Today we are all witnessing the start of a process in which responsibility for security at the bridge in Mitrovica will pass to the Kosovo Police.<\/p>\n
Sveclja described the process as short term and said it was leading toward opening the bridge to vehicle traffic, but he gave no date.<\/p>\n
What Brussels is basing this on<\/p>\n
The EU spokesperson pointed back to the position in the Union\u2019s 2025 report on Kosovo, which states that the bridge should open once work on the Austerlitz bridge in Mitrovica is finished, along with additional assessments and consultations with security partners.<\/p>\n
The EU\u2019s position on the bridge has always been clear: once work on the Austerlitz bridge in Mitrovica is completed, along with additional assessments and consultations, the bridge should be opened. We can confirm, as already stated in last year\u2019s annual report, that this is indeed the case.<\/p>\n
The EU considers the condition of consulting with security partners satisfied by KFOR\u2019s own statement announcing the start of the transition. The spokesperson also specified that NATO had informed the EU about the deployment of its mission, and that EULEX had been properly notified and continues to cooperate with the Kosovo Police and KFOR.<\/p>\n
What Srpska Lista is demanding<\/p>\n
In its letter to the EU Office, Srpska Lista raised a series of questions about the assessment itself.<\/p>\n
On the basis of which specific security analysis did the European Union conclude that the conditions for opening the bridge have been met? Who produced that analysis, when was it drafted, and which security parameters were taken into account, given the dozens of meetings at which we informed you in detail about violations of the rights of the Serbian people?<\/p>\n
The party specifically disputes the idea that the safety of Serbs can be guaranteed by relying on the Kosovo Police, and cites allegations of mistreatment and excessive use of force, including the case of Nenad Raskovic from Drenje near Zubin Potok, whose beating, the party says, has still not been attributed to anyone. It also raises a procedural question: since the bridge is a subject of the Brussels dialogue, it asks what purpose the dialogue serves if issues arising from it are resolved unilaterally.<\/p>\n
The safety of people must not be the subject of a political experiment.<\/p>\n
Pristina\u2019s reaction was the opposite. Kosovo\u2019s president, Vjosa Osmani, whose term has expired, called it a historic step in a Facebook post.<\/p>\n
The opening of the main bridge on the Ibar River and the transfer of authority to the Kosovo Police are welcome developments, which further help the full integration of every part of our country\u2019s territory.<\/p>\n
Were last year\u2019s two conditions met?<\/p>\n
An analysis published on August 18 by the nongovernmental Center for Affirmative Studies (CASA), based in North Mitrovica, describes the decision as political horse trading between the EU and the government in Pristina, and points to the precedent it sets.<\/p>\n
Last year, KFOR and the EU rejected Pristina\u2019s request to open the bridge during the election campaign and set two conditions: agreement between the negotiating parties, and consultation with the community. According to the analysis, neither condition has been met, and Belgrade has effectively been squeezed out of the process.<\/p>\n
The same analysis notes a detail that explains why no consultation took place in public. Representatives of the Peace Mediation and Dialogue Division, part of the European External Action Service, had already visited northern Kosovo in March 2025 and met with civil society representatives specifically about the possible consequences of opening the bridge.<\/p>\n
The main bridge has remained open to pedestrians and closed to vehicles throughout. Pristina has since built new crossings over the Ibar, and a road bridge opened on August 26, 2025. A date for opening the main bridge to traffic is still unknown.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Today we are all witnessing the start of a process in which responsibility for security at the bridge…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":148051,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[104],"tags":[211,210,73,70087,70085,70086,70318],"class_list":["post-148050","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-brussels","tag-belgium","tag-brussels","tag-european-union","tag-ibar-bridge","tag-kfor","tag-kosovska-mitrovica","tag-srpska-lista"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@dk\/117117066087887347","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/148050","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=148050"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/148050\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/148051"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=148050"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=148050"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=148050"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}