{"id":21745,"date":"2026-02-23T10:49:12","date_gmt":"2026-02-23T10:49:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/21745\/"},"modified":"2026-02-23T10:49:12","modified_gmt":"2026-02-23T10:49:12","slug":"calm-in-minsk-growing-unease-in-vilnius","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/21745\/","title":{"rendered":"Calm in Minsk, growing unease in Vilnius"},"content":{"rendered":"

The first reports that former 2020 Belarusian presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was planning to move from Vilnius to Warsaw appeared late last year \u2014 after the government of the Republic of Lithuania downgraded the security level of her office on October 1.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Previously, her security had been provided by the State Protection Service, but these functions were later transferred to the Criminal Police Bureau \u2014 on par with the protection of witnesses in criminal cases. As a result, Tsikhanouskaya\u2019s office temporarily suspended operations, allegedly due to the lack of adequate security guarantees. At the same time, no real threats or incidents related to the office were recorded either during that period or before.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Tsikhanouskaya sent a letter to Prime Minister Inga Ruginien\u0117 but received no response. She also held a series of meetings with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President\u2019s office in Lithuania, but these did not yield any results.<\/p>\n

For a long time, Tsikhanouskaya\u2019s office neither confirmed nor denied information about a possible relocation. By February 2026, it became known that the \u201cdemocratic leader,\u201d together with her closest associates, was indeed moving to the Polish capital. The Vilnius office will continue to operate, but only in a supporting role. In Warsaw, the structure is expected to be located in the \u201cBelarusian House\u201d at Saska K\u0119pa \u2014 in the building of the former residence of the Tunisian ambassador. Tsikhanouskaya also stated that in the future she intends to \u201cpermanently settle in Warsaw\u201d with her husband, Sergei Tikhanovsky, and their children. Meanwhile, her Vilnius office had diplomatic accreditation, whereas in Warsaw she will hold only guest status.<\/p>\n

Security worth a million<\/p>\n

What prompted this reshuffle? Tsikhanouskaya\u2019s office mainly cites technical issues related to security provision. According to them, recently the protection was reduced to simply giving the \u201cleader\u201d a police phone to call \u201cif anything happens.\u201d Physical security, they claim, was not provided due to a shortage of personnel.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Tsikhanouskaya avoids giving detailed explanations for the change in attitude toward her by the Lithuanian authorities. \u201cShe does not go into details and evades questions about the reasons for the Vilnius authorities\u2019 decision,\u201d reports <\/a>Rzeczpospolita, whose journalist interviewed her regarding the relocation to Poland.<\/p>\n

Why did this happen? Lithuanian authorities explain that the decision to reduce her security level was made after assessing the actual threat situation. In addition, providing presidential-level protection to a foreign opposition figure, according to them, contradicts the Lithuanian Constitution.<\/p>\n

Among the explanations circulating in opposition circles are more down-to-earth theories. Some suggest that the Lithuanian government simply ran out of funds. As reported by LRT <\/a>in early October 2025, Lithuania spends around \u20ac1 million annually on the 24-hour security of the Belarusian opposition leader, including transport and accommodation. Could cost-cutting have played a role in the decision? This is especially plausible given Lithuania\u2019s spending on rearmament and preparations for a potential military scenario involving Russia and Belarus. Another possibility is that the government\u2019s willingness to invest resources in the Belarusian opposition\u2014which has so far shown very limited effectiveness\u2014may simply have been exhausted.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Tsikhanouskaya\u2019s political influence \u2014 along with that of her team \u2014 continues to shrink, literally \u201clike a shagreen leather.\u201d She has long lacked support inside Belarus. At the same time, she, or rather her \u201cgrey cardinal\u201d Franak Via\u010dorka, still attract the attention of Western leaders and foundations. However, even in this sphere, they now face serious competitors.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

The reference is to Maria Kolesnikova, recently pardoned by the President of Belarus, who has in recent months been actively promoting proposals to lift sanctions and establish dialogue between the EU and Minsk. Behind Kolesnikova stands another former presidential candidate \u2014 also recently released \u2014 former banker Viktor Babaryka, as well as circles of German and broader European business and NGOs interested in returning to the Belarusian market. Her initiatives may also align with the expectations of certain Belarusian business groups seeking rapprochement with the West.<\/p>\n

