{"id":1925,"date":"2026-04-03T09:16:08","date_gmt":"2026-04-03T09:16:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/1925\/"},"modified":"2026-04-03T09:16:08","modified_gmt":"2026-04-03T09:16:08","slug":"which-one-works-better-with-trump-euobserver","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/1925\/","title":{"rendered":"which one works better with Trump? \u2013 EUobserver"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dealing with a patron on whose protection you depend is, by definition, a tightrope walk. <\/p>\n

Since the beginning of US president Donald Trump\u2019s second term in January 2025, the guardrail of European leaders\u2019 engagement with the president has broadly been to contain escalation in order to preserve the US security umbrella while Europe builds up its own defence capabilities. <\/p>\n

The widely-cited timeline for that build-up ranges between five and 10 years, under optimistic assumptions. <\/p>\n

Yet as international security unravels rapidly and Europe\u2019s de-escalation strategy falters, questions are mounting over whether this guardrail can \u2014 or should \u2014 be sustained.<\/p>\n

At one end of the spectrum stands Pedro S\u00e1nchez.<\/p>\n

The Spanish prime minister has emerged as the clearest proponent of a more outspoken and defiant approach. <\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

At the other end \u2014 despite his different role and mandate \u2014 Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte has become the reluctant symbol of accommodating flattery<\/a>. <\/p>\n

In practice, European policy has been more nuanced, combining a mix of deterrence, carefully managed dependence on Nato, and selective disagreement with Washington. <\/p>\n

Still, both S\u00e1nchez\u2019s public defiance and Rutte\u2019s careful appeasement have sparked intense debate across European capitals.<\/p>\n

Throughout Trump\u2019s second term, Europe has largely pursued de-escalation and diplomatic restraint. There is little evidence that this has meaningfully constrained Trump\u2019s behaviour or shaped US policy in Europe\u2019s favour.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

There is, however, more visible evidence of failed attempts at appeasement and ineffective de-escalatory diplomacy.<\/p>\n

It is true that the worst-case scenarios \u2014 a formal transatlantic rupture, a US withdrawal from Nato<\/a>, the collapse of the US security guarantee \u2014 have not happened.<\/p>\n

Yet appeasement has not prevented Trump from temporarily suspending military aid to Ukraine, repeatedly threatening sweeping tariffs on European exports, or even suggesting the use of force to annex the sovereign territory of a Nato ally \u2013 Greenland. Most recently, it has not prevented the United States from launching a military operation against Iran that risks undermining European security, empowering the Kremlin, and potentially triggering a global economic downturn.<\/p>\n

S\u00e1nchez confrontational approach<\/p>\n

Has S\u00e1nchez\u2019s more confrontational approach delivered better results?<\/p>\n

Over the past year, he has diametrically opposed US preferences on key issues \u2013 from Nato\u2019s five-percent spending target to the Gaza war, US tariffs, and most recently the Iran conflict, denying the US the use of its military bases. <\/p>\n

In response, Trump repeatedly lashed out at Madrid, even threatening to \u201cend all trade with Spain\u201d \u2014 in the presence of a German chancellor Friedrich Merz, in full appeasement mode, who was widely criticised for not speaking up.<\/p>\n

Arguably, Spain is less vulnerable with regard to US security guarantees than central and eastern Europeans, and as an EU member, it benefits from the Union\u2019s competence over trade policy, which constrains Washington\u2019s ability to target it unilaterally.<\/p>\n

Many in European capitals quietly sympathise and are watching closely.<\/p>\n

Some argue that fundamental changes in the international order require a Europe with spine and values and sustain that Trump ultimately respects assertive leadership. <\/p>\n

Others resent S\u00e1nchez\u2019s forays as domestically driven grandstanding that risks European cohesion,\u00a0 and point to Germany\u2019s enhanced defence spending as far more consequential to European empowerment than public finger-pointing.<\/p>\n

So far, however, none of Trump\u2019s threats or other game-changing reprimands towards Spain have materialised. Whether that reflects the limits of US coercion or simply a lag in escalation remains unclear.<\/p>\n

Hardening attitudes, and a turning point<\/p>\n

Across Europe, the rapid succession of transatlantic crises has gradually hardened attitudes. <\/p>\n

While European governments still absorbed Trump\u2019s tariff blitz last summer in an effort to preserve the relationship, the Greenland crisis marked a turning point. Not only did Europeans utterly fail to avoid escalation; the explicit threat by a sitting US president to seize allied territory by force was a strategic shock that helped shift the balance toward a more assertive posture, captured in the emerging view that retaliation, not conciliation, may at times better serve European interests. <\/p>\n

Crucially, however, Europe\u2019s response combined calibrated coercion \u2014 credible counter-tariff threats and visible military contingency planning \u2014 with continued diplomatic de-escalatory engagement (including Rutte\u2019s efforts to broker a face-saving off-ramp). <\/p>\n

On Greenland, Europe closed ranks with unusual speed.<\/p>\n

The Iran war is now another inflection point. Despite divisions and faltering in the initial reactions to the US-Israeli operation, Europe\u2019s eventual and firm refusal to participate in US-Israeli combat operations in Iran was a remarkable display of resolve. <\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

The refusal reflected a clear-eyed prioritisation of Europe\u2019s legal, strategic and security interests \u2013 independent of Trump\u2019s preferences. More broadly, it signals a shift in the underlying logic of European decision-making towards a mindset in which Oval Office sensitivities are no longer the primary frame of reference.<\/p>\n

In this light, the debate over whether appeasement \u201cworks\u201d risks missing the larger point. <\/p>\n

More consequential is the erosion of a long-standing, unspoken assumption: that a more self-confident and interest-driven Europe in transatlantic affairs will need to wait until full strategic autonomy in defence is achieved.<\/p>\n

On the shoulders of accumulative experiences of the past year, Europe\u2019s stance in the Iran war suggests that this assumption was a fallacy. Europe is beginning to act on its interests now, not later.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Dealing with a patron on whose protection you depend is, by definition, a tightrope walk. Since the beginning…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":1926,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[762,5,1964,1970,1976,1967,1958,1961,1973,1956,1959,1962,1965,1968,1971,1974,1957,1960,1963,1966,1969,1972,1975],"class_list":{"0":"post-1925","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-germany","8":"tag-typedefinedterm","9":"tag-germany","10":"tag-identifier4277","11":"tag-identifier4279","12":"tag-identifier4313","13":"tag-identifier4385","14":"tag-identifier4391","15":"tag-identifier4401","16":"tag-identifier4432","17":"tag-namedefence","18":"tag-nameeu-and-the-world","19":"tag-namegermany","20":"tag-namenato","21":"tag-namespain","22":"tag-nametrump","23":"tag-nameus","24":"tag-termcodedefence","25":"tag-termcodeeu-and-the-world","26":"tag-termcodegermany","27":"tag-termcodenato","28":"tag-termcodespain","29":"tag-termcodetrump","30":"tag-termcodeus"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1925","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1925"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1925\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1926"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1925"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1925"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1925"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}