What does Iraq's new government promise? A guide to Ali Al-Zaidi's ministerial program

Shafaq News-
Baghdad

Iraq has a new
prime minister and a new government program. For anyone outside the country
trying to understand what Ali Falih Al-Zaidi’s administration has actually
committed to —and where the obstacles are already visible— the fourteen-pillar
document ratified by parliament on May 14 offers a detailed, if carefully
worded, set of answers.

This is what it
says, and what it leaves unresolved.

The Hardest
Commitment: Weapons and the State

Pillar One
commits the government to consolidating all weapons under exclusive state
authority, meaning no armed group outside the formal military and security
structure should operate independently. In most countries, this would be an
unremarkable statement, but in Iraq, it is the central unresolved dilemma of
the post-2003 political order.

The Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella of predominantly Shiite armed factions
that mobilized against ISIS after 2014, operates under nominal state authority
but maintains independent command structures, funding channels, and regional
alignments, most significantly with Iran.

The Al-Zaidi
program does not dissolve the PMF. It commits to enhancing their combat
capabilities while formally defining their responsibilities within the military
structure according to law. Whether that legal definition materializes, and
what it contains, will determine whether this pillar carries any practical
weight.

The deferred
cabinet portfolios tell their own story. Nine ministries remained unfilled
after the May 14 session, including Defense and Interior, the two posts most
directly responsible for implementing a weapons monopoly. The impasse was
driven partly by the blocking of Nouri Al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition
candidate Qasim Atta for the Interior Minister post, with lawmakers accusing
rival blocs of “injustice, betrayal, and treachery.”

By convention
in Iraq’s sectarian power-sharing system, the Defense Ministry goes to a Sunni
figure, with competing Sunni alliances —including the Taqaddum party led by
former Parliament Speaker Mohammed Al-Halbousi and the Al-Azm alliance—
submitting rival candidate lists.

Political
sources told Shafaq News that Washington’s categorical rejection of any names
perceived as close to armed factions or directly under the Coordination
Framework’s influence was the principal obstacle to resolving the sovereign
portfolios.

Foreign Policy:
Sovereignty Under Pressure

Al-Zaidi’s
program describes an active foreign policy built on balance: keeping Iraq out
of regional and international conflict axes while maintaining productive
relationships in every direction. The language is deliberate and familiar from
previous Iraqi governments.

What is
specific is a commitment to activate the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA)
with the United States in a way that guarantees mutual interests. The SFA,
signed in 2008 alongside a Status of Forces Agreement that set the original
timeline for US troop withdrawal, governs the broader bilateral relationship covering
defense, economic, energy, and cultural cooperation.

A September
2024 security agreement between Baghdad and Washington called for most US-led
coalition forces to relocate from Iraqi bases to the Kurdistan Region by
September 2025, with the bulk of remaining troops scheduled to depart by
September 2026, leaving the SFA as the framework for whatever security
relationship follows.

Al-Zaidi’s
endorsement of the SFA is notable precisely because it arrives under pressure.
Days before the confidence vote, the Wall Street Journal reported that Israel
had established a secret military base in Iraq’s western desert, southwest of
Najaf, to support its aerial campaign against Iran, and those Israeli forces
launched airstrikes on Iraqi troops who nearly discovered the site in early
March, killing one Iraqi soldier. Shafaq News sources learned that the United
States blocked an Iraqi investigation into the base.

The episode
landed directly in the new government’s lap: a program committing to the
principle that Iraq will not be used as a corridor for attacks on other states,
adopted days after evidence emerged that its territory had been used for
precisely that, with American awareness.

Al-Zaidi’s
program also prioritizes building relations with Gulf states and advancing the
Development Road, a major infrastructure corridor intended to link the Arabian
Gulf to Turkiye and Europe through Iraqi territory, as well as a commitment to
channel all international engagement through official diplomatic channels.

The Economy:
Ambitious Architecture, Familiar Pressures

Three new
institutional bodies anchor the economic program. A Supreme Council for
Financial and Monetary Stability would coordinate fiscal and monetary policy. A
Supreme Investment Council would rebuild the framework for attracting foreign
direct investment. A Generations Fund would preserve Iraqi citizens’ future
share of oil and natural resource revenues —a sovereign wealth mechanism with
structural parallels to Norway’s Government Pension Fund and several Gulf state
models.

Banking reform
is a stated priority, with explicit reference to anti-money laundering
compliance and international banking standards. The framing is directly
relevant to Al-Zaidi’s own background: he previously served as chairman of
Al-Janoob Islamic Bank, which was sanctioned by the United States in 2024 over alleged
money laundering on behalf of Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite armed
groups.

While Al-Zaidi
is not himself under sanctions, the institution he once led sat at the center
of the exact tension he must now navigate as head of government. An investigation
by financial crime assessment firm K2 Integrity found no credible evidence
linking Al-Zaidi to Iran-linked financial activities, with a source noting the
restrictions were imposed for reputational risk rather than proven involvement
in money laundering.