An additional factor has been the intensification of negotiations between Minsk and the administration of US President Donald Trump. As a result of these contacts, a group of individuals convicted over the events of 2020 was released, and some sanctions were partially eased. Belarus received an invitation and officially became one of the founding members of the Board of Peace established by Trump.<\/p>\n

In this context, some observers suggest that the Lithuanian government may be seeking to move Tsikhanouskaya out of Vilnius so that her presence does not complicate a potential normalisation of relations with Minsk. Some more radical representatives of the Belarusian opposition have already accused the Lithuanian authorities of intending to \u201cstrike a deal with Lukashenko.\u201d However, this version sits uneasily with Lithuania\u2019s recent unfriendly steps, including the closure of border crossings with Belarus.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

It is telling that, while failing to respond to Tsikhanouskaya\u2019s letters, Lithuanian Prime Minister Inga Ruginien\u0117 held a meeting with Maria Kolesnikova on February 3. During the discussion, the pardoned opposition figure urged support for Trump\u2019s policy toward Belarus and called for the restoration of railway links between Vilnius and Minsk.<\/p>\n

Tsikhanouskaya\u2019s office, by contrast, continues to insist on maintaining sanctions and increasing pressure on Minsk. Another opposition figure, former Culture Minister Pavel Latushko, has taken an equally hard line:\u201cWe ask our European partners not to talk to Lukashenko without us and not to make decisions concerning Belarus without our participation. Nothing about us without us. This would not only be a major betrayal, but also a pointless act\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n

In effect, these statements contain veiled criticism of Trump\u2019s policy: his special envoy, John Coale, is conducting negotiations with Alexander Lukashenko without the participation of the Belarusian opposition or EU representatives.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

On the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, Tsikhanouskaya gave an interview to Politico, stating that Trump \u201cshould not be obstructed\u201d and acknowledging his Belarus policy as effective. At the same time, she stressed: \u201cWe ask Europe not to copy President Trump\u2019s policy.\u201d In her logic, Trump plays the role of the \u201cgood cop\u201d for Belarus, while the EU should remain the \u201cbad cop\u201d \u2014 although previously the distribution of roles had been interpreted differently. At the same time, her position effectively diverges from Trump\u2019s course: she demands the release of political prisoners without lifting sanctions and without ending isolation measures.<\/p>\n

The day before, a meeting took place in Berlin between Tsikhanouskaya and her advisers and Maria Kolesnikova and Viktor Babaryka. The sides were likely attempting to formulate a common line \u2014 or at least clarify the differences between the two centres of gravity within the Belarusian opposition.<\/p>\n

\u201cLitvins\u201d against Lithuania<\/p>\n

The most probable reason for the shift in attitude toward the \u201cexiled\u201d Belarusians appears to be tensions triggered by the rise of Belarusian nationalism in Lithuania. And this concerns not only individual radicals or marginal groups.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

In 2025, Tsikhanouskaya\u2019s office initiated the issuance of the so-called \u201cNew Belarus\u201d passports. The campaign was largely symbolic and PR-driven, as no country in the world recognises these documents. However, what drew particular attention in Lithuania was something else: the passports featured the coat of arms of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania \u2014 an armed horseman. In Belarus, the symbol is known as the \u201cPahonia\u201d; in Lithuania, as the \u201cVytis.\u201d Today, it is the state emblem of the Republic of Lithuania; in Belarus, it served as the national coat of arms from 1991 to 1995. The renewed use of this symbol once again caused irritation in Lithuania, where it is perceived as part of the country\u2019s own national identity.<\/p>\n

Yet the issue goes beyond heraldic disputes. Radical representatives of Belarusian nationalism lay claim not only to historical heritage but also to interpretations of territorial questions. In addition, Lithuanian authorities face objective strain due to the presence of a sizeable Belarusian diaspora in a relatively small country.<\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, Tsikhanouskaya stated in an interview with The Times that Minsk and Moscow were behind the \u201csudden revival of a little-known historical conspiracy theory\u2026 that the medieval Lithuanian empire was in fact Slavic.\u201d She was referring to the concept of so-called \u201clitvinism,\u201d according to which the Grand Duchy of Lithuania \u2014 encompassing the territories of present-day Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine \u2014 was allegedly an exclusively \u201cBelarusian state.\u201d<\/p>\n

