{"id":5983,"date":"2026-04-20T13:38:07","date_gmt":"2026-04-20T13:38:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/5983\/"},"modified":"2026-04-20T13:38:07","modified_gmt":"2026-04-20T13:38:07","slug":"for-germany-the-plot-thickens-toward-a-us-optional-nuclear-deterrent","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/5983\/","title":{"rendered":"For Germany, the plot thickens toward a US-optional nuclear deterrent"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s erratic policies and his disdain for NATO have weakened transatlantic security bonds and eroded trust in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">That is why the German government, and particularly the newly created National Security Council, started early in assessing options for a credible European nuclear deterrence mechanism in addition to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, as long as it holds.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">As Berlin weighs next steps, here is an overview of the various channels through which the conversation about nuclear weapons \u2014 namely those of France and the United Kingdom \u2014 is progressing.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Firstly, the U.K.-France nuclear talks, which have been ongoing since 2010, were taken to a new level with the \u201cNorthwood Declaration\u201d of July 2025. The communiqu\u00e9 put a \u201ccoordination\u201d of both nations\u2019 nuclear forces on the table for the first time.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Secondly, in October 2024, the defense ministers of Germany and the U.K. agreed on a German-British defense cooperation framework, the \u201cTrinity House Agreement,\u201d which was also intended to cover nuclear issues. However, this dialogue is still at a rudimentary stage.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Thirdly, Chancellor Merz and President Macron have agreed on a Franco-German nuclear dialogue. A <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2026\/03\/05\/france-germany-create-panel-to-advance-shared-nuclear-deterrence-plans\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" title=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/global\/europe\/2026\/03\/05\/france-germany-create-panel-to-advance-shared-nuclear-deterrence-plans\/\">high-level Steering Group<\/a> is to conduct regular exchanges on all nuclear-related issues and develop opportunities for cooperation.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">The fourth dialogue to start soon is based on the proposal of Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron to extend the bilateral dialogue to other European NATO member states. Poland, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium and Greece have already expressed interest. Should the U.K., Europe\u2019s second nuclear power, join this initiative, it would result in an all-encompassing European nuclear dialogue modeled on the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">These processes are only just beginning, and the initial focus is on developing a common understanding and formulating shared objectives within the various formats. In this regard, the British-French dialogue differs from the other formats because here two nuclear powers can discuss their respective nuclear doctrines on an equal footing, exchange nuclear-related data, or coordinate their operational principles and targeting.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">The German-British, German-French and multinational dialogues, meanwhile, put their initial focus on the exchange of information and the building of trust between nuclear and non-nuclear states. Such trust is essential when it comes to matters such as the sharing of sensitive data or documents.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">The conversations aren\u2019t merely a dialogue for dialogue\u2019s sake, but rather the development of a credible European deterrent based on the capabilities of France and the U.K. and \u2013 for as long as the U.S. so wishes \u2013 remaining linked to the American nuclear umbrella.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">German considerations in that direction envision the following steps:<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">To begin with, the German-British and German-French dialogues can only be a starting point. Both formats must be expanded to include other European states as soon as possible. Only in this way can potential political reservations be overcome regarding the predominance of a Paris-London-Berlin connection as well as France\u2019s history of a strictly national nuclear policy. Furthermore, representatives from the U.S. and Canada should always be invited to this expanded dialogue to underpin the transatlantic link.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Moreover, the dialogue should initially focus on political issues \u2013 such as the willingness of nuclear states to make a nuclear security pledge to their non-nuclear allies. The U.K. has already done so within the framework of NATO\u2019s \u201cextended deterrence,\u201d while France has consistently opposed this concept and intended its nuclear weapons solely for the protection of its own territory.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Most recently, however, President Emmanuel Macron has proposed an idea of \u201cadvanced deterrence\u201d (dissuasion avanc\u00e9e), thereby cautiously moving toward extended deterrence, albeit without explicitly saying so.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Furthermore, political guidelines could be drawn up for consultations between nuclear powers and their non-nuclear allies in the event of an imminent nuclear strike, as has been the case within NATO since 1962 \u2014 the so called \u201cAthens Guidelines.\u201d This does not restrict the nuclear states\u2019 sole right to decide, but gives the allies the assurance that, in the event of a strike, they will at least be heard.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Non-nuclear states can provide various forms of compensation in return for the nuclear protection afforded to them. These could, for example, take the form of direct financial contributions. In the case of Germany, the Research Service of the German Parliament had already recognized in May 2017 that such nuclear co-financing is legally possible.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Nevertheless, a European nuclear deterrent, however it is structured, also requires adequate conventional defense. Here, Germany, as Europe\u2019s largest economic power, bears a special responsibility. France and the U.K. are equally called upon, as a division of labor between the nuclear-armed states, which are left to focus on strategic forces while the other allies ensure sufficient conventional forces, is not realistic.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">This will require painful steps in London and Paris to establish new financial priorities.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Karl-Heinz Kamp was a special advisor in the German Ministry of Defense and is an associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s erratic policies and his disdain for NATO have weakened transatlantic security bonds and eroded&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":5984,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2042,1326,1327,1322,151,60,5,2336,5878,255,1875],"class_list":{"0":"post-5983","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-germany","8":"tag-canada","9":"tag-circulated-defense-news","10":"tag-defense-news","11":"tag-dn-dnr","12":"tag-europe","13":"tag-france","14":"tag-germany","15":"tag-nuclear-weapons","16":"tag-nuclear-deterrence","17":"tag-trump","18":"tag-uk"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5983","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5983"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5983\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5984"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5983"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5983"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5983"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}