FO Talks: The Iran War Could Crash the Global Economy, Here’s How

Manu Sharma”
post_date=”May 13, 2026 06:58″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-talks-the-iran-war-could-crash-the-global-economy-heres-how/” pid=”162442″
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Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Partner and geopolitical analyst Manu Sharma discuss how the Iran war reaches far beyond the battlefield into everyday economic life. What began as a military conflict in the Gulf has quickly spread through shipping lanes to fuel markets, agriculture, finance and trade. The war will raise the cost of fuel, travel, transport, fertilizers, food, medicine, industrial inputs and borrowing across much of the world.

A regional war with global consequences

Atul opens by asking Manu to map the immediate, medium-term and long-term implications of the conflict, along with its effects across different regions. Manu frames the crisis along both time and space, noting that what started as a regional war is already becoming something much larger. As he puts it, “we are seeing this grand convergence” as military disruption in one part of the world begins to reshape economic life in other parts of the world.

The most immediate shock comes through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. Before the conflict, roughly 140 ships passed through the strait each day. Now traffic has almost completely stopped. That matters for crude oil, gasoline, jet fuel, petrochemicals and industrial inputs that move through the chokepoint.

The closed chokepoint has led to major consequencees. Air travel becomes more expensive as jet fuel supplies tighten. Hydrocarbon byproducts such as sulfur, lubricants, asphalt, plastics and chemical derivatives also grow scarcer. Since modern medicine depends heavily on these inputs, a prolonged conflict could drive up medical costs and disrupt pharmaceutical production. The first phase of the crisis hits energy, transport and the basic materials that support modern economies.

From fuel shock to food shock

As the discussion moves into the medium term, Manu explains how shortages in energy and industrial inputs begin to spread downstream. If fertilizer supplies remain constrained during the spring planting season, the effects will show themselves months later in weaker harvests and rising food prices. Modern agriculture, Atul notes, depends on both fuel and fertilizers. When both come under pressure at once, food shortages are inevitable.

The closed chokepoint also makes the Gulf monarchies especially vulnerable because they import almost all of their food. They also depend on steady flows of revenue from hydrocarbons to maintain social stability. If food becomes scarce and welfare systems come under strain, governments may have to sell their assets to stay in power.

The Iran war has made the investment climate highly uncertain. A “flight to safety” into hard assets such as precious metals and agricultural land is likely. This flight will be caused by the decline in normal economic activity because of the supply shock. It will also be exacerbated by declining confidence in institutions. Equities represent confidence in future growth. If that confidence weakens, capital retreats toward harder assets that appear more direct and less dependent on intermediaries. The result is a lower-trust global economy, marked by caution, volatility and a reordering of trade and investment patterns.

Stagflation and the strain on the dollar system

Looking further ahead, Atul asks what the world might look like five years from now if the conflict continues and critical infrastructure across the Gulf suffers sustained destruction. Manu sketches a grim scenario in which energy production capacity is damaged on a large scale, leading to long-lasting shortages and high input costs. That, in turn, creates the classic ingredients of stagflation: slower growth combined with persistent inflation.

Atul reminds viewers that the world experienced similar inflationary shocks after the 1973 Arab oil embargo and again after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Manu sees the current war as a possible third Iran-linked stagflationary episode, one that could once again shake the foundations of the global economy.

This also raises deeper questions about the petrodollar system. Atul explains the historical bargain at its core: US security guarantees in exchange for a dollar-based oil order. Manu replies that if the United States cannot protect infrastructure in the Persian Gulf and keep shipping going through the Strait of Hormuz, then Gulf states may begin rethinking the currency architecture tied to that security relationship. Manu does not predict the end of the dollar, but he does suggest that its position could come under greater strain if the war exposes the limits of American protection.

Asia and Africa are exposed

The regional discussion begins with East and Southeast Asia, which Manu describes as the industrial engine of the world. The economies in this region depend heavily on Gulf energy and raw materials. If those flows are disrupted, output falls, finished goods become scarcer and inflation rises globally. Cheap electronics, clothes and household goods no longer remain so cheap. Western consumers feel the loss through a lower standard of living, but the effect within Asia may be even more politically significant.

Manu notes that many East Asian states built social stability on a promise of rising incomes and steady growth. If that growth model falters, long-suppressed political volatility could return. He stresses that these societies have a history of rapid and dramatic political change, a reality many outside observers underestimate.

South Asia appears even more vulnerable. Countries across the region depend heavily on remittances from Gulf workers and on imported energy. The Iran war has hit South Asia with a double whammy: rising import costs and falling external income. Manu is particularly pessimistic about pressure on the Indian rupee. India is stronger than it was during the 1991 balance-of-payments crisis, thanks to its services sector and wider diaspora, but will face increasing strains. Manu also warns that the region could face a mix of inflation, capital outflows and political strain. 

In contrast to Asia, Africa is a continent rich in resources. Political structures are weak though. Manu sees intensifying competition for African resources with outside powers, private military actors and regional players jockeying to gain a greater share of the pie. Resource politics, proxy conflict and coercive competition all become more likely.

Europe’s bind and America’s test

For Europe, the war compounds an already difficult situation. After reducing reliance on Russian gas, many European economies now face further energy stress, inflationary pressure and rising borrowing costs. Manu believes Europe is also spending political capital by being associated with the US in a broader Western bloc whose credibility has weakened in the eyes of much of the world.

Atul closes by turning to the US. If Washington prevails decisively, its strategic and financial position may hold. If it fails to control the Strait of Hormuz or the war ends in stalemate, much larger questions emerge about the dollar, American power and the future of the global order. Should the US fail to prevail, the economic system that has shaped daily life across the world for decades will crumble.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Partner and geopolitical analyst Manu Sharma discuss how the Iran war reaches far beyond the battlefield into everyday economic life. What began as a military conflict in the Gulf has quickly spread through shipping lanes to fuel markets, agriculture, finance and…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Manu Sharma examine how the Iran war is triggering a global economic chain reaction, thanks to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz through which about 20% of global oil and gas pass. This supply-side energy shock has spread into food systems, financial markets and regional economies. The specter of stagflation has returned after the 1970s, raising questions about the dollar-based global financial system.”
post-date=”May 13, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: The Iran War Could Crash the Global Economy, Here’s How” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-iran-war-could-crash-the-global-economy-heres-how”>

FO Talks: The Iran War Could Crash the Global Economy, Here’s How

Martin Plaut”
post_date=”May 12, 2026 06:13″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-talks-the-elon-musk-factor-why-has-trump-snubbed-south-africa-from-the-g20/” pid=”162425″
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Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Martin Plaut, a journalist, academic and author, about the deepening rupture between the Trump administration and South Africa. They examine why Washington barred South Africa from the 2026 G20 summit in Miami, Florida, and how decades of ANC foreign policy have collided with US President Donald Trump’s worldview. Plaut views the dispute as not simply about one diplomatic incident, but ideological alignment, domestic politics and competing visions of the global order. Can South Africa preserve its BRICS-oriented identity while remaining economically dependent on the United States?

A long-brewing rupture

Plaut argues that tensions between Washington and Pretoria predate Trump, rooted in the African National Congress (ANC)’s longstanding “third-worldist” foreign policy outlook. During the anti-apartheid struggle, both the Soviet Union and China supported the ANC, creating political loyalties that still shape South African diplomacy today. Pretoria continues to pursue close ties with Russia and China while promoting a multipolar world order through forums such as BRICS.

Khattar Singh highlights several recent flashpoints. South African military officials visited Iran, and Pretoria participated in joint naval exercises alongside Iran, Russia and China. For Plaut, these actions became impossible to separate from Trump’s confrontational posture toward the Iranian capital of Tehran. He suggests that the White House increasingly views South Africa not as a neutral middle power, but as a state drifting toward America’s strategic rivals.

The decision to exclude South Africa from the G20 therefore reflects more than personal animosity. Plaut believes that it signals growing American frustration with Pretoria’s geopolitical positioning and with what Washington sees as persistent anti-Western instincts inside the ANC.

Trump, Musk and the white farmer narrative

The discussion then shifts to the highly charged politics surrounding white South African farmers. Plaut explains that Trump’s relationship with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa deteriorated sharply after a White House meeting in which Trump confronted him with images of murdered farmers and allegations of anti-white discrimination.

Plaut acknowledges that violent crime in South Africa is severe and often brutal. However, he stresses that white farmers are not uniquely targeted compared to other vulnerable groups. Khattar Singh notes that available statistics show most farm murder victims in recent years have been black South Africans, complicating the narrative circulating on social media.

Plaut says that the issue resonates with Trump because it fits into a broader MAGA-era cultural framework. “What is the MAGA movement? It’s Make White America Great Again,” he says.

Tesla CEO Elon Musk also looms over the conversation. Musk, who was born in South Africa, has repeatedly amplified claims about attacks on white farmers through X. Plaut believes Musk and a circle of wealthy South African expatriates exert more influence over Trump’s understanding of the country than traditional diplomatic channels. “They just drip feed this stuff into his ear whenever they have the opportunity,” Plaut says.

The dispute also intersects with business interests. Musk reportedly wants to expand Starlink operations in South Africa but opposes Black Economic Empowerment policies requiring foreign firms to partner with black South Africans.

Israel, the ICJ and competing worldviews

Another major source of friction is South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Plaut describes the move as a significant irritant for Washington, particularly given the Trump administration’s skepticism toward international institutions.

For many South Africans, support for the Palestinian cause fits naturally within the ANC’s anti-colonial political identity. Yet Plaut notes that divisions persist within South Africa itself. Some conservative white South Africans identify strongly with Israel and view themselves as similarly isolated within a hostile regional environment.

The broader disagreement reflects competing attitudes toward global governance. Plaut argues that while much of the world still relies on institutions built after World War II, Trump increasingly favors personal diplomacy and transactional bilateral relationships over multilateral frameworks.

Khattar Singh raises the larger question of whether Africa itself is being sidelined. South Africa was the continent’s sole G20 representative for decades before the African Union joined the grouping in 2024. Plaut rejects the idea of a coordinated American strategy against Africa, instead portraying Trump’s approach as highly personal and improvisational.

South Africa’s declining dominance

Plaut repeatedly returns to South Africa’s internal problems. Ordinary citizens care less about G20 access than about failing infrastructure, unemployment and rising crime. Johannesburg has faced prolonged water shortages and rolling electricity outages, while youth unemployment has climbed to catastrophic levels.

“Sixty percent of young people under 25 are unemployed,” Plaut says. “It is just horrific.”

These weaknesses are eroding South Africa’s claim to continental leadership. Khattar Singh points to the growing prominence of countries such as Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia. Plaut agrees that other African powers are increasingly “punching above their weight,” even as divisions inside the African Union make unified continental leadership difficult.

Simultaneously, the ANC itself is weakening politically. After losing its outright majority, the party now governs through coalition arrangements and faces mounting electoral pressure at the local level. Plaut compares its trajectory to other historic liberation movements that dominated politics after independence before gradually declining.

Can the relationship be repaired?

To repair relations with Washington, Ramaphosa has appointed Ralph Meyer as ambassador to the US. A former National Party politician who later helped negotiate the end of apartheid, Meyer is an experienced statesman capable of calming tensions after the previous ambassador accused Trump of leading a white supremacist movement.

Yet Plaut warns that waiting for Trump to leave office would be a mistake. American concerns about South Africa’s strategic orientation extend beyond one administration. Pretoria’s economic interests remain rooted to the US even as parts of the ANC remain emotionally and ideologically aligned with Russia and China.

The result is a country caught between competing worlds: politically drawn toward multipolarity, economically dependent on the West and increasingly uncertain of its own position within Africa.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Martin Plaut, a journalist, academic and author, about the deepening rupture between the Trump administration and South Africa. They examine why Washington barred South Africa from the 2026 G20 summit in Miami, Florida, and how…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Martin Plaut examine why the Trump administration barred South Africa from the 2026 G20 summit. They explore South Africa’s ties with Russia, China and Iran, Elon Musk’s influence and politics surrounding white farmer violence. South Africa must balance its commitment to multipolarity with its economic dependence on the US.”
post-date=”May 12, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: The Elon Musk Factor — Why Has Trump Snubbed South Africa from the G20?” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-elon-musk-factor-why-has-trump-snubbed-south-africa-from-the-g20″>

FO Talks: The Elon Musk Factor — Why Has Trump Snubbed South Africa from the G20?

Glenn Carle”
post_date=”May 10, 2026 05:36″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-exclusive-us-iran-double-blockade-of-hormuz-threatens-global-economy/” pid=”162383″
post-content=”

Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, examine a conflict that has spilled far beyond the battlefield. The US–Israel–Iran war, anchored in a “double blockade” of the Strait of Hormuz, has ruptured the global resource, financial and security architecture. Crucially, this disruption extends beyond Hormuz to a second chokepoint at Bab al-Mandab, where Houthi threats have compounded shipping risks and insurance costs, effectively turning a regional crisis into a multi-node global supply shock.

An unwinnable standoff

The US and Iran are now in a military and diplomatic impasse. Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz while the US Navy countered by restricting access to Iranian ports. The result has become an economic war of attrition rather than a decisive military contest. Negotiations continued intermittently in Pakistan, which is painting itself as a new neutral Switzerland for peace negotiations. However, both Iran and the US treat the negotiations as positioning exercises rather than genuine attempts at resolution.

Glenn argues that the structure of the conflict makes escalation unlikely. Neither a US invasion nor a prolonged Iranian blockade is sustainable. Economic pressures constrain both sides: Tehran cannot endure extended isolation, while Washington cannot justify the political and financial costs of indefinite deployment. A negotiated outcome is therefore likely, even if neither side formally acknowledges this.

Glenn expects a settlement resembling a diluted version of the 2015 nuclear agreement, with Iran accepting inspections while retaining its right to nuclear technology, and the strait reopening under conditions that implicitly increase Iranian influence. Both sides, he suggests, will declare victory. The underlying reality, however, is less ambiguous: The balance of leverage in the Gulf has shifted.

The supply shock that breaks the system

For Atul, the deeper story lies in the economic consequences. He calls the crisis the most severe supply-side shock since the 1970s, which has disrupted energy flows, industrial inputs and shipping routes. Hormuz’s closure has constrained not only oil and gas exports but also critical materials such as helium, aluminum and fertilizers. This has created a ripple effect across many supply chains, from semiconductors to agriculture.

The crisis has caused a breakdown between financial pricing and physical reality. Industry sources report that actual delivery prices exceeded benchmark prices by 20% or more, revealing a failure in market price discovery. This disconnect, Atul suggests, reflects a deeper structural flaw: Financial “screen prices” are increasingly driven by algorithms and interest rate expectations, while real-world scarcity is determined by physical delivery constraints. 

War-risk insurance for transit through the Persian Gulf (if available), the extra costs of diverting around the African continent, port congestion, sanctions, variable freight rates, and differing grades of crude mean that European or Asian buyers may pay substantially more per barrel than North American buyers. 

Similar price differentials are now in place for refined products. For instance, at over $200 per barrel, the average price of jet fuel is ~$40 higher in Asia than in North America. Jet fuel in Asia was, on average, cheaper than in the US before the war. Already, almost every one of the world’s major airlines has canceled flights due to the shortage and rising costs of jet fuel. In turn, this has led to a decrease in tourism, particularly to places like Thailand and Japan, because of the increase in air ticket prices.

