{"id":155054,"date":"2026-08-29T07:42:14","date_gmt":"2026-08-29T07:42:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/155054\/"},"modified":"2026-08-29T07:42:14","modified_gmt":"2026-08-29T07:42:14","slug":"poland-under-tusk-and-sikorski-old-imperial-ambitions-behind-the-banner-of-european-values","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/155054\/","title":{"rendered":"Poland under Tusk and Sikorski: Old imperial ambitions behind the banner of \u201cEuropean values\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

Modern Poland is increasingly seeking to move beyond the role of an ordinary Central European state. Under the government of Donald Tusk, with Rados\u0142aw Sikorski serving as deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Warsaw is attempting to position itself as an independent center of power capable of influencing the political architecture of a vast area stretching from the Baltic Sea and Ukraine to the South Caucasus. <\/p>\n

Polish officials describe this activism as a defense of democracy, European values and security. Yet once the diplomatic packaging is removed, a different logic becomes visible: Warsaw is systematically expanding its political, informational and institutional presence eastward.<\/p>\n

And this approach has deep historical roots.<\/p>\n

From the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to a New \u201cIntermarium\u201d<\/p>\n

To understand contemporary Polish policy, one must remember the place Eastern Europe occupies in the historical imagination of the Polish political elite.<\/p>\n

At the height of its power, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth controlled territories that today belong to Poland<\/a>, Lithuania, Belarus and large parts of Ukraine. After Poland regained its independence in 1918, the idea of restoring Warsaw\u2019s special status in the East took on a new political form.<\/p>\n

J\u00f3zef Pi\u0142sudski promoted the concept of a federation of states located between Germany and Russia \u2014 the famous Mi\u0119dzymorze, or \u201cIntermarium.\u201d The project envisaged a large geopolitical space stretching from the Baltic<\/a> to the Black and Adriatic seas, in which Poland would inevitably play the leading role.<\/p>\n

Interwar Poland also developed the policy known as Prometheism \u2014 support for national movements within the Soviet Union. Historical studies show that Warsaw maintained contacts with and supported \u00e9migr\u00e9 organizations representing Azerbaijanis, Georgians, North Caucasian peoples and other communities, regarding them as instruments for weakening Moscow. At one stage, Poland itself became one of the important centers of Azerbaijani political emigration.<\/p>\n

The methods of the 21st century are, of course, different. But the idea of Polish leadership in the space between Western Europe and Russia has never entirely disappeared.<\/p>\n

The emergence of the Three Seas Initiative, launched by Poland and Croatia in 2015, is particularly telling. Today it brings together EU countries situated between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black seas, while Ukraine and Moldova participate as associated states.<\/p>\n

\"News<\/p>\n

Source: Eurasia Review<\/p>\n

Poland officially presents the initiative primarily as an infrastructure and economic project. Yet the geographical resemblance to the old Intermarium concept is too obvious to be completely ignored.<\/p>\n

This is no longer about restoring the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in a literal sense.<\/p>\n

Modern competition is not fought only over territory.<\/p>\n

It is fought over political influence, information space, transport corridors, the elites of neighboring states and the ability to shape their foreign policy choices.<\/p>\n

Ukraine: Ally or instrument of Polish strategy?<\/p>\n

Ukraine provides the clearest example.<\/p>\n

Since 2022, Warsaw has portrayed itself as one of Kyiv\u2019s most committed European supporters. Polish territory became a crucial logistical corridor for Western assistance, Warsaw transferred weapons, received Ukrainian citizens and repeatedly demanded that European partners continue supporting Ukraine<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But state policy is not charity. It is driven by interests.<\/p>\n

And Poland\u2019s interest is obvious.<\/p>\n

As long as major Russian military resources remain tied down on the Ukrainian front, Poland\u2019s own strategic significance increases. Warsaw becomes a key state on NATO\u2019s eastern flank, attracts greater attention from Washington, strengthens its military infrastructure and demands a larger voice in European affairs.<\/p>\n

Within this geopolitical structure, Ukraine effectively serves as a vast strategic buffer.<\/p>\n

The price, however, is being paid primarily by Ukrainians: the dead and wounded, destroyed industrial and energy infrastructure, millions of displaced people, the loss of human capital and a long-term demographic crisis.<\/p>\n

