{"id":6307,"date":"2026-02-09T11:08:09","date_gmt":"2026-02-09T11:08:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/6307\/"},"modified":"2026-02-09T11:08:09","modified_gmt":"2026-02-09T11:08:09","slug":"moscow-sees-opportunity-in-greenland-crisis-but-fears-expanded-us-arctic-presence","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/6307\/","title":{"rendered":"Moscow sees opportunity in Greenland crisis, but fears expanded US Arctic presence"},"content":{"rendered":"

BERLIN \u2014 The Trump administration\u2019s push to acquire Greenland<\/a> has produced a carefully calibrated response from Moscow. An air of restraint in public comments masks more private concern over potential threats to Russian submarine operations, combined with satisfaction at widening cracks in the transatlantic alliance, according to analysts.<\/p>\n

Russian officials and policy experts described the crisis as a double-edged sword, validating Moscow\u2019s position on the primacy of power projection over international law, while potentially enabling a major expansion of U.S. military infrastructure in waters critical to Russia\u2019s strategic deterrent.<\/p>\n

\u201cOne of the most evident conclusions made here in Moscow by many politicians and analysts is that in this emerging world order, which is replacing the old one, might makes right, whether we like it or not,\u201d said Andrey Kortunov, an expert with the Valdai Discussion Club and former director general of the Russian International Affairs Council. \u201cIt\u2019s not about norms, but rather about your capabilities to achieve the goals you set for yourself.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Greenland episode<\/a> represents \u201can entirely different level of realpolitik we haven\u2019t seen arguably since the Suez crisis of 1956,\u201d Kortunov added in an interview, noting that Trump targeted U.S. allies rather than adversaries. In the 50s, the United States intervened against its close allies Britain, France and Israel to stop an invasion of Egypt.<\/p>\n

Strategic submarine access at risk<\/p>\n

Beyond the geopolitical symbolism, Russian military planners harbor concrete concerns about what an enhanced U.S. presence in Greenland could mean for naval operations in the Atlantic.<\/p>\n

\u201cIf the U.S. is really serious about upgrading the military infrastructure in Greenland, that might create certain problems for the Russian navy, especially if we are talking about strategic submarines located in the Barents Sea,\u201d Kortunov said. \u201cThey might be denied free access to the North Atlantic Ocean.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Russia\u2019s Northern Fleet operates ballistic missile submarines from bases on the Kola Peninsula, with access to the Atlantic through the Norwegian Sea being a critical element of Moscow\u2019s nuclear deterrent. Expanded U.S. surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capabilities operating from Greenland could complicate those operations.<\/p>\n

Vladimir Barbin, Russia\u2019s ambassador to Denmark, warned in January that \u201cattempts to ensure U.S. national security at the expense of the interests of other nations may result in further deterioration of the situation in the Arctic, which Russia will take into account in its military planning.\u201d<\/p>\n

Alexander Vorotnikov, an Arctic researcher at Russia\u2019s Presidential Academy, separately warned that U.S. control over Greenland \u201cmay negatively affect the development\u201d of Russia\u2019s Northern Sea Route.<\/p>\n

Russia has sought to position itself as a key player in Arctic commercial shipping, which is becoming a more viable and cost-effective way to connect Asia to Europe as global warming melts polar ice caps. The Northern Sea Route is one of the primary connections that may become a competitor to traditional routes through the Suez Canal. <\/p>\n

Restrained but watchful<\/p>\n

Official Russian statements have maintained studied neutrality while emphasizing Moscow\u2019s Arctic interests and criticizing the U.S. for undermining international norms, echoing similar statements by Washington around Russia\u2019s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. <\/p>\n

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov called Trump\u2019s Greenland push \u201cextraordinary from the perspective of international law\u201d and noted Trump \u201chas indicated international law is not for him.\u201d Russian officials are \u201cmonitoring this rather significant development attentively,\u201d Peskov said in early January 2025, a year before the peak of the recent crisis, though he added it was \u201cconfined to rhetoric\u201d at the time.<\/p>\n

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A year later, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov changed the Russian government\u2019s tone somewhat, asserting that \u201cGreenland is not inherently a part of Denmark\u201d and that Danish governance represents a \u201cremnant of colonial history.\u201d However, Lavrov also pushed back against the Trump administration\u2019s claims of Russian threats to Greenland, which were used by the White House to justify a move on the island, saying \u201cwe have no connection to that.\u201d<\/p>\n