At the household level, shortages of liquefied petroleum gas have caused restaurants and bakeries to shut down across South Asia. Aluminum shortages have caused cola cans to disappear. Supply chains for consumer goods are in disarray. Helium shortages have begun to affect semiconductor production. Across South, Southeast and East Asia, rising input costs have driven inflation and not only suppressed but also destroyed demand. Stagflation, the combination of stagnation and inflation, has already hit Asia.

A ceasefire will not end the supply shock. It will continue and cause much pain. There are silver linings, though. The supply shock is accelerating structural change, pushing the global economy to be less reliant on oil and gas for its energy needs. Solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles already have a higher demand.

The reverse flow of capital

Importantly, the Hormuz Crisis has led to what Atul terms the “Reverse Gulf Stream.” For decades, countries of the Persian Gulf sold oil, gas, fertilizers and other commodities denominated in dollars. These Gulf states invested this money in the West. In a nutshell, capital flowed from the Persian Gulf to the West, boosting financial markets and other asset prices. Now, that flow of capital has stopped.

Gulf states run generous welfare states. They now face revenue shortfalls and rising domestic costs. Some have requested dollar swap lines from the US, a move Atul describes as a “canary in the coal mine,” signaling stress even among the most financially resilient states like the UAE. This is a signal of financial stress even among historically wealthy states. There is a chance that they might sell assets they hold in the West to tide them over hard times.

The Gulf’s sovereign wealth funds, managing an estimated $5–6 trillion in assets, may be forced into large-scale liquidations. These pressures operate through multiple channels: equity sell-offs in Western markets, reduced investment in AI and technology sectors, declining purchases of US Treasuries and feedback loops in which falling asset prices force further liquidation. 

In addition, Gulf countries are no longer pricing and paying everything in dollars. Alternative payment systems such as China’s CIPS have gained traction. Iran has charged transit fees in yuan, euros and cryptocurrencies, while many countries have purchased energy using non-dollar currencies. The implications of these developments extend far beyond the Persian Gulf. Reduced demand for dollars has weakened the foundations of the petrodollar system itself.

Experienced investors in our circle argue that bond markets are starting to recognize increased financial risks. Market yields on ten-year US Treasury securities have increased from 3.97% on February 27 to 4.35% on April 28. These investors expect bond yields to rise further. The US is spending a lot of money on the Iran war at a time when American debt has crossed $39 trillion. The “exorbitant privilege” that allows the US to borrow money at lower interest rates will become less exorbitant because of the growing loss of trust in the competence of the American government and the strength of the US. Furthermore, neither the Gulf countries nor America’s East Asian allies can keep buying US debt when their earnings drop. Our investor sources are convinced that bond yields will rise because of the war. Some even expect a 15-20% correction in equity markets within a few weeks.

Financial markets, long buoyed by liquidity, have begun to confront the constraints of the real economy. Atul warns that a “reverse contagion” could emerge, in which shortages in the physical economy trigger corrections in the prices of financial assets. The adjustment, delayed but inevitable, would reshape global capital flows. A “Reverse Gulf Stream” could emerge where capital does not flow from the Persian Gulf to the West but reverses direction and goes back to the Gulf countries.

A fractured security order

The conflict has also accelerated the fragmentation of global alliances. Glenn describes the United States as a “strategic loser,” noting that Iran has emerged with greater regional influence despite sustaining military damage. The regime has consolidated into what he characterizes as a garrison state dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), strengthening its capacity to extract leverage from control of the strait.

Confidence in US security guarantees has eroded. European leaders have openly criticized Washington’s strategy, while countries such as Spain and Italy have distanced themselves from the conflict. Note that Italy is led by Giorgia Meloni, a leader of the right who had good relations with US President Donald Trump. NATO, already strained, is further strained by the rift between Europe and the US, calling its long-term viability into question. For this reason, Europe has increased defense spending and coordination, signaling a shift toward greater autonomy from the US and a preparation for a post-NATO future.

A similar pattern has unfolded in East Asia. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have deepened cooperation. These countries question US reliability after American forces and military equipment in the region have been redeployed to the Middle East. They regard Barack Obama’s Asia Pivot and Trump’s China focus as aspirational efforts by a superpower that is still fundamentally mired in the Middle East. 

The Gulf states themselves are increasingly looking to external partners such as Pakistan for both diplomatic mediation and potential security support. Not only do these states face a threat from Iran but they also fear popular unrest at home. Hence, they are diversifying away from exclusive reliance on the US. 

Across regions, allies have begun to hedge, investing in their own capabilities rather than relying on American protection. This realignment reflects a broader transformation. The US role as guarantor of global trade routes — central to its post-World War II dominance — has appeared less certain. As Atul notes, the inability to secure key chokepoints challenges the very foundation of American hegemony. At its heyday, the UK was able to keep the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Bab al-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca open. That is the standard for a global superpower and that is the standard the US is failing to meet. 

The Hormuz Crisis of 2026 is for the US what the Suez Crisis of 1956 was for the UK. Just as Suez demonstrated the limits of British power, Hormuz is revealing the limits of American might.

Technology, energy and the new balance of power

Amid these disruptions, structural shifts have accelerated. The transition to renewable energy has gained momentum as countries seek to reduce dependence on vulnerable supply chains. Glenn estimates that the timeline for renewables to dominate global electricity production could advance by five to six years.

China has stood out as a primary beneficiary. Its leadership in electric vehicles, solar technology and battery production puts Chinese companies in pole position to capitalize on this transition. Even in the US, electric vehicle sales have already gone up because of higher gas prices.

The war has also showcased the ongoing revolution in military technology. Cheap drones, costing tens of thousands of dollars, have threatened assets worth billions. This asymmetry has undermined traditional power projection, reducing the effectiveness of aircraft carriers and other capital-intensive systems. As Glenn illustrates, even highly effective defense systems can be overwhelmed by asymmetric warfare. Destroying 98 out of 100 incoming drones still leaves two capable of inflicting catastrophic damage at a fraction of the cost of the systems they target. The result has been a leveling effect. Regional actors have gained relative strength while superpowers have faced higher costs and greater vulnerability.

In a nutshell, the old order is now dead. The resource, financial and security architectures that shaped the post-World War II world are crumbling. What is emerging is not yet a coherent new system, but a world in transition — more fragmented, more competitive and less predictable than the one it is replacing.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, examine a conflict that has spilled far beyond the battlefield. The US–Israel–Iran war, anchored in a “double blockade” of the…”
post_summery=”In this section of the April 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle argue that the Iran war has triggered a massive supply shock to the economy. Oil, gas, fertilizers and industrial inputs are scarce, causing shortages and price rises in the real economy. In fact, the resource, financial and security architectures of the post-World War II era are crumbling as the limits of American power become visible to the entire world.”
post-date=”May 10, 2026″
post-title=”FO Exclusive: US–Iran Double Blockade of Hormuz Threatens Global Economy” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-us-iran-double-blockade-of-hormuz-threatens-global-economy”>

FO Exclusive: US–Iran Double Blockade of Hormuz Threatens Global Economy

Glenn Carle”
post_date=”May 09, 2026 05:22″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-exclusive-global-lightning-roundup-of-april-2026/” pid=”162370″
post-content=”

Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, survey a month in which disparate events point in a single direction: a global order under strain. The US–Israel–Iran war anchors their analysis, but the surrounding developments — from space exploration to European politics — reveal deeper structural shifts. As Atul puts it, the aim is to “sift signal from noise” in a moment when American primacy appears less certain and states are recalibrating accordingly.

A brief moment of optimism

Atul and Glenn begin with the Artemis II mission. Astronauts orbited around the moon and returned, marking humanity’s first departure from Earth’s orbit in 54 years. For Glenn, the mission signals more than symbolic progress. It expands “the range of human capabilities” and promises technological spillovers that will boost economies for decades.

Yet even here, not all is rosy. Glenn notes that the current NASA architecture may prove financially unsustainable, with private-sector systems such as SpaceX’s Starship likely to dominate future exploration. Even in space, state-led models are giving way to hybrid or commercial ones, mirroring broader economic trends.

Israel, Europe and the politics of rupture

Atul and Glenn soon turn sombre and shine the light on Israel. The country was in the news for passing a law that, in effect, makes it mandatory for Palestinians to receive a death sentence if they are convicted by a military court of deadly terrorist acts. Those convicted have no right to appeal. Israeli civil and human rights groups say the law is racist. The language of the law implies that it could be applied to Israeli Arabs, for example, but not to Jewish citizens. This means they could be becoming second-class citizens in their own country.

The Israeli parliament has also passed a record $271 billion budget. This huge defense spending suggests the country is evolving into even more of a “Spartan state.” Israel is now the dominant military power in the region.

Israel is also increasingly losing international support. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni suspended defense cooperation despite her prior alignment with both Israel and US President Donald Trump. Meloni’s changed position reflects mounting domestic opposition in Italy to the war. Therefore, her government has denied US aircraft access to bases in Sicily. In Spain, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has been very vocal in opposing the war and attracted American ire. 

Sánchez has also made a sweeping change to Spain’s immigration policy. His government has offered residency to 500,000 undocumented migrants, provided they have lived in Spain for at least five months and have no criminal record. This is an unconventional immigration policy at a time when other European countries are tightening, not opening, borders to immigrants.

The tensions over immigration in the US, Europe and elsewhere point to a deeper dilemma across advanced economies: demographic decline versus social cohesion. Immigration sustains growth but can lead to a clash of cultures. It can also cause political backlash, fueling the rise of far-right movements. Tensions in Europe over immigration are triggered by structural changes and are here to stay.

Britain and the crisis of governance

British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer is in increasingly hot soup. His decision to appoint Lord Peter Mandelson as ambassador to America has come back to haunt him. Mandelson was one of the architects of New Labour who brought Tony Blair and Gordon Brown to power. In the UK, Mandelson is known as “the Dark Lord” and “the Prince of Darkness,” because he has too many dodgy friends. These include folks in China and Russia and a certain Jeffrey Epstein. 

After facing mounting criticism for appointing Mandelson, the Starmer government sacked Sir Oliver Robbins. Starmer blamed the Foreign Office for not telling him that Mandelson had failed security clearances. Robbins told a parliamentary committee there was a “very, very strong expectation” from the prime minister’s office to rush the process. Talk of Labour members of parliament defenestrating Starmer is now rife in London.

This political instability in the UK is worsening economic fragility. The broader picture is one of eroding confidence not only in the government but also in the country. Inflation, increasing debt and bond yields are pushing the country into a crisis.

Defense has also been in the news in the UK. Lord George Robertson said that Britain is in “peril” because of the Starmer government’s “corrosive complacency.” The former NATO secretary-general blamed the UK Treasury for its failure to fund the review’s recommendations.

Antisemitism is on the rise

In April, Britain’s chief rabbi, Ephraim Mirvis, warned that “a sustained campaign of violence” against Jews was gathering momentum. Nine people were arrested for planning an attack on an unknown Jewish target in one of the recent incidents.

Not only the UK but also the US is experiencing rising antisemitism. In fact, antisemitism is experiencing a dramatic, record-high surge globally. After the October 7, 2023, terror attacks on Israel and the subsequent Israeli conflict with Hamas in Gaza, antisemitic sentiment has increased. Data shows a nearly 350% increase in US incidents over the past five years, with over 9,300 incidents reported in 2024 alone. American Jewish Committee’s report, The State of Antisemitism in America 2025, chronicles rising physical attacks and online vitriol against Jews. One highlight from the report says, “In The Two Years Since October 7, An Overwhelming Number Of American Jews Feel Less Safe.”

In Europe, antisemitism is coming from two sources: the traditional far-right, as well as many recent Muslim immigrants. The nativist nationalist right has fanned prejudice against Jews, who have historically been the other. Many immigrants identify with the Palestinian cause. They believe that Jews oppress their fellow Muslims in an apartheid state and, often fanned by radical mosques, come to believe that attacks on Jews are justified.

Many Muslims come from societies where non-Muslims have few rights. So, they carry their prejudices to their new homes. French and British intelligence have been worried about many radical mosques preaching a toxic brew. For decades, Saudi money propagated an extreme form of Islam that was highly antisemitic. For years, the CIA focused on the Saudi promotion of puritanical and fanatical Wahhabi Islam, promoting both antisemitism and jihadism. The flames that have been fanned for years continue to burn.

Key developments in India, Canada, Japan and Hungary

In India, the Narendra Modi government suffered a politically embarrassing defeat. For the first time, a government bill was voted out by parliament. This has occurred only twice this century, the last time was in 2002. The government tabled amendments that would have increased the number of seats in the lower house of parliament from 543 to 850. This would have weakened India’s southern states, which duly voted against the bill. In addition to religion, language and region form the other two faultlines. Both faultlines have now returned to the forefront in Indian politics. 

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s Liberal Party secured a small majority in the House of Commons after winning special elections, also called by-elections, to three constituencies. Under Carney and his predecessor, Justin Trudeau, the Liberals ran a minority government with coalition partners. Now, they have a majority in parliament and have strengthened Carney’s position.

In an important move, the Carney government has created a Canada Strong Fund, a sovereign wealth fund, to invest in energy, infrastructure, mining, agriculture and technology. This is a first for the country. The fund will have an initial corpus of $25 billion Canadian dollars, i.e. $18.4 billion. This is part of a broader strategy by Carney to boost Canada’s economy in the face of US tariff threats. 

In combination with the private sector, the government will invest in “nation-building projects” such as port upgrades and natural resource development. The opposition has criticised the move. They make the argument that, unlike Norway, Canada is in debt, meaning its sovereign wealth fund will not be paid for by revenues but by borrowed money. Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre has called it a “sovereign debt fund.” In an innovative move, the Carney government will allow Canadians to directly pay into the new fund. This practice doesn’t exist in other countries with similar funds and might be a clever way to reduce reliance on Wall Street and Washington. Carney is taking a step to protect Canada from America’s capriciousness.

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae announced a relaxation of restrictions on weapons exports to open up the defence industry’s trade with foreign countries. Sanae said, “No single country can now protect its own peace and security alone.” Last year, Sanae sparked a row with China last year by suggesting Japan would respond if Taiwan was invaded. Beijing said it would resist Japan’s “new form of militarism.” Glenn takes the view that this marks Japan’s emergence as a fully independent strategic actor, no longer relying entirely on the American security umbrella. Both Japan and Canada are similar in taking steps to rely less on the US and more on themselves.

In Hungary, the centrist Tisza party won around two-thirds of the seats in Hungary’s election, booting Viktor Orbán and his populist-right Fidesz party out of office after 16 years in power. Péter Magyar will be the new prime minister. He once belonged to Orban’s party and began to campaign against corruption and for the rule of law. Magyar won on competence and governance issues, overcoming apathy and energizing voters.

Magyar’s victory was shaped by late-campaign events that weakened Orbán. A leaked telephone call between Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov reinforced perceptions of the government’s subservience to Moscow. Also, US Vice President JD Vance’s visit to support Orbán did not cut much ice with Hungarian voters.

For Glenn, Orbán was a pawn of Moscow who ran an “authoritarian and corrupt regime” aligned with Moscow. Atul offers a more qualified view, noting that Magyar was able to run a grassroots campaign, win handsomely and also that Orbán conceded defeat quickly.

