The division of defeated Germany after the Second World War, formalised in Potsdam at the conference of the leaders of the three victorious powers, held from 07\/17\/1945 to 08\/02\/1945 \u2014 the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain, represented by Joseph Stalin, Harry Truman and Winston Churchill \u2014 was quite literally \u201ccemented\u201d on 08\/13\/1961 with the construction of the Berlin Wall.<\/p>\n
That monstrous structure, which split one city in two with concrete, also marked the end of even the appearance of post-war harmony among the victors, dividing the entire world with the sharp edge of the Cold War.<\/p>\n
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Everything happened suddenly and with lightning speed. Even the powerful Western intelligence services, most notably the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and West Germany\u2019s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), failed to uncover the secret plan to build the wall.<\/p>\n
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Ulbricht\u2019s denial and the real intentions<\/p>\n
\u201cNo one has any intention of building a wall,\u201d Walter Ulbricht, the party and state leader of the German Democratic Republic, replied sharply to a question from a journalist of Frankfurter Rundschau at a press conference, asking whether a state border was also planned in Berlin.<\/p>\n
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This happened in mid-June 1961. And at that moment, truly, it did not occur to anyone that Ulbricht meant precisely the opposite of what he had said: that he was in fact preparing to build the wall. That plan would be carried out only two months later, on 08\/13\/1961.<\/p>\n
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The fate of this monstrous structure would, incidentally, be marked by several unusual facts. The wall would disappear suddenly, entirely unexpectedly and overnight, just as it had come into being.<\/p>\n
Its construction was prompted by an avalanche of refugees fleeing from the eastern part of the city to the western part, just as an avalanche of refugees would bring it down twenty-eight years later.<\/p>\n
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It was erected while its political \u201cbuilders\u201d had strong backing from Moscow. It fell when that support from Moscow was no longer there.<\/p>\n
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Just as Germany was divided among the victors into four occupation zones after the war \u2014 including France, which had played a secondary role in Potsdam \u2014 Berlin itself was divided into an eastern sector, held by the Soviets, and a western sector, controlled by the United States, Great Britain and France.<\/p>\n
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The plan to build the wall was made in complete secrecy, within the narrowest circle. It was signed by Walter Ulbricht, on this occasion in his capacity as chairman of the National Defence Council. Its overnight implementation, \u201cOperation X\u201d, was directed by the council\u2019s secretary and Politburo member of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Erich Honecker. He would later become Ulbricht\u2019s successor and, for a long time, the unchallenged leader of East Germany.<\/p>\n
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At midnight, the entire army was ordered to go on heightened combat readiness. That also meant preparing all weapons for possible use.<\/p>\n
At 1am, 3,150 soldiers of the Eighth Motorised Assault Division set off from Schwerin towards the city centre with 100 tanks and 120 armoured personnel carriers. From Potsdam, 4,200 soldiers of the First Motorised Division, with 140 tanks and 200 armoured vehicles, took up positions on the outer \u201cring\u201d around West Berlin.<\/p>\n
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Overnight, mostly only barbed wire was put in place. This would later be replaced by a solid concrete structure: 155 kilometres of concrete slabs, thick and between 2.60 and 3.60 metres high, with a multi-layered security system. It was the most heavily guarded and the most dangerous border in the world: a flashpoint where Cold War tensions often sparked dangerously.<\/p>\n
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A camp in the heart of Berlin<\/p>\n
At 1am, the national news agency Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (ADN) broadcast a statement by the Council of Ministers from a session held on 08\/12\/1961. It stressed that, \u201cin order to thwart hostile activities by revanchist and militarist forces in West Berlin and West Germany\u201d, controls had been introduced at the GDR border, of the kind \u201ccustomary at the borders of every sovereign state\u201d. This included the border with the western sector of Berlin.<\/p>\n
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The police in West Berlin received the first report of the border closure at 2am. They learned that city transport links had been cut. They were also told that heavily armed forces were moving towards the sector crossings, and that under their protection engineering units were already stringing out barbed wire.<\/p>\n
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The West Berlin Senate held an emergency session at 9.30am. In the statement issued afterwards, it \u201cbrought an indictment before the whole world\u201d against unlawful and inhumane measures that were separating Germany, \u201cterrorising East Berlin\u201d and \u201cthreatening West Berlin\u201d.<\/p>\n
The mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt, said that a \u201cconcentration camp wall\u201d had been drawn through the heart of Berlin.<\/p>\n
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Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer addressed the public by radio at 11am. He told the nation, and especially the citizens of West Berlin, that the government in Bonn was \u201ctaking all necessary measures\u201d. He said this was a moment to show \u201cfirmness and resolve\u201d. But above all, peace had to be preserved so as not to \u201cprovoke the East\u201d and worsen the situation.<\/p>\n
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The people of Berlin were dissatisfied, both with the chancellor\u2019s statement and with his conduct in the first and most critical days of the Berlin crisis.<\/p>\n
Brandt was desperately trying to ensure that something more concrete and decisive was done. He attended a meeting of the Western commanders at the American command headquarters. The commanders said they were not authorised to take any action on their own initiative. The procedure for obtaining approval was complicated. Politically, they were subordinate to the foreign ministries of their respective countries; militarily, to their defence ministries. Then came the commander of all allied forces stationed in Germany, and after that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command for Europe.<\/p>\n
