{"id":73713,"date":"2026-05-03T05:50:14","date_gmt":"2026-05-03T05:50:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/73713\/"},"modified":"2026-05-03T05:50:14","modified_gmt":"2026-05-03T05:50:14","slug":"closed-europe-turkiyes-geopolitical-weight-and-brussels-double-standards","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/73713\/","title":{"rendered":"Closed Europe – T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s geopolitical weight and Brussels\u2019 double standards"},"content":{"rendered":"

The issue of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s European integration remains an important element of Ankara\u2019s state policy.\u00a0<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

This fact was once again confirmed by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in his\u00a0statements <\/a>at a joint press conference with Austrian Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger in Vienna.<\/p>\n

In particular, the Turkish Foreign Minister emphasised that T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s accession to the European Union is delayed \u201cnot due to technical criteria, but due to a lack of political will, which was effectively destroyed by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007.\u201d He stated: \u201cThe European political will, previously articulated by Schr\u00f6der [former German Chancellor Gerhard Schr\u00f6der] and Chirac [former French President Jacques Chirac], was dismantled with the arrival of Sarkozy.\u201d<\/p>\n

To support Hakan Fidan\u2019s remarks, it is worth recalling the history of Turkish-French relations during Sarkozy\u2019s presidency in 2007\u20132012. As head of state and leader of the Union for a Popular Movement (later The Republicans), he adopted a clearly radical position based on the slogan \u201cNo to T\u00fcrkiye in the EU.\u201d Under his leadership, France blocked the opening of 5 out of 33 key chapters in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s accession negotiations with the European Union.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Instead of full membership, Sarkozy proposed an alternative of a \u201cprivileged partnership,\u201d arguing that T\u00fcrkiye belongs to Asia Minor rather than Europe, and also called on Ankara to open its ports to Cyprus vessels. As a result, the policies of the then-French leader led to the accession talks launched in 2005 becoming effectively deadlocked by 2010\u20132011 and ultimately being frozen by 2016.<\/p>\n

The position of subsequent leaders of the Fifth Republic is also quite revealing in this regard. For example, Fran\u00e7ois Hollande (2012\u20132017) adopted a more moderate stance; during the 2015\u20132016 migration crisis, he supported negotiations with T\u00fcrkiye, but set strict conditions: visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens would only be possible if Ankara fulfilled all 72 technical EU criteria. In other words, he was not as categorical opponent of dialogue as Sarkozy, but neither was he an active supporter of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s rapid accession.<\/p>\n

The current President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly expressed a sceptical attitude toward T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s accession to the European Union, openly stating that he sees no prospects for progress in this process and instead suggesting that full membership be replaced with a strategic partnership.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Referring back to Hakan Fidan\u2019s statements, it is worth noting that he not only pointed to the lack of political will within the EU, but also delivered an important message to the \u201cguardians of democratic values\u201d that the need to reconsider the European security architecture is pushing T\u00fcrkiye and Europe toward closer cooperation. As he stated: \u201cIssues such as the Russian-Ukrainian war, developments in the Middle East, and energy security compel us to act together.\u201d<\/p>\n

So, what exactly does the European Union want from T\u00fcrkiye, and what is truly obstructing the Turkish EU integration process? It can be assumed that, in this context, the most irritating factor for Brussels is Ankara\u2019s independent foreign policy course, oriented toward national interests, as well as T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s multi-vector diplomacy, based on maintaining balanced relations with various global centres of power.<\/p>\n

A second key aspect is undoubtedly T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s position on the Cyprus issue, where the EU adopts a diametrically opposite stance, supporting the Republic of Cyprus, which, notably, is already a member of the European Union.<\/p>\n

Thirdly, a further obstacle for Ankara on its path toward EU membership is the sceptical and often biased stance not only of the Fifth Republic, but also of such EU heavyweights as Germany and Austria, which view with considerable reservations the prospect of a major representative of the Muslim world becoming a full member of the European family. In September 2023, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer even called for the complete termination of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s EU accession talks, stating <\/a>that they \u201ccannot imagine\u201d full membership for Ankara.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Fourthly, both Brussels and the major European capitals\u2014Paris, Berlin, and others\u2014are increasingly concerned about T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s growing geopolitical significance. They clearly understand that in the event of escalating conflicts in the Black Sea region or the Middle East, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s role within the European security architecture would increase dramatically. This is due to several factors: the country controls the strategically vital Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, possesses one of the largest armies among NATO members, and serves as a key ally of the alliance on its southeastern flank. In addition, T\u00fcrkiye functions as a buffer against migration flows originating from Syria, Africa, and Afghanistan and heading toward Europe.<\/p>\n

Thus, taking the above factors into account, it can be assumed that in the short and medium term European countries will continue their current approach: keeping the doors of the European Union for T\u00fcrkiye only half-open, while substituting full membership with the concept of \u201cdeepened partnership.\u201d<\/p>\n

However, today\u2019s tectonic shifts in the international political system are unlikely to allow the Old Continent to maintain this approach for long. In turn, Ankara does not appear willing to remain in a state of endless waiting for a revival of \u201cEuropean political will,\u201d especially as President Erdo\u011fan stated in his address to parliament in 2023: \u201cT\u00fcrkiye will no longer accept the conditions and requirements for EU membership set by Brussels. We have fulfilled all the promises made to the EU, but they have failed to fulfil almost any of theirs.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The issue of T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s European integration remains an important element of Ankara\u2019s state policy.\u00a0 This fact was once…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":73714,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[104],"tags":[2526,2532,2531,211,210,2527,2530,2525,2529,2528,2524],"class_list":{"0":"post-73713","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-brussels","8":"tag-analysis-of-azerbaijan","9":"tag-azerbaijan","10":"tag-baku","11":"tag-belgium","12":"tag-brussels","13":"tag-important-news-of-azerbaijan","14":"tag-international-experts","15":"tag-interviews","16":"tag-interviews-with-azerbaijani-analysts","17":"tag-news-from-baku","18":"tag-news-of-azerbaijan"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@dk\/116509083491094694","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73713","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=73713"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/73713\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/73714"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=73713"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=73713"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/dk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=73713"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}