{"id":645416,"date":"2026-08-19T12:39:43","date_gmt":"2026-08-19T12:39:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/645416\/"},"modified":"2026-08-19T12:39:43","modified_gmt":"2026-08-19T12:39:43","slug":"why-thailand-will-not-allow-spacex-full-ownership-of-starlink-operations","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/ie\/645416\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Thailand will not allow SpaceX full ownership of Starlink operations"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>&#13;<br \/>\n<strong>Allowing a service is different from allowing full ownership<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The government distinguishes between allowing Starlink services to enter Thailand and allowing a foreign company to own an entire telecommunications operation in the country.<\/p>\n<p>Chaichanok previously explained that SpaceX regarded complete foreign ownership as necessary for its investment. Thailand, however, maintained that it could not accept such an arrangement for a business directly connected with satellite telecommunications and digital security.<\/p>\n<p>Telecommunications are not treated as an ordinary commercial activity because they involve infrastructure that the government must be able to supervise.<\/p>\n<p>Thailand\u2019s Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 (1999) imposes different conditions depending on the type of business involved. Activities governed by sector-specific legislation must also comply with the relevant specialised laws.<\/p>\n<p>The government is also seeking to prevent the use of nominee ownership structures to circumvent foreign-ownership restrictions.<\/p>\n<p>Since August 1, 2026, the Department of Business Development has increased its scrutiny of companies\u2019 shareholder and director structures after incorporation, with the aim of preventing Thai nationals from being used as nominees concealing effective foreign control.<\/p>\n<p>These concerns are particularly significant in Starlink\u2019s case because it uses satellites in low-Earth orbit, or LEO.<\/p>\n<p>The system can provide internet coverage across wide areas without depending on conventional terrestrial telecommunications networks. Its implications therefore extend beyond ordinary internet access to emergency communications, national security and Thailand\u2019s reliance on infrastructure controlled from overseas.<\/p>\n<p>&#13;<br \/>\n<strong>Sovereignty issue raised in US trade talks<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Thailand\u2019s position was reiterated during trade negotiations with the United States.<\/p>\n<p>On August 5, <strong>Kirida Bhaopichitr<\/strong>, Vice Minister for Commerce, said Thailand did not want a US company to establish a wholly foreign-owned LEO satellite telecommunications business in the country.<\/p>\n<p>She described the issue as one involving sovereignty and indicated that it would be raised again during the next round of Thai-US trade negotiations, scheduled for late August.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cOnly one business sector is one that we genuinely do not want the United States to enter through full investment: low-Earth-orbit satellite telecommunications services, because this is a sovereignty issue,\u201d she said.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cEssentially, there is only one US company seeking this, which is SpaceX.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>&#13;<br \/>\n<strong>Foreign satellites could enter under Thai conditions<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Thailand\u2019s position does not mean that the government has closed the door to Starlink or other foreign satellite operators.<\/p>\n<p>On the same day that the government reiterated its ownership limits, the National Space Policy Committee was advancing the landing-rights framework intended to allow foreign satellites to provide services under Thai regulations.<\/p>\n<p>The approach is consistent with proposals previously considered by the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission.<\/p>\n<p>The NBTC board proposed replacing the previous system, which had an exclusive character, with three separate categories of authorisation:<\/p>\n<ul>&#13;<\/p>\n<li>Landing rights<\/li>\n<p>&#13;<\/p>\n<li>Gateway operations<\/li>\n<p>&#13;<\/p>\n<li>Satellite services<\/li>\n<p>&#13;\n<\/ul>\n<p>Separating the permissions would allow the authorities to regulate the different parts of satellite operations more precisely.<\/p>\n<p>The proposed licensing framework is also intended to protect consumers and maintain balanced competition, giving individuals and businesses more options for accessing high-quality communications services without compromising national security or Thailand\u2019s interests.<\/p>\n<p>&#13;<br \/>\n<strong>State seeks free satellite capacity for public services<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Another issue considered by the National Space Policy Committee concerns communications capacity allocated to the state by companies licensed to use Thailand\u2019s satellite orbital rights.<\/p>\n<p>The government plans to use this capacity free of charge for state missions and public services under the concept of State Use and Public Services.<\/p>\n<p>The approach reflects the government\u2019s position that orbital positions and space resources should not be treated solely as commercial assets.<\/p>\n<p>Some of the benefits should be returned to the public through government services, public-interest operations and national-security activities.<\/p>\n<p>This is another reason why the rules governing major foreign satellite operators are seen as more important than a simple decision over whether to allow them into the country.<\/p>\n<p>&#13;<br \/>\n<strong>Thailand develops broader space-economy strategy<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The National Space Policy Committee\u2019s work extends well beyond satellite internet services.<\/p>\n<p>It has established three principal areas for Thailand\u2019s wider space strategy.<\/p>\n<p>The first is the space economy, focusing on creating a competitive ecosystem capable of attracting investment and supporting business growth.<\/p>\n<p>The second is security, including the development of surveillance systems and space traffic management to address threats in the digital, cyber and space domains.<\/p>\n<p>The third is technology, covering research and development in Earth-observation satellites and a feasibility study for a proposed Thailand Spaceport.<\/p>\n<p>Satellite data would also be used to support agriculture, disaster management and the monitoring of PM2.5 pollution.<\/p>\n<p>The government additionally plans to accelerate the development of skilled personnel needed for the expanding space industry.<\/p>\n<p>These initiatives are being pursued alongside work to revise the draft Space Activities Act and update the National Space Master Plan for 2023\u20132037 to reflect changes in technology, investment, economic value and national security.<\/p>\n<p>&#13;<br \/>\n<strong>The real question is not whether to accept Starlink<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Thailand is not positioning itself against SpaceX or foreign satellite technology.<\/p>\n<p>Instead, it is attempting to create rules that would allow foreign companies to participate while ensuring that the government retains meaningful oversight.<\/p>\n<p>Allowing SpaceX to hold 100% ownership of a LEO satellite telecommunications business could give a single foreign company substantial commercial power over infrastructure with implications for national sovereignty and security.<\/p>\n<p>However, Thailand must also avoid making its regulations so restrictive that it misses opportunities arising from new technology and investment flowing into the global space economy.<\/p>\n<p>The policy choice is therefore not simply between accepting or rejecting Starlink.<\/p>\n<p>The challenge is to determine how Thailand can open its space economy without surrendering full regulatory authority over strategic communications and space infrastructure to any single private operator.<\/p>\n<p>&#13;<br \/>\nSource: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bangkokbiznews.com\/tech\/ai\/1247910\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Krungthep Turakij<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"&#13; Allowing a service is different from allowing full ownership The government distinguishes between allowing Starlink services 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