\nHow the Inuit\u2019s Right to Self-Determination Constrains External Decisions on Greenland\u2019s Sovereignty\n<\/p>\n
Greenland\u2019s predominantly Inuit population is recognized as an Indigenous People with a corresponding right to self\u2011determination under international law. Any external attempt to alter Greenland\u2019s sovereignty \u2013 including annexation by the United States \u2013 would violate that right and therefore cannot be lawful without the freely expressed will of the Greenlandic people.<\/p>\n
Indigenous Peoples and self-determination<\/p>\n
Greenland\u2019s status as the Indigenous land of the Inuit people is recognized both domestically within the Kingdom of Denmark and internationally. The preamble to the Greenland Self\u2011Government Act of 2009<\/a> explicitly affirms that \u201cthe people of Greenland is a people under international law with the right of self\u2011determination.\u201d This understanding is further reflected in Greenland\u2019s 2023 draft constitution<\/a>, which states that \u201cInuit are the Indigenous People of our country.\u201d Denmark also underscored this position upon ratifying ILO Convention No.\u202f169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples<\/a>:<\/p>\n \u201cIn Denmark, there is only one Indigenous People within the meaning of Convention No. 169. This is the Indigenous population of Greenland, the Inuit.\u201d<\/p>\n International law often has limited capacity to constrain the current US President\u2019s foreign policy choices (the current US President himself has stated<\/a> that \u201chis own morals\u201d are the main limit on presidential power). Nevertheless, it remains a relevant legal exercise to assess what international law requires, and what it excludes, in relation to the rights of Indigenous Peoples and the potential annexation of Greenland. This is particularly so for idealistic (or hopeful, or na\u00efve) international lawyers such as the author.<\/p>\n Recognition as an Indigenous People entails a range of collective and individual rights under international law, most notably under ILO Convention No. 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples<\/a> (UNDRIP). Denmark has ratified ILO Convention No. 169 and voted in favor<\/a> of UNDRIP upon its adoption by the UN General Assembly in 2007. The United States has not ratified ILO Convention No. 169 but formally endorsed the objectives of UNDRIP \u2013 both in 2010<\/a> and 2014<\/a>.<\/p>\n Both ILO Convention No. 169 and UNDRIP set out a wide range of Indigenous rights, encompassing cultural, religious, and social rights, as well as rights relating to land, participation, and self-determination. Any external decision concerning Greenland\u2019s sovereignty therefore engages not only general international law \u2013 such as the UN Charter<\/a>\u2019s principle of self-determination (Art. 1(2)) \u2013 but also specific Indigenous rights protections.<\/p>\n In light of the current geopolitical context and challenges to Greenland\u2019s sovereignty, this contribution focuses specifically on the right of Indigenous Peoples to self-determination and asks how that right constrains external decisions \u2013 including the prospect of annexation \u2013 affecting Greenland.<\/p>\n Indigenous self-determination and sovereignty under international law<\/p>\n Self-determination is firmly established as a right of peoples under international law and has been affirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a principle of customary international law. From the Namibia<\/a> (1971) and Western Sahara<\/a> (1975) to the Wall<\/a> (2004) and Chagos<\/a> (2019) advisory opinions, as well as in the East Timor<\/a> (1995) case, the Court has consistently emphasized that peoples are entitled to freely determine their political status and that this right is owed erga omnes.<\/p>\n At the same time, international law draws an important distinction between external self-determination \u2013 typically associated with decolonization or secession \u2013 and internal self-determination, which concerns autonomy, self-government, and effective participation within an existing state. This distinction is reflected in UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), reinforced in the ICJ\u2019s Western Sahara and Wall Advisory Opinions, and further elaborated by the UN Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 12. Indigenous Peoples\u2019 claims to self-determination have often been framed in this latter sense. This does not render them legally marginal. On the contrary, it situates Indigenous self-determination at the intersection between territorial sovereignty and the rights of peoples.