On an important note, Magyar has made improving relations with the EU a priority. Now, Brussels is likely to release not only previously frozen funds for Hungary but also an aid package for Hungary that had so far been blocked by Orbán. Now, we have a completely new political landscape in Hungary and in Europe.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, survey a month in which disparate events point in a single direction: a global order under strain. The US–Israel–Iran war anchors…”
post_summery=”In this section of the April 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle analyze key events of the month. They analyze the Artemis II mission, a discriminatory Israeli law, loss of international support for Israel, a deepening crisis in the UK, and antisemitism in the UK, the US and Europe. They also examine major political developments in India, Canada, Japan and Hungary.”
post-date=”May 09, 2026″
post-title=”FO Exclusive: Global Lightning Roundup of April 2026″ slug-data=”fo-exclusive-global-lightning-roundup-of-april-2026″>

FO Exclusive: Global Lightning Roundup of April 2026

Sinem Sonmez”
post_date=”May 08, 2026 05:54″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-talks-economy-sanctions-and-oil-why-iran-could-not-sustain-this-war/” pid=”162354″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with economist and game theorist Sinem Sonmez about a conflict in which economics proves as consequential as military force. Their discussion examines how the US-led blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, combined with strikes on Iranian infrastructure, pushed Iran into an increasingly unsustainable position. While the war revealed Iran’s military resilience in some areas, Sonmez argues that the decisive factor was economic vulnerability. The episode ultimately asks whether modern wars are now won less through battlefield dominance than through the ability to choke an adversary’s financial system.

A blockade built on economic pressure

Khattar Singh opens by asking Sonmez to explain the legal and strategic logic behind the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz. She notes that under UNCLOS Article 38, passage through the strait is ordinarily protected even during conflict. The United States, however, justified its actions by designating Iran a “rogue state” and arguing that it had the right to inspect vessels carrying war-sustaining material.

She states that the blockade only became possible after the US first degraded Iran’s military and industrial capacity. She argues that Washington delayed enforcement until it could reduce the risk posed by Iranian air power and ensure that economic pressure would be maximally effective. “The US had to destroy Iran’s critical infrastructure and industries in order to bring Iran’s economy to a standstill,” she says.

The blockade itself was a major logistical operation involving warships, fighter aircraft, helicopters and thousands of US personnel. Sonmez argues that its effectiveness demonstrated how maritime power can still determine the trajectory of modern conflict. Once Iranian exports were interrupted, Tehran rapidly lost economic room to maneuver.

Iran’s economic vulnerability

The central theme of the discussion is Iran’s structural dependence on oil revenues. Sonmez explains that oil accounts for roughly 13% of Iran’s GDP and provides the foreign exchange needed to finance imports. Without access to those revenues, the country faces currency devaluation, hyperinflation and industrial paralysis.

The blockade quickly exposed those weaknesses. Iran reportedly had only two to three weeks of storage capacity before it would have to shut down production entirely. According to certain figures, the blockade was costing Iran approximately $435 million per day, including hundreds of millions in lost oil and petrochemical exports.

The domestic consequences were severe. Nearly 12 million jobs or 50% of Iran’s workforce were reportedly at risk, while major sectors such as steel, petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals faced mass disruption. Sonmez argues that this pressure forced Iran to negotiate far sooner than it otherwise would have. “Iran runs on cash generated by oil exports,” she explains, warning that without foreign currency reserves and a currency devaluation, “hyperinflation ensues.”

Khattar Singh notes that Iran’s economy had already been weakened by years of sanctions following the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018. The war compounded those problems, leaving Tehran with shrinking options even before the blockade took full effect.

Regional escalation and China’s calculation

The conversation also explores Iran’s attempt to widen the conflict by targeting infrastructure and bases across the Gulf region. Khattar Singh points out that Iranian strikes hit the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and even Oman, despite Oman’s role as a mediator.

Sonmez believes Tehran hoped Gulf states would pressure Washington to halt the assault once their own energy infrastructure came under threat. Instead, the strategy backfired. Reports suggested that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman favored a tougher US response after damage to regional infrastructure, including disruptions affecting Qatar’s liquefied natural gas capacity.

The role of China emerges as another critical factor. As Iran’s largest oil customer, Beijing was theoretically positioned to soften the impact of the blockade. Yet Sonmez argues that US pressure on Chinese banks and shipping companies successfully deterred major intervention. Chinese tankers reportedly rerouted away from the strait, while Beijing assured Washington it would not provide weapons or military assistance to Tehran.

For Sonmez, this became the decisive turning point. “The whole thing boils down to economics,” she says. Without Chinese financial or military backing, Iran lacked the capacity to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

Military surprises and political realities

Despite Iran’s economic weakness, the war still revealed unexpected strengths. Sonmez notes that the scale of Iran’s drone and missile arsenal surprised observers and imposed significant costs on US defensive systems. Iranian attacks also continued even after senior military figures were killed.

“The organization ran seamlessly,” Sonmez says, describing how Iranian operations continued despite leadership losses. That resilience complicated assumptions that decapitation strikes alone could cripple the Iranian state.

Still, Sonmez argues that military endurance could not overcome financial exhaustion. She believes Tehran entered negotiations because it needed immediate economic relief and had to preserve the regime’s ability to pay the military and security establishment that keeps it in power.

Khattar Singh and Sonmez close by turning to the broader global economy. Sonmez expresses astonishment that US stock markets rallied during the crisis despite continuing uncertainty surrounding oil prices, private credit markets and heavily valued AI companies. She compares the surge in markets to the dot-com bubble and argues that investor optimism became detached from underlying risks.

Even after the ceasefire reduced oil prices, Sonmez remains skeptical that the underlying structural problems have disappeared. The episode ends with a broader warning that economic fragility, financial markets and geopolitical conflict are now deeply interconnected. Military victories may shape headlines, but the long-term balance of power increasingly depends on who can survive economic pressure the longest.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with economist and game theorist Sinem Sonmez about a conflict in which economics proves as consequential as military force. Their discussion examines how the US-led blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, combined with strikes on Iranian…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Sinem Sonmez examine how the US-led blockade in the Strait of Hormuz pushed Iran’s already economy toward crisis. Oil dependence, limited storage capacity, sanctions and foreign exchange shortages made Iran unable to sustain a prolonged war. Modern conflict increasingly turns on economic leverage as much as military power.”
post-date=”May 08, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Economy, Sanctions and Oil — Why Iran Could Not Sustain This War” slug-data=”fo-talks-economy-sanctions-and-oil-why-iran-could-not-sustain-this-war”>

FO Talks: Economy, Sanctions and Oil — Why Iran Could Not Sustain This War

Ali Omar Forozish”
post_date=”May 07, 2026 06:20″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-talks-turkeys-eurasian-partnership-with-russia-and-china-risks-isolation-in-nato/” pid=”162337″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with author Ali Omar Forozish about Turkey’s attempt to navigate an increasingly fragmented world order without fully committing to either East or West. Under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish capital of Ankara is expanding ties with Russia- and China-led institutions while remaining embedded within NATO and the broader Western security system. Forozish believes this balancing act reflects both Turkey’s geopolitical realities and its growing desire for strategic autonomy. Yet the discussion also raises a central question: Can a middle power sustain a position between rival blocs without eventually being forced to choose?

Turkey’s search for its own center of gravity

Forozish frames Turkey’s geopolitical strategy through political scientist Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis rather than political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History.” In his view, the contemporary world is increasingly divided into competing civilizational and geopolitical blocs, leaving countries such as Turkey searching for a distinct position between them.

He says Turkey occupies a “liminal space” shaped simultaneously by the Islamic and Ottoman past and the secular, Western-oriented republic created in the 20th century. Ankara’s frustrations with both camps have reinforced this ambiguity. Turkey spent decades attempting to join the European Union without success, while its NATO membership has also generated suspicion among non-Western powers.

As a result, Forozish believes Ankara no longer seeks full integration into either side. “Turkey believes its role identity is not to be a side, but to be [the] center of gravity,” he states.

Domestic politics reinforce this orientation. Erdoğan’s alliance with politician Devlet Bahçeli’s Nationalist Movement Party has strengthened nationalist narratives that portray the West as hostile to Turkish sovereignty and Islamic civilization. Forozish links this outlook to the long-standing “Sèvres Syndrome,” a belief among Turkish nationalists that foreign powers continue to seek Turkey’s fragmentation and subordination.

Hedging between NATO and Eurasia

Khattar Singh and Forozish describe Turkey’s strategy as one of institutional hedging rather than outright realignment. Ankara is deepening engagement with non-Western organizations while avoiding a complete break with NATO.

Turkey formally applied for BRICS membership in 2024, although it ultimately received partner status rather than full accession. At the same time, Turkey has maintained dialogue-partner status within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization since 2013, making it the only NATO member connected to the group.

Forozish argues these moves are pragmatic rather than ideological. “It’s not a complete shift to the Eastern Bloc,” he says. “It’s just a complementary act for them.”

Geography remains central to Ankara’s calculations. Turkey seeks to position itself as a logistical bridge between Europe and Asia through the so-called Middle Corridor, a trans-Caspian trade route connecting China and Europe while bypassing Russia. The corridor has gained importance following disruptions tied to the war in Ukraine and wider instability across Eurasia.

Under optimal conditions, delivery times along this route could reportedly fall to around 15 days. Ankara therefore sees infrastructure and transit connectivity as tools for expanding both economic influence and geopolitical leverage.

An “unholy alliance” of convenience

Despite Turkey’s growing engagement with Russia and China, Forozish rejects the idea that a coherent Eurasian bloc is emerging. Instead, he characterizes the relationship as an “unholy alliance” built on mutual convenience rather than shared values or long-term trust.

The three states continue to compete across multiple arenas. Turkey and Russia back opposing actors in conflicts such as Syria and Libya, while Ankara’s push to expand influence among Turkic states in Central Asia challenges Moscow’s historic dominance in the region. China, meanwhile, remains economically dominant within the relationship.

Trade figures illustrate the imbalance. Turkey runs trade deficits of roughly $40–50 billion with China and approximately $16 billion with Russia. According to Forozish, this leaves Turkey functioning more as a transit and consumer economy than an equal strategic partner.

Tensions also persist over the treatment of Uyghurs in China. Forozish warns that Ankara’s silence on the issue could generate domestic backlash inside Turkey, where many nationalists and Islamists identify closely with Turkic Muslim communities.

For him, the partnership ultimately reflects transactional realpolitik rather than ideological solidarity. Russia gains opportunities to weaken NATO cohesion, China expands access to European markets and Turkey acquires leverage against the West.

The danger of “double isolation”

Khattar Singh presses Forozish on the risks of Turkey’s balancing strategy failing. If Ankara drifts too far from the West without securing meaningful alternatives from Russia or China, it could find itself isolated from both camps at once.

Forozish describes this possibility as “double isolation” or “strategic homelessness.” Turkey could become too Eastern for Western allies to fully trust while remaining too connected to NATO for Russia and China to treat as a dependable partner.

Such a scenario would create economic as well as geopolitical vulnerabilities. Turkey remains deeply integrated with Western capital markets and trade networks. A decisive rupture with Europe and the United States could intensify inflation, weaken the lira and trigger capital flight.

Forozish also warns that strategic isolation could deepen domestic radicalization. “Turkey will be the hub for the radical Islamists,” he says, describing what he views as the most dangerous possible outcome of a failed balancing strategy.

The conversation ultimately presents Turkey’s Eurasian pivot as a high-risk effort to maximize flexibility in a multipolar world. Ankara may gain short-term leverage from balancing rival powers, but the structural tensions within the strategy place clear limits on how far that balancing act can go.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with author Ali Omar Forozish about Turkey’s attempt to navigate an increasingly fragmented world order without fully committing to either East or West. Under Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish capital of Ankara is…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Ali Omar Forozish discuss Turkey’s attempt to balance between the West and a Russia–China-led Eurasian bloc. They examine Turkey’s BRICS application, its ties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its promotion of the Middle Corridor trade route. This strategy gives Ankara leverage, but risks isolating Turkey from both sides.”
post-date=”May 07, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Turkey’s Eurasian Partnership with Russia and China Risks Isolation in NATO” slug-data=”fo-talks-turkeys-eurasian-partnership-with-russia-and-china-risks-isolation-in-nato”>

FO Talks: Turkey’s Eurasian Partnership with Russia and China Risks Isolation in NATO

Daniel J. Fernández-Guevara”
post_date=”May 02, 2026 06:53″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/latin_america/fo-talks-trump-says-cuba-is-collapsing-so-why-hasnt-it-fallen-yet/” pid=”162255″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with historian Daniel J. Fernández-Guevara about why Cuba, despite facing one of the gravest crises in its modern history, still has not collapsed. The island is enduring deep economic pain, constant blackouts, inflation, outmigration and institutional strain. Yet Fernández-Guevara argues that anyone trying to understand Cuba must look beyond the usual predictions of imminent regime change and pay attention to the forces that have long sustained the country: national sovereignty, historical memory and local resilience.

A crisis without a clear breaking point

Fernández-Guevara describes Cuba’s present condition as a “polycrisis,” borrowing the term as it applies to the island from scholar Mayra Espina. The country is confronting several overlapping emergencies at once: economic decline tied to Venezuela’s reduced support, structural adjustments to a harsher global market, severe demographic loss through migration and the corrosion of the solidarity networks that once helped people endure hardship.

This has brought grave social consequences. Infant mortality has risen, life expectancy has fallen and the energy grid is in near collapse. Blackouts have become routine, disrupting hospitals, schools and daily life. Fernández-Guevara goes so far as to say the situation is in some respects worse than the crisis that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Even so, he resists declaring that Cuba is on the verge of collapse. As he notes, “Everyone who has forecasted the change in government in Cuba has been wrong for 67 years.” That does not make the current situation any less severe. It means only that suffering alone has not translated neatly into regime change.

Why Cuba never fully embraced the China or Vietnam model

Khattar Singh presses Fernández-Guevara on why Cuba has not taken the same path as China or Vietnam, both of which incorporated major elements of capitalism while preserving one-party rule. Fernández-Guevara explains that Cuba has repeatedly opened parts of its economy, then pulled back once private wealth began to accumulate too visibly.

He recalls a remark from someone close to the Cuban government: “Cuba wants to have a country that makes millions and millions of dollars but without any millionaires.” That paradox lies at the heart of the Cuban system. The leadership wants growth, foreign exchange and investment, but remains wary of the inequalities that market reform can unleash.

This pattern has produced a stop-start cycle of reform and retrenchment. Tourism was opened. Small private restaurants, or paladares, emerged. Independent drivers and other small entrepreneurs found room to operate. But each time the private sector began to develop social and economic weight, the state moved to contain it.

Fernández-Guevara suggests that Cuba has not followed a long-term strategic reform plan so much as it has improvised under pressure. It has had to adapt not only to the global spread of capitalism, but also to shifting regional politics and the collapse of older support systems.

Sovereignty, memory and the rejection of foreign pressure

For Fernández-Guevara, the key to Cuba’s endurance lies not only in institutions, but in history. He believes many outside observers underestimate how central national sovereignty remains to Cuban political identity. Cubans may be deeply critical of their own government, but that does not mean they welcome external intervention.