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Willy Brandt was disappointed. Another disappointment came from across the Atlantic. After consulting President John Kennedy, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk told him that, according to the information available to them, the measures taken in Berlin were directed against the citizens of East Germany, and not \u201cagainst the position of the allies in West Berlin\u201d. The president had also concluded, and said, that \u201ca wall is not a very nice solution, but it is better than war\u201d.<\/p>\n
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In a letter to Brandt five days after the wall was built, the American president said: \u201cSerious as the matter is, there are no steps available to us that could force a change in the present situation\u201d… He also reminded Brandt: \u201cNeither you nor I, nor any of our allies, can assume responsibility for going to war over this conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n
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Much later, on 06\/29\/1963, Kennedy would try to \u201cimprove the situation\u201d with an improvised, historic speech \u2014 he felt that the prepared text did not suit the atmosphere \u2014 before several hundred thousand citizens of the \u201cclosed\u201d city, appealing to German emotions.<\/p>\n
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And he succeeded, above all thanks to the message and rallying cry, \u201cIch bin ein Berliner\u201d (\u201cI am a Berliner\u201d). The phrase would become historic. His entire speech, and especially that sentence, was understood and accepted as an expression of his strong support for and solidarity with the citizens of West Berlin, the \u201cisland of freedom in a communist sea\u201d.<\/p>\n
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Life across the whole of Berlin had pulsed for years despite the formal division into sectors. Half a million Berliners crossed from east to west and back every day. Many of them held permanent jobs on one side or the other. Almost 30 per cent of students at universities and higher education institutions in West Berlin came from the eastern side.<\/p>\n
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From 08\/13\/1961, all of that was definitively over. Tram and rail traffic was halted. Only one line remained \u201calive\u201d, the one departing from the station at Friedrichstra\u00dfe.<\/p>\n
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The building of the wall finally destroyed the illusion that an undivided city \u2014 in this case Berlin \u2014 could exist and endure within a divided Germany.<\/p>\n
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The anti-Hitler coalition broke up soon after the war. The allies became opponents, and then enemies. The Cold War followed. Out of the occupation zones, two German states emerged in 1949. From the three western zones came the Federal Republic of Germany; from the eastern, Soviet zone came the German Democratic Republic.<\/p>\n
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Two states, two paths<\/p>\n
Unequal in size, the two German states were set, by the dictate of the occupying powers, on different paths. West Germany moved towards capitalism, a market economy and a multi-party system. East Germany moved towards socialism, a centralised planned economy and a one-party system.<\/p>\n
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Thanks to generous assistance, especially from the United States through the famed Marshall Plan, to relatively well-preserved industry, and to free enterprise, what would later become the German \u201ceconomic miracle\u201d emerged in West Germany.<\/p>\n
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Increasingly visible differences developed between the two German states, in ideological, political, economic and military terms. West Germany became a powerful challenge and a strong attraction for East Germans. The migration gathered pace.<\/p>\n
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The avalanche had, in fact, begun even before the creation of the two German states. Between 1945 and 1949, around 4 million people moved from the east to West Germany. Most of them, 80 per cent, went through West Berlin.<\/p>\n
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The exodus continued with undiminished intensity even after the founding of the German Democratic Republic. In a panicked fear that the country might \u201cbleed out\u201d, its leadership resolved on extremely radical steps and measures: the hermetic closure of Berlin. That, however, could not be carried out without Moscow\u2019s consent.<\/p>\n
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Ulbricht asked the Soviet ambassador, Mikhail Pervukhin, to convey the following message to Communist Party General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev: the situation in the country was deteriorating dramatically and an explosion could soon occur.<\/p>\n
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Khrushchev gave the order to build the wall. \u201cThat was my decision,\u201d he said, adding that he did not want to hide \u201cbehind Ulbricht\u2019s weak shoulders\u201d. There had been, he said, only two possibilities: completely halt air traffic with West Berlin or build a wall. The first option, he explained, would have led to a serious conflict with the Americans that could have turned into war. \u201cThat was a risk I could neither take nor allow.\u201d So only the wall remained, one that would \u201cdisappear one day, but only when the reasons that led to its construction disappear\u201d…<\/p>\n
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The word that brought down the wall<\/p>\n
That day would have to wait twenty-eight years. In the summer and autumn of 1989, East Germany was in turmoil. Thousands of its citizens, who had found themselves abroad as tourists, first laid siege to the West German embassies in Prague and Budapest, demanding to be allowed to leave for the West.<\/p>\n
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This was followed by demonstrations on a scale previously unseen in the country. They were particularly large in Leipzig and Berlin. Their main slogan was, at first, \u201cWe are the people\u201d, later supplemented by: \u201cWe are one people.\u201d The first stressed their rights; the second called for reunification.<\/p>\n
