{"id":9861,"date":"2026-05-03T05:27:37","date_gmt":"2026-05-03T05:27:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/9861\/"},"modified":"2026-05-03T05:27:37","modified_gmt":"2026-05-03T05:27:37","slug":"opinion-its-only-5000-troops-but-america-will-come-to-regret-its-rash-withdrawal-from-germany","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/9861\/","title":{"rendered":"Opinion | It\u2019s Only 5,000 Troops, but America Will Come to Regret Its Rash Withdrawal From Germany"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">President Trump is right to demand that Europe spend more on its own defense. But the Trump administration\u2019s <a class=\"css-yywogo\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/05\/01\/us\/politics\/us-troops-germany.html\" title=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">announcement<\/a> on Friday that it would pull 5,000 U.S. troops out of Germany risks weakening one of America\u2019s best strategic investments: a military presence that deters Russia and keeps Europe\u2019s old rivalries from becoming America\u2019s problem again.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">NATO has never been only about Russia. Lord Ismay, the alliance\u2019s first secretary general, is said to have stated that its founding purpose in 1949 was \u201cto keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.\u201d Germany clearly should not be \u201ckept down\u201d anymore: Germany is democratic, responsible and indispensable. Europe needs its money, industry and political will. For NATO\u2019s frontline states, Germany\u2019s decision in 2023 to gradually deploy a 5,000-strong brigade in Lithuania, where I live, was one of the most important deterrent moves on the eastern flank since the Cold War.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">Yet the past does not disappear because Europe wishes it away. Germany recently made a historic turn in defense policy. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stated that the German armed forces <a class=\"css-yywogo\" href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/germany-military-strategy-bundeswehr-boris-pistorius\/\" title=\"\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">should become<\/a> \u201cthe strongest conventional army in Europe.\u201d Germany\u2019s defense budget, already the fourth largest in the world, is on track to <a class=\"css-yywogo\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/03\/03\/world\/europe\/germany-military-defense-spending-europe-nato.html\" title=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">approach<\/a> the combined military spending of Britain and France by the end of the decade. A few years ago, such ambition would have been almost unimaginable.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">Some in Europe are already uneasy. In conversations with European leaders and officials, one senses that Germany\u2019s current trajectory \u2014 its economic scale, population size and military ambitions \u2014 is already changing the continent\u2019s internal balance. Europe\u2019s conventional center of gravity is clearly moving away from France and Britain and toward Berlin. The fact that the Alternative for Germany, a far-right political party, is already the second-largest faction in Parliament and continues to rise in the polls only adds to the apprehension.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">All of this has revived arguments thought to belong to history. In January 1990, as German reunification accelerated, President Fran\u00e7ois Mitterrand of France <a class=\"css-yywogo\" href=\"https:\/\/www.margaretthatcher.org\/document\/113883\" title=\"\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">told<\/a> Britain\u2019s prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, <a class=\"css-yywogo\" href=\"https:\/\/www.margaretthatcher.org\/document\/113883\" title=\"\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">according to notes of the meeting<\/a>, that Germany had the right to self-determination but not the right to \u201cupset the political realities of Europe.\u201d<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">His concern was not Germany alone. It was that a reunified Germany, with its renewed scale and weight at the center of Europe, could revive the old continental habit of balancing against the strongest power. Postwar Europe\u2019s answer was not to keep Germany weak, but to bind German strength inside Europe and an American-backed NATO.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">The lesson still applies. Europe needs German power. But German power remains less worrying when it is embedded in a unified Europe and anchored by the United States. And a Europe that competes within itself is not only less capable but also far easier for Russia to divide and intimidate.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">The <a class=\"css-yywogo\" href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2026\/03\/02\/world\/europe\/france-nuclear-arsenal-macron.html\" title=\"\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">recent emphasis<\/a> of the current French president, Emmanuel Macron, on his country as a nuclear power is part of this anxiety. In March, he announced plans to expand France\u2019s nuclear arsenal and work more closely on deterrence against attacks with European partners, arguing that France\u2019s vital interests have a European dimension but that France alone should retain authority over any use of nuclear weapons. The message was aimed at Russia and uncertainty over U.S. guarantees of protection. But it also spoke to Berlin: Europe\u2019s strongest conventional power is not Europe\u2019s only strategic power.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">If America becomes ambivalent in its security commitments to European allies, the nuclear question will become more urgent in Europe. The U.S. nuclear umbrella removes pressure for alternative, more destabilizing arrangements on the continent, but that umbrella rests on trust. And trust is eroding. A <a class=\"css-yywogo\" href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/publication\/how-trump-is-making-china-great-again-and-what-it-means-for-europe\/\" title=\"\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer nofollow\" target=\"_blank\">European Council on Foreign Relations-Oxford University poll<\/a> published in January found that only 16 percent of people in 10 European Union countries view the United States as an ally, though about half view it as a \u201cnecessary partner.\u201d Twenty percent describe it as a rival or an adversary. This is the political soil in which talk of alternatives to U.S. nuclear guarantees grows.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">Mr. Trump\u2019s planned reduction of U.S. troops in Germany, which comes after the German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, said Iran had \u201chumiliated\u201d America, is therefore not just part of another bilateral spat. It chips away at the core of Europe\u2019s security architecture and America\u2019s ability to project power beyond Europe. The tens of thousands of U.S. troops that will remain stationed in Germany reassure allies, secure America\u2019s military role on the continent and help sustain U.S. operations in the Middle East.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">The same logic applies to NATO command. The supreme allied commander Europe is traditionally an American general, dual-hatted as commander of U.S. European Command. The post is currently held by Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, who leads Allied Command Operations and is responsible for NATO military planning and operations. The tradition keeps Europe\u2019s most sensitive military post from becoming a contest among Berlin, Paris, Warsaw and London.<\/p>\n<p class=\"css-ac37hb evys1bk0\">The United States remains Europe\u2019s strategic shock absorber. It keeps Russia at bay, embeds Germany, reassures France, protects the Eastern front line and gives smaller allies confidence that their security will not be settled by continental hierarchy alone. Without America, Europe could become more national, more suspicious and more unstable.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"President Trump is right to demand that Europe spend more on its own defense. But the Trump administration\u2019s&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":9862,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3901,60,5,3380,8478,2336,9217,1831,255,774,8510,9218],"class_list":{"0":"post-9861","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-germany","8":"tag-donald-j","9":"tag-france","10":"tag-germany","11":"tag-lithuania","12":"tag-north-atlantic-treaty-organization","13":"tag-nuclear-weapons","14":"tag-putin","15":"tag-russia","16":"tag-trump","17":"tag-ukraine","18":"tag-united-states-defense-and-military-forces","19":"tag-vladimir-v"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9861","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9861"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9861\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9862"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9861"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9861"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/germany\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9861"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}