He points to a long history of US involvement in Cuban affairs. After the war of 1898, the United States intervened directly and then imposed the Platt Amendment, which embedded US power in the island’s constitutional order. Washington later backed Batista, including after his 1952 coup against a constitutional government. That memory still shapes how many Cubans understand foreign pressure today.

As Fernández-Guevara puts it, “national sovereignty is a very important thing” in Cuba. The 1959 revolution, despite all its failures and contradictions, still carries symbolic weight because it is seen by many as the moment Cuba definitively resisted outside domination.

That helps explain why US pressure does not always produce the outcome Washington expects. Hardship can fuel anger, but it can also reinforce a siege mentality, strengthen nationalist sentiment and push people to rely more heavily on one another.

Trump, Rubio and the logic of maximum pressure

The conversation then turns to US President Donald Trump’s renewed focus on Cuba and the role of Secretary of State Marco Rubio in shaping policy. Fernández-Guevara argues that the Trump administration sees Cuba as unusually weak after the pandemic, the collapse of tourism, currency unification and the continuing deterioration of the energy system.

He contrasts this with the years of US President Barack Obama’s administration, when normalization created what he remembers as a mood of genuine optimism. Cubans repaired homes, opened businesses and believed the long freeze with Washington might finally end. Trump’s first term halted that opening, and US President Joe Biden largely continued the same restrictions. Then came Covid-19 and a disastrous currency reform, which compounded the damage.

From Fernández-Guevara’s perspective, the current administration appears to believe this is the best possible moment to force concessions. He describes that approach as “the bluster of the art of the deal,” with foreign policy treated as a coercive business negotiation.

Yet he is careful not to pretend that Washington’s aims are fully clear. Economic liberalization appears to be one goal. Tourism and foreign capital may be another. But whether the US wants a negotiated transition or a more confrontational outcome remains uncertain.

Why Cuba still endures

Khattar Singh closes by asking the most important question: If life in Cuba is so hard, why has the system not broken? Fernández-Guevara says that Cuba lacks a coordinated opposition of the kind seen in Venezuela, while still retaining a powerful state structure, especially through the military. Protest exists, but it remains fragmented and localized.

At the same time, ordinary Cubans have decades of experience surviving under pressure. Communities share resources. Families improvise. People leave when they can, adapt when they cannot and continue living inside a system that has taught them endurance.

This is what outsiders miss. Cuba is not simply a failing state waiting to tip over. It is a society marked by exhaustion, pain and uncertainty, but also by a long political memory and a stubborn resistance to external designs. That is why the country’s future remains so difficult to predict.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with historian Daniel J. Fernández-Guevara about why Cuba, despite facing one of the gravest crises in its modern history, still has not collapsed. The island is enduring deep economic pain, constant blackouts, inflation, outmigration…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Daniel J. Fernández-Guevara examine Cuba’s deepening “poly-crisis,” marked by economic collapse, blackouts and mass migration. Despite severe hardship, Cuba has not fallen due to strong national sovereignty, historical memory and no coordinated opposition. External pressure, especially from the United States, continues to strain the system without collapsing it.”
post-date=”May 02, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Trump Says Cuba Is Collapsing, so Why Hasn’t It Fallen Yet?” slug-data=”fo-talks-trump-says-cuba-is-collapsing-so-why-hasnt-it-fallen-yet”>

FO Talks: Trump Says Cuba Is Collapsing, so Why Hasn’t It Fallen Yet?

Stephen Zunes”
post_date=”May 01, 2026 06:09″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-talks-irgc-survives-why-the-iran-war-has-backfired-for-trump-and-netanyahu/” pid=”162233″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Stephen Zunes, professor of politics and director of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco, about a war that was meant to weaken adversaries but may instead be reinforcing them. As fighting spills across Iran, Israel and Lebanon, is the military force achieving its stated political aims? Or is it producing the opposite effect?

A war measured in displacement

Khattar Singh opens with Lebanon, where the scale of destruction has become impossible to ignore. Zunes points to the displacement of roughly 1.2 million people in a country of just five million, describing a campaign that goes far beyond tactical strikes. Entire towns in southern Lebanon have been leveled, often in areas with little evidence of active combat.

For Zunes, the pattern resembles deliberate devastation rather than incidental damage. “These are not buildings damaged in firefights… this is controlled demolitions,” he says, highlighting how the campaign disproportionately affects civilians. The targeting of infrastructure linked to Hezbollah’s social services, including medical networks, further blurs the line between military and civilian space. The result is a humanitarian crisis that risks reshaping Lebanon’s social fabric for years to come.

Hezbollah’s resilience and roots

Khattar Singh and Zunes then turn to Hezbollah itself. Despite the killing of senior leaders and significant operational setbacks, the group remains intact. Zunes provides historic context for the group’s resilience: Hezbollah emerged in direct response to Israel’s 1982 occupation of southern Lebanon, embedding itself within marginalized Shia communities.

Over time, it evolved into more than a militant organization. By providing healthcare, welfare and local governance where the Lebanese state fell short, Hezbollah built a durable support base. That dual role as both militia and service provider helps explain why it can absorb military blows without collapsing.

Zunes also highlights the cyclical nature of the conflict. Efforts to eliminate Hezbollah risk reproducing the very conditions that sustain it. Military pressure, particularly when it affects civilian populations, can deepen grievances and reinforce the group’s legitimacy among its constituents.

Strategic goals, unmet outcomes

At the core of the conversation is the gap between stated objectives and actual results. The United States and Israel entered the conflict with ambitions that included weakening Iran’s regime, curbing its nuclear capacity and dismantling the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US hasn’t achieved even one of these goals.

The IRGC remains in place. Iran’s nuclear material has not been removed. Instead, Tehran has demonstrated new leverage by disrupting the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global energy flows. A ceasefire, announced on April 16 and mediated by Pakistan, reflects these constraints as much as any diplomatic breakthrough.

Zunes is blunt about the broader pattern. “This kind of pressure… has not eliminated their nuclear program… if anything, it’s strengthened the regime,” he says. Rather than forcing capitulation, the campaign appears to have consolidated hardline power within Iran, undermining earlier internal dissent.

Regional ripple effects

Beyond the immediate battlefield, the war has triggered wider instability. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted supply chains and strained Gulf economies that depend on both exports and imports through the corridor. Even states traditionally aligned against Iran now face difficult trade-offs between security and economic survival.

Khattar Singh notes that Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have experienced the conflict’s consequences more directly. While some remain wary of Iran’s influence, the economic shock has increased the appeal of deescalation. For many, reopening the strait has become an overriding priority.

Simultaneously, tensions persist. Iranian strikes on regional infrastructure have hardened attitudes in some capitals, complicating any unified response. The result is a fragmented landscape in which no actor fully controls the trajectory of events.

Power, politics and unintended consequences

The conversation closes with the political dimension. Both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump face domestic pressures that intersect with military strategy. For Netanyahu, ongoing conflict may delay political reckoning at home. For Trump, the war’s economic and strategic fallout could shape upcoming elections.

Yet the most consequential shift may be inside Iran. Despite earlier protests against the regime, the external threat has rallied segments of the population around the state. Zunes sees this as a familiar dynamic. “People rally around the flag when they’re being bombed,” he observes. External intervention often strengthens the very forces it seeks to weaken.

This leads to a broader conclusion about regime change. Zunes argues that durable political transformation cannot be imposed from outside, but must emerge internally. Historical examples, from Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia, underscore the limits of military solutions in achieving political ends.

If the war has demonstrated anything, it is that escalation does not guarantee control. Instead of collapse, it may produce adaptation. Instead of weakening adversaries, it may entrench them. For policymakers, that raises a difficult but unavoidable question: What happens when the use of force systematically fails to deliver the outcomes it promises?

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Stephen Zunes, professor of politics and director of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco, about a war that was meant to weaken adversaries but may instead be reinforcing them. As fighting spills across Iran,…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Stephen Zunes argue that the Iran War reveals a persistent gap between military success and political outcomes. While the campaign has inflicted damage, it has strengthened hardline forces and deepened humanitarian crises. Additionally, Zunes reviews modern Lebanese history to explain why Israel’s devastating war likely won’t destroy Hezbollah.”
post-date=”May 01, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: IRGC Survives — Why the Iran War Has Backfired for Trump and Netanyahu” slug-data=”fo-talks-irgc-survives-why-the-iran-war-has-backfired-for-trump-and-netanyahu”>

FO Talks: IRGC Survives — Why the Iran War Has Backfired for Trump and Netanyahu

Aron Rimanyi”
post_date=”April 30, 2026 06:05″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/fo-talks-hungary-votes-for-change-peter-magyar-ends-viktor-orbans-16-year-rule/” pid=”162211″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Aron Rimanyi, an associate at Training The Street, about an election result that may reshape Hungary’s political trajectory. Péter Magyar’s center-right Tisza party has secured an electoral victory, ending incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s 16-year dominance and raising questions about whether this marks a routine change of leadership or a deeper systemic shift. Beyond the numbers, Khattar Singh and Rimanyi explore the economic, social and political forces behind the vote, and what they signal for Hungary’s future.

A landslide that signals rupture

Rimanyi describes the election as more than a decisive win. With 55.3% of the vote translating into a two-thirds parliamentary majority — 141 out of 199 seats — Tisza has achieved the kind of mandate rarely seen in European politics. Turnout reached roughly 80%, underscoring the scale of public engagement.

For Rimanyi, the magnitude of the outcome carries particular meaning. He calls it a “popular rejection of 16 years of Orbán government;” the result reflects accumulated dissatisfaction rather than a narrow electoral swing. While pre-election polling had pointed to a Magyar victory, the scale of defeat for Orbán’s right-wing Fidesz party — especially among government-aligned pollsters — turned the outcome into a genuine political upset.

The result also reflects a generational shift. Younger voters, many of whom have only known Orbán’s leadership, played a decisive role. Their participation suggests not only dissatisfaction with the present, but a desire to redefine Hungary’s political future.

Economic strain and campaign contrast

Economic conditions form the backbone of Rimanyi’s explanation. Hungary’s post-2010 growth model, he argues, faltered after external conditions worsened. EU funds declined, global conditions tightened and inflation surged to the highest levels in the European Union during 2022 and 2023. As costs rose faster than wages, public frustration deepened.

Rimanyi frames this as a structural problem rather than a temporary downturn. He notes that the system “ran out of steam,” leaving Hungary caught in a middle-income trap where productivity lags and living standards stagnate. Voting behavior became more pragmatic, driven by household economics rather than ideological alignment.

Simultaneously, the campaign itself highlighted a contrast in political style. Magyar’s grassroots approach — touring small towns and villages often overlooked by national politicians — helped him build a broad support base. His focus on everyday concerns, from wages to cost of living, resonated more strongly than the government’s emphasis on geopolitical messaging.

By contrast, Fidesz’s communication strategy appeared increasingly detached from voter priorities. Its focus on external threats, particularly Ukraine, failed to address domestic economic pressures. Rimanyi suggests that voters ultimately prioritized tangible concerns over abstract security narratives. He also notes that the visit of US Vice President JD Vance during the campaign had little to no impact. Vance has low name recognition in Hungary and arrived without concrete economic commitments, reinforcing the perception that Orbán’s ties to Washington produced rhetoric rather than tangible benefits for Hungarian voters.

System fatigue and political backlash

Beyond economics, the election exposed deeper institutional tensions. Rimanyi points to a series of late-campaign revelations from insiders, including allegations that state institutions were used for partisan purposes. Among the most striking was a military captain — previously the public face of the armed forces’ recruitment campaign — who broke ranks to describe chronic underfunding and claimed that most personnel would not support Orbán. This intervention, largely overlooked in Western coverage, resonated strongly with Hungarian voters. These developments reinforced perceptions of overreach within a highly centralized system.

He characterizes the dynamic as “state capture.” This use of public institutions to target political opponents crossed a threshold for many voters. While corruption had long been part of the political discourse, these more direct allegations appear to have intensified public backlash.

The election result, therefore, reflects not only dissatisfaction with governance but also fatigue with the broader political structure. It represents a rejection not just of Orbán’s leadership but of the system that sustained it — and, notably, of older opposition parties that failed to offer a credible alternative in the past.

A different governing approach

Magyar’s rise ties closely to his positioning as both insider and outsider. A former Fidesz affiliate, he leveraged his familiarity with the system to critique it, presenting himself as someone capable of reform from within while breaking decisively from past practices.

Rimanyi emphasizes that Magyar’s appeal lies less in ideology than in pragmatism. Rather than framing his movement along a traditional left–right spectrum, he has presented his Tisza party as a broad coalition focused on practical improvements. This “big tent” approach reflects the diverse electorate that delivered his victory, bringing together voters from across the political spectrum.

Policy priorities are likely to follow this pragmatic line. Domestically, the emphasis will remain on economic stabilization and administrative reform. Internationally, the shift may be more measured. Rimanyi expects a more cooperative stance toward the European Union and a less confrontational approach on issues such as Ukraine, while maintaining certain limits, such as not exporting lethal military aid.

What comes next for Hungary

The immediate future remains uncertain. Rimanyi outlines a wide range of possible outcomes for Orbán and Fidesz, from internal fragmentation to sustained resistance through institutional influence. The coming weeks, before Magyar is sworn in on May 9 and his new government fully consolidates power, may prove decisive in determining which path emerges.

Still, Hungary’s broader orientation could shift. A government more aligned with EU policy frameworks and less closely tied to Russia would mark a notable departure from recent years. Yet the extent of this change will depend on how firmly Magyar translates electoral momentum into durable policy.

Rimanyi frames the election as both an end and a beginning. It closes a long chapter in Hungarian politics while opening a more uncertain one, shaped by high expectations and structural constraints. Whether this moment becomes a lasting realignment will depend on how effectively the new leadership addresses the economic pressures and institutional tensions that brought it to power.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Aron Rimanyi, an associate at Training The Street, about an election result that may reshape Hungary’s political trajectory. Péter Magyar’s center-right Tisza party has secured an electoral victory, ending incumbent Prime…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Aron Rimanyi examine Hungarian Prime Minister-elect Péter Magyar’s landslide victory as a rejection of incumbent Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule. Economic strain, institutional fatigue and youth turnout drive the shift, while grassroots campaigning outperforms geopolitical messaging. The result may signal a deeper political realignment.”
post-date=”Apr 30, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Hungary Votes for Change — Péter Magyar Ends Viktor Orbán’s 16-Year Rule” slug-data=”fo-talks-hungary-votes-for-change-peter-magyar-ends-viktor-orbans-16-year-rule”>

FO Talks: Hungary Votes for Change — Péter Magyar Ends Viktor Orbán’s 16-Year Rule

Fernando Carvajal”
post_date=”April 29, 2026 06:20″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-live-how-the-muslim-brotherhood-survives-and-thrives-across-the-middle-east/” pid=”162194″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates an FO Live discussion on the Muslim Brotherhood, from its founding in Egypt in 1928 to its varied roles across Yemen, Sudan and the wider Middle East. He is joined by Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for South Yemen Studies; Dr. Abdul Galil Shaif, author of South Yemen: Gateway to the World, former Chairman of the Aden Free Zone Public Authority and Chairman of the Friends of South Yemen; and Anas Himedan, a Sudanese biomedical scientist and human rights advocate. The discussion presents the Brotherhood not as a single visible institution, but as a flexible political and social network that adapts to local conditions while retaining a broader ideological framework. Nearly a century after its creation, the central question is whether the movement is fading, or merely changing form once again.

