The following is an adapted version of an article written by former Minister for Regional Development and Public Administration and researcher at the Europe Strategy Research Institute Tibor Navracsics, originally published in Hungarian on the Five Minutes Europe blog of Ludovika.hu.
The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, was intended by its drafters to usher in a new era in the history of European integration. In addition to the traditional focus on economic integration, the treaty’s entry into force was also intended to usher in an era of political integration, as reflected in the name change: the European Community became the European Union.
However, while the creation of a single internal market enjoyed widespread support among European citizens, closer political cooperation sparked much more debate. A significant number of provinces and regions feared that political integration would not only strengthen the EU level but also hollow out the provincial level in member states with federal systems.
This concern was already evident at the intergovernmental conference that prepared the treaty. While representatives of the subnational level fought for a decentralized European institutional system under the slogan ‘Europe of the Regions’, participants in the intergovernmental conference also made it possible for the constituent parts of federal states to participate more broadly in EU decision-making. These gestures resolved the issue, thereby removing the obstacles to the drafting of the treaty.
It appeared that by 7 February 1992, the date of the treaty’s ceremonial signing, all contentious issues had been resolved. The provinces of the federations had more or less calmed down, or at least accepted the proposed solution, under which the regions could be directly represented in decision-making within certain council bodies. At the same time, the drafters of the treaty did not perceive any problem in transferring powers to the EU level and strengthening cooperation.
This reckless optimism backfired during the ratification process. The treaty’s provisions strengthening federalism provoked domestic political debate in several countries. In those countries—Denmark, France, and Ireland—where referendums were also held, the political conflict was particularly intense. While supporters of the treaty won by a landslide in Ireland, in France, this margin was narrow—51.05 per cent. The real shock, however, came on 2 June 1992, when Danish voters, concerned about the loss of their national sovereignty, rejected the ratification of the treaty.
‘The treaty’s provisions strengthening federalism provoked domestic political debate in several countries’
The fact that the ‘yes’ votes had prevailed in the French and Irish referendums in the meantime did little to alleviate the politically tense situation, as the Danish veto alone was enough to prevent the treaty from entering into force. After six months of paralysis, in December 1992, under the British presidency, the EU member states reached an agreement in Edinburgh. Under the terms of this agreement, the member states committed to allowing Denmark to opt out of cooperation in three areas deemed key to the process. Under the opt-out clause, Denmark is not required to participate in the third stage of the European Economic and Monetary Union—the introduction of the euro—in the common defence policy, or in certain areas of cooperation in justice and home affairs.
The concessions secured by Denmark shifted public opinion in favour of ratification, and in the referendum held again in May 1993, 56.74 per cent of voters approved the text of the treaty. The successful Danish referendum allowed the Maastricht Treaty to enter into force in November 1993, while Denmark was also able to preserve key elements of its national sovereignty.
‘Denmark was also able to preserve key elements of its national sovereignty’
In parallel with the Danes, the United Kingdom also agreed on an opt-out clause with the other member states regarding the third phase of Economic and Monetary Union, the social chapter of the treaty, and certain areas of cooperation in justice and home affairs.
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