The UAE today faces perhaps the most dangerous strategic dilemma in its modern history. Not because Iran has suddenly become hostile. Tehran has always possessed the capacity to threaten Gulf security.
Not because Israel has suddenly become expansionist. Its regional ambitions have been visible for a long time before October 7. And certainly not because India suddenly emerged as an unreliable partner. New Delhi has always pursued transactional interests while pretending to be everybody’s strategic friend simultaneously.
The real problem is that Abu Dhabi increasingly appears to be drifting away from the very Gulf geography where its roots, prosperity and long-term security ultimately lie. The Iran-US-Israel war exposes this reality brutally. Iran attacks the UAE repeatedly during the conflict, far more aggressively than many expected. Emirati infrastructure and strategic assets come under pressure. Regional trade routes face disruption. The Gulf’s fragile security architecture suddenly appears vulnerable.
And what is the Emirati response? More dependence on Israel. Greater enthusiasm for the Abraham Accords. Deeper security engagement with India. More distance from the natural GCC strategic consensus led by Saudi Arabia. It is difficult to imagine a more dangerous lesson being drawn from this war.
MBZ essentially looks at October 7 and draws the opposite conclusion from much of the Arab world. While others see Israeli overreach, humanitarian catastrophe and the dangers of permanent escalation, Abu Dhabi increasingly appears convinced that unresolved deterrence threats must be crushed decisively, even at the cost of wider regional confrontation. That logic gradually aligns Emirati and Israeli strategic thinking in unprecedented ways.
The problem, however, is geography. There is ultimately no escape from geography in the Gulf. Israel is not the UAE’s neighbour. India is not the UAE’s neighbour. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the rest of the GCC are. The Emirates may deepen relations with extra-regional powers, but its long-term stability will still depend upon a functional Gulf order rather than permanent confrontation inside it.
Which is why the May 15 UAE statement becomes important despite everything else unfolding simultaneously. Abu Dhabi publicly reaffirms “close coordination with the GCC” and its commitment to “regional security and stability”. Ironically, that official language itself points towards the only viable pathway available to the Emirates: a return to Gulf cohesion rather than gradual strategic isolation.
The wiser response after Iranian attacks should have been immediate reconciliation with Saudi Arabia over the growing differences that emerged after the Abraham Accords: Yemen, Sudan, Somaliland, Red Sea competition and diverging regional priorities. Instead, the opposite trajectory intensifies. The Abraham Accords now increasingly look less like a diplomatic breakthrough and more like the original strategic rupture that gradually pushes Abu Dhabi away from its own region.
The future security of the Emirates lies in restoring Gulf cohesion, not deepening dependence upon extra-regional players whose own interests revolve around perpetual instability
Even during the war, Saudi strategic patience works better. Riyadh refuses to fall into the trap desired by Israel and Iranian hardliners. Despite attacks on Gulf infrastructure, despite pressure from multiple directions, Saudi Arabia avoids being dragged into a wider war. Prince Turki al-Faisal correctly observes that had Saudi Arabia reacted impulsively either to Israeli pressure or Iranian provocation, the entire region could already have descended into devastation.
That restraint matters because Israel’s strategic objective throughout this conflict remains transparent: widen regional confrontation, fragment GCC cohesion and trap the Gulf into a war of Israel’s choosing. This explains why Netanyahu repeatedly attacks Pakistan’s mediation role and accuses Islamabad of trying to create a wedge between Israel and the United States. The Israeli leadership understands that Pakistan’s diplomacy, backed quietly by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and others, threatens the escalation logic on which Netanyahu politically survives.
The controversy surrounding Netanyahu’s supposed UAE visit becomes revealing in this context. Israeli circles leak it. Abu Dhabi denies it. Yet the entire episode appears designed to reinforce precisely one message: the UAE is moving closer to Israel while drifting further from Saudi strategic thinking. That serves Israel’s interests perfectly. It does not necessarily serve Emirati interests, because every step the UAE takes away from GCC cohesion deepens the regional security dilemma it already faces.
The same confusion appears in Abu Dhabi’s growing fascination with India as a supposed strategic security provider against Iran. India struggles even to maintain credible deterrence against Pakistan after last year’s humiliating four-day conflict. Trump repeatedly praises Pakistan while publicly rebuking the Indian leadership. Western capitals no longer see New Delhi with the same aura of inevitable regional dominance that existed only a year ago. Yet Abu Dhabi suddenly appears willing to imagine India as a Gulf security partner against Iran.
Even Tehran itself does not take this idea seriously. During recent BRICS-related engagements, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi openly praised Chabahar as a “golden gate” connecting India to Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe. In other words, while some Emirati voices romantically portray India as a strategic counterweight to Iran, Tehran itself continues treating India as an important connectivity and economic partner. This should caution Abu Dhabi against romanticising New Delhi’s reliability.
India ultimately offers the UAE far less strategic depth than some Emirati enthusiasts imagine. Beyond Bollywood glamour, commercial opportunism and the regressive impulses of Hindutva politics, New Delhi shows little evidence of either credible regional deterrence capability or independent diplomatic weight during this crisis.
Israel and India increasingly resemble strategic liabilities in their respective regions rather than reliable anchors of long-term stability. Aligning too closely with Israel after Gaza is also morally damaging. It steadily narrows the UAE’s political space across the Muslim world and among global publics still sensitive to civilian suffering and questions of human rights.
Yet perhaps the strangest aspect of this entire period is watching certain Emirati social media handles attack Pakistan’s neutrality during the conflict. Pakistan becomes the only serious mediator trusted simultaneously by Washington, Tehran, Beijing, Riyadh, Doha, Ankara and Cairo. Pakistani diplomacy helps sustain the ceasefire, hosts the Islamabad talks, keeps channels open and repeatedly prevents escalation. Even Trump publicly acknowledges Pakistani requests for de-escalation.
Yet pro-Israel and pro-India narratives emerging from sections of Emirati discourse attempt to portray Pakistan negatively through unverified claims, selective leaks and information warfare.
The CBS story regarding Iranian aircraft at Nur Khan Airbase serves precisely such a purpose: to create suspicion about Pakistan’s neutrality and generate distrust between Islamabad and Washington.
Simultaneously, reports implying Saudi military involvement against Iran also serve another political objective: portray Riyadh as already trapped inside the war despite Saudi Arabia’s actual strategic restraint.
Such narratives benefit precisely those actors seeking division inside the GCC and distrust towards Pakistan’s mediation. Meanwhile, populist Iranophile discourse inside Pakistan also complicates matters from the other side.
Hyper-emotional anti-American rhetoric and irresponsible commentary regarding Gulf states create unnecessary difficulties for Pakistani leaders conducting an exceptionally delicate balancing act involving Iran, the United States, Saudi Arabia, China and others simultaneously.
Diplomacy requires discipline, and Pakistan’s leadership, despite immense pressure, largely demonstrates that discipline throughout this crisis.
The broader lesson for the UAE is becoming unavoidable. The future security of the Emirates lies in restoring Gulf cohesion, not deepening dependence upon extra-regional players whose own interests revolve around perpetual instability. Saudi Arabia’s post-war thinking reportedly increasingly favours some form of Gulf Cooperation Council–Iran non-aggression framework. That may ultimately prove the only realistic pathway towards sustainable Gulf stability.
It would also suit the UAE far better than permanent entanglement in Israeli regional ambitions or exaggerated expectations from India. Geography eventually humbles everybody. The Gulf cannot be replaced, and no amount of Abraham Accords enthusiasm, Israeli military coordination or Bollywood diplomacy can permanently alter that reality.