President Vladimir Putin has largely stayed above the fray, with Kortunov noting that the official line remains: \u201cThis is not our problem, it\u2019s a problem between the U.S. and Europe, and it\u2019s up to them to fix it.\u201d<\/p>\n

Russian experts generally dismissed Trump administration assertions about Chinese and Russian naval threats to Greenland as pretexts for expansion.<\/p>\n

\u201cI think we should take it with a grain of salt. I don\u2019t see any actual evidence that would support this statement,\u201d Kortunov said of the claim from the White House that the seas around Greenland were \u201cswarming\u201d with Russian and Chinese ships. \u201cGreenland is not a part of Russia\u2019s sphere of interest.\u201d<\/p>\n

Konstantin Blokhin, an analyst with the Center for Studies of Security Problems at the Russian Academy of Science, characterized Trump\u2019s rhetoric as \u201cprobably less about the purchase [of Greenland] than beginning negotiations with Denmark about hammering out better conditions for deployment of American military infrastructure\u201d \u2014 calling it \u201ca classic negotiation technique.\u201d<\/p>\n

Transatlantic divisions as a strategic win<\/p>\n

Seeing deep rifts among the Kremlin\u2019s key foreign adversaries manifest so quickly is sure to have sparked at least some feelings of glee in Moscow. Analysts and commentators see the crisis as validation of Moscow\u2019s long-term strategic bet on Western disunity.<\/p>\n

\"\"U.S. Vice President JD Vance tours the U.S. military’s Pituffik Space Base in Greenland on March 28, 2025. (Photo by Jim Watson\/POOL\/AFP via Getty Images)<\/p>\n

\u201cAt least in the situational sense, this conflict can play into the Kremlin\u2019s hands,\u201d Kortunov said. \u201cMany [in Moscow] believe that Trump is crossing certain red lines, but at the same time, if it is a crisis that can weaken NATO, then why should Russia stand for NATO unity?\u201d<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s foreign minister Lavrov himself framed the dispute as posing a \u201cdeep crisis for NATO\u201d that raises questions about \u201cthe alliance\u2019s preservation as a single military-political bloc.\u201d<\/p>\n

The episode also feeds Russian narratives about spheres of influence, with some Moscow voices noting that if the U.S. can invoke the Monroe Doctrine to justify claims over Greenland, Russia\u2019s assertions about its \u201cnear abroad\u201d gain legitimacy. Barbin, the Russian ambassador to Denmark, specifically noted that the updated U.S. National Security Strategy \u201crevives the Monroe Doctrine, providing for U.S. responsibility for the situation in the Western Hemisphere.\u201d<\/p>\n

However, Kortunov cautioned that the crisis also reveals the limits of the multipolar world that Russian strategists and policy thinkers have long predicted. Europe\u2019s inability to deter potential U.S. actions demonstrates \u201cthe EU is not an independent global center of power; it is still too dependent on the United States,\u201d he said. The multipolar world order oft-professed in Russian academic papers is still in the making, the takeaway is. <\/p>\n

Indeed, a common line in many Russian policy papers is that a geopolitically independent Europe may find that many of its interests align more closely with Russia than with the United States. Both sides have things to offer that the other side needs, and the EU was Russia\u2019s largest trading partner before imposition of sanctions in the aftermath of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. <\/p>\n

Arctic militarization likely to intensify<\/p>\n

While official responses downplayed the significance of the Greenland spat to Moscow\u2019s interests, the episode may have accelerated Russian military investments in the Arctic.<\/p>\n

\u201cI can imagine that this crisis might be yet another motivation to invest heavier in the Arctic region of the Russian Federation just to secure Russia against various uncertainties and potential problems looming on the horizon,\u201d Kortunov said. \u201cThere are people who suggested that in a couple of years from now the Arctic strategy of the U.S. might constitute a formidable challenge to the Russian Federation.\u201d<\/p>\n

Ilya Kravchenko, director of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, said that \u201cit is now a pervasive opinion in Washington that the Arctic region should be developed much more intensively to hinder Russia\u2019s advancements.\u201d<\/p>\n