A movement built for adaptation

Shaif begins by noting the difficulty of defining the Brotherhood. Founded by a schoolteacher named Hassan al-Banna in Egypt, it started as a religious movement but developed into a political project aimed at shaping society through education, religious outreach and institutional influence. In Egypt, it has been severely restricted since the fall of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, but Shaif argues that its influence persists underground.

Yemen offers a different model. There, the Brotherhood-linked Al-Islah party did not simply copy the Egyptian organization. Instead, it embedded itself in tribal politics, patronage networks and state institutions. Shaif describes Al-Islah as a “hybrid political actor,” shaped by ideology but also by pragmatism and survival.

Sudan as a warning

Himedan gives the starkest account of the Brotherhood’s impact, focusing on Sudan. He argues that the movement, through the National Congress Party and related Islamist networks, helped shape decades of war, repression and institutional decay. He says Sudan shows what happens when the Brotherhood penetrates the state, education system, military and civil society.

Himedan describes recruitment through universities, where students could face pressure to join affiliated groups in order to advance academically. He also points to forced military recruitment, ideological indoctrination and the use of religion or ethnicity to divide communities. Brotherhood-linked elements within the Sudanese Armed Forces have been accused of extreme brutality in the current conflict, including the use of chemical weapons against civilians, which has contributed to sanctions and terrorist designations by multiple states. For him, the Brotherhood is no longer compatible with the modern world, because it cannot reform or adapt morally, even if it adapts tactically.

He believes the movement survives by creating enemies, sustaining conflict and blocking peaceful transitions that might end its political usefulness.

Yemen’s Al-Islah and political survival

Shaif and Carvajal both emphasize that Yemen’s Al-Islah is more adaptable than Himedan’s account of Sudan might suggest. Shaif says Al-Islah has survived because it understands Yemen’s fractured landscape. It has worked with tribal leaders, aligned with Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, opposed southern independence and later positioned itself as a useful partner for Saudi Arabia against the Houthis.

Carvajal adds historic depth. He notes that Brotherhood influence in Yemen dates back to the 1940s, when Yemeni students in Cairo encountered Brotherhood networks. Over time, this influence moved through schools, mosques and state institutions. After unification in 1990, Al-Islah became a major pillar of political life.

Carvajal believes Al-Islah is not a normal party. Rather, it is an umbrella organization combining Brotherhood activists, Salafis, tribal leaders and business interests. Its strength lies in its capacity to provide religious legitimacy to political projects, much as it did for Saleh’s secular military regime.

Regional rivalries and shared enemies

The panel also explores how the Brotherhood fits into regional rivalries. Carvajal explains that Gulf monarchies view the movement as a threat because it seeks to shape Arab societies through religious politics. The Arab Spring intensified these fears, especially when the Brotherhood briefly led Egypt after 2011.

Yet the movement’s alliances are not simple. Despite the Sunni–Shia divide, Carvajal and Himedan both point to cooperation between Brotherhood-linked actors and Iran. Sudan, they note, has served as a route for Iranian weapons to Hamas, while Islamist forces in Sudan have received Iranian support. In Yemen, the Houthis, Al-Islah, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates form a shifting field of rivalry and convenience.

Carvajal summarizes the logic clearly: “Both entities, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Republic, need an enemy.” For him, permanent conflict gives ideological movements a reason to endure.

Decline or transformation?

The speakers disagree on the Brotherhood’s future. Himedan believes its era is ending because social media, public awareness and modern political expectations make old forms of manipulation harder to sustain. Shaif is more cautious. He sees Al-Islah as a survivor, especially in Yemeni cities like Taiz and Marib, where it retains social and charitable networks.

Carvajal warns that the Brotherhood remains dangerous precisely because it often lacks visible headquarters or formal structures. Its power lies in networks, education, secrecy and social influence rather than in a single command center.

The discussion ends with uncertainty rather than closure. The Brotherhood may be weakened in some countries, outlawed in others and divided by local conditions. Yet its history suggests that decline does not necessarily mean disappearance. Across Sudan, Yemen and the wider region, the movement’s future may depend less on its original ideology than on the crises, rivalries and political vacuums that continue to give it room to adapt.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh moderates an FO Live discussion on the Muslim Brotherhood, from its founding in Egypt in 1928 to its varied roles across Yemen, Sudan and the wider Middle East. He is joined by Fernando Carvajal, executive director of The American Center for…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Live, Rohan Khattar Singh and regional experts examine the Muslim Brotherhood as a decentralized network that embeds itself within political and educational institutions. While Anas Himedan highlights Sudan to show its destructive legacy, Abdul Galil Shaif and Fernando Carvajal reveal its flexibility in Yemen. The Brotherhood is evolving, shaped by shifting alliances and regional conflicts.”
post-date=”Apr 29, 2026″
post-title=”FO Live: How the Muslim Brotherhood Survives and Thrives Across the Middle East” slug-data=”fo-live-how-the-muslim-brotherhood-survives-and-thrives-across-the-middle-east”>

FO Live: How the Muslim Brotherhood Survives and Thrives Across the Middle East

Ishtiaq Ahmed”
post_date=”April 28, 2026 06:35″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/fo-talks-why-pakistan-is-mediating-between-the-us-and-iran-and-why-is-israel-not-invited/” pid=”162179″
post-content=”

Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and eminent scholar Ishtiaq Ahmed explore Pakistan’s striking contradiction: The country faces political instability, economic strain and fragile institutions, yet it has emerged as a facilitator for dialogue between the United States and Iran. Singh and Ahmed examine how geography, relationships and leadership have created this moment of diplomatic relevance, and whether it can endure.

A fragile state at the center of diplomacy

Singh opens by outlining Pakistan’s internal strains. Economic instability, repeated reliance on assistance from the International Monetary Fund and a lack of broad political legitimacy define the current moment. Regional tensions compound this picture; Pakistan has strained ties with Iran, Afghanistan and India.

Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s emergence as a diplomatic venue appears counterintuitive. Ahmed acknowledges the contrast but points out that context matters. When major powers seek a channel for dialogue, practical constraints narrow the field. Pakistan excludes Israel because it does not recognize Israel, while other potential venues carry their own political complications.

Why Pakistan, not Turkey?

Why are peace talks not being hosted in a more obvious location, like Turkey? Ahmed points to leadership dynamics and geopolitical rivalries. Personal rapport plays a role in shaping diplomatic choices, particularly under the current US administration. He notes that strained relations between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US President Donald Trump make Turkey a less appealing venue.

Pakistan, by contrast, benefits from a convergence of factors. Its leadership maintains working ties with Washington, reinforced by recent economic and business engagements. Simultaneously, Pakistan is not seen as a direct rival by Iran in the way Turkey might be. This combination creates a degree of acceptability across parties. As Ahmed puts it, “It’s been more credible to have such talks in an apparently neutral Pakistan than, let’s say, in Istanbul.”

Strategic depth and social links

Geography and demography further strengthen Pakistan’s case. The country shares a long border with Iran and maintains deep cultural and religious linkages. Its sizable Shia Muslim minority, integrated across political, military and economic life, provides an additional layer of connection. These factors contribute to a level of familiarity and understanding that can facilitate dialogue.

Leadership also matters. Singh highlights the role of Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir, described as an Iran specialist with prior engagement on related issues. Ahmed says that this expertise enhances Pakistan’s credibility in the eyes of external actors. Combined with ties to Saudi Arabia, China and the US, Pakistan occupies a rare position of overlapping relationships. This allows it to engage multiple sides without appearing fully aligned with any single one.

A diplomatic opening with domestic impact

Ahmed characterizes Pakistan’s current posture as unusually effective. “For once, I think Pakistan’s diplomacy has been very effective this time,” he says. In the past, Pakistan’s geostrategic positioning was often used primarily for military alliances rather than diplomatic leverage.

This shift has produced tangible domestic effects. A government previously criticized for weak legitimacy has gained a measure of public approval. Even political opponents have adjusted their behavior to avoid disrupting the diplomatic process. The perception of Pakistan as a constructive international actor has created a narrative of competence at a time when internal governance remains contested.

Pakistan presents its approach as balanced. It has criticized both US–Israeli actions against Iran and Iranian actions against Saudi interests, framing its role as principled rather than partisan. Ahmed broadly accepts this characterization, noting that such positioning helps sustain credibility across competing actors.

Limits, risks and regional implications

Despite the current momentum, both Singh and Ahmed remain cautious about long-term outcomes. The situation remains fluid, with only a ceasefire rather than a durable settlement in place. If negotiations falter or conflict escalates, Pakistan’s role could quickly diminish.

Ahmed stresses that future influence depends on execution. “Right now, they have done it very well,” he observes, but sustaining that advantage requires continued diplomatic skill and favorable external conditions. A second round of talks could reinforce Pakistan’s standing, while failure could expose its limitations.

Regional implications further complicate the situation. India has reacted critically, reflecting broader tensions in South Asian geopolitics. Meanwhile, unresolved conflicts with Afghanistan highlight the limits of Pakistan’s diplomatic reach. Ahmed raises a pointed question: Can a country capable of facilitating dialogue between distant powers apply similar energy to resolving disputes closer to home?

Ultimately, Pakistan’s current role reflects a convergence of circumstance rather than a guaranteed shift. It draws on historical patterns, including its past role in facilitating US–China rapprochement, but unfolds in a more volatile environment. Whether this moment translates into sustained influence or remains a passing alignment of interests will hinge on how Pakistan and the wider region respond to what follows.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and eminent scholar Ishtiaq Ahmed explore Pakistan’s striking contradiction: The country faces political instability, economic strain and fragile institutions, yet it has emerged as a facilitator for dialogue between the United States and Iran. Singh and Ahmed examine…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Ishtiaq Ahmed examine how Pakistan, despite political and economic fragility, has emerged as a facilitator for US–Iran dialogue. Geography, leadership ties and regional relationships have created this moment of diplomatic relevance. Whether it endures depends on how Pakistan and the region manage what comes next.”
post-date=”Apr 28, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Why Pakistan Is Mediating Between the US and Iran — and Why Is Israel Not Invited?” slug-data=”fo-talks-why-pakistan-is-mediating-between-the-us-and-iran-and-why-is-israel-not-invited”>

FO Talks: Why Pakistan Is Mediating Between the US and Iran — and Why Is Israel Not Invited?

Ashraf Haidari”
post_date=”April 27, 2026 05:23″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-talks-pakistans-airstrikes-in-kabul-is-taliban-failing-to-keep-afghanistan-safe/” pid=”162149″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Ambassador Ashraf Haidari, a former Afghan diplomat and the president of Displaced International, about the escalating hostilities between Pakistan and the Taliban, and the devastating consequences for Afghan civilians.

Airstrikes and contested truths

Khattar Singh opens by mentioning a recent and highly controversial Pakistani airstrike on the Omit camp in Kabul, a rehabilitation center that reportedly housed more than 1,000 drug addiction patients. According to initial reports, the strike killed nearly 400 people. Pakistan maintains that the site was a Taliban drone factory, while the Taliban insist it was a civilian medical facility.

Haidari firmly rejects Islamabad’s version, calling it “a flat lie” and arguing that the Taliban lack the technological capacity to operate such a facility. He reframes the broader pattern of strikes as part of a campaign that disproportionately harms civilians rather than Taliban leadership. In his account, Pakistan’s actions reflect a deeper strategic logic: weakening Afghanistan as a whole rather than targeting specific militant actors.

This divergence in narratives highlights a recurring feature of the conflict. Competing claims obscure accountability, while Afghan civilians bear the immediate cost. Images of grieving families and destroyed infrastructure have circulated, but they have not translated into sustained international scrutiny.

A battlefield for regional rivalry

The discussion then widens to the geopolitical dynamics shaping the conflict. Haidari describes Afghanistan as a space where regional powers pursue competing interests through indirect means. He characterizes the Taliban as a “strategic project up for rent,” suggesting that different factions within the movement are influenced by external actors.

Khattar Singh notes the historical irony: Pakistan originally cultivated the Taliban to secure strategic depth. Yet that relationship has become more complicated. Haidari explains that the group is no longer monolithic. Internal divisions, combined with shifting alliances, have opened the door for other players, particularly India, to establish influence.

Pakistan’s airstrikes can be seen as an attempt to reassert control. Haidari argues that India has found ways to pressure Pakistan indirectly, including through militant groups operating from Afghan territory. This triangular dynamic of Pakistan, India and the Taliban creates a volatile environment in which Afghanistan becomes a proxy arena.

The result, as Haidari puts it, is a “lose-lose for the Afghan people,” but a strategic gain for external powers. Each actor extracts some advantage, while the underlying instability persists.

Silence and selective outrage

Khattar Singh points out that the airstrikes occurred during Ramadan, yet drew limited condemnation from Muslim-majority countries. Haidari contrasts this silence with the frequent statements issued by organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on other conflicts.

He interprets this disparity as evidence of selective attention shaped by political priorities. Even when aid arrives, as in India’s delivery of medical supplies, Haidari views it through a geopolitical lens. Assistance may alleviate immediate suffering, but it does not address the structural drivers of the conflict.

For Afghans, this silence reinforces a sense of abandonment. The country’s crises compete with larger global events, including the Iran war, leaving Afghanistan largely absent from headlines and diplomatic agendas.

A deepening humanitarian crisis

Beyond the geopolitical maneuvering lies a deteriorating humanitarian situation. Haidari describes Taliban rule as enforcing a system of “gender apartheid,” restricting women and girls from education, employment and public life. These policies have far-reaching social and economic consequences.

Health indicators have also worsened. Mortality rates among infants and young children have risen, reversing gains made during the previous two decades. Haidari contends that more Afghans are now dying under current conditions than during the years of active conflict before 2021.

Simultaneously, the country faces economic isolation. Sanctions and lack of recognition limit formal trade and financial flows, while reports of external cash shipments create what Haidari calls an “artificial macroeconomic stability.” The result is a fragile system that masks deeper structural collapse.

Leadership vacuum and an uncertain future

The conversation concludes with a focus on governance and accountability. Haidari views the current situation as the outcome of both external decisions and internal failures. He describes the US withdrawal as enabling the Taliban’s return to power and leaving a political vacuum that has yet to be filled.

Inside Afghanistan, opposition forces remain fragmented and ineffective. Without a coherent alternative, the Taliban face limited pressure to change. Haidari argues that meaningful reform would require strong external incentives, both rewards and penalties, capable of altering the group’s calculations.

He also challenges attempts to frame the Taliban as representative of Afghanistan’s Pashtun population, emphasizing that many Pashtuns have been among the movement’s primary victims. This distinction underscores the complexity of Afghan society, which cannot be reduced to simple ethnic or political narratives.

