Osman Bahadir Dinçer and Zeynep Sahin-Mencütek argue that Syria is not ready for large-scale refugee return. Drawing on interviews with returnees, they show how economic collapse, weak institutions, and social fragmentation undermine reintegration. Policy debates, they say, must move beyond rhetoric to reflect realities on the ground 

At a joint press conference in Berlin on 30 March, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that ‘over the next three years – this was also Syrian President al-Sharaa’s wish – around 80% of the Syrians living in Germany should return….’  

The German Chancellery swiftly clarified that the ‘80%’ figure came from the Syrians. Yet al-Sharaa rejected this claim, calling it ‘somewhat exaggerated’. Instead, he stressed that returns would depend on economic reconstruction and improved living conditions. 

Despite growing expectations in host countries, and increasing returns from neighbouring countries, we still know little about Syrians’ post-return experiences. This matters for assessing Syria’s material, political and social reconstruction. Many Syrians are observing returnees’ experiences closely, using their accounts when deciding whether to return, stay, or migrate elsewhere. 

Our field-based research with returnees draws on 210 in-depth interviews. Here, we analyse 80 of those interviews, conducted in March 2026. Three core findings emerge. 

First, Syria lacks the institutional, economic and infrastructure to absorb large-scale returns. Returnees navigate fragile security, economic hardship and persistent barriers to housing, employment, legal assistance and services. 

Second, returnees perceive the current political order as transitional. They recognise limited openings in participation and representation but no fully functioning system.  

Third, unemployment, low wages, rising prices and weak service provision make return highly precarious, and this poses the most immediate constraint. Economic pressures deepen social fragmentation, reinforce divisions – particularly between stayers and returnees – and erode social cohesion. 

Who returns – and to what conditions? 

Since late 2024, returns to Syria have increased. Around 1.99 million internally displaced persons have returned to their areas of origin. Over 1.14 million have arrived from abroad, meaning that returnees now make up roughly 11% of Syria’s population. 

Cross-border returns come largely from neighbouring Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan. Returnees concentrate in urban centres, including Damascus, Aleppo, Idlib, Homs and rural Damascus.

Returning refugees now make up roughly 11% of the Syrian population

Our research shows that multiple factors drive these movements, including  political shifts – most notably the end of Assad-era rule – as well as family reunification, care responsibilities and a desire to help rebuild local communities. Poor living conditions, legal uncertainty and limited onward migration options in host countries also push Syrians to return. 

But what are these people returning to? Local actors stress that collapsed infrastructure, and a weak economy limit Syria’s ability to sustain return. As one interlocutor in Damascus put it: ‘Returnees will drown Syria … a huge burden for Syria.’ 

Current levels of return are already straining housing, food prices and basic services. In Damascus and Aleppo, rising rents and widespread destruction intensify urban overcrowding. Some returnees live in tents next to the ruins of their homes. 

Sustainable return requires reconstruction, institutional stabilisation and economic recovery. This will take considerable time.   

Economic and social dynamics 

Returnees’ perceptions of the economic situation are overwhelmingly negative, and this is the most immediate constraint shaping post-return life. Many express dissatisfaction (60% dissatisfied; 18.75% very dissatisfied), citing unemployment, low wages, high living costs and currency depreciation. Only a small number with external income or savings describe their situation as manageable. These conditions shape daily survival and influence whether individuals stay or leave again. 

Socially, returnees do not identify one dominant problem but a broader erosion of the social fabric. As one respondent put it: ‘We live side by side, but we don’t know who we are to each other anymore.’ Our interviews highlight broken relationships, weakened family structures and new social divisions. Persistent suspicion across groups – shaped by past political alignments, displacement histories and ethnic or sectarian differences – reinforce these divisions. The rift between stayers and returnees has deepened, often marked by resentment, exclusion and mutual misunderstanding.

In Syria, the rift between stayers and returnees is marked by resentment, exclusion and mutual misunderstanding

Respondents cite poverty, unemployment and rising inequality as drivers of tension. These weaken family and community structures, and push people toward begging or illicit activities. Many also point to the erosion of social norms, including mutual support and solidarity. 

Perceptions about political transition and safety conditions 

Returnees’ assessments of the political situation are cautious and ambivalent. In our sample, a majority express some satisfaction with the post-Assad environment: 31.25% are satisfied, 20% very satisfied. However, a large share (41.25%) remains neutral and a small minority expresses dissatisfaction. 

Returnees’ main concern is not direct repression or immediate instability but the absence of a fully formed political order. Many describe Syria as being in a ‘transitional period’, and emphasise that ‘there is no real political life yet’. They also point to the lack of a constitution, functioning political parties and institutionalised channels of participation. 

Assessments of safety and security are more positive. A majority report satisfaction (51.25% satisfied and 10% very satisfied), while 30% remain neutral. Many point out that while large-scale violence has receded, insecurity has not disappeared but transformed. Concerns for returnees and stayers include difficulties accessing electricity, water, healthcare and employment. Landmines, unexploded ordnance and armed actors operating outside state control, also pose ongoing threats. 

Return without reintegration 

While many returnees acknowledge improvements in security and, to a lesser extent, the political environment, they face persistent economic hardship, weak public services and social fragmentation. They have not experienced return as ‘homecoming’ but as a negotiation with uncertainty. Many express a willingness to stay – but only if economic opportunities improve, services are restored and security holds.

Many refugees have not experienced return to Syria as a ‘homecoming’ but as a negotiation with uncertainty

Our findings support a broader argument: Syria is not only unsafe for return in parts but fundamentally unprepared for return at scale. Increasingly assertive return narratives promoted by European governments and neighbouring countries overlook realities on the ground. 

We must place returnees’ lived experiences at the centre of policy debates. Their experiences shape future return intentions and mobility trajectories. Ignoring these experiences risks producing policies that are ineffective and potentially destabilising – reinforcing cycles of precarious return and renewed migration.