The episode crystallises Poland\u2019s central dilemma: Brussels is now the paymaster of Europe\u2019s most ambitious rearmament, but Warsaw is not entirely sure it trusts the strings attached. Relative to the size of its economy, Poland\u2019s rearmament is the largest in Europe. Defence outlays hit 4.9 per cent of GDP in 2026, or \u20ac27bn, second only to the United States in NATO. \u201cPoland\u2019s defence spending trajectory is unmatched in the alliance,\u201d the Alliance\u2019s Poland country profile reads.<\/p>\n
What Poland is buying from whom<\/p>\n
The EU legislative backdrop matters here. The ReArm Europe plan, an \u20ac800bn package championed by Warsaw during its 2025 Council Presidency, reshaped how the bloc thinks about collective defence spending.<\/p>\n
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2026) concludes that Warsaw\u2019s 2025 EU Presidency \u201cregained trust at the European level,\u201d leading to the closure of the Article 7 rule-of-law procedure and unfreezing of cohesion funds<\/a>. Warsaw leveraged that goodwill to push defence to the top of the EU agenda. \u201cPoland is treated as the absolute most important element of SAFE,\u201d Mr Tusk said then.<\/p>\n The procurement list is vast and deliberately diversified. On land, Poland has ordered South Korean K2 tanks and K9PL howitzers from Hyundai Rotem and Hanwha, American M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks from General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin, and domestically produced Borsuk infantry fighting vehicles from Huta Stalowa Wola. In the air, 32 F-35A jets join from 2026\u20132030 under Project HARPIA. The existing fleet of 48 F-16 Block 52+ aircraft enters a \u20ac1.2bn mid-life upgrade, adding JASSM-ER cruise missiles and a new SABR radar. Two A330 MRTT tankers lease from Airbus Defence.<\/p>\n At sea, the Miecznik programme orders three 7,000-tonne frigates based on the Arrowhead-140 hull, assembled in Gdynia with Britain\u2019s Babcock and France\u2019s Thales providing sensors. The long-delayed ORKA submarine acquisition now favours Saab\u2019s A26 Blekinge design, with delivery from 2032. Missile defence rests on a three-layer architecture: Patriot batteries integrated via Northrop Grumman\u2019s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) fire-control system, for which Warsaw secured the rare concession of source-code access, topped up by CAMM-ER and Pilica+ anti-drone batteries.<\/p>\n Where the friction is<\/p>\n Fondapol\u2019s 2026 strategic paper argues that Warsaw seeks \u201cflexilateral\u201d arrangements<\/a>, plug-and-play coalitions inside NATO and the EU, to maximise rapid-reaction mass and resilience, aiming to field \u201cthe largest land army in Europe\u201d. That ambition is visible in every line of the procurement plan.<\/p>\n Money will keep flowing, but industrial obstacles will prevent full autonomy. \u2014 European Security and Defence<\/p>\n The deals look clean on paper. In practice, each one carries political and industrial baggage. The K9 howitzer deal illustrates the central tension. Warsaw ordered Korean-built guns for early delivery, promising a Polish K9PL production line later. But without volume guarantees, Hanwha hesitates to transfer tooling. The army wants kit now; industry wants contracts long enough to justify retooling. Neither side can fully satisfy the other.<\/p>\n The Miecznik frigate programme faces a similar bind. The Gdynia yard must retool for warship construction while still delivering commercial work for Babcock. Cost overruns loom. The K2PL tank deal is more promising: Hyundai Rotem has committed to a Gliwice production line with 120 per cent offset, including transfer of autoloader intellectual property. General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin have opened an Abrams maintenance facility in Pozna\u0144, servicing US pre-positioned stocks as well as Polish vehicles.<\/p>\n Money, rules, and sovereignty<\/p>\n Poland\u2019s integration of EU funding into its defence plans is unprecedented in scale, but it creates its own complications. The ReArm Europe loans come with conditionality. Brussels expects recipients to align procurement with EU defence-industrial priorities, which means buying European where possible. Poland\u2019s shopping list, heavy on American F-35s, Korean tanks, and Swedish submarines, sits awkwardly with that expectation.<\/p>\n The tension is not merely commercial. The European Defence Fund and the Defence Industrial Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) both incentivise joint EU procurement. Poland has signed on to several joint-procurement frameworks, including the Baltic Sea Memorandum of May 2025, under which 11 states and the EU pledged to protect undersea infrastructure and share maritime intelligence assets.<\/p>\n The initiative was co-drafted<\/a> by Warsaw. The Eastern Flank Group, formed in December 2025, went further, calling for an EU \u2018Eastern Shield\u2019 with forward-pre-positioned stocks inside Poland.<\/p>\n The politics of it<\/p>\n Yet Warsaw has also shown it will push back when EU rules cut across national security priorities. Hungary challenged its exclusion from a European Peace Facility (EPF) vote on Ukraine military aid, illustrating how the EPF\u2019s governance rules can become a battlefield in their own right. Poland, a strong EPF supporter, watches that case closely: a ruling that tightens member state voting rights inside the EPF could constrain Warsaw\u2019s own ability to shape future Ukraine-assistance decisions.<\/p>\n Poland is treated as the absolute most important element of SAFE. \u2014 Donald Tusk, Poland\u2019s prime minister<\/p>\n State-owned Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) anchors 60 companies in the domestic sector. Critics say the conglomerate slows decision-making and obscures cross-subsidies. Research-and-development spending sits at just 0.7 per cent of the defence budget, well below NATO\u2019s two per cent guideline. Only two of Poland\u2019s top-ten pension funds hold defence equities. A mooted Defence Innovation Agency remains unfunded. The European Security and Defence<\/a> report warns of a middle-income trap: \u201cMoney will keep flowing, but industrial obstacles will prevent full autonomy,\u201d it says.<\/p>\n The procurement mix reflects a deliberate hedge. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk\u2019s government has pursued what it calls a \u2018European Plan B\u2019 (strategic pacts with France in May 2025, Germany in June 2026, and the United Kingdom in December 2025) to reduce dependence on Washington. Yet the F-35, the Abrams, HIMARS, and ATACMS-ER remain central to the plan. No European partner offers equivalent strike depth or interoperability.<\/p>\n Internal instability hurts<\/p>\n RANE\/Stratfor, a US think-tank argues that prolonged confrontation between President Karol Nawrocki and Mr Tusk could inject uncertainty<\/a> into long-term defence-procurement contracts. This holds true even as both camps agree on threat perceptions.<\/p>\n That risk is real. Multi-year contracts with Hyundai Rotem, Hanwha, and Babcock all require stable budget commitments. The finance ministry projects defence spending will peak at 5.2 per cent of GDP in 2028 before sliding to 4.0 per cent by 2035. If that slide accelerates through recession, election-cycle populism, or EU cohesion-fund cuts, half-finished programmes could leave capability gaps worse than today\u2019s.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/whatsapp-image-2026-09-09-at-085717-1024x651.jpeg\")
Source: NATO Country Assessment, Tier 1<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/whatsapp-image-2026-09-09-at-085633-1024x556.jpeg\")
Source: NATO Country Assessment, Tier 1<\/p>\n