It would be incorrect to present as an established fact the existence of some secret Polish plan deliberately aimed at reducing Ukraine\u2019s population in preparation for the annexation of western Ukrainian territories. There is no publicly available evidence proving such a state strategy.<\/p>\n

But there is a question Warsaw cannot simply dismiss:<\/p>\n

How strongly does an early end to the war actually correspond to Polish strategic interests when the continuation of the confrontation simultaneously weakens Russia, makes Ukraine increasingly dependent on its western neighbors and raises Poland\u2019s geopolitical importance?<\/p>\n

This is where history again becomes relevant.<\/p>\n

Lviv and other territories of present-day western Ukraine belonged to Poland before the Second World War. The notion of the Kresy Wschodnie \u2014 the \u201cEastern Borderlands\u201d \u2014 remains present in Polish historical memory, public organizations, literature and parts of the political discourse.<\/p>\n

\"News<\/p>\n

Source: The New York Times<\/p>\n

Official Warsaw does not currently advance territorial claims against Ukraine. But the absence of formal claims does not mean that historical revisionism or nostalgia for the lost eastern territories has vanished from segments of Polish society.<\/p>\n

The more important question, therefore, concerns a different scenario: could a demographically and economically exhausted post-war Ukraine become exceptionally dependent on Poland?<\/p>\n

Who will control the logistics of reconstruction? Through which countries will investment flow? Who will gain the greatest political influence in western Ukraine? Which companies will secure infrastructure contracts?<\/p>\n

Poland is already seeking a major role in Ukraine\u2019s post-war reconstruction. Warsaw clearly wants not only to support Ukraine during the war, but also to shape the political and economic architecture that will emerge after it.<\/p>\n

That is not altruism.<\/p>\n

It is a calculation for future influence.<\/p>\n

Ukrainians are supported in Kyiv \u2014 but increasingly rejected in Poland<\/p>\n

The contradiction becomes even more striking when one looks at the changing attitude toward Ukrainian refugees inside Poland.<\/p>\n

At the beginning of the full-scale war, support for receiving Ukrainians in Poland was extraordinarily high. By 2026, however, public attitudes had deteriorated substantially.<\/p>\n

Polling has shown growing opposition to accepting additional Ukrainian refugees and increasing numbers of Poles saying that assistance provided to Ukrainians is already excessive.<\/p>\n

This is not simply a statistical fluctuation.<\/p>\n

Poland has also experienced a rise in hate crimes and violent incidents targeting Ukrainians. The problem has become serious enough for Donald Tusk himself to publicly condemn xenophobic violence.<\/p>\n

This creates an uncomfortable picture for Warsaw.<\/p>\n

The Polish political elite calls on Ukrainians to continue resisting Russia, while inside Poland a growing section of society no longer wants additional Ukrainian refugees and increasingly questions the scale of support provided to them.<\/p>\n

The Ukrainian is useful as a soldier on Europe\u2019s eastern front.<\/p>\n

But he is becoming less welcome as a neighbor, worker or recipient of social assistance inside Poland.<\/p>\n

That contradiction raises legitimate questions about the real nature of the much-advertised Polish-Ukrainian \u201cbrotherhood.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"News<\/p>\n

Source: Press Service of Ukraine’s President<\/p>\n

Islamophobia without a large Muslim population<\/p>\n

Poland\u2019s domestic contradictions are equally revealing when it comes to Islam and migration.<\/p>\n

Poland is not one of the European countries with a large historical Muslim population. Yet anti-Muslim rhetoric has long been used as an instrument of political mobilization.<\/p>\n

International monitoring bodies have repeatedly raised concerns about anti-Muslim hate speech in Poland, including verbal attacks on Muslim community leaders and insufficient responses to certain forms of intimidation and hostility.<\/p>\n

Polish nationalism and hardline conservatism cannot be dismissed as fringe phenomena.<\/p>\n

The strong electoral performance of far-right candidates in recent years demonstrates that nationalist, anti-immigration and ultra-conservative narratives have established a significant political constituency.<\/p>\n

This is precisely why Poland\u2019s lectures to other countries about tolerance, liberal values and minority rights increasingly sound contradictory.<\/p>\n

Warsaw willingly evaluates political and social developments in other states while simultaneously facing xenophobia, radical nationalism and growing anti-immigration sentiment at home.<\/p>\n