Afghanistan remains a “managed island of instability,” in Haidari’s words, shaped by external competition and internal weakness. For now, the Afghan people continue to endure a conflict driven by forces largely beyond their control.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Ambassador Ashraf Haidari, a former Afghan diplomat and the president of Displaced International, about the escalating hostilities between Pakistan and the Taliban, and the devastating consequences for Afghan civilians.Airstrikes…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Ashraf Haidari examine Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan, including a deadly strike in Kabul that likely hit civilians. Afghanistan may be a proxy arena for India–Pakistan rivalry, with the Taliban exploited by external powers. With worsening humanitarian conditions and little international response, Afghan civilians remain unprotected and without meaningful leadership.”
post-date=”Apr 27, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Pakistan’s Airstrikes in Kabul — Is Taliban Failing to Keep Afghanistan Safe?” slug-data=”fo-talks-pakistans-airstrikes-in-kabul-is-taliban-failing-to-keep-afghanistan-safe”>

FO Talks: Pakistan’s Airstrikes in Kabul — Is Taliban Failing to Keep Afghanistan Safe?

Josef Olmert”
post_date=”April 26, 2026 09:28″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-talks-why-the-iran-ceasefire-solves-nothing-in-israel-hezbollah-war/” pid=”162134″
post-content=”

Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Josef Olmert, a former Israeli government official and Middle East scholar, discuss the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, and the unresolved questions it leaves behind. The truce may reduce immediate fighting in southern Lebanon, but Olmert argues that it has not settled the strategic contest. Instead, the discussion moves from Hezbollah’s origins and Iran’s regional strategy to Israel’s military dilemmas, Lebanon’s humanitarian crisis and the changing nature of US–Israel relations.

A ceasefire under pressure

Olmert begins by stressing how precarious the situation remains. Just before the discussion, Israeli forces killed more than 20 Hezbollah members in an encounter several miles from the border. Hezbollah then announced that it no longer recognized the ceasefire, though it would decide its response according to circumstances.

For Olmert, this shows that the truce is not a stable political settlement. He argues that the ceasefire was forced on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by the United States as part of broader negotiations with Iran. In his view, Israel was close to weakening Hezbollah more decisively but stopped too soon. The result is a pause that may allow Hezbollah to recover rather than a turning point that changes Lebanon’s security landscape.

Hezbollah and Iran’s regional strategy

Singh asks Olmert to explain Hezbollah’s history from an Israeli perspective. Olmert responds that while the name Hezbollah emerged after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the movement’s roots go back earlier, particularly to Shia factions influenced by Iran’s 1979 revolution. He accepts that Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon gave Hezbollah momentum, but insists that Iran would have backed a radical Shia movement regardless.

Singh offers a counternarrative often heard from critics of Israel: Hezbollah grew from the marginalization of Lebanon’s Shia community, the failures of the Lebanese state and the group’s provision of social services. Olmert does not deny Hezbollah’s civic role, but says that these services are funded and shaped by Iran. For him, the organization’s defining function is not Lebanese representation but Iranian strategy. He calls Hezbollah “a division in the Iranian army which is based in Lebanon.”

That framing shapes his entire analysis. Olmert sees Hezbollah as part of Iran’s plan to pressure Israel through multiple fronts. Its role in the Syrian Civil War showed that the group was willing to sacrifice Lebanese lives for Tehran’s objectives. In this view, Hezbollah’s conflict with Israel is not primarily about Lebanese sovereignty, but Iran’s regional confrontation with Israel.

The limits and purpose of force

Singh presses Olmert on what a “final blow” against Hezbollah would actually mean. Olmert clarifies that he does not believe Israel can eliminate an ideology. His goal is more limited: to weaken Hezbollah’s armed wing so thoroughly that it can no longer dominate Lebanon or determine whether the Lebanese state goes to war.

Olmert rejects the idea that Israel can dismantle every Hezbollah structure or erase its political identity. But he believes Israel can reduce its military power to the point where it no longer controls Lebanon’s strategic choices. “You can’t kill an ideology,” he says, “but you can weaken the people who bear arms in support of that ideology.”

Singh also raises the humanitarian toll in Lebanon, noting that roughly 1.2 million people have been displaced and thousands have been killed or injured. He asks whether some critics are right to see Hezbollah as a pretext for broader Israeli ambitions, including control of southern Lebanon and the Litani River. Olmert dismisses that argument, saying Israel’s desalination capacity has solved its water needs. He argues instead that Hezbollah created the crisis by attacking Israel after October 7, 2023, and that democracies must be strong enough to defeat forces that threaten their existence.

Lebanon after Hezbollah

The discussion turns to what a durable settlement would require. Singh states that many Israelis privately believe the way forward must combine military neutralization of Hezbollah with reconstruction of the Lebanese state. Olmert agrees.

In his view, Israel should withdraw fully to the international border once Hezbollah is no longer able to dictate Lebanon’s security policy. He also calls for a stable buffer zone up to the Litani River, monitored by forces more effective than the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Beyond that, Lebanon would need international support and, potentially, Israeli cooperation to rebuild.

Yet Olmert sees a central obstacle: Lebanon remains difficult to govern because of corruption, sectarian patronage and Hezbollah’s power. Singh emphasizes that elite politics and dysfunction also predate Hezbollah. Olmert accepts this but insists that no serious peace is possible while Hezbollah retains the ability to prevent Lebanon from making sovereign decisions.

The old US–Israel relationship is gone

The conversation ends by widening the frame to US–Israel relations. Singh notes growing Democratic opposition to Israeli military action and changing attitudes among younger Americans. Olmert agrees that the old bipartisan consensus has eroded. He points to demographic changes, social media, the rise of Muslim political influence and polarization inside both US parties.

Olmert is especially critical of Netanyahu’s relationship with US President Donald Trump. He argues that Netanyahu has become too personally dependent on Trump, weakening Israel’s strategic autonomy. Trump’s public demand that Israel stop bombing Lebanon, Olmert says, exposed a troubling imbalance between the two leaders.

Still, Olmert does not reduce the problem to Netanyahu alone. He argues that the broader US–Israel relationship must be rebuilt for a new political era. “The old relationships are dead,” he says. A different Israeli government, he suggests, would find it easier to negotiate that new formula, though he acknowledges that if Netanyahu wins again, that too is democracy at work.

For Singh and Olmert, the ceasefire is therefore only one piece of a larger puzzle. Hezbollah remains powerful, Lebanon remains fragile, Israel remains divided and Washington is no longer the partner it once was. The truce may hold, but the conflict’s deeper causes remain unresolved.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Josef Olmert, a former Israeli government official and Middle East scholar, discuss the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, and the unresolved questions it leaves behind. The truce may reduce immediate fighting in southern Lebanon, but Olmert argues that…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Josef Olmert discuss the fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, which may not be a strategic resolution. They examine Hezbollah’s roots, Iran’s regional strategy, Israel’s military limits, Lebanon’s humanitarian crisis and the need to weaken Hezbollah before reaching a lasting peace. They also explore the erosion of the old US–Israel relationship.”
post-date=”Apr 26, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Why the Iran Ceasefire Solves Nothing in Israel–Hezbollah War” slug-data=”fo-talks-why-the-iran-ceasefire-solves-nothing-in-israel-hezbollah-war”>

FO Talks: Why the Iran Ceasefire Solves Nothing in Israel–Hezbollah War

Édouard Husson”
post_date=”April 25, 2026 04:50″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/europe/fo-talks-is-europes-strategic-amnesia-driving-the-world-toward-another-global-war/” pid=”162112″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson speaks with historian Édouard Husson about the geopolitical implications of the Ukraine war and what it reveals about the erosion of diplomatic traditions in Europe. They examine how historical memory, strategic culture and competing visions of world order shape today’s crisis. Together, Isackson and Husson explore whether the conflict reflects not only tensions between Russia and NATO but also a deeper transformation in Western thinking about diplomacy, security and global governance.

The fading of historical memory in Europe

Husson begins by arguing that contemporary European leadership lacks the historical experience that once shaped diplomatic caution. Leaders of the Cold War era, he notes, had lived through the devastation of two world wars and therefore understood the stakes of confrontation. This memory informed figures such as French President Charles de Gaulle, German Chancellor Willy Brandt and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who encouraged dialogue with the Soviet Union and contributed to ending Cold War tensions. By contrast, Husson believes today’s leaders have lost that sensibility. He describes “the lack of memory” as the defining problem shaping current policy choices.

For Husson, this generational shift has coincided with growing intellectual alignment with American strategic thinking. He suggests that younger European leaders absorbed a worldview emphasizing ideological clarity and decisive action rather than the historically grounded pragmatism that once characterized European diplomacy. This shift, he argues, has weakened Europe’s ability to act independently and to pursue negotiated settlements. Without leaders capable of challenging escalation, the continent risks drifting toward confrontation rather than compromise.

Ukraine’s complex history and competing identities

The discussion then turns to Ukraine as a case study of how historical complexity is often ignored in contemporary policymaking. Husson emphasizes that Ukraine’s regional diversity reflects centuries of shifting borders and cultural influences. Western regions were historically tied to Central Europe, while eastern areas developed closer links with Russia and the Soviet Union. These layered identities, he argues, complicate attempts to frame the conflict as a simple clash between two distinct civilizations.

Husson challenges narratives portraying Ukraine and Russia as entirely separate historical worlds. He calls it “absurd” to claim that the two share nothing in common, pointing to linguistic and cultural overlaps that developed over centuries. Isackson reinforces this point with personal reflections on family history and linguistic continuity, underscoring how identity in the region cannot be reduced to clear national categories. For Husson, ignoring this complexity has encouraged policies that deepen division rather than promote reconciliation.

He also recalls interviews conducted in eastern Ukraine, where many residents identified as Ukrainian yet opposed confrontation with Russia. These memories illustrate how local perspectives often diverge from geopolitical narratives promoted by outside actors. The failure to account for these nuances, he argues, has contributed to a conflict that pits Europeans against each other instead of encouraging diplomatic compromise.

Contradictions in threat narratives

Isackson raises another issue dominating European political discourse: the claim that failing to defeat Russia in Ukraine could lead to broader Russian expansion across Europe. Husson sees this argument as internally inconsistent. On one hand, Russia is described as militarily weak for failing to secure quick victory; on the other, it is portrayed as capable of sweeping across the continent. He highlights this contradiction to question the coherence of current rhetoric.

Husson argues that such narratives reflect what he calls an “Americanization” of European political thinking. Instead of traditional balance-of-power diplomacy, leaders increasingly adopt binary frameworks that divide the world into opposing camps. This shift, he contends, contrasts with earlier European diplomatic traditions, which emphasized coexistence among competing systems. By abandoning that approach, policymakers risk escalating conflicts rather than managing them.

The framing of global politics as a struggle between democracy and autocracy, Isackson suggests, echoes earlier crusading mindsets. Husson responds that past European diplomacy focused less on transforming other societies and more on maintaining stability between them. That pragmatic tradition helped Europe avoid major conflicts for long periods, Isackson says, and remains relevant today.

Neutrality, collective security and diplomatic traditions

Isackson and Husson then examine Russia’s long-standing calls for a neutral security zone in Europe. Husson traces this concept back through Soviet and post-Soviet thinking, arguing that Moscow has repeatedly sought arrangements based on neutrality and collective security. While interpretations differ, he sees continuity in these proposals and believes they reflect a broader European tradition of balancing interests rather than imposing ideological uniformity.

Husson contrasts this with modern approaches that prioritize ideological alignment. He argues that diplomacy historically avoided judging the internal political systems of other states and instead focused on managing coexistence. His primary concern, he explains, is not endorsing any particular regime but “securing peace in Europe.” This emphasis on stability over ideological competition reflects his broader critique of current Western policy.

Isackson adds that the concept of indivisible security — recognizing that one state’s safety depends on its neighbors — could provide a foundation for renewed diplomacy. Both speakers suggest that returning to this principle would require acknowledging competing interests and accepting compromise.

Toward a multipolar diplomatic future

The conversation concludes with a discussion of initiatives aimed at reviving diplomatic thinking. Husson outlines plans for an international school of diplomacy designed to bring together students from Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. Such collaboration could foster a multipolar mindset and rebuild the skills needed for negotiation in a fragmented world.

Husson also emphasizes the importance of cultural understanding and shared education. Training future leaders together could increase trust and encourage cooperation across civilizations. He ends on a hopeful note, expressing confidence that renewed emphasis on equality and mutual respect can help restore diplomacy. By acknowledging diverse perspectives and rejecting exceptionalism, the international system may move toward a more stable multipolar order.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson speaks with historian Édouard Husson about the geopolitical implications of the Ukraine war and what it reveals about the erosion of diplomatic traditions in Europe. They examine how historical memory, strategic culture and competing visions…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Peter Isackson and Édouard Husson examine how the Ukraine war reflects a breakdown in European diplomacy and historical awareness. Husson argues that NATO expansion, neglect of collective security and oversimplified narratives about Ukraine’s identity contributed to the conflict. He advocates renewed diplomacy, neutrality and multipolar cooperation as pathways to restoring global stability.”
post-date=”Apr 25, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Is Europe’s Strategic Amnesia Driving the World Toward Another Global War?” slug-data=”fo-talks-is-europes-strategic-amnesia-driving-the-world-toward-another-global-war”>

FO Talks: Is Europe’s Strategic Amnesia Driving the World Toward Another Global War?

Stephen Zunes”
post_date=”April 24, 2026 06:42″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-talks-the-iran-war-has-no-clear-endgame/” pid=”162097″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Stephen Zunes, professor of politics and director of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco, about a war that was meant to be short but is becoming something far more complex and open-ended. What began as the United States and Israel’s targeted campaign against Iran’s leadership is now revealing deeper strategic limits, unintended consequences and a growing absence of clear objectives. As the conflict expands, the central question becomes whether military force is achieving anything at all — or simply prolonging the crisis.

A war built on flawed assumptions

Khattar Singh opens by challenging the premise of the campaign. It was framed as a swift operation aimed at regime change and nuclear rollback has instead turned into a prolonged and uncertain conflict. Zunes responds bluntly, arguing that the outcome was foreseeable from the start. As he puts it, “I really don’t know any serious strategic analyst… who thought that air power alone could end up with a regime change.”

Despite the killing of senior clerical and military figures, Iran’s political system has not collapsed. In some respects, it has adapted and even strengthened. Repression has increased, opposition has been contained and the state has shifted into survival mode. Rather than triggering internal revolt, the campaign appears to have reduced the space for dissent.

This exposes a recurring pattern in modern warfare: the assumption that precision strikes can produce political transformation. In this case, that assumption is proving deeply flawed.

Adaptation and the logic of resistance

Zunes explains that Iran anticipated such an attack and prepared accordingly. Its leadership structure has been decentralized both politically and militarily, making it harder to dismantle through targeted strikes. While this has created coordination challenges, it has also ensured continuity.

The result is a shift toward asymmetrical warfare. Iran continues to deploy drones and missiles across the region, maintaining pressure despite sustaining heavy losses. The conflict, in his view, has become an “existential struggle,” one in which the regime is willing to endure significant costs.

Khattar Singh highlights how this dynamic complicates traditional measures of success. Damage inflicted does not necessarily translate into victory. As Zunes notes, overwhelming firepower can coexist with strategic failure if the adversary remains capable and willing to fight.

From military targets to civilian infrastructure

A key turning point in the discussion is the expansion of targets. The targets, initially just military assets, have broadened to include infrastructure such as bridges, schools and industrial facilities. Zunes calls this shift “a war on the population.”

Rather than weakening the regime, these attacks appear to be producing the opposite effect. Khattar Singh points to interviews with Iranian civilians who, despite opposing the government, express willingness to defend their country against foreign bombing. We now see national identity and historic pride becoming unifying forces.