Russia has already invested heavily in Arctic military infrastructure over the past decade, reopening Soviet-era bases and deploying new air-defense and coastal-defense systems across its northern coastline. Russia\u2019s Arctic coastline constitutes more than 40 percent of the global total, and the region hosts more residents than all other Arctic nations combined. Several major Russian cities lie within the Arctic Circle.<\/p>\n

Northern Sea Route tensions <\/p>\n

Beyond immediate military concerns, Russian strategists worry about future conflicts over Arctic maritime routes as climate change opens new passages.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere is a controversy about the Northern Sea Route, because Russia claims ownership of large areas of the Arctic Ocean and considers the Northern Sea Route as legally Russia\u2019s domestic [transportation link],\u201d Kortunov said. \u201cWith the Arctic ice melting, with the U.S. settled in Greenland, there might be a contradiction between U.S. intentions to find alternative routes and the Russian claims on these parts of the ocean.\u201d<\/p>\n

Moscow has long insisted the Northern Sea Route \u2014 running along Russia\u2019s Arctic coast from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait \u2014 falls under Russian jurisdiction, requiring foreign vessels to seek permission and pay fees for passage. Western nations contest this interpretation, viewing much of the route as international waters.<\/p>\n

Mixed views on cooperation<\/p>\n

Despite the tensions, some Russian experts also see potential for cooperation if the U.S. becomes more invested in Arctic governance.<\/p>\n

\u201cIf the U.S. were to become a true Arctic nation with strategic interests in this part of the world, that might constitute certain opportunities for cooperation between Moscow and Washington,\u201d Kortunov said, citing resource exploration, climate change management and indigenous peoples\u2019 issues.<\/p>\n

Work of the Arctic Council \u2013 a forum for regional stakeholders established in 1996 \u2013 has been \u201cat least partially paralyzed\u201d since 2022, he noted. Moscow may view expanded U.S. Arctic engagement as an opening for alternative dialogue channels.<\/p>\n

However, that scenario depends on avoiding what Kortunov described as the \u201cdanger that the Arctic region will be sucked into this geopolitical competition<\/a>,\u201d which \u201cwould clearly be detrimental to the future of the region.\u201d<\/p>\n

Russian officials have called for maintaining Arctic cooperation despite broader geopolitical tensions. Moscow\u2019s ambassador in Oslo in 2025 urged policy \u201con the basis of international law, the principles of mutual consideration of interests, and inclusive dialogue.\u201d<\/p>\n

Russian views on Trump remain divided<\/p>\n

The Greenland crisis has not produced consensus in Moscow about Trump\u2019s presidency, with commentators split between those who see him as a potential partner and those who view him as an unpredictable threat.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere are many Trump fans who believe Trump is a great guy who was able to stand up against neoliberalism, and basically he defends traditional values and therefore he is a natural ally,\u201d Kortunov said. \u201cAnd there is another group of people who are very critical of Trump \u2014 who see him as a typical Yankee billionaire who goes after independent nations and constitutes a more serious threat to the Russian Federation than, for example, Biden did before.\u201d<\/p>\n

This division extends to debates over spheres of influence, with some arguing that major powers have the right to dominate their neighbors, while others advocate a more restrained approach that balances smaller nations\u2019 sovereignty with great-power security concerns, Kortunov explained.<\/p>\n

The ultimate Russian verdict on the U.S. president, Kortunov said, \u201cwill depend on whether Trump is instrumental in his attempts to end the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. I think that will be the decisive factor in how Moscow ultimately views the Trump presidency.\u201d<\/p>\n

Linus H\u00f6ller is Defense News’ Europe correspondent and OSINT investigator. He reports on the arms deals, sanctions, and geopolitics shaping Europe and the world. He holds a master\u2019s degrees in WMD nonproliferation, terrorism studies, and international relations, and works in four languages: English, German, Russian, and Spanish.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"BERLIN \u2014 The Trump administration\u2019s push to acquire Greenland has produced a carefully calibrated response from Moscow. An…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":6308,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[5598,4224,4225,26,4220,57,5599,3561,238,75],"class_list":{"0":"post-6307","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-greenland","8":"tag-artic","9":"tag-circulated-defense-news","10":"tag-defense-news","11":"tag-denmark","12":"tag-dn-dnr","13":"tag-greenland","14":"tag-kola-peninsula","15":"tag-putin","16":"tag-russia","17":"tag-trump"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6307","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6307"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6307\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6308"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6307"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6307"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6307"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}