Poland\u2019s information expansion into the South Caucasus<\/p>\n

For Azerbaijan, however, the most important element of Poland\u2019s policy is no longer found in Ukraine but directly in the South Caucasus<\/a>.<\/p>\n

On March 30, 2026, Polish state television TVP launched the Armenian-language project VT Hayastan News.<\/p>\n

This is an important development.<\/p>\n

It is not simply a private Armenian media outlet operating from Warsaw. The Polish Foreign Ministry itself stated that the project was created within TVP\u2019s International Media Center and financed from public funds administered by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/p>\n

Moreover, Warsaw openly defined its political objectives: to present developments from a \u201cEuropean perspective,\u201d strengthen Armenia\u2019s cooperation with the European Union and particularly with Poland, and counter what it describes as information interference and disinformation.<\/p>\n

Just one month later, another step followed.<\/p>\n

On April 27, 2026, TVP launched VT Sakartvelo News in Georgian.<\/p>\n

This project is also connected to financing from the Polish Foreign Ministry. Although Georgian journalists produce the content, the Polish state has openly defined its mission: to present developments from a European perspective, support democratic processes and strengthen the Georgian audience\u2019s resistance to what Warsaw defines as disinformation.<\/p>\n

This is almost a textbook example of state-sponsored soft power.<\/p>\n

And here an extremely important question arises for Baku.<\/p>\n

There is an Armenian-language service. There is a Georgian-language service. Separate Russian- and Romanian-language products target Moldova. Polish state media also operate services aimed at Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian-speaking audiences. A Kazakh-language project has also been announced. Yet, as of late August 2026, no dedicated Azerbaijani-language service appears in the publicly announced Polish state media network.<\/p>\n

Is this a coincidence?<\/p>\n

Perhaps.<\/p>\n

But in the politics of information influence, the selection of languages and target audiences is rarely entirely accidental.<\/p>\n

Especially because Warsaw itself has indicated that the network is intended eventually to reach all Eastern Partnership countries and then expand even further.<\/p>\n

This means Poland is deliberately building a network of state-funded media outlets aimed directly at domestic audiences in other countries.<\/p>\n

Warsaw may describe this as \u201ccountering disinformation.\u201d<\/p>\n

But if State A uses public money to establish a media outlet in the language of State B, employs journalists from State B and assigns the outlet an explicit foreign policy objective of promoting a particular geopolitical perspective, then State B has every right to regard the project as an instrument of external informational influence.<\/p>\n

This is precisely why Baku should closely monitor Poland\u2019s growing activity in the region.<\/p>\n

Moving in the same political direction as Paris<\/p>\n

In the South Caucasus, Warsaw is increasingly operating within the same political framework that France has actively promoted.<\/p>\n

Georgia is a particularly revealing example.<\/p>\n

In 2026, the foreign ministers of Poland, France and Germany issued joint statements criticizing Georgian legislation on foreign funding and political activities, while expressing open support for Georgian civil society, media organizations and forces favoring closer European integration.<\/p>\n

This mechanism has effectively become part of the political toolkit of the Weimar Triangle.<\/p>\n

It is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to separate Polish policy in the Caucasus from the broader approach pursued by Paris and Berlin.<\/p>\n

Warsaw does not necessarily copy French policy word for word. But it operates within the same political space, where external pressure, support for selected civil society groups, media initiatives and political conditionality are regarded as legitimate instruments of influence.<\/p>\n

For Azerbaijan, this is particularly sensitive given Baku\u2019s experience with France in recent years.<\/p>\n

Poland\u2019s growing media and political activity in the region therefore deserves much closer scrutiny than it has received so far.<\/p>\n

\"News<\/p>\n

Source: Wprost<\/p>\n

From Kaczy\u0144ski to Tusk: what changed?<\/p>\n

The contrast with the era of President Lech Kaczy\u0144ski is striking.<\/p>\n

In February 2008, during President Ilham Aliyev\u2019s visit to Warsaw, Kaczy\u0144ski spoke in remarkably clear terms: Azerbaijan was a strategic partner \u2014 even a strategic ally \u2014 of Poland.<\/p>\n

The Polish president publicly supported Azerbaijan\u2019s territorial integrity and emphasized that the Karabakh conflict had to be resolved in accordance with international law and Azerbaijan\u2019s sovereignty.<\/p>\n