Beyond
Al-Janoob, the broader banking sector has faced sweeping US Treasury measures
in recent years, with dozens of Iraqi private banks cut off from
dollar-clearing access over compliance failures. The banking reform pillar
addresses this directly, though the political will to implement it against the
interests of faction-linked financial networks remains the central question.

The program also
commits to expanding the role of the insurance sector in the national economy,
a commitment that signals awareness of a market that remains underdeveloped
relative to Iraq’s economic scale.

The private
sector is positioned as the primary driver of growth and employment, with
monopoly prevention and competitive principles written into the framework.
Foreign companies operating in Iraq, particularly major oil firms, are promised
dedicated security protection. How much of this framework gets built depends substantially
on global oil prices, which fund roughly 90 percent of the Iraqi state budget,
a dependency the program acknowledges but cannot resolve.

Energy: The
Iranian Gas Problem

Iraq’s
electricity crisis is among the most visible failures of post-2003 governance,
and the program addresses it in unusual technical detail. But the structural
problem runs deeper than the reform agenda acknowledges.

The sanctions
waiver that had exempted Baghdad from penalties for purchasing Iranian energy
expired in March 2025 under the Trump administration, which declined to renew
it. At peak supply, Iran was delivering around 30 million cubic meters of gas
per day to Iraq, enough to support nearly a third of the country’s power
generation capacity. Iranian gas flows dropped by roughly 40 percent between
April and August 2025 as sanctions enforcement tightened.

Iraq now faces
peak summer demand of roughly 40 gigawatts against current production of
approximately 29 gigawatts, a shortfall that Iranian imports once helped
partially bridge and that domestic alternatives have not yet replaced.

The program
commits to ending this dependency by accelerating associated gas capture,
reducing flaring, and developing domestic gas production on a fixed timeline
coordinated with the oil ministry. Iraq simultaneously flares enough natural
gas to power millions of homes while importing gas from Iran to keep power
plants running —a paradox that successive governments have promised to resolve,
and none has fully delivered.

The program
also commits to legislating the long-stalled Oil and Gas Law, a draft that has
remained deadlocked in parliament since 2007 and whose passage would directly
affect revenue-sharing arrangements between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG).

The electricity
pillar also calls for private sector participation in distribution, transition
to smart grid infrastructure, and a tariff review with explicit protection for
low-income households.

Governance and
Corruption: The Recurring Commitment

The governance
pillar commits to institutional reform across all ministries, digital
transformation to reduce bureaucracy, financial investigation mechanisms
running parallel to legal proceedings, and decentralization of administrative
and financial authority to the provinces. A national anti-corruption framework
with clear legal and oversight mechanisms is promised.

The
communications and technology pillar is among the more concrete and ambitious
sections of the document. Beyond digital transformation of government services,
national digital identity, and a data governance framework, the program commits
to establishing national centers for cybersecurity and artificial intelligence
and strengthening their institutional and technical capabilities. A national
mobile license project in partnership with the Iraqi private sector is named
specifically, a significant market reform in a sector currently dominated by a
small number of operators under opaque regulatory arrangements.

Most notable
for an international technology audience is the commitment to position Iraq as
an international data transit hub and a regional data exchange center. Iraq
sits between three continents and borders six countries, a geographic reality
the program proposes to monetize through digital infrastructure investment
rather than leaving it underutilized.

Regulatory
oversight of social media content to enhance societal stability is also
committed to, sitting in direct tension with the program’s own guarantee of
press freedom and freedom of opinion in the same pillar.

The two
positions occupy the same government document: one promising to regulate online
content, the other pledging to protect media freedom. How the government
resolves that contradiction in practice will be an early indicator of its
governance character, and one that international press freedom organizations
are already positioned to monitor.

Human Capital:
Education, Health, and Social Protection

The education
pillar commits to raising standards across public and private schools,
continuing a school construction program funded through the Iraq-China
framework agreement, launching a national literacy program, and expanding
university specializations in modern fields. Support for study abroad
scholarships in priority disciplines and scientific research centers is
included.

Health
commitments center on expanding insurance coverage, completing stalled hospital
projects, and modernizing public hospitals, with a specific focus on rare
medical specializations and pharmaceutical research and development.

The social
protection pillar proposes a gradual shift from welfare dependency to economic
empowerment, moving beneficiaries from cash assistance toward small and medium
enterprise support, microfinance, and vocational training.

Culture, Youth,
and the National Identity Question

A full pillar
is devoted to culture, tourism, and archaeology, committing to revive Iraq’s
civilizational heritage in domestic and international forums, develop museums,
including virtual ones, recover looted artifacts, and build cultural tourism
into a source of budget revenue.

A cultural
security project is named explicitly, framing culture as a defense of national
identity. In a country where sectarian and ethnic divisions remain politically
operative, and where the government’s own coalition reflects those divisions,
the framing carries weight beyond its surface meaning.

