{"id":42740,"date":"2025-09-04T09:23:12","date_gmt":"2025-09-04T09:23:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/42740\/"},"modified":"2025-09-04T09:23:12","modified_gmt":"2025-09-04T09:23:12","slug":"man-united-given-1-75bn-valuation-assessment-that-majorly-undercuts-glazers-deal-with-ineos","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/42740\/","title":{"rendered":"Man United given \u00a31.75bn valuation assessment that majorly undercuts Glazers’ deal with Ineos"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

When Sir Jim Ratcliffe paid the Glazers over \u00a31bn for a minority stake in 2024, it reaffirmed the belief that Manchester United are one of the world\u2019s most valuable clubs. But new analysis from Kinnaird Sports Intelligence suggests that their true worth has been overstated.<\/strong><\/p>\n

In finance, a \u2018bubble\u2019 is when the value of a good surpasses its inherent worth. And bubbles burst, leading to a sharp drop in value.<\/p>\n

For decades, United\u2019s value as appraised by analysts and the club themselves has trended relentlessly up and to the right, but what is it exactly that is fuelling that optimism?<\/p>\n

Man United<\/a> have lost \u00a3359m since they last turned a profit in 2018-19. Much of that shortfall has been underwritten by debt and, more recently, equity contributions from Sir Jim Ratcliffe<\/a> and Ineos<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\"IneosPhoto by Michael Regan \u2013 UEFA\/UEFA via Getty Images<\/p>\n

Ratcliffe\u2019s programme of job cuts<\/a>, intentions to re-base the playing squad, and masterplan to build a new stadium are a tacit admission that the club is not where it should be. <\/p>\n

And that\u2019s before we get to the issues on the pitch under Ruben Amorim.<\/p>\n

United\u2019s brand is still strong \u2013 but is it a sticking plaster?<\/p>\n

The club\u2019s brand has an insulating effect, of course. United\u2019s global cache<\/a> has allowed them to withstand the strongest headwinds of the post-Sir Alex Ferguson and David Gill era, when six successive managers have tried and failed to return the Red Devils to former glories.<\/p>\n

Financially, their commercial and matchday income have allowed them to remain one of the dominant players in the transfer and wage markets, even if those resources have been poorly allocated historically.<\/p>\n

\"ChartMan United commercial and matchday income chart<\/p>\n

Credit: Adam Williams\/United in Focus\/GRV Media<\/p>\n

Even after Amorim\u2019s side<\/a> finished a pitiful 15th in last season\u2019s Premier League, they received more prize money than four clubs who finished above them, courtesy of appearing on TV more frequently. Again, that is thanks to their brand \u2013 whether they win or lose, United are must-watch.<\/p>\n

Speaking exclusively to United in Focus<\/strong> earlier this summer, Hugo Hensley of Brand Finance said: \u201cBy their standards of coming first or second every season, their recent record on the pitch has damaged them. But they\u2019re still an amazing commercial machine, one of the first properly sophisticated and organised football brands.<\/p>\n

\u201cThey\u2019ve still got a blue-chip technology front-of-shirt partner<\/a>. That reflects that they\u2019re actually still a very strong brand. They can continue to ride on that heritage. Whereas it\u2019s not as forgiving the other way. You can get to a Champions League final like, say, Spurs have, but it doesn\u2019t cement in the same way.\u201d<\/p>\n

United\u2019s business in the summer transfer window<\/a> cost them almost \u00a3150m on a net basis meanwhile. In Benjamin Sesko, Matheus Cunha, and Bryan Mbeumo, United leveraged their brand to sign prize assets ahead of teams who could offer them European football and stonking wages.<\/p>\n\nPlayer<\/td>\nDirection<\/td>\nClub<\/td>\nFee<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nBryan Mbeumo<\/td>\nIn<\/td>\nBrentford<\/td>\n\u00a371m<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nBenjamin Sesko<\/td>\nIn<\/td>\nRB Leipzig<\/td>\n\u00a373.7m<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nMatheus Cunha<\/td>\nIn<\/td>\nWolverhampton Wanderers<\/td>\n\u00a362.5m<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nSenne Lammens<\/td>\nIn<\/td>\nRoyal Antwerp<\/td>\n\u00a318.2m<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nDiego Leon<\/td>\nIn<\/td>\nCerro Porte\u00f1o<\/td>\n\u00a33.3m<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nHarley Emsden-James<\/td>\nIn<\/td>\nSouthampton<\/td>\n\u00a31m<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nEnzo Kana-Biyik<\/td>\nIn<\/td>\nLe Havre<\/td>\nFree<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nAlejandro Garnacho<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nChelsea<\/td>\n\u00a340m<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nAntony<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nReal Betis<\/td>\n\u00a321.6m<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nMarcus Rashford<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nBarcelona<\/td>\nLoan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nJadon Sancho<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nAston Villa<\/td>\nLoan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nVictor Lindel\u00f6f<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nReleased<\/td>\nFree<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nChristian Eriksen<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nReleased<\/td>\nFree<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nJonny Evans<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nReleased<\/td>\nFree<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nElyh Harrison<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nShrewsbury Town<\/td>\nLoan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nRadek Vitek<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nBristol City<\/td>\nLoan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n\nEthan Wheatley<\/td>\nOut<\/td>\nNorthampton Town<\/td>\nLoan<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