<\/p>\n Greenland exemplifies this intersection. It is not a non-self-governing territory in the classical UN and colonial sense; that is, at least, how it has been officially and historically framed thanks to great diplomatic efforts by Denmark (for an interesting account, see the book \u201cthe Children of the Empire<\/a>\u201d (Danish: Imperiets B\u00f8rn) by \u00a0Anne\u00a0Kirstine\u00a0Herman). Nor is it merely an ordinary sub-state entity. Through the Self-Government Act<\/a>, Denmark has explicitly recognized the Greenlandic people as a people under international law (preamble) and acknowledged their right ultimately to decide their own future status (art. 21). Any external decision concerning Greenland\u2019s sovereignty therefore necessarily implicates the right to self-determination of an Indigenous People.<\/p>\n Indigenous self-determination and external sovereignty claims under UNDRIP<\/p>\n UNDRIP constitutes the most comprehensive articulation of Indigenous Peoples\u2019 rights under international law and places self-determination at its (normative) core. Article 3 affirms that Indigenous Peoples have the right to self-determination, while Article 4 specifies that this includes autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs.<\/p>\n UNDRIP recognizes Indigenous Peoples as collective political actors with authority over their own institutions, lands, and development priorities. Articles 26 and 32 further protect Indigenous Peoples\u2019 rights to their lands, territories, and resources and require states to obtain their free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) before approving projects that affect those lands.<\/p>\n UNDRIP\u2019s relevance to questions of sovereignty is reinforced by Article 46, which safeguards the territorial integrity of states. This provision is sometimes invoked<\/a> to argue that UNDRIP excludes any implications for sovereignty. That reading is overly simplistic. Article 46 prevents UNDRIP from being interpreted as authorizing unilateral secession or the fragmentation of states. It does not, however, license the imposition of sovereignty by external actors over Indigenous Peoples or their territories.<\/p>\n Applied to Greenland, UNDRIP supports a clear proposition: sovereignty over Greenland cannot lawfully be altered without the freely expressed will of the Greenlandic people. Any annexation or transfer of sovereignty imposed externally (the diplomatic way to say \u201cUS annexation\u201d) would sit uneasily with Articles 3 and 4, and would directly undermine Indigenous autonomy and political self-determination. The fact that the United States has formally endorsed UNDRIP, even if it disputes its binding force, does not guarantee compliance \u2013 particularly in light of the Trump administration\u2019s willingness to disregard international law. UNDRIP\u2019s significance in this context therefore lies less in its capacity to discipline state behavior through normative expectations than as a shared legal and political framework. Even in the face of a rogue American President, UNDRIP structures the terms of contestation, provides a vocabulary for Indigenous claims, and offers an internationally recognized platform against which the legality and legitimacy of external actions affecting Greenland may be assessed.<\/p>\n Binding constraints through Denmark through ILO Convention No. 169<\/p>\n While UNDRIP is formally a non-binding instrument, ILO Convention No. 169 imposes legally binding obligations on states parties \u2013 including Denmark. Although the Convention does not explicitly employ the language of self-determination, it gives that principle concrete legal expression.<\/p>\n Article 6 requires governments to consult Indigenous Peoples in good faith whenever legislative or administrative measures may affect them. Article 7 recognizes Indigenous Peoples\u2019 right to decide their own priorities for development and to exercise control over their economic, social, and cultural development. Articles 13 to 15 protect Indigenous Peoples\u2019 special relationship with their lands and natural resources, while Article 16 limits relocation without free and informed consent.<\/p>\n These provisions have direct implications for sovereignty decisions. A change in sovereignty would constitute the most far-reaching measure imaginable affecting Indigenous Peoples\u2019 political status, lands, and institutions. Under ILO Convention No. 169, Denmark cannot lawfully consent to or facilitate (or tolerate?) such a change without the \u201cmeaningful participation<\/a>\u201d \u2013 and, practically speaking, the consent \u2013 of the Greenlandic people.<\/p>\n Moreover, a basic principle of international law applies: a third state cannot acquire greater rights over a territory than the territorial state itself possesses (\u201cnemo dat quod non habet\u201d \u2013 see the Island of Palmas<\/a> case). If Denmark\u2019s authority (under international law as well as national law and legal fiction) over Greenland is legally conditioned by Indigenous participation and consent, no external actor can lawfully bypass those conditions through bilateral arrangements.<\/p>\n Consent, consultation, and annexation<\/p>\n