defence suppliers. Berlin’s pragmatic approach of offering technology transfers, rather than diplomatically coercing or pressuring New Delhi to limit ties with Moscow, may organically contribute to reducing India’s dependence on Russia for defence. It also sets a constructive template for how other EU member states might deepen high-end defence and technological cooperation with India.
It is clear that India and Germany are moving towards a relationship that is as much about shared strategic interests as it is about economic complementarity. Whether the submarine deal delivers on its potential will depend on developments in the months ahead. But the direction of travel is unmistakably forward.
Shairee Malhotra is Deputy Director of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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