After more than five months of political cajolery, threats, and infighting since Iraq’s 11 November parliamentary elections – the seventh since Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003 – an erstwhile obscure businessman, Ali al-Zaidi, has been selected as the Prime Minister-designate of the governing Iran-aligned Shia Coordination Framework bloc. Regarded as a compromise candidate between more pro-West sitting Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, and one of his predecessors, the pro-Iran Nouri al-Maliki, al-Zaidi now has until 27 May to form a government. This is done by selecting a cabinet, which must, in turn, be approved by Iraq’s parliament (the Council of Representatives). So, what happens if, as occurred in 2020, he as Prime Minister-designate cannot do so, and what happens if he can?

A cornerstone of Iraq’s 2005 Constitution was the safeguarding against the re-emergence of a single dominant force in Iraqi politics, especially any resurgence of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party. This meant a dispersal of executive power between three key jobs – Prime Minister, President, and Speaker of Parliament. These have traditionally been split between the three main groups in the country — the Prime Ministership for the Shia Arabs (the largest demographic group), the Presidency for the Kurds (occupying the semi-autonomous state in the North), and the Speakership of Parliament for the Sunni Arabs (the other principal religious grouping). Although this power structure has indeed prevented any meaningful revival of the Ba’ath Party, it has also complicated what on the face of it looks a straightforward and quick procedure for choosing a new premier. According to the constitution, once the general election results have been verified, the president asks the newly elected parliament to meet within 15 days. In that first gathering, parliament elects a speaker and two deputies by a simple majority vote. It can then choose a new president – provided there is a two-thirds majority for a single candidate — or extend the sitting president’s term. Once this has been finalised, the new president authorises the bloc that holds the most seats in the new parliament to form a cabinet led by its chosen nominee for prime minister. Related: Asia’s Major LNG Importers Japan and Korea Turn to Coal

So what happens if al-Zaidi is unable to form a new government by 27 May? Under Article 76 of the Constitution, the President (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan member and former Environment Minister, Nizar Amedi) has 15 days from the date of the deadline’s expiration (taking us to 11 June) to task another candidate with forming the Council of Ministers. The new nominee then receives their own 30-day window to present a cabinet and government programme to the Council of Representatives, and so the process would continue until any of the subsequent Prime Minister-designates can form a new government. In 2020, two consecutive Prime Minister-designates failed to take office after proving unable to assemble a cabinet with parliamentary support. In the interim period, the outgoing government – currently led by al-Sudani – would continue to function in a caretaker capacity to prevent a political vacuum.

If al-Zaidi is successful in forming a new government, what would it look like? The Shia-centric Coordination Framework that would be pivotal to his ability to achieve this is a broad array of pro-Iran parties to varying degrees of zealotry. At the extreme end is the al-Sadiqoun bloc, with 27 seats won in the November elections, the political wing of the U.S.-designated terrorist organisation Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Winning the same number of seats is the slightly more moderate pro-Iran State of Law bloc. The Coordination Framework also consists of pro-Iran blocs, the Badr Organisation, the National State Forces Alliance, and other smaller factions. The problem for al-Zaidi would be the same as faced his predecessor al-Sudani in that he would have to walk a tightrope between the harder-line factions and the less-hardline ones, in order not to incur trouble from either Iran and its proxies in Iraq or the U.S. and its forces in and around the country.

One factor that al-Zaidi has going for him is that he is a relative cleanskin in the arena of Iraqi politics, in which people are quick to develop a grudge and memories are long. He has never held an office in politics or in any administrative sector of government. Rather, he secured degrees in law and finance, becoming a member of the Iraqi Bar Association and chairman of National Holding Company, a conglomerate established in 2017 with interests spanning agriculture, real estate, banking, logistics, and renewable energy. Crucially, from the U.S.’s perspective, he appears to have passed all initial security screenings, at least sufficiently to warrant the tacit backing of President Donald Trump. Following the announcement of al-Zaidi as Prime Minister-designate on 27 April, Trump said: “We wish him success as he works to form a new Government free from terrorism that could deliver a brighter future for Iraq.” He also invited al-Zaidi to visit Washington after ‌forming a government during a phone call in which he personally congratulated him on his nomination. This was in stark contrast to Trump’s threat in January to withdraw Washington’s support for Iraq if former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was designated to form a cabinet.

Having said all of this, whether al-Zaidi is successful in forming a government, or al-Sudani continues indefinitely as caretaker, or al-Maliki again re-emerges, or whether someone else breaks through, much of the way any of the possible top political permutations work out depends on the outcome of the Iran conflict. Given the near-zero prospect of an invasion by the U.S. and a long-running occupation, there will be a peace deal at some point. But with no sign of any meaningful weakening in the hardline Islamic regime that underpins Iran – enforced domestically by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and promulgated internationally by it – the country is as likely to keep running much as it has done since its 1979 Islamic Revolution. It is also likely to continue to receive the same backing as it has done since that point form Russia and China and, as exclusively revealed to OilPrice.com some time ago by a very high-ranking official from the Kremlin: “By keeping the West out of energy deals in Iraq, [Russia and China will see] the end of Western hegemony in the Middle East will become the decisive chapter in the West’s final demise.” On the other side of the equation, the U.S. and its allies are likely to keep pushing their own agenda, which involves removing the influence of China and Russia in Iraq.

Both sides of the superpower dividend continue to regard the country as critical to their global ambitions for the same three reasons they always have, as detailed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. Suffice it to say here, the first of these is that it remains a huge repository of oil at the world’s joint lowest average lifting cost of $2-4 per barrel, together with large quantities of associated and non-associated gas – with both its oil and gas reserves still enormously underestimated. Second, it occupies the geographical heart of the region, lying west of Iran, north of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, east of Jordan and Syria (with its long Mediterranean coastline offering access to further critical sea routes), and south of Turkey (affording an entry into the European continent). And third, it is still a key member of the ‘Shia Crescent of Power’ geopolitical arc that stretches from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, where Shia communities and Iran-backed groups exert significant influence over regional politics, economics, and security. So, whoever ultimately occupies the premiership in Baghdad, Iraq’s political machinery will continue to turn on forces far larger than its own fragmented parliament. The country sits at the collision point of an Iran that shows no sign of moderating, a U.S. that refuses to cede strategic ground, and a Russia–China axis intent on shutting Western influence out of the region’s energy future. That makes every Iraqi government a temporary steward of a much deeper geopolitical contest. Until the outcome of the Iran conflict is settled and the great?power rivalry around Iraq stabilises, no administration in Baghdad will be able to govern with genuine autonomy.

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

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