Zunes reinforces this point by emphasizing the symbolic dimension of the strikes. Damage to culturally significant sites and urban infrastructure is not just material but psychological. It deepens resentment and reduces the likelihood of compromise, making the conflict more intractable.

A widening conflict with global consequences

The war’s impact extends far beyond Iran. Khattar Singh highlights the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global trade in oil, gas, fertilizers and even helium. The blockage threatens supply chains, energy markets and food security.

Zunes notes that while Iran’s actions may violate international norms, they are also part of a broader strategy to impose costs on the global system. Simultaneously, other powers show reluctance to intervene militarily, both because of the risks involved and a perception that the crisis was avoidable.

This widening scope underscores the absence of a coherent endgame. Even if the US or Israel declare victory, there is no guarantee that Iran will deescalate. The conflict risks becoming self-sustaining, with each side reacting to the other in an ongoing cycle.

No clear path to resolution

The conversation closes with a sobering assessment of the war’s trajectory. Khattar Singh raises the possibility of further escalation, including a ground invasion, but Zunes outlines the practical constraints: Iran’s size, mountainous terrain and limited US troop presence make such an option highly unlikely and costly.

He also dismisses more speculative scenarios, such as seizing nuclear facilities, as unrealistic. Meanwhile, the risk of catastrophic consequences, such as radiation leaks from damaged reactors, adds another layer of danger. Sites like Natanz, Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility, are deeply buried and difficult to strike, while Bushehr, its only nuclear power plant, poses the risk of a wider environmental disaster if hit.

Ultimately, the core problem remains the lack of clear objectives. As Zunes observes, the goals of the war are “all over the map,” contributing to confusion both domestically and internationally. Without defined aims or a political settlement, military action alone cannot produce a stable outcome.

The result is a conflict drifting without direction — one that risks entrenching the very forces it set out to weaken.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Stephen Zunes, professor of politics and director of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco, about a war that was meant to be short but is becoming something far more complex and open-ended. What began as the…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Stephen Zunes examine how the US–Israel campaign against Iran has drifted from a limited military operation into an open-ended conflict. Iran has adapted, strengthened internal cohesion and shifted to asymmetrical warfare. With expanding targets, global economic risks and no clear objectives, the war lacks a clear path to resolution.”
post-date=”Apr 24, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: The Iran War Has No Clear Endgame” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-iran-war-has-no-clear-endgame”>

FO Talks: The Iran War Has No Clear Endgame

Jean-Daniel Ruch”
post_date=”April 23, 2026 05:28″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/video/fo-live-wars-in-ukraine-iran-does-europe-look-weak-in-2026/” pid=”162083″
post-content=”

Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson speaks with former Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch and former NATO policy officer Peter Hoskins about Europe’s place in a world growing more dangerous by the month. They ask a sharp question: Is Europe preparing for a harsher strategic environment, or is it spending more on defense without deciding what that defense is for? Europe faces not only external threats from war and instability but also an internal problem of political confusion, institutional fragmentation and diplomatic drift.

Two wars, two public reactions

Ruch begins by drawing a distinction between how Europeans see the war in Ukraine and the conflict involving Israel, Iran and the United States. Many Europeans still regard Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a direct threat to the continent, even if support varies by geography and weakens farther from Russia’s borders. That perception helps explain why many governments have justified higher military spending despite the economic burden of inflation and energy costs.

The Middle East conflict produces a different response. Ruch argues that much of the European public does not see that war through the same moral or strategic lens. Polling shows broad opposition and suggests that many citizens regard it less as a necessary response to aggression than as a discretionary intervention. Europe is not responding to a single, coherent public mood; its leaders are navigating two overlapping crises with two different levels of public legitimacy.

More military spending with no clear strategy

Hoskins approaches the issue from the military side. He argues that European states, especially leading powers such as Britain and France, spent too many years preparing for counterinsurgency and overseas operations while neglecting the capabilities needed for a major conventional war in Europe. The result is a continent that talks more seriously about defense than it did a decade ago but is still not fully prepared for the kind of conflict it now fears.

Ruch takes the point further. For him, the real weakness is not just underprepared armed forces but the absence of a guiding political framework. Europe may be spending more, but it still lacks a clear security strategy linking military means to foreign-policy ends. He says Europe continues to run on “old software,” meaning the post-1945 habit of assuming that the US will provide both strategic direction and military backing. That dependency, he suggests, has outlived the world that produced it.

Hoskins broadly agrees. He sees Europe as too reliant on American protection and believes it must start preparing for a future in which Washington is less willing, or less able, to carry the burden.

The loss of diplomacy

Isackson returns to a deeper problem: the decline of diplomacy itself. Ruch and Hoskins agree that military planning cannot substitute for political engagement. Ruch argues that despite its dangers, the Cold War was in some ways safer because it had guardrails. Arms-control treaties, confidence-building measures and structured dialogue created habits of communication that reduced the risk of catastrophic miscalculation. With the expiration of the last major bilateral agreements and the weakening of diplomatic channels, that safety net has largely disappeared.

Ruch also argues that policymaking has shifted away from diplomatic institutions toward intelligence and military bureaucracies. That change matters because diplomats are trained to search for workable settlements, while security institutions are trained to identify and counter threats. The result, he says, is a world more inclined to manage crises through force than through negotiation.

Hoskins is more cautious but sympathetic to the point. He recalls periods when military officers from rival states could still work together and build trust. In his view, those opportunities mattered because professional contact often reduced suspicion. He laments that many of those openings were allowed to fade.

Russia, NATO and Europe’s political confusion

The conversation then turns to Russia and the larger structure of European security. Hoskins maintains that, whatever opportunities may have been missed in the past, Russia remains Europe’s primary strategic threat. Ruch is less convinced by the more alarmist versions of that argument. He points to a long history of what he sees as exaggerated or sometimes irrational fear of Russia and argues that Europe never developed a serious long-term vision for how to live with Russia as a permanent neighbor.

That debate leads into NATO and the European Union. Hoskins argues that NATO remains the most credible framework for defense, even if Europe must start thinking about how it would function with a diminished American role. Ruch responds that Europe still needs its own strategic culture and institutions if it wants genuine autonomy. Both men agree that Europe cannot drift indefinitely between dependence on Washington and vague talk of independence.

US President Donald Trump’s return to power sharpens that dilemma. Ruch thinks the “divorce” between Europe and the US may now be too obvious to ignore, while Hoskins argues that Europe should assume life “without the United States” is becoming a real strategic possibility.

A dangerous year without a settled order

By the end of the discussion, neither Ruch nor Hoskins offers much comfort. Ruch calls 2026 “the most dangerous year” he has ever lived through, citing the erosion of diplomatic norms, the risk of wider war and even the possibility that nuclear escalation can no longer be dismissed as fantasy. Hoskins echoes the warning. He sees a clear gap between publics and leaders, but he also insists that leadership still matters. Europe’s problem is that its leaders are weak, divided and often unable to sustain a common line.

Europe knows the world is changing. But can it define its own interests before major world events do?

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson speaks with former Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch and former NATO policy officer Peter Hoskins about Europe’s place in a world growing more dangerous by the month. They ask a sharp question: Is Europe preparing for a harsher strategic…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Live, Peter Isackson, Jean-Daniel Ruch and Peter Hoskins discuss Europe’s uncertain strategic position as the wars in Ukraine and Iran expose its weaknesses. Although European states are increasing defense spending, they remain too dependent on the US for security. Europe now enters a dangerous world without the diplomatic guardrails or leadership needed to navigate it.”
post-date=”Apr 23, 2026″
post-title=”FO Live: Wars in Ukraine & Iran — Does Europe Look Weak in 2026?” slug-data=”fo-live-wars-in-ukraine-iran-does-europe-look-weak-in-2026″>

FO Live: Wars in Ukraine & Iran — Does Europe Look Weak in 2026?

Aron Rimanyi”
post_date=”April 22, 2026 05:59″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-talks-viktor-orban-faces-his-toughest-challenge-in-hungarys-defining-vote/” pid=”162070″
post-content=”

[Editor’s note: This video was recorded prior to Péter Magyar’s victory in the April 12 Hungarian parliamentary election.]

Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Aron Rimanyi, an associate at Training The Street, about the political, economic and geopolitical dynamics that shaped the contest between incumbent Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and challenger Péter Magyar. Uncertainty dominated the leadup to Hungary’s parliamentary election, with polls and betting markets suggesting the strongest opposition challenge in 16 years. 

A system under pressure

Khattar Singh opens by providing historic context for this election. Since 2010, Orbán and his right-wing Fidesz party have maintained consistent two-thirds parliamentary control. Rimanyi emphasizes the significance of this moment, noting that “this will be the first time in 16 years… that an opposition will actually take the lead and gain a parliamentary majority.” That possibility alone marks a break from Hungary’s recent past.

The structure of Hungary’s parliament adds another layer of importance. With 199 seats determining executive power, even small shifts in vote distribution can have outsized consequences. Thus, this election is not just a routine democratic exercise, but a test of whether a long-dominant political system can be meaningfully challenged.

Magyar’s rise

At the center of this challenge is Magyar and his center-right Tisza party, or the Tisztelet és Szabadság Párt. A former Fidesz insider, Magyar entered the political arena only recently, breaking with the ruling party in early 2024 amid a broader scandal. His rapid ascent reflects both organizational momentum and public appetite for change.

Rimanyi describes Tisza as a significant disruption to Hungary’s political landscape, pointing to its strong performance in the 2024 European parliamentary elections, where it secured roughly 30% of the vote. He characterizes the movement as “a new opposition party… that was actually a kind of major upstart,” highlighting its unexpected strength.

Ideologically, Tisza positions itself as conservative and patriotic. This allows it to compete directly with Fidesz on national identity while shifting the focus toward governance and accountability. Its messaging blends familiar themes with a critique of the status quo, appealing to voters dissatisfied with both economic outcomes and political continuity.

Economic discontent and political messaging

Economic conditions play a central role in the election. Hungary has faced high inflation in recent years, particularly in 2022 and 2023, alongside stagnating wages and slowing growth. The freezing or withdrawal of approximately €18 billion in EU funds has further constrained the economy, exposing structural weaknesses.

Rimanyi explains how these pressures have reshaped political perceptions. While earlier years of Orbán’s rule coincided with rising living standards and steady growth, the post-2019 period has been marked by disruption — from the Covid-19 pandemic to declining external support. Growth has slowed to below 1%, and affordability, particularly in housing, has deteriorated.

Tisza translates these macroeconomic trends into political messaging. Rather than relying on technical economic arguments, the party emphasizes perceived corruption and inequality. Rimanyi notes that their approach draws a clear contrast: “While your wages are stagnating… look at all these people who are quite close to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán who have gotten extremely rich.”

Foreign policy and campaign narratives

Hungary’s position on Russia and Ukraine adds another dimension to the campaign. Orbán is often portrayed as pro-Russian, but Rimanyi points out that, in practice, Hungary has largely aligned with EU policy since the 2022 invasion. “If you actually look at the voting record… Mr. Orbán and his government is much more towing the European line than actually the rhetoric would suggest,” he explains.

Despite this, campaign rhetoric tells a different story. Fidesz has framed Ukraine as a direct security threat, emphasizing risks to Hungary’s energy supplies and sovereignty. This narrative resonates with a significant portion of the electorate and places Tisza in a delicate position.

Magyar’s response reflects a balancing act. He avoids endorsing strong pro-Ukraine positions while also distancing himself from overtly pro-Russian narratives. Rimanyi suggests that even in the event of a Tisza victory, policy continuity is likely, though tone may change. A shift in rhetoric — particularly greater criticism of Russia — could emerge without fundamentally altering Hungary’s strategic posture.

The electoral system and uncertain outcomes

The complexity of Hungary’s electoral system makes the outcome difficult to predict. Voters cast two ballots — one for a local representative and one for a party list — and the system redistributes surplus and losing votes into national totals. This “winner” and “loser” compensation mechanism complicates straightforward projections.

“This makes it extremely difficult to actually forecast the seat allocations in the Hungarian Parliament,” Rimanyi points out. Even if polling suggests a lead for one party, translating that into parliamentary seats involves multiple layers of calculation.

For Tisza, the stakes are particularly high. The party aims not just for victory but for a two-thirds constitutional majority, which would allow it to reshape institutions built during Orbán’s tenure. However, Rimanyi views such an outcome as unlikely given the electoral mechanics.

As Khattar Singh and Rimanyi conclude, the election’s significance lies as much in its uncertainty as in its potential consequences. At the time of the discussion, Hungary stands at a political inflection point — one where economic strain, shifting alliances and institutional complexity converge to shape a deeply consequential vote.

Ultimately, Magyar would go on to win Hungary’s parliamentary election, and his Tisza party would secure 141 seats in the 199-seat parliament with 55.3% of the vote, while Orbán’s Fidesz party would take just 52 seats with 36.7%.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Aron Rimanyi, an associate at Training The Street, about the political, economic and geopolitical…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Rohan Khattar Singh and Aron Rimanyi examine Hungary’s April 2026 election after 16 years under Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. They discuss the rise of challenger Péter Magyar and his Tisza party, economic discontent and Hungary’s stance on Russia and Ukraine. The result ultimately signals a major political shift with implications for Europe.”
post-date=”Apr 22, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Viktor Orbán Faces His Toughest Challenge in Hungary’s Defining Vote” slug-data=”fo-talks-viktor-orban-faces-his-toughest-challenge-in-hungarys-defining-vote”>

FO Talks: Viktor Orbán Faces His Toughest Challenge in Hungary’s Defining Vote

Matthew Cavedon”
post_date=”April 20, 2026 07:08″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/fo-talks-the-american-jury-system-explained-democracy-or-illusion/” pid=”162021″
post-content=”

Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and speaks with legal scholar Matthew Cavedon of the Cato Institute about the evolution and erosion of the American jury system. What began as a cornerstone of democratic participation has, they argue, become a marginal feature of a highly bureaucratized legal process. They trace how juries once embodied community judgment and ask whether that role can still be reclaimed in a system dominated by prosecutors, plea deals and legal complexity.

From citizen judgment to constitutional right

Cavedon traces the jury’s origins to ancient Athens, where ordinary citizens collectively judged disputes as part of direct democracy. That tradition carried into medieval England, culminating in Magna Carta’s guarantee that no free person could lose liberty or property except “by a jury of their peers.” Over time, this principle hardened into a defining feature of common law.

By the 18th century, legal scholar William Blackstone had formalized the idea that a criminal conviction required the agreement of 12 peers. This tradition crossed the Atlantic, where American colonists embraced jury trials not only as a legal safeguard but as a political right. The Constitution enshrined this protection twice, in Article III and the Sixth Amendment, reflecting its centrality to the new republic.

Cavedon emphasizes that juries were never meant to be passive fact-checkers. Historically, they evaluated both facts and the justice of the law itself, exercising what some have termed “jury nullification.”

Revolution, resistance and jury autonomy

The American Revolution reinforced the importance of juries. Singh and Cavedon note that British attempts to bypass colonial juries — by shifting trials to admiralty courts or even to London — provoked widespread alarm. Cavedon describes this as an “absolute panic,” as colonists feared the loss of local accountability and community judgment.