However, this theory is promoted not by the official structures of the Republic of Belarus, but by representatives of the Belarusian nationalist opposition.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

At the origins of litvinism stood Mikola (Nikolai) Yermalovich, one of the founders of the nationalist Belarusian Popular Front (BNF). The first congress of the BNF took place in Vilnius in 1989. Yermalovich advanced the thesis that modern Lithuanians were allegedly not the \u201ctrue Lithuanians,\u201d but rather Samogitians and Auk\u0161taitians (\u201cLietuviai\u201d), while the \u201cgenuine Litvins\u201d were supposedly Belarusians \u2014 claimed to have been the state-forming people of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL).<\/p>\n

Within this framework, it was argued that Vilnius was in fact \u201cBelarusian Vilnia,\u201d that the ancestors of today\u2019s Belarusians had allegedly conquered the territory of present-day Lithuania \u2014 rather than the other way around \u2014 and other controversial historical interpretations were put forward.<\/p>\n

Such radical ideas of litvinism are not supported by official Belarusian historiography. In the state interpretation, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is viewed as a Lithuanian-Belarusian polity: while Old Belarusian was indeed used in official record-keeping, the duchy\u2019s legacy is recognised as shared by both nations. Official Minsk has also never advanced territorial claims against Lithuania.<\/p>\n

In 2024, the Lithuanian State Security Department noted <\/a>in its National Threat Assessment report: \u201cPublic statements by followers of litvinism, a radical branch of Belarusian chauvinism, are being disseminated in Lithuania\u2019s information space. These individuals deny the Baltic origin of the rulers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and question the belonging of the Vilnius region to the Republic of Lithuania. Some followers of litvinism residing in Lithuania actively promote their ideological views on social media. A broader spread of these views among the Belarusian diaspora in Lithuania would harm their integration into Lithuanian society and contribute to rising ethnic tensions\u2026\u201d<\/p>\n

The issue of litvinism has also been discussed in the Seimas of Lithuania. At the same time, within Lithuanian political discourse, suggestions have been voiced about a possible Polish factor in the spread of this concept.<\/p>\n

Andrei Kazakevich, a lecturer at Vytautas Magnus University residing in Lithuania, was accused of promoting litvinism on his YouTube channel. He has been sentenced in absentia in Belarus in connection with the Tsikhanouskaya case. Employees of the Belarusian opposition outlet Belsat \u2014 linked to Polish state structures \u2014 have also faced similar accusations.<\/p>\n

According to some estimates, around 60,000 Belarusians reside in Vilnius. Organisations of a Belarusian nationalist orientation also operate in Lithuania, including those united under a structure known as \u201cPospolite Ruszenie.\u201d<\/p>\n

At the same time, the ideas of litvinism face opposition from Lithuanian right-wing radical movements. Specialised \u201canti-litvin\u201d resources exist on social media. The decision to downgrade the security of Tsikhanouskaya\u2019s office was preceded by a campaign organised by local nationalists. In August 2025, a protest took place in Vilnius outside the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demanding the revocation of the \u201cprivileges granted to the Tsikhanousky family,\u201d under the slogan \u201cLeave, Tsikhanouskaya!\u201d The organiser of the rally was Vytautas Sinica, a member of the Seimas from the ultra-right National Alliance party.<\/p>\n

Among the grievances raised against Tsikhanouskaya was her failure to provide an unequivocal assessment of the ideology of litvinism. Lithuanian media also reported that some Belarusians residing in Vilnius expressed dissatisfaction that their position was not being reflected or acknowledged by Tsikhanouskaya\u2019s office.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The first reports that former 2020 Belarusian presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was planning to move from Vilnius to…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":21746,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[93],"tags":[2526,2532,2531,2527,2530,2525,2529,171,2528,2524,170],"class_list":{"0":"post-21745","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-vilnius","8":"tag-analysis-of-azerbaijan","9":"tag-azerbaijan","10":"tag-baku","11":"tag-important-news-of-azerbaijan","12":"tag-international-experts","13":"tag-interviews","14":"tag-interviews-with-azerbaijani-analysts","15":"tag-lithuania","16":"tag-news-from-baku","17":"tag-news-of-azerbaijan","18":"tag-vilnius"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21745","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=21745"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21745\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/21746"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=21745"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=21745"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=21745"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}