Manchester United\u2019s summer transfers 2025 <\/p>\n

Reports of the demise of the United brand are perhaps exaggerated, therefore. They have pulling power with players, sponsors and the kind of floating fan outside the UK that underpins their commercial operation.<\/p>\n

But are these status symbols actually a fig leaf for a weaker set of business fundamentals? And is United\u2019s trophy-asset premium disproportionately inflating their true value as an enterprise?<\/p>\n

Kinnaird Sports Intelligence\u2019s alternative view of Manchester United\u2019s real value<\/p>\n

United\u2019s value as an asset matters. How the market views the club will ultimately decide who owns it. <\/p>\n

And as 20 years under the Glazers<\/a> demonstrates, who owns Man United<\/a> shapes the soul of the club and its ability to compete on the pitch.<\/p>\n

Ratcliffe committed \u00a31.25bn to acquire 29 per cent of the club, split across an initial fee paid to the six Glazer siblings<\/a> and some Class A shareholders who bought into United on the New York Stock Exchange, as well as a further funding commitment, which has now been satisfied.<\/p>\n

\"DiagramManchester United ownership diagram<\/p>\n

Credit: Adam Williams \/ United in Focus \/ GRV Media<\/p>\n

That implied a valuation of \u00a34.3bn in total, which was significantly short of the Glazers\u2019 reported \u00a36bn quote for a full takeover. Even Sheikh Jassim, the Qatari banker backed by hundreds of billions of petrodollars, balked at that price tag. <\/p>\n

For context, Forbes, Football Benchmark, Sportico have pegged United\u2019s enterprise value in the \u00a34.4bn to \u00a34.9bn range, while Brand Finance are less bullish at \u00a33.2bn.<\/p>\n

But Kinnaird Sports Intelligence<\/a>, a free-to-use data-driven platform that provides financial insights into sports clubs, uses a different model to appraise clubs and has arrived at a valuation of \u00a31.75bn.<\/p>\n

\"AMan United Kinnaird Sports Intelligence valuation<\/p>\n

Credit: Joe Roberts\/Kinnaird Sports Intelligence<\/p>\n

\u201cThe fundamental difference between the Kinnaird Valuation Model [KVM] and valuations from the likes of Forbes lies in what they\u2019re actually measuring: intrinsic worth versus market price,\u201d says Joe Roberts, founder of Kinnaird, in exclusive conversation with United in Focus<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\u201cFor example, Forbes calculates \u2018enterprise values based on historical transactions and the future economics of each league and each team,\u2019 essentially estimating what someone would pay by analysing recent sale prices and market sentiment, which explains why their valuations often appear inflated due to factors like billionaire prestige-seeking, geopolitical motivations, or speculative market conditions. <\/p>\n

\u201cIn contrast, the KVM focuses on determining a club\u2019s actual economic value based on its assets, profitability, and long-term revenue generation potential.\u201d<\/p>\n

Red Devils deemed to be worth the least of the \u2018Big Six\u2019 clubs<\/p>\n

Kinnaird Sports Intelligence\u2019s analysis, which uses 2023-24\u2019s statements as the last full published financial year, notes that United\u2019s revenue has grown by just 5.5 per cent since 2019, compared to peers like Arsenal (55 per cent), Manchester City (33.6 per cent) and Liverpool (15.2 per cent).<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, United\u2019s net assets \u2013 that\u2019s their total assets minus total liabilities, ranging from their cash reserves, property and player registrations to their debt, transfer instalments due, and accrued expenses \u2013 have fallen from a high of nearly \u00a3500m in 2015 to just over \u00a3100m at the last count.<\/p>\n

These are among the factors which, according to their model, give them the lowest value in the so-called \u2018Big Six\u2019.<\/p>\n

\"GraphicManchester United\u2019s value compared to the Big Six<\/p>\n

Credit: Joe Roberts\/Kinnaird Sports Intelligence<\/p>\n

Read on for a detail of Kinnaird\u2019s methodology in arriving at this valuation.<\/p>\n