Two landmark cases illustrate the power juries once wielded. In 1670, a jury acquitted Quaker leader William Penn despite judicial pressure; their case established that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts. In 1735, a New York jury acquitted publisher John Peter Zenger of seditious libel, even though the law offered no defense for truthful criticism of the government. In both cases, juries asserted their authority to interpret justice beyond strict legal instructions.

Singh contrasts this tradition with civil law systems, where judges and legal professionals dominate decision-making. In the Anglo-American system, by contrast, juries historically acted as a democratic check on state power.

The rise of the modern “assembly line”

Cavedon states that over the past century, the criminal justice system has transformed into what he calls a “utilitarian… assembly line to produce convictions.” He traces this shift to Prohibition in the 1920s and 1930s, which expanded federal enforcement mechanisms that persisted long after alcohol bans ended.

Today, the overwhelming majority of cases never reach a jury. Roughly 97% of federal convictions and 94–95% of state convictions result from plea deals. Prosecutors wield significant leverage through what is often called the “trial penalty” — the threat of much harsher sentences if defendants refuse a plea and lose at trial.

Cavedon also points to structural incentives that reinforce this system. Many judges are former prosecutors, and law enforcement funding can be tied to arrest and conviction rates. Grand juries, once intended as a safeguard, have largely become procedural formalities. As Cavedon notes, they are often seen as “rubber stamps” for prosecutorial decisions.

The cumulative effect, he says, is a system that sidelines ordinary citizens and concentrates power in legal institutions.

Blinding juries to context

Even when jury trials occur, Singh and Cavedon argue that jurors are often constrained in ways that limit meaningful judgment. Courts typically instruct juries to focus narrowly on factual questions while ignoring broader context, legal interpretation and consequences.

Cavedon highlights cases where this restriction leads to troubling outcomes. In one federal trial in California, jurors convicted a man for growing marijuana without being told he was part of a city-authorized medical program. In another case, a juror later learned that a defendant he helped convict received a 40-year mandatory sentence, prompting deep regret.

For Cavedon, such examples illustrate a broader problem: Jurors are excluded from considering the full moral and social implications of their decisions. He believes that this undermines both fairness and the democratic purpose of the jury system. “If people do not have confidence that ultimately it will be their neighbors and their peers who will make judgments,” he says, “then I think we have lost a significant amount of personal liberty.”

Can the jury system be reclaimed?

Singh and Cavedon conclude with a question: Can the jury’s original role be restored? Cavedon believes it can, but only through a cultural and educational shift. He describes the forthcoming Cato Institute initiative, “Your Verdict Counts,” as an effort to reframe jury duty as an active form of citizenship rather than a burdensome obligation.

He feels that jurors should see themselves as participants in a democratic process, bringing “their conscience and their values” into deliberations. This could revive the jury’s function as a check on state power and a protector of individual liberty.

Singh closes by considering the stakes. If juries no longer serve as a meaningful counterbalance within the justice system, then a key pillar of democratic accountability may already be eroding. The question is not just how the system functions today, but whether citizens are willing to reclaim the role it once gave them.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and speaks with legal scholar Matthew Cavedon of the Cato Institute about the evolution and erosion of the American jury system. What began as a cornerstone of democratic participation has, they argue, become a marginal feature of a highly bureaucratized legal process….”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Matthew Cavedon argue the American jury system has shifted from a core democratic safeguard to a sidelined institution dominated by plea deals. They trace its historic role as a check on authority and warn that modern practices limit citizen participation in justice. Reclaiming jury duty is essential to democratic accountability.”
post-date=”Apr 20, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: The American Jury System Explained: Democracy or Illusion?” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-american-jury-system-explained-democracy-or-illusion”>

FO Talks: The American Jury System Explained: Democracy or Illusion?

Manu Sharma”
post_date=”April 19, 2026 06:14″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-talks-war-in-iran-does-the-future-of-the-middle-east-look-bleak/” pid=”161977″
post-content=”

Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with FOI Partner and geopolitical analyst Manu Sharma about how the Iran war is evolving beyond a military confrontation into a systemic economic crisis. What began as a conflict shaped by assumptions about regime weakness and rapid victory now reveals a far more complex situation. As the war drags on, its most consequential effects are spreading through global energy markets, financial systems and industrial supply chains.

A war built on flawed assumptions

Atul opens by asking Manu to frame the conflict. Manu describes it starkly as “a royal fight between… two thoroughly different military ideologies,” highlighting the clash between Western shock-and-awe doctrine and Iran’s long-prepared defensive model. The United States and Israel entered the war believing Iran was weakened by sanctions, internal unrest and economic decline. That assessment shaped a strategy centered on rapid decapitation strikes designed to collapse the regime within days.

Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or projecting power through regional proxies was a central objective. If left unchecked, Iran could potentially dominate Gulf energy flows, reshaping the balance of power in one of the world’s most critical regions.

Yet the early premise — that Iran would quickly crumble — has not held. Despite economic strain and political tensions, the regime has endured. Atul and Manu suggest that Israeli and American planners underestimated the depth of Iran’s institutional and ideological structures, as well as its ability to absorb and respond to sustained military pressure.

Iran’s resilience and asymmetric strategy

Iran’s response rests on preparation rather than improvisation. Instead of relying on centralized command structures vulnerable to decapitation, it has implemented what a decentralized “mosaic defense.” This system distributes authority across 31 independent military commands, making it difficult to disable the state through targeted strikes.

The same logic extends to governance. Iran’s layered redundancy ensures continuity even under extreme conditions. Leadership positions are backed by multiple successors, while the broader theocratic system provides an additional reservoir of authority. As Atul notes, this creates a depth that is not easily dismantled through conventional military means.

Manu explains that Iran has effectively built a different “operating system” for political survival. This system combines ideological commitment with military capability, allowing the state to withstand pressure that might destabilize more centralized regimes. The result is a conflict that has settled into a form of strategic stalemate, where none of the principal actors have achieved decisive political collapse.

Diverging political realities

While the battlefield remains contested, political responses differ sharply across countries. Atul says the war is highly popular in Israel, where even critics of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu broadly support the campaign. In contrast, public opinion in the US is far more divided, creating what Atul calls a “tale of two countries.”

Iran, meanwhile, has focused on building support beyond its borders. Its diplomatic outreach across Asia, particularly among Shia Muslim communities, has generated both political sympathy and material support. There are visible signs of this mobilization, including donations and grassroots support, suggesting that Iran’s messaging resonates in parts of the Global South. Women are even donating gold, considered family treasure in Asia, to the Iranian war effort.

These dynamics reinforce a key point: The war is not producing uniform political outcomes. Rather, it is deepening fragmentation, both within societies and across the international system.

Economic warfare and Gulf vulnerability

Unable to match Israeli or American firepower, Iran has resorted to economic warfare. Iranian forces have targeted the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and shaken their economic foundations. Iran has also blocked the Strait of Hormuz and reduced the ships going through this chokepoint to a trickle. This strategy exploits structural vulnerabilities in a region that, despite decades of diversification, remains heavily dependent on energy exports and food imports as well as consumer goods and machines for critical infrastructure such as desalination plants.

By threatening shipping routes and energy facilities, Iran is effectively weaponizing geography. By blocking the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is driving up oil and gas prices, while attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf states create long-term supply constraints. In our globalized world, Arab states generating wealth through energy exports are diversifying their economies by pumping money into frontier economic activities. Iran has interrupted this flow of capital, which will have cascading effects far beyond the region.

The Gulf’s role as a hub for trade, finance and transportation amplifies these risks. Cities like Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Doha in Qatar, built as global hubs with international airports, high-end shopping and luxury tourism, now face the possibility that their greatest strengths — connectivity and openness — could become liabilities in a prolonged conflict.

Global spillovers and systemic risk

The economic consequences extend well beyond energy markets. Gulf capital has played a crucial role in funding innovation and investment across Western economies, from real estate to cutting-edge technologies. If the war constrains the flow of this capital, the effects will ripple through sectors such as venture capital, artificial intelligence and infrastructure development.

Simultaneously, physical disruptions to energy production threaten the supply of critical industrial inputs. Helium shortages could affect semiconductor manufacturing, sulfur constraints could disrupt metal refining and reduced fertilizer production could reduce global agricultural output. These are not isolated shocks but interconnected pressures that strain the foundations of the global economy.

Manu captures the scale of the challenge with a warning: “This is a world that nobody is prepared for.” The conflict is no longer simply about territory or regime change. It is about the stability of systems that underpin modern economic life.

As Atul concludes, the war has entered a new phase. Iran has survived the initial assault, the US and Israel remain engaged, but the Gulf economies — central to global energy and finance — are under growing strain. The longer the conflict continues, the more likely it is to trigger cascading crises that reach far beyond the Middle East.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with FOI Partner and geopolitical analyst Manu Sharma about how the Iran war is evolving beyond a military confrontation into a systemic economic crisis. What began as a conflict shaped by assumptions about regime weakness and rapid victory now reveals a far more…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Manu Sharma examine how the Iran war poses huge risks to the global economy. Iran has withstood US and Israeli efforts to engineer regime change, and resorted to asymmetric warfare, which includes hitting targets in the Persian Gulf as well blockading the Strait of Hormuz. The ensuing disruptions to energy, shipping, finance and industrial inputs will trigger consequences far beyond the Middle East.”
post-date=”Apr 19, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: War in Iran: Does the Future of the Middle East Look Bleak?” slug-data=”fo-talks-war-in-iran-does-the-future-of-the-middle-east-look-bleak”>

FO Talks: War in Iran: Does the Future of the Middle East Look Bleak?

Atul Singh”
post_date=”April 18, 2026 05:04″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/middle-east-news/fo-live-how-the-us-israel-war-in-iran-could-redraw-middle-east-borders/” pid=”161959″
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Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh leads an FO Live editorial workshop on the escalating US–Israel war on Iran. The war is not an isolated crisis, but a conflict preceded by a long history. Joined by Katilyn Diana, Cheyenne Torres, Casey Herrman, Zania Morgan and Lucy Golish, Atul argues that the confrontation cannot be understood without revisiting the 1948 creation of Israel, the 1953 CIA-backed coup in Iran and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Atul moves between history, military strategy and economics, asking not only how the war began but also what kind of regional and global disorder it may yet unleash.

The three dates that shape the conflict

Atul begins by identifying three decisive turning points: 1948, 1953 and 1979. In 1948, the UN established the state of Israel. It immediately had to fight the invading Arab states. For Israelis, that moment remains inseparable from the trauma of the Holocaust and the fear that the state could be destroyed at birth. Palestinians remember this moment as the Nakba, the mass displacement that accompanied Israel’s creation. Atul suggests these two memories still shape how the region understands security and injustice.

He then turns to 1953, when Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh faced an overthrow after nationalizing oil. Atul presents the coup as a foundational rupture in modern Iranian political memory. Britain and the US, he argues, removed a nationalist leader and restored a monarchy that ruled through repression. He says that the intervention weakened secular opposition and unintentionally strengthened the clerical networks that later filled the vacuum. By 1979, those clerical forces were organized enough to take power during the Iranian Revolution and build a theocratic state deeply suspicious of both Washington and domestic dissent.

Revolution, paranoia and the proxy strategy

The discussion portrays the Islamic Republic as a regime shaped by insecurity from the start. Atul explains that after the revolution, the new leadership distrusted the regular military and built Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a parallel force. The Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 then hardened the regime further, reinforcing a political culture built around sacrifice, siege and martyrdom.

From that position, Iran gradually extended influence through allied armed groups across the region. Hezbollah, Hamas and later the Houthis became central as instruments of an Iranian strategy designed to offset conventional weakness. Atul argues that the regime sought legitimacy by presenting itself as the one power willing to resist both Israel and the US, while many Arab governments moved toward accommodation.

Simultaneously, he makes clear that opposition to Western power did not make the Iranian system admirable. He repeatedly stresses its repression of women, students and dissidents, as well as its economic failures and political brutality.

A decisive moment for Israel and the US

Atul argues that Israel and the US believe Iran is now weaker than it has been in years. From the Israeli perspective, the danger is existential. A small state with limited strategic depth cannot easily tolerate the possibility of a hostile regional power gaining stronger missile and nuclear capabilities. As Atul puts it, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has built his career around the doctrine that “peace through strength is the way forward.” In that framework, confrontation appears necessary.

Atul also highlights Israel’s confidence in its intelligence reach and military effectiveness. Atul describes a country that believes it has penetrated Iran deeply and can strike key personnel and infrastructure with precision. Yet he does not present victory as automatic.

Casey raises the possibility of Iran’s “Balkanization.” Atul explores the idea, noting that some American and Israeli thinkers see advantage in a looser, weaker or fragmented Iran. But he also warns that this could produce unintended consequences, including nationalist backlash, prolonged instability and deeper hostility toward outside powers.

Uncertainty inside Iran

Iranian society is fractured and complex. Atul notes widespread discontent with the regime, especially among younger and educated Iranians. Protest movements, secular aspirations and anger at repression all suggest that the Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy among many citizens. Yet he cautions against assuming that foreign bombing will automatically translate into regime collapse.

External attack can strengthen nationalism even where a government is unpopular. Atul remarks that “nationalism is the last refuge of a scoundrel,” but he also considers it a real political force. The killing of senior leaders, especially the Ayatollah, may not weaken the regime in the way outsiders expect. Martyrdom carries powerful weight in Shia political culture, and the failing oppressive late ruler has now become a symbol of resistance after being killed by a foreign enemy.

Kaitlyn and others push the conversation toward possible futures, including a democratic Iran. Atul sees some hope there, especially in a decentralized federal model that protects minorities and devolves power. But he also emphasizes that opposition groups remain divided among monarchists, republicans, federalists and competing ethnic movements. That makes any clean transition unlikely.

The war’s economic danger

When Zania asks about stagflation, Atul shifts from battlefield dynamics to global markets. He warns that a prolonged conflict could disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, drive up energy prices and trigger a supply shock across the world economy. Oil above $90 per barrel is not just a regional problem; it hits transport, industry, fertilizers, food production and financial confidence all at once.

The risk is not merely higher inflation but the toxic combination of inflation and stagnation that defined the 1970s oil shocks. The Gulf’s importance extends beyond crude exports. Capital from Arab states is deeply embedded in global finance, technology, property and sport. If war erodes confidence, both trade and investment could suffer.

This discussion ends with a broader warning: This is not only a Middle Eastern war. It may become a global economic and geopolitical turning point whose consequences reach far beyond the region.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh leads an FO Live editorial workshop on the escalating US–Israel war on Iran. The war is not an isolated crisis, but a conflict preceded by a long history. Joined by Katilyn Diana, Cheyenne Torres, Casey Herrman, Zania Morgan and Lucy Golish, Atul argues that the…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Live, Atul Singh and several Fair Observer editors trace the US–Israel war on Iran back to 1948, 1953 and 1979. The conflict reflects historic grievances and present-day fears about Iranian power, Israeli security and American strategy. Even if Iran appears weakened, a prolonged war could be destabilizing and economically disastrous, posing risks for global energy.”
post-date=”Apr 18, 2026″
post-title=”FO Live: How the US–Israel War in Iran Could Redraw Middle East Borders” slug-data=”fo-live-how-the-us-israel-war-in-iran-could-redraw-middle-east-borders”>

FO Live: How the US–Israel War in Iran Could Redraw Middle East Borders