The youth and
sports pillar calls for institutional empowerment of young Iraqis in
decision-making, digital platforms for youth engagement, and funding models
allowing sports clubs to sustain themselves from their own revenues rather than
state dependency.

Human Rights,
Women, and Civil Society

Pillar Twelve
addresses human rights, women, and children, and for international observers,
it is among the more closely watched sections of any Iraqi government program.

The commitments
include combating all forms of violence and discrimination against women and
children through legislation against domestic violence, accountability in cases
of abuse, and embedding a human rights culture across state institutions.

Leadership
training programs for women in government and political work are specifically
named, alongside a commitment to treat women as active and fundamental partners
in development and decision-making.

The pillar also
commits to strengthening the role of local and international civil society
organizations in human rights protection, and to establishing an independent
body for civil society affairs with a long-term plan to support, empower, and
evaluate their social role.

Whether the
institutional calculus to implement them follows is a separate issue. Iraq
ranked 132nd out of 146 countries in the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global
Gender Gap Index, and civil society organizations have operated under
increasing legal and political pressure in recent years.

Industry:
Restoring a Neglected Sector

Iraq’s
industrial sector, once a meaningful contributor to the national economy, has
contracted sharply over decades of conflict, sanctions, and oil dependency.
Pillar Five commits to reversing that trajectory through legislative and
regulatory reform, with the stated goal of increasing the industry’s share of
gross domestic product and reducing reliance on oil revenues.

The program
identifies strategic industries —food processing, pharmaceuticals, and
construction materials— as priority sectors, and commits to reactivating
stalled state-owned factories through partnerships with strategic investors
from inside and outside Iraq. Export-oriented industries and those with high
local employment intensity receive preferential treatment under the framework,
alongside environmentally-friendly projects.

The development
of industrial cities is named as a structural goal, alongside streamlining the
administrative procedures and licensing processes that have long deterred
private industrial investment.

An export
support fund and a policy of protecting domestic products against dumping are
also committed to, measures that signal an intent to use trade policy actively
rather than leaving local manufacturers exposed to cheaper imports. How much of
this translates into functioning industrial policy depends heavily on the
investment climate reforms promised in the economic pillar and on the security
guarantees the government can credibly offer to private and foreign investors.

Agriculture,
Water, and Food Security

Iraq sits at
the downstream end of the Tigris and Euphrates river system, with Turkiye and
Iran controlling significant upstream flow through dam construction and
diversion projects that have reduced Iraqi river levels dramatically over the
past two decades. Against that backdrop, Pillar Six commits to restoring
agricultural production as a vital economic sector, adopting modern irrigation
techniques, and pursuing food security as an explicit policy goal.

The program
commits to leveraging Iraq’s political and economic relationships with upstream
countries to secure maximum water benefit, directing those relationships
specifically toward agricultural development.

Livestock
production, reduction of food imports, local and foreign agricultural
investment, and water conservation across all sectors are also addressed. The
UN has identified Iraq as one of the five countries most vulnerable to climate
change and water scarcity, an urgency the document itself does not fully
convey.

What the
Program Does Not Resolve

Similar
commitments appeared in the programs of both of Al-Zaidi’s immediate
predecessors, Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani and Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. According to a
Shafaq News analysis comparing the programs of Al-Zaidi and his two immediate
predecessors, the vast majority of core commitments appeared verbatim in one or
both previous programs without having been resolved. The program does not name
specific cases, frozen assets, or institutional targets, standard for a program
document, but limiting for any observer trying to identify measurable
commitments.

However,
Al-Zaidi’s ministerial program is more technically specific than many of its
predecessors in several areas, particularly banking reform, energy, and digital
governance.

The nine
unfilled cabinet posts —Defense, Interior, Planning, Culture, Reconstruction
and Housing, Higher Education, Labor, Migration and Displacement, and Youth and
Sports— will be negotiated in a subsequent parliamentary session after the Eid
al-Adha holiday. The outcomes, particularly for Defense and Interior, will
signal more about the direction of this government than any written commitment.

Three
structural realities sit outside the document’s pages. The armed factions’
question is the load-bearing issue: the program commits to a state weapons
monopoly, while the political system that produced this government includes
actors with direct interests in preventing that monopoly from becoming real.
The Israeli base episode and the US sanctions pressure over banking and armed
factions’ inclusion have narrowed Al-Zaidi’s room to maneuver before his
government has fully formed.

Iraq’s budget
remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil. Every reform ambition in this
document: the Generations Fund, the investment councils, the hospital projects,
the school construction, is downstream of a commodity price set in markets
Baghdad does not control.

The post-Eid
parliamentary session is the first measurable test of whether the commitments
in this document have the political backing to survive contact with reality.

Written and edited by Shafaq News Staff.

What does Iraq’s new government promise? A guide to Ali Al-Zaidi’s ministerial program

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