The value of the Glazers\u2019 investment over the years, per Kinnaird<\/p>\n

Whichever way you cut it, the six Glazer siblings are way, way up on the investment their father, Malcolm Glazer, made via leveraged buyout back in June 2005.<\/p>\n

After dividends<\/a>, management fees, directors\u2019 salaries and cash directly from Ineos, the owners have made north of \u00a31bn out of the club<\/a>. And that is before one considers the appreciation of Man United as an asset, which by any measure has risen dramatically since their debt-financed takeover.<\/p>\n

But Kinnaird\u2019s analysis suggests that the markup on that \u00a3790m deal might not be quite as significant as some have deduced.<\/p>\n

\"ManchesterMan United\u2019s value over the years, per Kinnaird Sports Intelligence<\/p>\n

Credit: Joe Roberts\/Kinnaird Sports Intelligence <\/p>\n

According to their formula, United\u2019s value actually dipped as low as \u00a31.4bn in 2022, from a high of \u00a32.72bn four years earlier.<\/p>\n

How to value a club like Man United: Kinnaird\u2019s methodology explained <\/p>\n

Balance sheet valuations, recent comparable transactions, revenue multiples and discounted cash flow are often used to value traditional businesses \u2013 but Kinnaird argue that these approaches aren\u2019t suitable for a club like Man United, nor indeed any football team.<\/p>\n

They hypothesise that balance sheet valuations, for example, fail to recognise the worth of academy players, who have a book value of zero. That\u2019s why United make \u2018pure profit\u2019 when they sell a homegrown player like Alejandro Garnacho<\/a>, incidentally. A club\u2019s intangible brand too is incompatible with a balance sheet valuation.<\/p>\n

Analysis based on recent comparable transactions meanwhile \u2013 such as benchmarking against Chelsea\u2019s \u00a32.5bn sale to a consortium led by Todd Boehly and Clearlake Capital three summers ago \u2013 don\u2019t take into account buyers\u2019 different motives. <\/p>\n

Sheikh Jassim, backed by the sovereign wealth of a Gulf state<\/a>, probably wants something different out of owning a football club than the Glazer family, who are focused on a financial return, for example. They therefore have different valuations.<\/p>\n

Discounted cash flow analysis \u2013 which arrives at a value based on expected revenues, adjusted for time and risk \u2013 isn\u2019t adequate because of the inherent volatility of football, Kinnaird suggests. Relegation, European qualification, transfer market volatility and myriad other factors mean discounted cash flow is too speculative and assumption-driven for football.<\/p>\n

\"APhoto by Wolverhampton Wanderers FC\/Wolves via Getty Images<\/p>\n

Football-specific valuation methods like Markham Multivariate Model \u2013 which estimates a club\u2019s value by combining its revenue and net assets, adjusting for profitability, stadium utilisation, and wage efficiency \u2013 are a step in the right direction.<\/p>\n

However, Kinnaird argues that the Markham formula doesn\u2019t sufficiently consider strong academy systems, intelligent recruitment or, at the other end of the spectrum, poor cost control. It also said to give too much weight to low-quality revenue and so-called \u2018soft\u2019 owner loans, though the latter is not a factor with United specifically.<\/p>\n

The Kinnaird Valuation Model by contrast uses three-year averages of revenue, commercial income, EBITDA [earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation], and wages. This smooths out one-off financial spikes which distort valuations.<\/p>\n

KVM also employs net assets as the base for its calculations but excludes \u2018soft\u2019 owner loans. It then introduces a squad value uplift provision which accounts for hidden value in academy-produced players and consistent player sale profits.<\/p>\n

A profitability multiplier is applied using a three-year EBITDA average, with a contingency that mitigates for short-term operating losses as a result of long-term investment.<\/p>\n

Finally, Kinnaird utilise a brand strength multiplier calculated using a three-year average of commercial income offset against wages. That is how they arrived at their \u00a31.75bn valuation of Man United.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"When Sir Jim Ratcliffe paid the Glazers over \u00a31bn for a minority stake in 2024, it reaffirmed the…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":42741,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[73],"tags":[79,18,2644,32302,19,23298,17,23071],"class_list":{"0":"post-42740","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-business","8":"tag-business","9":"tag-eire","10":"tag-finances","11":"tag-glazers","12":"tag-ie","13":"tag-ineos","14":"tag-ireland","15":"tag-sir-jim-ratcliffe"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42740","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=42740"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42740\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/42741"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=42740"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=42740"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=42740"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}