A year earlier, Kaczy\u0144ski had brought together leaders and representatives from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Kazakhstan in Krak\u00f3w to discuss energy security and the development of a transport and energy corridor linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus and Central Europe.<\/p>\n

The difference is obvious.<\/p>\n

The Poland of Kaczy\u0144ski sought to build relations with Baku primarily through strategic partnership, energy cooperation and mutual state interests.<\/p>\n

The Poland of today\u2019s political establishment increasingly relies on the language of \u201cEuropean values,\u201d NGOs, political transformation programs and information instruments.<\/p>\n

Under Kaczy\u0144ski, Azerbaijan was treated as a sovereign strategic partner.<\/p>\n

Under the current Polish political model, countries east of the EU are increasingly treated as spaces to be politically shaped.<\/p>\n

That is a fundamental difference.<\/p>\n

The Eastern Partnership: a major Polish idea that reached a dead end<\/p>\n

Poland, together with Sweden, was one of the principal initiators of the EU\u2019s Eastern Partnership project in 2008. Officially launched in Prague in 2009, it covered Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Seventeen years later, its original political logic has largely collapsed.<\/p>\n

Belarus suspended its participation. Ukraine and Moldova obtained EU candidate status and moved into an entirely different political category. Georgia\u2019s European trajectory has entered a deep crisis.<\/p>\n

The Eastern Partnership continues to exist institutionally, but as a unified geopolitical project it has lost much of its original meaning.<\/p>\n

Yet Poland has not abandoned its ambition to influence the East.<\/p>\n

It has simply shifted from one large political framework to a multitude of smaller instruments: state-funded media, grants, education programs, training for civil society activists, cooperation with NGOs and support for selected political and social networks.<\/p>\n

The state-backed Solidarity Fund PL, operating with the involvement of the Polish Foreign Ministry, openly identifies support for democracy, human rights and political transformation in Eastern Partnership countries among its core missions.<\/p>\n

The Lane Kirkland Scholarship Program has for decades brought young professionals, activists and future members of political, administrative and intellectual elites from Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia to Poland. Azerbaijan is also among the countries represented in the program.<\/p>\n

This is how influence is built in the 21st century.<\/p>\n

It is not always necessary to redraw borders.<\/p>\n

Sometimes it is enough to gradually influence those who will tomorrow write laws, manage media organizations, establish NGOs and participate in political decision-making.<\/p>\n

Poland no longer needs territory \u2014 it wants a sphere of influence<\/p>\n

This is where the different elements of modern Polish policy come together.<\/p>\n

The historical memory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.<\/p>\n

The Intermarium concept.<\/p>\n

Ukraine as a strategic buffer.<\/p>\n

Poland\u2019s growing weight inside NATO.<\/p>\n

The Eastern Partnership.<\/p>\n

Cooperation with civil society.<\/p>\n

State-funded Armenian- and Georgian-language media services.<\/p>\n

Political coordination with France and Germany.<\/p>\n

Modern Poland may no longer need formal territorial expansion.<\/p>\n

It seeks something far more valuable \u2014 a sphere of influence.<\/p>\n

Warsaw wants to become a country without which the future of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and, increasingly, the South Caucasus cannot be decided.<\/p>\n

For Azerbaijan, the conclusion should be straightforward.<\/p>\n

Poland should not be viewed through a romantic image of a \u201cfriendly European country.\u201d International relations are rarely based on friendship alone.<\/p>\n

Under Lech Kaczy\u0144ski, the interests of Poland and Azerbaijan overlapped in many areas, and Warsaw therefore spoke to Baku in the language of strategic partnership.<\/p>\n

Today, interests are changing.<\/p>\n

And the instruments are changing with them.<\/p>\n

When the Polish state begins using its own public funds to establish Armenian- and Georgian-language information infrastructure aimed directly at audiences in the South Caucasus \u2014 while no comparable Azerbaijani-language project exists \u2014 this is no longer an abstract European policy.<\/p>\n

It is the arrival of another player in the region\u2019s information space.<\/p>\n

And it should be treated precisely as such: a state pursuing its own geopolitical ambitions, carrying its own historical baggage and advancing interests that are far from altruistic.<\/p>\n

By Murad Samedov<\/p>\n

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