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Fearing that this heavily policed state \u2014 with the notorious and all-powerful secret police, the Stasi \u2014 might indeed \u201cexplode\u201d because of its lack of freedom, given that East German citizens could travel only to neighbouring socialist countries, the party leadership was forced to loosen the valve slightly on the \u201cpressure cooker\u201d. Erich Honecker had already fallen under pressure from peaceful but mass demonstrations. The leadership now moved to liberalise travel and departures from the country.<\/p>\n
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After a session of the party\u2019s Central Committee, Politburo member G\u00fcnter Schabowski was meant to announce that decision to a large gathering of domestic and foreign journalists. The press conference at the International Press Centre had been scheduled for 6pm. It had been expected that the Central Committee session would be over by then. It ran late, however.<\/p>\n
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Egon Krenz, Honecker\u2019s successor, handed Schabowski the text of the decision on liberalising travel. Formally, it had been \u201cdrafted\u201d by the government. There are two versions, from the main participants, of what Krenz casually \u201cremarked\u201d to Schabowski before he went to the press conference. Krenz says he told him that it would be \u201cworld news\u201d. Schabowski says: \u201cKrenz only told me, \u2018announce this, it will be a real hit for us\u2019.\u201d<\/p>\n
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After a long and dull account of the agenda of the Central Committee session, Schabowski only \u201cremembered\u201d near the end of the conference the decision he was supposed to communicate to journalists. He said that an important decision had been taken that very day, under pressure from dramatic events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, under which East German citizens would be able to travel abroad through all border crossings into West Germany.<\/p>\n
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A journalist then asked: does this also apply to West Berlin?<\/p>\n
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\u201cYes,\u201d Schabowski replied, \u201cincluding West Berlin.\u201d<\/p>\n
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A new question from a journalist placed the \u201cexplosive charge\u201d under the monstrous concrete structure: when does the decision enter into force?<\/p>\n
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Schabowski, confused and shuffling through his papers, answered: \u201cAs far as I know… immediately. Without delay…\u201d<\/p>\n
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In fact, it had been planned that the decision would be made public the following morning, so that all services, including the border authorities, could be informed in time and prepare themselves.<\/p>\n
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A team from the West Berlin radio station RIAS intercepted Schabowski in the corridor: \u201cDo you now expect a mass exodus?\u201d Schabowski replied: \u201cI hope that will not happen…\u201d<\/p>\n
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But it did. The major world agencies competed over which would be the first to report the sensation. Reuters was first, at 7.03pm: citizens of the German Democratic Republic who wish to do so may leave immediately through all border crossings into the Federal Republic of Germany…<\/p>\n
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A report of the same content followed a second later from West Germany\u2019s Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), and from the Associated Press at 7.05pm.<\/p>\n
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At first uncertain and incredulous, a flood of East Berlin citizens poured towards the border crossings. The stunned, helpless and bewildered border guards had no choice but to lift the barrier. More than 50,000 crossed to the western side that evening, on 11\/09\/1989. They were met with a loud and euphoric welcome.<\/p>\n
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Television broadcasts history<\/p>\n
At that moment, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was on a visit to Poland. His close associate, Eduard Ackermann, told him: \u201cDr Kohl, hold tightly to your chair, citizens of the German Democratic Republic are bringing down the wall…\u201d<\/p>\n
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Kohl replied: \u201cAre you sure, Ackermann? That cannot be. Are you really sure?\u201d<\/p>\n
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Ackermann said: \u201cI am watching it with my own eyes, television is broadcasting everything live…\u201d Kohl answered: \u201cThat is completely unimaginable…\u201d<\/p>\n
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Total astonishment and surprise reigned in both Moscow and Washington. At around 10pm that evening, Gorbachev left the empty Kremlin and drove to his dacha. Only the following morning was he informed of what had happened.<\/p>\n
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US President George Bush Sr later recalled that he had learned of the news at 3pm US time. Until that moment there had been no indication at all that anything like this might happen. Not a single intelligence paper… His advisers suggested that he should fly to Berlin immediately. \u201cI have never been given such foolish advice,\u201d he would later say. The Soviets should not have been irritated or provoked.<\/p>\n
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The fall of the Berlin Wall encouraged, and signified, the collapse of an entire world. On the Cold War ruins of that world, amid the triumphalism of the Western allies, though not immediately, a fear of imbalance emerged. The consequences of that well-founded fear are now being expressed in dramatic and stark fashion: the dominant feature of today\u2019s world is, unfortunately, the brutal law of force…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The division of defeated Germany after the Second World War, formalised in Potsdam at the conference of the…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":75029,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[18,1582,2890],"class_list":["post-75028","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-berlin","tag-berlin","tag-berlin-wall","tag-cold-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75028","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=75028"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75028\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/75029"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=75028"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=75028"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=75028"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}